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A B S T R A C T
The principal purpose of this study is to account for 
changes in the amount of economic aid which the United States has 
provided to less developed countries. Economic aid is defined 
broadly to cover direct transfers of resources (money, credits, 
commodities or services) from the government of the donor nation 
to the economic sector of the recipient nation. Concessional 
economic aid refers to grants and credits on terms markedly more 
liberal than those applying in private commercial markets.
The first chapter of the dissertation notes that the United 
States provided very little economic aid to less developed countries 
prior to the New Deal. The American Government sought many of those 
objectives which later gave rise to the transfer of aid, but it used 
other instruments (including gunboat diplomacy, the institution of 
customs receiverships, and measures to deny or facilitate private 
loans) to achieve its objectives. U.S. relations with Central 
American countries in the first part of the century illustrate the 
use of these techniques.
The second chapter covers the emergence of significant 
programmes of economic aid for less developed countries over 1933- 
47. It includes detailed case studies on the growth of Eximbank 
lending and technical assistance in Latin America, and the provision 
of aid to North Africa, Saudi Arabia and China. The chapter argues 
that a number of factors explain increased resort to economic aid 
over this period, including the presence of strong foreign policy 
and defence motives for providing assistance, increased interest
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in developing new outlets and markets for American products, 
changed attitudes concerning the effectiveness of aid as a 
foreign policy instrument, diminished use of alternative methods 
(of the type discussed in Chapter One) for influencing events in 
less developed countries, improved relations between the United 
States and some recipient nations, the increased capacity of the 
United States to provide aid, a humanitarian response to widespread 
destruction brought about by the Second World War, and a relatively 
favourable domestic political climate for the transfer of aid.
Chapters Three and Four deal with the expansion of con­
cessional economic aid to less developed countries between 1948 and 
1966. The third chapter suggests that the expansion of general 
programmes of capital and technical assistance over this interval 
resulted from increased concern with ’communist' influence in less 
developed countries, the growth of doctrines which were optimistic 
in their assessment of the way in which large scale capital aid 
could promote development, increased requirements in a number of 
less developed countries, improved relations between the United 
States and some important recipients, a more pessimistic judgment 
of alternatives to economic aid, and an increase in the capacity 
of the American Government to provide aid as less funds were 
required in Europe and revenue from other sources expanded.
Chapter Four considers the special case of PL480 and 
associated programmes. It takes issue with the view that the intro­
duction of PL480 can be understood simply in terms of the emergence 
of large agricultural surpluses in the United States. While this 
was the immediate cause, resort to economic aid to deal with the
(v)
problem of surpluses was facilitated by the increased reliance of 
less developed countries on imports of wheat and other relevant 
commodities, and by the existence of a climate in which the provision 
of large quantities of concessional aid was considered more accept­
able than it would have been fifteen years previously. Subsequent 
expansion of commodity aid to LDCs is attributed to diminished 
willingness to transfer surpluses to Europe and Japan, a positive 
interest in providing additional economic aid to less developed 
countries, expanded requirements for food imports in these nations, 
and improved relations between the United States and other producer 
countries.
The fifth chapter shows that there was a decline in the 
amount of U.S. concessional economic aid to less countries over 
1966-73. This is explained in terms of reduced emphasis on some 
of the 'Cold War' objectives previously important in justifying the 
transfer of aid, a marked reduction in the level of U.S. agricul­
tural surpluses, greater scepticism concerning the effectiveness 
of aid as an instrument of policy, the increasing severity of the 
American balance of payments problem, deteriorating relations between 
the United States and some important recipients (including India 
and Egypt), the manner in which concessional economic aid became 
linked with unpopular issues (such as American involvement in Indo­
china) , the ability of a number of less developed countries to 
expand their foreign exchange earnings rapidly by other means, and 
increased concern with domestic problems in the United States.
The concluding chapter states the principal findings of 
the dissertation concerning the emergence, growth and decline of
(vi)
American economic aid to less developed countries, 
attempts some general statements about the factors 
influenced the amount of economic aid transferred.
It also 
which have
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1.
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is concerned with changes in the amount of 
economic aid which the United States has provided to less developed 
countries. More precisely, an attempt is made to account for three 
major changes in the quantity of aid transferred to LDCs. The first 
section attempts to explain the gradual emergence of significant pro­
grammes of economic aid for less developed countries over the period 
1933-47. The second part of the dissertation seeks to explain the 
expansion of concessional economic aid to LDCs over the period 1948- 
1966, while the third section takes up the question of why there was 
a substantial decline in the amount of concessional economic aid 
provided to LDCs between 1966 and 1973.
I
Accounting for changes in the amount of American economic 
aid transferred to less developed countries is important for three 
reasons. First, the provision of economic aid to LDCs by the United 
States involves a significant transfer of resources: concessional
aid commitments amounted to more than four billion dollars during 
1966.^ Explanation of major changes in the amount of aid is there­
fore of value in its own right for those interested in economic 
aspects of international relations.
Second, the amount of concessional economic aid ('official 
development assistance') provided by developed countries to less 
developed areas is itself an issue in international politics. LDCs
2 .
have repeatedly raised the question of the volume of aid provided by 
rich countries during the course of sessions of the U.N. General 
Assembly, meetings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), and in other international forums. These states 
have also used the General Assembly and UNCTAD to define minimum tar­
gets for economic aid for less developed areas. In launching the 
First Development Decade, the General Assembly resolved that developed 
countries should provide at least 1% of their national income as aid 
(broadly defined to include private capital flows). Current targets
stipulate, in addition, that 0.7% of national income should be pro-
2vided in the form of 'official development assistance*.
The performance of individual countries as far as the level 
and quality of aid is concerned is monitored by the UNCTAD Secretariat 
on behalf of the less developed countries. The performance of many 
donors, including the United States, is also scrutinised by the Devel­
opment Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooper-
3ation and Development. Member nations provide detailed reports on 
their aid programmes to this organisation, and the reports are then 
subjected to criticism by other members. The Chairman and staff 
members of the Development Assistance Committee have periodically 
issued reports on the aid performance of its member nations. Other 
organisations, including the World Bank and non-governmental agencies, 
have also taken an interest in the level of economic aid provided by 
rich countries to less developed areas. It was the World Bank which 
established the Pearson Commission to inquire into aid and the perform­
ance of developing countries when the level of concessional aid showed
4signs of stagnation and decline in the second half of the 1960s.
The amount of concessional aid provided by the United States
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has assumed particular importance since it is an important determin­
ant of the total flow of concessional aid to less developed countries. 
Even by 1973, after a long interval during which its contributions 
had declined relative to those of many other donors, the United States 
provided almost one third of the concessional economic aid trans­
ferred to 'developing countries' and multilateral agencies: in 1963,
the United States provided almost two thirds of the total. (Table 1). 
Any fluctuations in such a substantial share of aid have an immediate 
and significant impact on the total flow. Further, the willingness 
of American policy makers to provide aid may affect the amounts trans­
ferred by other countries. Thus, where aid is to be provided through 
multilateral channels such as the International Development Associa­
tion, contributions from individual countries must first be negotiated. 
The amount which key donors such as the United States are prepared 
to support at this stage may have a significant impact on the contri­
butions made by other states.
A third justification for this thesis is that the amount of 
economic aid received by less developed countries has a significant 
impact on their rate of economic growth. There are a number of ways 
in which aid has been held to accelerate economic growth in less 
developed countries. According to the foreign exchange constraint 
model, growth rates in LDCs are frequently limited by the problem of 
financing an adequate volume of imports. Aid makes it possible for 
the recipient to obtain the imports required for a rapid rate of 
growth. Some writers who accept this view argue that there is a mini­
mum rate at which imports must grow in order to sustain a given rate 
of economic growth. In Chenery's view:
In periods of normal development,
imports increase somewhat more rapidly
4.
TABLE 1.
Net Official Development Assistance from 
DAC Countries to Developing Countries and 
Multilateral Agencies, 1963, 1968, 1973:
Share Provided by the United States. 
(millions of U.S. dollars)
1963 1968
Official Development
Assistance from the U.S. 3566.6 3242.3
Official Development 
Assistance from
DAC Countries 5772.4 6320.1
Share provided by the
United States 62% 51%
Source: From data in Development Cooperation:
1974 Review: Efforts and Policies of 
the Development Assistance Committee:
O.E.C.D., 1974, p .201.
1973
2968.0
9408.0 
32%
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th a n  GNP i n  m ost c o u n t r i e s  b e c a u s e  
th e  income e l a s t i c i t y  o f  demand f o r  
in v e s tm e n t  and o t h e r  im p o r te d  m a n u fa c tu re d  
goods i s  h ig h e r  th an  th e  a v e ra g e  f o r  
d o m e s t ic  p r o d u c t s .  A lthough  t h i s  Import 
demand can  be t e m p o r a r i l y  l i m i t e d  by 
im p o r t  s u b s t i t u t i o n  and demand r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  
p a s t  e x p e r i e n c e  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  i n  t h e  lo n g  
ru n  a minimum r a t i o  o f  im p o r t  g row th  to  
GNP o f  1 .0  t o  1 .2  i s  r e q u i r e d  f o r  s u s t a i n e d  
d e v e lo p m e n t . ^
I f  t h i s  r a t i o  i s  u s e d ,  and e s t i m a t e s  a r e  made o f  t h e  f o r e i g n  exchange  
a v a i l a b l e  th ro u g h  e x p o r t s ,  b o r ro w in g  on p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l  m a r k e ts  and 
f rom  o t h e r  s o u r c e s ,  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  to  compute t h e  amount o f  a i d  r e ­
q u i r e d  to  s u s t a i n  a  g iv e n  r a t e  o f  econom ic g row th  f o r  p a r t i c u l a r  
c o u n t r i e s ,  o r  f o r  l e s s  d e v e lo p e d  c o u n t r i e s  a s  a g ro u p .
A n o th e r  a rg u m en t  ( t h e  s a v in g s  c o n s t r a i n t  m odel)  h o ld s  t h a t  
econom ic  g row th  i n  LDCs i s  f r e q u e n t l y  l i m i t e d  by i n s u f f i c i e n t  s a v in g s :  
a i d  i s  h e l d  to  p rom ote  g row th  by l i f t i n g  t h e  l e v e l  o f  in v e s tm e n t  above 
t h a t  w hich  c o u ld  be f i n a n c e d  by s a v in g s  from  d o m e s t ic  and o t h e r  
f o r e i g n  s o u r c e s . ^  A f u r t h e r  v iew  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  a i d  can  p rom o te  g row th  
by ove rcom ing  s h o r t a g e s  o f  s k i l l e d  p e r s o n n e l  i n  c r u c i a l  a r e a s .  A g a in ,  
t h o s e  a d m i n i s t e r i n g  a i d  h av e  o f t e n  a rg u e d  t h a t  i t  can  be  u se d  to  i n ­
f l u e n c e  t h e  p o l i c i e s  o f  r e c i p i e n t  g o ve rnm en ts  i n  ways l i k e l y  to  a c c e l -
g
e r a t e  econom ic  g ro w th .  F i n a l l y ,  a i d  i s  som etim es  h e l d  to  p rom ote  
g row th  by c h a n g in g  g e n e r a l  a t t i t u d e s ,  i n t r o d u c i n g  new p r a c t i c e s  and 
g e n e r a t i n g  a more ’m odern ' o u t lo o k  on th e  p a r t  o f  t h e  r e c i p i e n t  
p o p u l a t i o n .
I n  t h i s  w r i t e r ’ s  v ie w ,  th e  p r i n c i p a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  a  h ig h  
l e v e l  o f  econom ic  a i d  t o  l e s s  d e v e lo p e d  c o u n t r i e s  i s  to  b e  found  i n  
i t s  r o l e  i n  overcom ing  f o r e i g n  exchange  s h o r t a g e s .  T h is  i s  n o t  to  sa y  
t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  d i r e c t  q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e tw e en  th e  r a t e  o f  
g row th  o f  GNP and e x p a n s io n  o f  im p o r t s  o f  t h e  k in d  s u g g e s t e d  by C henery : 
o n ly  t h a t  f o r e i g n  e x c h an g e  s h o r t a g e s  f r e q u e n t l y  l i m i t  econom ic  g row th
6 .
in  LDCs, and t h a t  in  h e lp in g  to  su p p le m e n t o t h e r  s o u rc e s  o f  f o r e ig n
e x c h a n g e , a id  o f t e n  makes a u s e f u l  c o n t r i b u t i o n  to  h ig h e r  grow th
r a t e s .  Nor i s  i t  s u g g e s te d  t h a t  th e  o th e r  a rg u m en ts  s k e tc h e d  above
a r e  u n im p o r ta n t .  Any th o ro u g h  d i s c u s s io n  o f  th e  im p a c t o f  a id  on
econom ic  g row th  w ould  r e q u i r e  a  d e t a i l e d  d i s c u s s io n  o f  th e s e  a rg u m en ts
q
and th e  v a r io u s  o b j e c t io n s  to  them : h e r e ,  h o w ev er, d i s c u s s io n  w i l l
be  l i m i t e d  to  a  b r i e f  re v ie w  o f  th e  ex ch an g e  c o n s t r a i n t  m odel.
T here  a r e  s e v e r a l  o b j e c t io n s  to  th e  n o t io n  t h a t  a id  may make 
a u s e f u l  c o n t r i b u t i o n  to  h ig h e r  g row th  r a t e s  in  LDCs by overcom ing  
f o r e ig n  ex c h an g e  s h o r t a g e s .  I t  can  be a rg u e d  t h a t  a i d  i n c r e a s e s  th e  
f o r e ig n  ex ch an g e  p ro b le m s o f  LDCs in  th e  lo n g  ru n  by  b u i ld i n g  up 
in d e b te d n e s s ." ^  And in d e e d ,  i t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  much a id  i s  p ro v id e d  in  
th e  form  o f  l o a n s ,  and  t h a t  paym ents o f  i n t e r e s t  and p r i n c i p a l  u l t i ­
m a te ly  a b s o rb  a s i g n i f i c a n t  am ount o f  f o r e ig n  ex c h an g e  i f  b o rro w in g  
i s  c o n tin u e d  f o r  some t im e . H ow ever, t h e r e  a r e  two c o n s id e r a t io n s  
w hich  w eaken th e  f o r c e  o f  t h i s  o b j e c t i o n .  In  th e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  LDCs 
w hich  a r e  u n a b le  to  o b ta in  c o n c e s s io n a l  a id  hav e  f r e q u e n t l y  so u g h t 
to  f in a n c e  th e  im p o r ts  th e y  r e q u i r e  by r e c o u r s e  to  f in a n c e  on much 
more o n e ro u s  te rm s . W hether th e s e  s o u rc e s  a r e  fu n d s  from  p r i v a t e  
c a p i t a l  m a r k e ts ,  o r  lo a n s  o f  th e  k in d  p ro v id e d  by governm en t e x p o r t  
p ro m o tio n  a g e n c ie s ,  th e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  a r e  h ig h e r  and m a t u r i t i e s  
s h o r t e r  th a n  th o se  a p p ly in g  to  fu n d s a v a i l a b l e  th ro u g h  program m es o f 
c o n c e s s io n a l  econom ic  a i d .  The n e t  r e s u l t  h a s  o f t e n  b e e n  t h a t  i n d e b t ­
e d n e ss  h a s  b u i l t  up m ore r a p i d l y  in  th e  a b se n c e  o f  c o n c e s s io n a l  econo ­
m ic a id  th a n  when i t  i s  a v a i l a b l e  i n  s u b s t a n t i a l  a m o u n t s .^  One 
f u n c t io n  o f  c o n c e s s io n a l  a id  i n  some c a s e s  h a s  b e e n  to  e n a b le  r e c i p ­
i e n t s  to  overcom e p ro b le m s o f  in d e b te d n e s s  a r i s i n g  from  e x c e s s iv e  r e ­
c o u rs e  to  lo a n s  on o n e ro u s  te rm s  from  th e  s o u rc e s  m e n tio n e d . Thus one
7.
function of early loans under the Alliance for Progress was to refin­
ance debts built up by Latin American countries in the preceding
12period by recourse to loans on onerous terms. The other point is
that borrowing is frequently justified if there is a reasonable pro­
spect that the funds will be used productively. If the loans direct­
ly or indirectly generate a substantial expansion of exports or sub­
stitute for imports, then earnings or savings in foreign exchange may 
well exceed the amount to be repaid.
A different objection to the exchange constraint model proceeds 
by arguing that foreign exchange shortages promote economic growth 
in the long run by forcing the country concerned into more self reli­
ant and viable forms of economic development. Galtung and Jenkins 
tend to adopt this position, arguing that boycotts and economic sanct­
ions are among the most effective techniques in generating viable
13forms of economic development. This argument is at least partly
valid. Foreign exchange shortages during the Great Depression and
difficulties in obtaining imports during the Second World War made
an important contribution to industrialisation in Latin America, for
it was posssible for domestic firms to move into the production of
14commodities formerly supplied from abroad. To cite a further ex­
ample, a sharp decline in export earnings after 1952 and consequent 
foreign exchange shortages contributed to rapid industrialisation in 
Pakistan^: it is at least arguable that this was of benefit to its
long run prospects for economic growth. Nevertheless, prolonged con­
straints on imports are likely to lead to inefficiencies in the 
country concerned and to lower rates of growth than would otherwise 
have been obtainable.
A further objection may concede that aid contributes to
8.
economic growth in the ways described, but holds that the kind of 
growth occurring in many LDCs is highly inequitable and may well be 
unviable in the long run. The barrier to a satisfactory form of eco­
nomic growth - one in which the benefits are distributed to a broad 
section of the population, and which is capable of sustaining itself 
over a long period - lies, in this view, in the basic economic, poli­
tical and social structure of most less developed countries. Provid­
ing aid to deal with foreign exchange shortages, modify particular 
government policies, raise the level of investment, or overcome short­
ages of skilled personnel, fails to tackle the root of the problem.
More than this, it may strengthen the position of those classes and 
interests which seek to maintain the status quo, thereby helping to
prevent the kind of radical change which is required if real economic
16development is to occur.
The distribution of income in less developed countries outside 
the socialist system is indeed highly unequal. According to Ahluwalia, 
the average income share for the poorest 40% of the population in 
these countries amounts to approximately 12.5% (though there is a 
good deal of variation around this average). By contrast, the average 
income share of the bottom 40% amounts to about 16% in developed mark­
et economies and 25% for countries in the socialist system.^ However, 
it does not follow that measures to accelerate economic growth in 
the less developed capitalist countries should be abandoned for this 
reason. There appears to be little relationship between growth rates
and the degree of inequality at a given point of time, or the trend
18of income inequality over time. In some countries, high rates of
growth have been accompanied by a greater share of income for the low­
est 40%. In other instances, the share of income obtained by this
9.
section of the population has diminished, but income in absolute
terms has risen appreciably. According to Ahluwalia’s data, Mexico
and Brazil fall into this category, with the income of the lowest 40%
rising by about 6% per annum over the period reviewed even though
19their share of total income declined. This data is subject to sub­
stantial error and other observers have reached quite different con­
clusions. But there does appear to be little by way of solid empiri­
cal foundation for the doctrine that minority elite groups have been 
the only beneficiaries of economic growth in most less developed 
countries. Even where relative inequality has deteriorated, it is 
possible that future redistributive measures will spread more of the 
benefits of economic growth to a broader section of the population.
It is assumed here that continued economic growth is possible in less 
developed countries, and that it will not be arrested (though it may 
be slowed) by energy shortages, scarcities of basic raw materials, 
environmental considerations, shortages of foreign exchange or savings 
or other problems.^
There is much to be said for the view that radical changes 
in the economic, social and political structure of many LDCs would 
provide a basis for more rapid and more equitable economic growth 
than is at present possible. However, such changes are difficult to 
bring nhoul In practice. Analyst« of case« where radical change has 
occurred in the past - for example, China, Cuba and Indochina - sug­
gests that they are based on special circumstances and not upon factors
21general to less developed countries. This is not to say that 
socialist revolutions are impossible in other less developed countries. 
But the prospects are not as favourable as is sometimes assumed, and 
it is accordingly unreasonable to abandon more moderate measures on
10.
the premise that radical solutions will be successful. It is not 
clear that the provision of economic aid will, in normal circum­
stances, prevent the momentum for radical change gathering if the 
conditions for it exist. Indeed, there is a strong case for the
view that rapid economic growth, increased levels of literacy and
22the like contribute to political instability.
The above arguments provide some grounds for study of changes 
in the amount of American economic aid transferred to LDCs. However, 
in view of the substantial volume of published and unpublished mater­
ial on American economic aid, it could still be objected that further 
study in this area is difficult to justify, and that the existing 
literature provides answers to the questions considered here. There 
are several replies to this objection. First, there is no overall 
study of the emergence, growth and decline of American economic aid. 
The existing literature consists of studies which focus on particular 
programmes of aid, on limited periods, on aid to particular regions 
or countries, or on recommendations or criticisms pertaining to aid 
policy. The task of bringing the substantial volume of material to­
gether in one history of American aid is itself a major one, and would 
alone justify this study. Moreover, there are gaps in the existing 
literature. The decline of aid, for example, has been reviewed brief­
ly in some general works on aid and has been discussed in some 
23articles, but the causes of its decline have not been investigated 
in detail as far as this writer is aware. Again, the question, taken 
up in the first chapter of this dissertation, as to why policy makers 
employed alternative instruments in preference to economic aid in the 
first third of this century, has not been discussed at any length. 
Finally, even where this dissertation tackles questions which have
11.
been examined elsewhere, it has been possible to deal with the subject 
in a substantially different form from that in existing works. Thus, 
the emergence and expansion of the PL480 programme has been discussed 
in a number of works, but as Chapter Four indicates, the received 
explanations are far from adequate. In other instances, examination 
of the existing literature reveals significant disagreement as to the 
causes of changes in aid levels: this dissertation attempts to
critically examine the arguments and evidence favouring the different 
explanations.
II
Having provided some justification for a study of the kind
outlined, the problem of defining terms such as 'economic assistance',
'concessional economic aid', 'level of economic aid', and 'less
developed countries' can be tackled. It is generally agreed that the
'economic assistance' provided by a country covers certain transfers
of resources (money, credits, commodities or services) from that
nation to those outside it. There is, however, a lack of consensus
24as to which transfers should be excluded. Resources may be provid­
ed as a result of action by a variety of sources including central 
government institutions, private enterprise, trade unions and philan­
thropic organisations. Different writers are in disagreement over
25the question of which of these are to be counted as aid. If, as
is the case in this dissertation, attention is restricted to resources
provided as a result of central government policies, a second question
arises: namely whether indirect as well as direct transfers should
26be included. Direct transfers are made where the funds, services
12.
or commodities are provided from the stocks or account of the govern­
ment agency concerned. Indirect flows take place when the government 
pursues policies, such as special tariff concessions for products 
from less developed countries, which increase the quantity of resources 
transferred from other sections of society. A number of government 
decisions, including those which affect the overall level of economic 
activity or the rate of company taxation may add to the indirect flow 
of resources. In this dissertation, only direct transfers are includ­
ed as aid. This is understood to include cases where the government 
provides funds to organisations such as the World Bank or United 
Nations Development Programme for subsequent use in connection with 
other countries.
A further area of disagreement arises from the problem of
distinguishing aid from normal commercial transactions. Thus writers
differ on the question of whether loans made on onerous terms, such
as those provided by the United States Export-Import Bank, should be
27counted as assistance. Even if a country receives a grant, it may
incur certain obligations to the 'donor’ such as the provision of 
military base facilities, and it could be argued that the funds provid­
ed should not be included as aid. One procedure for making the dis­
tinction required is to judge the transaction against rates prevailing 
In the commercial marker, and to Haaalfv It an aid It the reel pleat 
would have obtained worse terms, or the donor better ones, by dealing 
with private commercial institutions. However, this rule is not 
entirely satisfactory since: (1) rates in the private market are
influenced by the fact that governments provide loans and grants.
Thus the interest rate on overseas loans from commercial institutions 
would presumably be higher if some of the demand for such loans were
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not catered for by government action. Hence, under this criterion, 
government loans provided at current commercial rates might become 
aid if less of them were made available. (2) the services which 
the recipient is required to perform may, as in the case of the pro­
vision of military base facilities, be impossible to value by the 
standards of commercial markets. In practice, it is difficult to 
formulate any simple but adequate rule for making a sharp distinction 
between aid and normal commercial transactions: while many cases
fall clearly into one category or the other, there remains an area 
of ambiguity. In this dissertation, economic assistance is defined 
broadly, and is understood to include Eximbank loans and other credits 
made on relatively onerous terms. However, concessional economic aid 
is defined more narrowly, and covers only grants and credits provided 
on terms markedly more liberal than those applying in private commer­
cial markets. Eximbank loans are not included in concessional 
economic aid.
Finally, there is the question of which transfers can be 
labelled economic assistance as distinct from, say, military aid.
There are several ways in which such a distinction may be made. The 
procedure followed here is to classify aid on the basis of the purpose 
for which resources are ostensibly allocated in the recipient. Where 
they are used for the expansion of investment, the improvement of 
educational institutions, support for the government’s general budget 
or similar purposes,the transfer will be included as economic aid.
Only where they are employed directly to alter the size or technical 
efficiency of the armed forces will they be classified as military 
aid. Of course, to promote many of the aims referred to above as 
’economic' would also serve to enhance the capability of military
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forces. Thus the expansion of industrial capacity might significant­
ly enhance the capability of the country to wage war; Improving 
communications might, apart from promoting commerce, assist the mili­
tary in counterinsurgency operations; and contributing to general 
prosperity might well enhance troop morale. Similarly, increasing 
the efficiency of the armed forces might well have a favourable eco­
nomic impact in the short term by, for example, promoting business 
confidence. Despite these points, this dissertation will distinguish 
between military and economic assistance by the method outlined above.
As noted, there are other ways of separating military from 
economic aid: these do not yield the same results as the one adopted
here. Thus the basis for classifying the two types of assistance 
may be:
(1) the actual impact of the aid. This will be different from
the use to which the resources are directly allocated if the recipient
28would have undertaken the project even in the absence of aid. It 
has often been argued that the provision of agricultural commodity 
assistance to Sukarno’s Indonesia merely enabled the government to 
divert foreign exchange which would have been used to buy food toward
other ends, notably the purchase of additional quantities of arms.
*
(2) the reasons for which policy makers in the donor country pro­
vided the aid. Again, this may give different results from the pre­
ceding two criteria: moreover, there are cases which cannot readily
be classified as either military or economic aid, as when funds are 
provided to influence the recipient's foreign policy.
(3) the agency administering the assistance. According to 
this criterion, civilian relief programmes administered by the U.S. 
Army during and after World War Two would be classed as military aid,
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whereas they are here counted as economic assistance.
(4) the type of resource transferred. Under this rule, military 
aid would consist of shipments of arms and the transfer of military 
advisers. Using the definition adopted in this dissertation, mili­
tary assistance might also include items such as machinery for army 
work shops, vehicles and the like.
Having indicated what transfers of resources will be consid­
ered as economic assistance and concessional economic aid, the pro­
blem of comparing the ’level’ of aid at different times can be 
discussed. It is extremely difficult to arrive at any simple measure 
of the amount of aid provided, and even more troublesome to compare 
levels at different times precisely. To begin with, there are problems 
which arise from the diversity of flows which go to make up aid.
Loans and grants can be added together to give a total, but the result­
ing figure is highly misleading. On the other hand, the procedure of 
reducing loans to a 'grant equivalent' is somewhat tedious. Where 
the assistance is provided in the form of commodities, it is possible 
to value them according to a number of different principles - their 
cost to the donor, the value they would realise if sold in commercial 
markets, the amount the recipient would have to pay to obtain goods 
of equivalent value, and so on. Still further difficulties arise 
where some of the assistance is tied to procurement in the donor, or 
where the recipient provides services or commodities in return which 
are difficult to value precisely. Even if these questions are re­
solved, there is the choice of measuring actual flows of resources 
or the obligations and commitments entered into to make them available. 
Trends in aid levels measured on the former basis typically lag some 
two years behind those calculated on the second principle. There is
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also a choice between measuring new transfers from the donor on the 
one hand, and new transfers net of repayments of principal and 
interest on past loans on the other. Further, one may measure the 
absolute level of assistance, or its value relative to some other 
indicator such as national income or gross national product. Finally, 
special problems, such as the need to make allowances for inflation, 
arise when aid levels are compared at different times.
This dissertation is concerned with the problem of explaining 
general trends in the level of aid rather than with that of measuring 
the amount of aid precisely. For the purpose of this study, it has
only been necessary to establish the general trend in aid levels 
over the period in question. In practice, Chapter Three, dealing with 
the growth of concessional economic aid (excluding that provided under 
PL480) over 1948-66; and Chapter Five, on the decline of concessional 
aid over 1966-73, are the only two points where the task of establish­
ing trends in aid levels requires detailed discussion, including refer­
ence to the type of problems mentioned in the preceding paragraph. 
Elsewhere changes in aid levels are reasonably clear. Chapter Two, 
dealing with the gradual emergence of programmes providing economic 
aid to countries now classed as less developed, does not provide aggre­
gate measures of the level of aid, for the change under discussion 
is quite clear without this. (There is, however, a description of 
the various programmes and of the type of aid which they provided.)
In Chapter Four, dealing with the emergence and expansion of PL480 
assistance, the trend is again quite clear on the basis of gross 
figures on the value of agricultural commodities supplied. The 
figures used represent the export market value of commodities esti­
mated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, but other measures,
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such as outlays made by the Commodity Credit Cprporation to 
obtain and ship the commodities, would yield similar conclusions 
concerning the trend in the amount of aid provided.
In Chapters Three and Five, the starting point for examining
movements in the volume of assistance is provided by data from the U.S.
Agency for International Development in U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants:
30Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945 - June 30, 1974.
The figures given represent gross commitments under those programmes 
considered by A.I.D. to constitute concessional economic aid or offi­
cial development assistance. Unfortunately, information on gross 
commitments for 1948-65 is only available for multiyear intervals, but 
this does not affect the study significantly. With this as a start­
ing point, allowance is then made for other factors which might alter 
the value of aid to the recipient, and which might accordingly alter 
the conclusions reached by studying the figures on gross commitments. 
First, allowance is made for the impact of price changes. Second, 
changes in the proportion of aid provided as loans, and in the financ- 
cial terms on which loans are made available are examined. A higher 
proportion of loans, or a significant hardening of terms reduces the 
value of aid to the recipient even if gross commitments remain the 
same. Third, various forms of tying are considered, since measures 
which increasingly tie aid to procurement in the donor country, or 
to projects in the recipient, reduce the value of aid to the recipient.
Alternative measures of the level of aid are sometimes used.
The Development Assistance Committee of O.E.C.D. provides information
on flows of official development assistance (or concessional economic
aid) to developing countries and multilateral agencies, and reference
31is occasionally made to this. These data differ considerably from
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t h e  f i g u r e s  p r o v id e d  by U .S . A . I .D .  i n  U.S.  O verseas Loans and  
G ra n ts . D evelopm ent A s s i s t a n c e  Committee f i g u r e s  r e f e r  to  d i s b u r s e ­
m ents o f  a id  r a t h e r  than  com m itm ents , and th e  d i s b u r s e m e n t s  a r e  n e t  
o f  r e p a y m e n ts  on p r e v i o u s  l o a n s .  As n o te d  b e lo w , th e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  
’ d e v e lo p in g  c o u n t r i e s '  d i f f e r s  from t h a t  em ployed h e r e  f o r  l e s s  
d e v e lo p e d  c o u n t r i e s .  A g a in ,  DAC d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  o f f i c i a l  deve lopm en t 
a s s i s t a n c e  do n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  c o in c i d e  w i th  th o s e  o f  t h e  U .S . Agency 
f o r  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  D evelopm en t.  F i n a l l y ,  DAC d a t a  r e f e r s  to  c a l e n d a r  
y e a r s ,  w h i l e  U .S . A . I .D .  f i g u r e s  a r e  b a s e d  on a i d  p r o v id e d  o v e r  th e  
f i s c a l  y e a r  ( e n d in g  Ju n e  3 0 ) .  D i f f e r e n c e s  o f  t h i s  k in d  a r e  n o t  o f  
m a jo r  im p o r ta n c e  f o r  t h i s  s tu d y  i n  p r a c t i c e ,  s i n c e  th e y  do n o t  m a te r ­
i a l l y  a l t e r  c o n c l u s i o n s  a b o u t  g e n e r a l  s h i f t s  i n  t h e  l e v e l  o f  a i d  o f  
t h e  k in d  u n d e r  d i s c u s s i o n .
The te rm  ' l e s s  d e v e lo p e d  c o u n t r i e s '  h e r e  r e f e r s  to  th o s e  
c o u n t r i e s  o f  A f r i c a ,  A s i a ,  O c e a n ia  and L a t i n  and C e n t r a l  A m erica  i n  
w h ich  m a jo r  s e c t i o n s  o f  th e  p o p u l a t i o n  have  lo n g  been  p o o r  i n  compar­
i s o n  w i th  c o n su m p t io n  p a t t e r n s  and l i v i n g  s t a n d a r d s  p r e v a i l i n g  i n  
th e  U n i te d  S t a t e s ,  A u s t r a l i a ,  t h e  U n i te d  Kingdom, th e  S o v i e t  U nion , 
and o t h e r  r i c h  n a t i o n s .  I n  p r a c t i c e ,  t h e  te rm  c o v e r s  a lm o s t  a l l  
c o u n t r i e s  i n  t h e  r e g i o n s  m e n t io n e d :  J a p a n ,  A u s t r a l i a  and New Z e a la n d
a r e  e x c lu d e d .  These  c o u n t r i e s  a r e  a l s o  r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  T h i rd  World 
c o u n t r i e s ,  d e v e lo p in g  c o u n t r i e s ,  u n d e rd e v e lo p e d  c o u n t r i e s ,  o r  s im p ly  
a s  LDCs. D u r in g  th e  p e r i o d  c o v e re d  by t h e  f i r s t  c h a p t e r  o f  t h i s  
d i s s e r t a t i o n  -  t h a t  p r i o r  to  th e  New D ea l  -  t h e y  would  n o r m a l ly  have  
been  te rm ed  'b a c k w a rd  c o u n t r i e s ' ,  b u t  b e c a u s e  o f  i t s  p e j o r a t i v e  
i m p l i c a t i o n s ,  t h i s  e x p r e s s i o n  i s  n o t  u se d  h e r e .  G rouping  c o u n t r i e s  
t o g e t h e r  a s  l e s s  d e v e lo p e d  does  n o t ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  im p ly  t h a t  th e y  a r e  
s i m i l a r  i n  o t h e r  r e s p e c t s .  I n  te rm s  o f  p e r  c a p i t a  incom e, l i t e r a c y
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level, degree of urbanisation, political alignment and other criteria, 
the countries vary widely.
In some tables in the dissertation, totals for less developed 
countries include amounts provided to some other countries. Where 
information from the Development Assistance Committee is employed, 
the totals refer to aid provided to ’developing countries and multi­
lateral agencies’: developing countries, as defined by DAC, include
relatively poor countries in Southern Europe such as Spain, Greece 
and Cyprus. This does not materially affect conclusions about general 
trends in the level of aid.
Explanation proceeds in this dissertation by examining a 
number of possible causes of the change in aid levels under discussion. 
An attempt has been made to identify both proximate and underlying 
causes. The dissertation does not employ any of the various analy­
tic frameworks which other writers have used for the study of foreign 
policy. One such framework, developed by Rosenau, classifies the
factors shaping foreign policy under five headings: namely systemic,
32societal, governmental, role and idiosyncratic variables. Models 
of this kind are useful in suggesting the determinants of foreign 
policy, but it has not been found fruitful in practice to employ 
them in the present study.
This is not to say that possible causes have been selected 
for investigation in an unsystematic fashion. In approaching the 
task of accounting for changes in aid levels, this writer has pro­
ceeded with a checklist of factors which include:
1. changes affecting the scope or importance of the various foreign 
policy and military objectives which have given rise to the transfer
20.
of economic aid. Such aims include those of promoting political 
stability, influencing the foreign policies of recipient governments, 
promoting a more favourable image of the United States in the eyes 
of foreign populations, contributing to the capacity of other govern­
ments to deal with external military threats, obtaining military bases 
in the recipient, and expanding the production of raw materials re­
quired for military purposes by the United States.
2. changes altering the importance or scope of the various economic
objectives which have contributed to the provision of aid. Such
objectives include the expansion of trade, disposing of surplus agri-
33cultural commodities, and similar objectives.
3. changes in the weight accorded to humanitarian justification 
for aid. Increased support for the view that aid should be provided 
to alleviate poverty in other countries as an end in its own right 
might well be expected to contribute to the growth of aid. Some 
writers have seen changes of this kind as the principal cause of the 
expansion of aid.
4. changes bearing upon the capacity of the United States to pro­
vide aid. Pressure on government revenue from other sources, the 
growth of government revenues and the American balance of payments 
position fall under this heading.
5. changes affecting relations between the United States and less
developed countries. Strained relations between the United States 
and other governments not infrequently leads to aid being reduced or 
completely cut off: accordingly, one might suppose that general
shifts of this kind, or changes in relations with large recipients, 
might well be a factor altering the amount of aid provided.
6. changes affecting the use of alternative instruments. Alter-
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native instruments cover a variety of actions which the United States 
might take to realise its objectives in place of economic aid. The 
nature of the alternatives depends on the objectives in question.
Where the objective is that of disposing of agricultural surpluses, 
an alternative to aid may be to enlarge domestic food relief pro­
grammes. Where the goal is that of influencing the policies of other 
governments, alternatives range from providing other benefits (for 
example military aid) to imposing sanctions or resorting to military 
intervention. If economic growth in the recipient is required 
(whether for foreign policy, economic or humanitarian reasons), alter­
natives to aid may include trade concessions, or efforts to enlarge 
the flow of private capital.
7. changes affecting policy makers’ assessments of the effective­
ness of aid in accelerating economic growth, influencing recipient 
governments and promoting political stability.
8. changes in the requirements of less developed countries for 
aid. ’Requirements' can be measured in a number of different ways, 
but the problems involved in the concept need not be discussed here.
It can be said that factors which contribute to balance of payments 
difficulties (such as export shortfalls, increased indebtedness, 
ambitious programmes of industrialisation requiring imports on a large 
scale, and declining flows of private capital), food shortages, in­
creasing demand for skilled personnel, and similar changes are among 
those which add to aid requirements. Greater requirements may lead 
donors to increase the amount of aid provided in some cases.
9. other changes affecting the political climate for economic 
aid. Aid may become linked with other political issues in a variety 
of ways. Thus economic assistance may be affected by issues involving
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military aid where funds for both are provided under the same legis­
lation. Aid may also become connected with general foreign policy 
issues, and with such questions as the proper scope of government 
intervention in the economy. These may well affect the amount of 
support for economic aid, and accordingly, the amount transferred.
The above list has served only as a guide to the kind of
factors which might be worth investigating as causes of changing aid
levels. It has not been employed in a rigid fashion in each chapter.
Even in this limited role, the above checklist might be questioned.
At first sight, it bears some of the marks of a rational actor model
of the kind which has been much criticised in recent studies of
34American foreign policy. The suggestion is made that shifts in
the level of aid may frequently be traced to changes in the importance
or scope of various objectives, or to an altered disposition on the
part of policy makers to chose aid as against other instruments.
35Those impressed by the bureaucratic politics model would doubtless 
wish to include, as key variables for investigation, the nature of 
the agencies administering aid and their relations. There is, however, 
room for the investigation of factors of this kind within the frame­
work sketched above. Despite the shorthand reference to government 
objections, it is not assumed that government is an entity comparable 
to a single actor. Changes in many of the variables sketched above 
could result from the altered influence of particular persons or 
agencies. Thus greater optimism concerning the impact of aid might 
result from the influx of persons convinced of the effectiveness of 
aid, or from the increased influence of existing agencies or policy 
makers who had long considered aid to be particularly useful.
23.
Ill
There remains the task of outlining the way in which the 
remainder of the dissertation is organised. Chapter One is concerned 
with explaining the use of alternatives to economic aid during the 
first third of this century. The United States aimed, in this period, 
to promote a number of the objectives which in subsequent periods 
have given rise to the transfer of economic aid. But prior to the 
New Deal, very little economic assistance was provided to countries 
now classed as less developed. An attempt is made to account for 
the lack of resort to economic aid.
Chapter Two is concerned with the gradual evolution of pro­
grammes providing economic aid to countries now classed as less 
developed. The chapter covers the period from 1933 to 1947. It 
begins by describing the various programmes which policy makers used 
to transfer aid to LDCs, and subsequently moves on to examine the 
underlying changes contributing to the emergence of economic aid on 
a significant scale over this interval.
In Chapters Three and Four, the expansion of concessional 
economic aid over the period 1948-66 is examined. Chapter Four deals 
with the particular case of the emergence and expansion of agricul­
tural commodity assistance under PL480 and related programmes.
Chapter Three is concerned with the remaining programmes of conces­
sional economic aid.
The fifth chapter of the dissertation begins by demonstrating 
that there was a decline in the amount of concessional economic aid 
provided by the United States to less developed countries over the 
period 1966-73. An attempt is then made to identify the causes of
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this decline. In the concluding chapter, the causes of the emergence, 
expansion and decline of American economic aid to less developed 
countries are summarized. An attempt is also made to make some 
general statements concerning the factors which have contributed to 
changes in the level of aid over the period reviewed.
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CHAPTER ONE
ALTERNATIVES TO ECONOMIC AID 
PRIOR TO THE NEW DEAL.
Subsequent chapters of this dissertation will show that the 
United States has provided economic aid to less developed countries 
for a variety of reasons since 1933. These include promoting politi­
cal and economic stability in the recipient, increasing American in­
fluence over the policies of recipient governments, disposing of 
'surplus' production, developing raw material supplies and promoting 
exports.
It is argued in this chapter that many of these same objectives 
were present (if in more limited form) prior to the New Deal. However, 
they did not, as a rule, give rise to significant quantities of eco­
nomic aid in this period. The chapter attempts to account for this 
failure to resort to economic aid.
The first part of the chapter undertakes the preliminary task 
of establishing that the United States provided relatively little
keconomic aid to less developed countries prior to 1933. Subsequent 
sections develop the argument mentioned above.
I
The United States provided capital and commodity aid to inde­
pendent less developed countries only rarely before the New Deal.
k The term 'less developed countries' was not in common usage 
in the period discussed in this chapter. Policy makers and 
others did use 'backward countries' to refer to broadly the 
same areas, but because of its pejorative implications, this 
term is not used here.
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Relief assistance, involving the transfer of fifty thousand dollars’ 
worth of provisions and tender, was provided at Venezuela in 1812 
following an earthquake. But this was, according to Merle Curti, 
the only instance in the nineteenth century where Congress appropri­
ated funds for the purchase of relief supplies (though measures for 
this purpose were unsuccessfully introduced in 1847 and 1892).^
The American government did provide money on several occasions
in connection with the transfer of facilities or territory to the
United States. Thus Colombia was to obtain a grant of ten million
dollars, as well as annual payments of a quarter of a million dollars,
under a treaty provisionally concluded with the United States in 1903
and entailing the transfer of the Panama Canal Zone. The Colombian
Congress was unwise enough to refuse to ratify the treaty, but the
Republic of Panama, formed by the secession of the relevant area
from Colombia, entered into an arrangement involving the payment of
identical considerations. Colombia itself received twenty five
million dollars compensation and certain rights with respect to the
Canal Zone under an agreement with the United States which was signed
in 1914 and ratified in 1922: in return, Colombia recognised the in-
2dependence of Panama. Again, Nicaragua obtained three million
dollars under a convention, ratified in 1916, whereby the proprietary
rights necessary for the construction of an interoceanic canal as well
as certain islands and a base site were granted or leased to the 
3United States.
A number of the above transactions - the acquisition of the 
Panama Canal Zone is a case in point - are more appropriately classi­
fied as government purchases than as aid. But in other cases it is 
doubtful whether American policy makers placed much value on the
31.
facilities which they obtained. In the case of Nicaragua, for 
example, it was not imprudent for the American Government to obtain 
the facilities and rights in question, but there is much evidence 
to suggest that policy makers were primarily interested in providng 
that country with money to demonstrate their continued support for
4the existing regime, and to tide it over its financial difficulties.
In instances of this type, the funds provided can reasonably be 
classed as aid.
Loans were made available by the United States on a large 
scale during and immediately after World War One. Acts of April and 
September 1917 appropriated $3000 million and $4000 million respect­
ively for the establishment of credits to foreign governments engaged 
in war with enemies of the United States, while in the post-war period 
the American Relief Administration and the United States Grain Cor­
poration made substantial loans. Cuba and Liberia were the only 
recipients among those countries now termed less developed, obtaining 
credits of $10 million and $26,000 respectively.^ The nature of the 
loan to Liberia is not clear. That to Cuba was partly to finance the 
purchase of coastal defence equipment, but one component of it was 
for railroad construction and therefore falls into the category of 
economic aid as defined here.^
The above instances aside, the United States Government pro­
vided little in the way of direct capital and commodity assistance 
to less developed countries before 1933. As Secretary of State Hughes 
explained, it was "not the policy of our Government to make loans 
to other governments, and the needed capital, if it is to be supplied 
at all, must be furnished by private organisations."^
Some American Government activities in the period under
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discussion qualify as technical assistance, though the scale of 
these operations was extremely small by comparison with that after 
World War Two. On a number of occasions, the United States facili­
tated the recruitment of skilled personnel by other governments, fre­
quently by lending or referring its own experts and administrators.
But as a rule the persons concerned were treated as employees of the 
foreign government after the transfer or during the period of loan, 
and they were usually paid (frequently at very high rates) from theg
same source. In cases where the project was of more direct interest 
to the United States, government funds were allocated in somewhat 
larger amounts. Thus Congress appropriated $65,000 for survey work
9associated with the construction of an inter-American railroad, and 
in 1923 made available $500,000 so that the American Government might 
investigate, in association with recipients, the possibility of devel­
oping rubber plantations in the Philippines and Latin America.^
The United States did take actions which had the effect of
increasing the flow of private capital to less developed countries.
It was the general policy of the United States Government to support
American investors in cases where foreign governments infringed their
freedom of entry or their property rights. In the case of Latin
America, this support frequently extended to military action or the
threat of it: not until the first years of the Franklin Roosevelt
Administration did the United States, under the Good Neighbour policy,
commit itself to a non-intervention treaty whereby it abandoned the
right to intervene directly to preserve property rights."^ Again,
the United States sought to facilitate the entry of American private
capital through its 'Open Door' policies in China and the Middle 
12East. Steps were also taken in some instances to seek or encourage
3 3 .
l o a n s  from  p r i v a t e  b a n k s  f o r  p a r t i c u l a r  p u r p o s e s .  And i n  some c a s e s ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  i n  th e  C a r ib b e a n  and C e n t r a l  A m erica ,  t h e  A m erican Govern­
ment assum ed d i r e c t  pow ers  o v e r  t h e  f i n a n c e s  o f  o t h e r  g o v e rn m e n ts ,  
and a r r a n g e d  p r i v a t e  l o a n s  on th e  s e c u r i t y  o f  t h e  r e c i p i e n t ’ s t a x  
r e c e i p t s  o r  o t h e r  a s s e t s . “^
These  p o l i c i e s  u n d o u b te d ly  i n c r e a s e d  th e  f lo w  o f  p r i v a t e
f o r e i g n  c a p i t a l  t o  l e s s  d e v e lo p e d  c o u n t r i e s .  M oreover ,  th e y  e n a b le d
g o v e rn m e n ts  and i n d i v i d u a l s  i n  some c o u n t r i e s  u n d e r  s t r o n g  Am erican
’p r o t e c t i o n ’ to  o b t a i n  l o a n s  on much e a s i e r  te rm s  th a n  would  o t h e r w i s e
have  b een  t h e  c a s e .  In  Cuba, w here t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  had  th e  power
to  i n t e r v e n e  to  p r o t e c t  p r o p e r t y  and to  v e to  governm ent b o r ro w in g
p r o p o s a l s ,  i t  was p o s s i b l e  f o r  t h e  governm ent t o  b o rro w  fu n d s  on
p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l  m a rk e ts  a t  r a t e s  w hich  w ere  a good d e a l  b e t t e r  t h a n
14t h o s e  o b t a i n a b l e  by F r a n c e .  N o n e t h e l e s s ,  t h e  above  p o l i c i e s  c a n ­
n o t  be c o u n te d  a s  a i d  u n d e r  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  g iv e n  p r e v i o u s l y ,  f o r  t h e  
A m erican  Government d id  n o t  i t s e l f  p r o v id e  fu n d s  i n  a s s o c i a t i o n  w i th  
p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l .
Nor do t h e  v a r i o u s  t a r i f f  a g re e m e n ts  w hich  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  
n e g o t i a t e d  w i th  i n d e p e n d e n t  l e s s  d e v e lo p e d  c o u n t r i e s  f a l l  w i t h i n  th e  
c a t e g o r y  o f  econom ic  a i d .  Under t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  a d o p te d  i n  th e  I n t r o ­
d u c t i o n ,  even  s p e c i a l  p r e f e r e n c e s  f o r  th e  p r o d u c t s  o f  l e s s  d e v e lo p e d  
c o u n t r i e s  ( o f  t h e  k in d  o p e r a t i n g  u n d e r  t h e  G e n e r a l i s e d  Scheme o f  P r e ­
f e r e n c e s )  a r e  n o t  c l a s s e d  a s  econom ic  a i d .  I n  any e v e n t ,  t h e r e  i s  
l i t t l e  e v id e n c e  o f  any c o n c e s s io n s  s i m i l a r  to  t h i s  i n  th e  p e r i o d  r e ­
v iew e d .  Under t a r i f f  l e g i s l a t i o n  o f  1890 and 1897 , t h e  A m erican  
Government e n t e r e d  i n t o  a  number o f  t a r i f f  a g re e m e n ts  w i th  LDC 
g o v e rn m e n ts ,  b u t  th e y  d id  n o t  i n v o lv e  a d d i t i o n a l  c o n c e s s i o n s  on th e  
p a r t  o f  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s .  R a t h e r ,  t h e  o t h e r  governm en ts  w ere  in d u c e d
to grant tariff reductions on American products as a way of avoiding 
additional duties on products, many of which had long entered the 
United States on the free list.“^  A number of other tariff treaties 
were negotiated outside the authority of the legislation referred to 
above, and three (with Cuba, Hawaii and Canada) were actually ratified. 
These were, however,reciprocal treaties in which the United States 
made some concessions in its own tariffs in return for reductions on 
duties imposed on American products.^ It is true that in each of
these cases American policy makers were probably more interested in 
the effect the treaties would have on promoting stability in the 
other country and cementing political relations with it than in the 
commercial benefits which were obtained."^ But they did not on this 
account set aside the objective of negotiating a treaty which was 
commercially advantageous to the United States and which granted a 
number of tariff concessions on imports from the United States.
American colonies seem not to have been the recipients of any 
substantial measure of economic aid in the period under discussion, 
unless the transfer of the necessary administrative personnel is 
included under this heading. Economic development programmes were 
indeed carried out, but these seem to have been financed from revenue 
generated in the colony. This was apparently the case in Cuba during 
the American occupations. In the Philippines, there were a number 
of unusually liberal procedures associated with American colonial 
administration, including early acceptance of the concept of trustee­
ship, the establishment of an elected assembly, and provision for
Philippino participation in the execution of government policy. But
18there seems to have been no programme of economic aid. In this 
respect, American policy was in conformity with that of Great Britain,
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which, minor exceptions aside, did not provide economic assistance
19to its colonies in the period under discussion.
To conclude: there were relatively few instances of economic
assistance from the United States to less developed countries in the 
period prior to the New Deal. Nor, with the exception of loans and 
supplies to Europe during World War One, was there much assistance, 
whether military or economic, to any area. In this respect, the United 
States did not depart from the practice of states in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, though subsidies, most typically given 
in relation to considerations of war or alliance, had played a signi­
ficant part in the Italian state system of the fifteenth century and
20in the European system of the eighteenth century. The United States
did facilitate loans and investment from private sources (though not 
normally in ways that fell within the category of aid as defined 
here): again, the practice of other great powers in the period under
discussion was similar.
II
This paper now turns to the question of explaining the rela­
tive absence of economic aid in the period under discussion. It is 
argued that the United States had, in this period, many of the object­
ives which later gave rise to the provision of economic assistance, 
but that the presence of a number of conditions resulted in the use 
of other techniques and instruments to realise these aims. Before 
going on to develop this argument, it is convenient to examine Ameri­
can Government objectives, and the instruments used to advance them, 
in two cases, commencing with the U.S. response to the Mexican
Revolution.
3 6 .
The r e v o l u t i o n  w hich  began  i n  Mexico i n  1910 was t h e  f i r s t
m ajo r  s o c i a l  u p h e a v a l  o f  t h e  t w e n t i e t h  c e n t u r y ,  p r e c e d in g  th e
B o ls h e v ik  R e v o lu t io n  by se v en  y e a r s .  Under t h e  r u l e  o f  D ia z ,
Mexico in  th e  l a t t e r  p a r t  o f  th e  n i n e t e e n t h  and  e a r l y  t w e n t i e t h
c e n t u r i e s  had d e v e lo p e d  a s  t h e  v e ry  model o f  an  i n e g a l i t a r i a n  and
n e o c o l o n i a l  s o c i e t y ,  w i t h  one p e r c e n t  o f  th e  p o p u l a t i o n  owning p e rh a p s
21
n i n e t y  p e r c e n t  o f  a l l  l a n d ,  and w i th  e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y  g e n e ro u s  c o n -
22c e s s i o n s  to  f o r e i g n  and  d o m e s t ic  p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e .  The r e v o l u t i o n
began  in  a  c o m p a r a t iv e ly  m ild  f a s h i o n  i n  r e s p o n s e  t o  th e  d e c i s i o n  o f
D ia z ,  who had  a l r e a d y  o c c u p ie d  th e  p r e s i d e n c y  f o r  t h i r t y - f o u r  y e a r s ,
to  s e e k  t o  f u r t h e r  e x te n d  h i s  te rm  o f  o f f i c e .  D iaz  was o u s t e d  i n
1911 a t  th e  han d s  o f  a  r e l a t i v e l y  m o d era te  g roup  l e d  by F r a n c i s c o
M adero, h i m s e l f  a  w e a l th y  la n d o w n e r .  W hile  M adero ' s  r e f o r m s  were
m i l d ,  th e y  p ro v e d  to o  sw eep in g  f o r  t h o s e  -  t h e  a r m y - o f f i c e r  c l a s s ,
la n d o w n e rs ,  d o m e s t ic  e n t r e p r e n e u r s  and f o r e i g n  i n t e r e s t s  -  i d e n t i f i e d
w i t h  t h e  o ld  o r d e r .  I n  1913 , Madero was o v e r th ro w n  and m urde red  i n
a r i g h t i s t  coup l e d  by V i c t o r i a n a  H u e r ta ,  g i v i n g  r i s e  to  a  p r o lo n g e d
p e r i o d  o f  c i v i l  w a r ,  f i r s t  be tw een  H u e r t a ' s  f a c t i o n  and t h e  o p p o s in g
2 3' C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s t '  f o r c e s ,  and  th e n  among th e  l a t t e r .
The U n i te d  S t a t e s  Government made many a t t e m p t s  t o  i n f l u e n c e  
t h e  c o u r s e  o f  th e  M exican R e v o l u t i o n ,  a  number o f  w hich  in v o lv e d  th e  
u se  o f  econom ic  i n s t r u m e n t s  n o t  f a l l i n g  i n t o  t h e  c a t e g o r y  o f  ' a i d '  a s  
d e f i n e d  h e r e .  In  t h e  f i r s t  c a se  t o  be c o n s i d e r e d ,  t h e  W ilson  Admini­
s t r a t i o n ,  a f t e r  an i n i t i a l  p e r i o d  o f  w i t h h o ld i n g  r e c o g n i t i o n ,  a c t i v e l y
s o u g h t  to  d i s p l a c e  t h e  H u e r ta  reg im e w i th  some more a c c e p t a b l e  a l t e r -  
24
n a t i v e .  I t  i s  n o t  c o m p le te ly  c l e a r  why t h i s  c o u r s e  o f  a c t i o n
was a d o p te d .  The S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  f o r  th e  o u tg o in g  T a f t  A dm in i-
s t r a t i o n  had seemed n o t  i n d i s p o s e d  to  g r a n t  r e c o g n i t i o n  to  H u e r t a , 25
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and some European countries, including the British Government, had 
granted it recognition by mid-1913. It seems that the Wilson Admini­
stration took the view that it was necessary to spell out, not only 
to Mexico, but to other countries in Central America and the Carib­
bean, that American recognition would, in future, depend on agreement
to observe what was considered by Washington to be 'sound’ and consti-
26tutional procedures in government. In addition, it developed the
impression that Huerta's regime was unduly sympathetic to British
financial interests, and that American prestige and influence would
suffer from belated recognition, though these were evidently not the
27dominant considerations.
Abandoning its initial policy of simply withholding recognition 
and waiting, the Wilson Administration, in August 1913, dispatched a 
representative, John Lind, who was to present to Huerta what the United 
States deemed to be a satisfactory solution - a cessation of fighting 
and an early election in which Huerta would not be a candidate. When 
these proposals were not accepted, Lind offered as an additional induce­
ment the promise that "the President will assure the American bankers
and their associates that the government of the United States will
2 8look with favour on an immediate loan". Huerta was indeed in some 
need of foreign loans: domestic taxation was not, given the circum­
stances of his government and its basis of support, an effective or 
expedient means of gaining revenue, and the failure of the United 
States to grant recognition had closed the American money market to 
his government. The European capital market, which had been opened
to him in May as a result of recognition by European countries, had
29proved disappointing. Nonetheless, the Lind proposals were re­
jected, and Huerta further consolidated his position in October by
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d i s b a n d i n g  h i s  Chamber o f  D e p u t ie s  and a r r e s t i n g  a number o f  i t s  
m e m b e r s . ^
The W ilso n  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  now d i r e c t e d  i t s  e f f o r t s  to  s e c u r i n g  
H u e r t a ’ s r e p l a c e m e n t  by o t h e r  m eans. S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  B ryan  n o te d  
i n  November t h a t
The p r e s e n t  p o l i c y  o f  t h e  Government o f  
t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  i s  to  i s o l a t e  G e n e ra l  
H u e r ta  e n t i r e l y ;  to  c u t  him o f f  from  
f o r e i g n  sym pathy and a i d  and from  d o m e s t ic  
c r e d i t ,  w h e th e r  m o ra l  o r  m a t e r i a l ,  and 
t o  f o r c e  him o u t  . . .  I f  G e n e ra l  H u e r ta  
d o e s  n o t  r e t i r e  by f o r c e  o f  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  
i t  w i l l  become th e  d u ty  o f  t h e  U n i te d  
S t a t e s  to  u se  l e s s  p e a c e f u l  means to  
p u t  h im  o u t .  31
To a c h ie v e  i t s  o b j e c t i v e  w i t h o u t  r e s o r t i n g  to  m a s s iv e  m i l i t a r y  i n t e r ­
v e n t i o n ,  t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  u t i l i s e d  a number o f  i n s t r u m e n t s .  F i r s t ,  
i t  s o u g h t  to  c u t  t h e  reg im e  o f f  from  s o u r c e s  o f  f o r e i g n  p r i v a t e  
l o a n s  and o t h e r  e x t e r n a l  s u p p o r t ,  and was s u c c e s s f u l  i n  h a v in g  Germany 
w i th d ra w  r e c o g n i t i o n  and E ng land  w i th d ra w  Am bassador C arden . S econd , 
by  l i f t i n g  th e  em bargo on arms s a l e s  to  M exico , i t  a l lo w e d  th e  r e v o ­
l u t i o n a r y  f o r c e s  to  a c q u i r e  s u b s t a n t i a l  q u a n t i t i e s  o f  arms from 
a c r o s s  t h e  b o r d e r .  T h i r d ,  i t  u n d e r to o k  a l i m i t e d  m i l i t a r y  o c c u p a t io n  
o f  V era  C ruz . T h i s  l a s t  was p a r t l y  i n  r e t a l i a t i o n  f o r  what was p e r ­
c e iv e d  to  be an ’a f f r o n t ’ to  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  by H u e r t a ’s  g o v e rn m en t ,  
b u t  i t  was a l s o  s e e n  by W ilson  and Bryan a s  a  means o f  a i d i n g  th e  i n ­
s u r g e n t  f o r c e s  ( th o u g h  i t s  a c t u a l  e f f e c t  was c l e a r l y  u n f a v o u r a b le  to  
them) . F i n a l l y ,  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  s o u g h t  th e  m e d ia t i o n  o f  A r g e n t i n a ,
B r a z i l  and C h i l e ,  though  i n  t h e  e v e n t ,  H u e r ta  f e l l  t o  t h e  a d v a n c in g
32C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s t  f o r c e s  b e f o r e  t h i s  was p u t  i n t o  e f f e c t .
W ith t h e  d e f e a t  o f  H u e r t a ' s  f o r c e s  by th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s t s  
u n d e r  th e  l e a d e r s h i p  o f  C a r r a n z a ,  t h e  W ilson  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  made a 
f u r t h e r  e f f o r t  to  i n f l u e n c e  th e  c o u r s e  o f  a c t i o n  t a k e n  by th e  M exican
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G overnm ent. W ilson  com m unicated to  th e  new governm ent h i s  c o n c e rn  
w i th  t h r e e  a r e a s  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  s t r e s s i n g  th e  need  f o r  r e s p e c t  f o r  
f o r e i g n  l i v e s  and p r o p e r t y  ( i n c l u d i n g  t h e  l e g i t i m a t e  f i n a n c i a l  o b l i ­
g a t i o n s  o f  H u e r t a ’ s r e g i m e ) ,  a g e n e ro u s  am nesty  f o r  o p p o n e n ts  o f  
C a r r a n z a ’ s f o r c e s ,  and  a t o l e r a n t  a t t i t u d e  to w a rd s  t h e  C a t h o l i c  Church 
and i t s  m i n i s t e r s .  C a r r a n z a ' s  r e p l y  on t h e s e  p o i n t s  was c o n s id e r e d  
u n s a t i s f a c t o r y ,  and S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  Bryan r e i t e r a t e d  them i n  a 
m essage  t o  t h e  M exican l e a d e r  w hich  n o te d  t h a t  t h e  f a i l u r e  to  f o l l o w  
U .S . a d v ic e
. . .  m ig h t  make i t  m o r a l ly  im p o s s ib l e  f o r  
us  to  r e c o g n i s e  a  new g o v e rn m e n t .  I f  we 
do n o t  r e c o g n i s e  i t ,  i t  c o u ld  o b t a i n  no 
l o a n s  and m ust s p e e d i l y  b r e a k  down. The 
e x i s t e n c e  o f  war i n  Europe would c l e a r l y  
make i t  im p o s s ib l e  to  o b t a i n  a s s i s t a n c e  
anyw here  on t h e  o t h e r  s i d e  o f  t h e  w a te r  
even  i f  su c h  e x c e s s e s  a s  we have  a l l u d e d  to  
d id  n o t  th e m s e lv e s  make i t  im p o s s ib l e  . . .  33
How ever, C a r r a n z a ' s  governm ent rem a in e d  opposed  to  A m erican  i n t e r ­
f e r e n c e ,  and t h e  W ilson  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  a g a in  a d o p te d  a s t a n c e  o f  w i t h ­
h o l d i n g  r e c o g n i t i o n ,  a p p a r e n t l y  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  t h o s e  d e f e c t i n g  from  
C a r r a n z a ' s  r a n k s  u n d e r  th e  l e a d e r s h i p  o f  V i l l a  would  be more a c c e p t ­
a b l e  to  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  and more r e c e p t i v e  to  i t s  demands. Mexico 
was a g a in  e m b r o i le d  i n  c i v i l  w a r ,  b u t  th e  outcome was to  c o n f i rm  
C a r ra n z a  i n  pow er: by m id -1 9 1 5 , V i l l a  had  been  f o r c e d  to  r e v e r t  to
g u e r r i l l a  w a r f a r e  i n  t h e  N o r th ,  and i n  O c to b e r  o f  t h e  same y e a r ,  t h e
34U n i te d  S t a t e s  g r a n t e d  de f a c t o  r e c o g n i t i o n  to  C a r r a n z a .
A f i n a l  c a se  w h ich  w i l l  be  c o n s id e r e d  h e r e  c o n c e rn s  th e  a t t e m p t  
by t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  t o  r e p a i r  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  Mexico in  1917 i n  o r d e r  
t o  f a c i l i t a t e  i t s  war e f f o r t  a g a i n s t  Germany. De f a c t o  r e c o g n i t i o n  
o f  C a r ra n z a  i n  O c to b e r  1915 had n o t  b r o u g h t  Mexico and th e  U n i te d  
S t a t e s  i n t o  a c o o p e r a t i v e  r e l a t i o n s h i p :  in d e e d  t h e y  had  d r i f t e d  c l o s e
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to  g e n e r a l  w ar a f t e r  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  had  u n d e r t a k e n  a p u n i t i v e  e x ­
p e d i t i o n  i n t o  M exican t e r r i t o r y  f o l l o w i n g  th e  e x e c u t i o n  o f  a  number
35o f  A m erican  c i t i z e n s  i n  one o f  V i l l a ' s  r a i d s .  I t  was im p o r ta n t
f o r  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  to  p rom o te  b e t t e r  r e l a t i o n s  w i th  Mexico f o r
s e v e r a l  r e a s o n s  -  Mexico was a s o u rc e  o f  raw m a t e r i a l s  n ee d ed  f o r  th e
36war e f f o r t ,  m ost n o t a b l y  p e t r o le u m  ; and any a c t i v e  h o s t i l i t y  on
i t s  p a r t  c o u ld  t i e  down A m erican  t r o o p s  a t  a  t im e  when th e y  were
r e q u i r e d  e l s e w h e r e .  M oreover ,  t h e r e  was a d a n g e r  t h a t  Mexico m igh t
c o o p e r a te  w i t h  Germany. A l th o u g h  C a r ra n z a  s i d e s t e p p e d  a p r o p o s a l  from
th e  German Government i n  J a n u a r y  1917 w hich  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  Germany
would h e lp  to  r e c o v e r  t e r r i t o r y  l o s t  to  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  i n  1848 i f
Mexico j o i n e d  i n  t h e  war a g a i n s t  t h e  A l l i e s ,  a  number o f  h i s  p u b l i c
37s t a t e m e n t s  i n d i c a t e d  sym pathy w i th  t h e  C e n t r a l  P ow ers .  The M exican 
Government r e s t r i c t e d  n e i t h e r  t h e  e f f o r t s  o f  Germans w i t h i n  Mexico to  
d i s t r i b u t e  a n t i - A m e r ic a n  p ro p a g a n d a ,  n o r  t h o s e  o f  t h e  German Ambas­
s a d o r  t o  o r g a n i s e  r e v o l u t i o n i s t s  i n  H o n d u ra s ,  N ic a ra g u a  and G uatem ala  
w i t h  t h e  h e l p  o f  s u p p l i e s  p r o v id e d  f rom  M exico . And i t  made a 
s t r o n g  e f f o r t  t o  p rom o te  th e  i d e a  o f  a  c o a l i t i o n  o f  n e u t r a l s  w hich  
would su sp e n d  c om m erc ia l  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  b e l l i g e r e n t s  i f  th e y  f a i l e d  
t o  a c h ie v e  p e a c e  by n e g o t i a t i o n ,  c a u s i n g  t h e  A m erican  S t a t e  D epar tm en t
to  u n d e r ta k e  i n t e n s e  d i p l o m a t i c  a c t i v i t y  i n  o r d e r  to  p r e v e n t  a number
38o f  L a t in  A m erican n a t i o n s  from j o i n i n g  i n .
The U n i te d  S t a t e s  made a number o f  c o n c e s s io n s  i n  i t s  e f f o r t s  
to  im prove r e l a t i o n s .  The p u n i t i v e  e x p e d i t i o n  was w ith d raw n  and 
C a r r a n z a ' s  Government r e c o g n i s e d  de j u r e  i n  t h e  e a r l y  p a r t  o f  1917 ,
w h i le  th e  War D ep a r tm en t  was u rg e d  t o  a v o id  f u r t h e r  b o r d e r  i n c i d e n t s .  
L ic e n c e s  w ere  i s s u e d  f o r  a  v a r i e t y  o f  e x p o r t s  t o  M ex ico , i n c l u d i n g  
some w hich  had  p r e v i o u s l y  b een  th e  s u b j e c t  o f  em bargo . Thus 2 .7
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m i l l i o n  ro u n d s  o f  am m unition  w hich  had p r e v i o u s l y  b e e n  p u rc h a s e d  by
40th e  M exican Government were f i n a l l y  f r e e d  f o r  d e l i v e r y .  F u r t h e r ,  
t h e  A m erican  G overnm ent, in  A ugust 1917, i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  i t  would n o t  
oppose  a l o a n  by U n i te d  S t a t e s  ban k s  f o r  th e  M exican G overnm ent, a n d ,  
when t h e  b a n k s  d id  n o t  move t o  t a k e  up t h e  q u e s t i o n ,  a c t e d  to  f a c i l i ­
t a t e  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  I n  a  com m unica t ion  to  W ilson  p r o p o s in g  t h a t  a 
c o n f e r e n c e  be h e l d  w i th  b a n k e r s  to  in d u c e  them to  open  d i s c u s s i o n s  
w i t h  t h e  M exican G overnm ent, t h e  S t a t e  D epa r tm en t  C o u n s e l l o r ,  P o lk ,  
a rg u e d  t h a t  t h i s  was n e c e s s a r y  to  d e m o n s t r a te  t h e  d e s i r e  o f  t h e  
U n i te d  S t a t e s  t o  a s s i s t  M exico , and t o  c o u n te r  German i n f l u e n c e  a r i s ­
i n g  from  p ro m is e s  t o  p r o v id e  f i n a n c i a l  a i d  when th e  w ar was o v e r .
I t  was a l s o  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  i t  would r e l i e v e  M ex ico ’ s im m ed ia te  re v e n u e
r e q u i r e m e n t s  and t h e r e b y  d i v e r t  a t t e n t i o n  from  t a x a t i o n  on o i l
41p r o d u c t i o n ,  w hich  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  o p p o se d .
The exam ples  c o n s id e r e d  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  A m erican  p o l i c y  m akers 
saw t h e  c a p a c i t y  to  f a c i l i t a t e  o r  deny l o a n s  from  p r i v a t e  b a n k s  as  
an i m p o r t a n t  means o f  e x e r c i s i n g  i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  t h e  p o l i c i e s  and p r o ­
c e d u r e s  o f  M exican g o v e rn m e n ts ,  and a s  one f a c t o r  a f f e c t i n g  t h e i r  
p r o s p e c t s  o f  s u r v i v a l .  I t  was n o t ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  t h e  o n ly  i n s t r u m e n t  
t h a t  th e y  em p lo y ed ,  o t h e r s  i n c l u d i n g  d i r e c t  m i l i t a r y  i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  
a l l o w i n g  o r  d e n y in g  arms s a l e s  to  c o n te n d in g  f a c t i o n s ,  d i p l o m a t i c  
a c t i v i t y ,  and  g r a n t i n g  o r  r e f u s i n g  e x p o r t  l i c e n c e s .
The se co n d  c a s e  s tu d y  exam ined  h e r e  c o n c e rn s  A m erican p o l i c y
to w a rd s  t h e  s m a l l e r  c o u n t r i e s  o f  C e n t r a l  A m erica  and  th e  C a r ib b e a n
42
d u r in g  t h e  T heodore  R o o s e v e l t ,  T a f t  and W ilson  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s .  
B r o a d ly ,  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  s o u g h t ,  o v e r  t h i s  p e r i o d ,  t o  a v o id  p o l i ­
t i c a l  i n s t a b i l i t y  in  th e  r e g i o n ,  e x c e p t  w h e re ,  a s  i n  N ic a ra g u a  in  
I ‘>09, (h e  e x i s t  l ug  reg im e came i n t o  s t r o n g  c o n f l i c t  w i th  A m erican
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i n t e r e s t s .  I t  a l s o  s o u g h t  to  a v o id  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t a b i l i t y  w hich  
m ig h t  l e a d  to  d e f a u l t  on l o a n  fu n d s  w hich  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  had  b o r ­
rowed on p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l  m a rk e ts  a b r o a d ,  o r  t o  overcom e t h i s  i f  i t  
had  a l r e a d y  o c c u r r e d .  A f u r t h e r  o b j e c t i v e  was t h a t  o f  e x e r c i s i n g  
i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  t h e  p o l i c i e s  o f  t h e  governm en ts  c o n c e rn e d  on m a t t e r s  
o f  i n t e r e s t  to  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s .
U n t i l  a b o u t  1917 , t h e  U .S . i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  and f i n a n ­
c i a l  s t a b i l i t y  o f  c o u n t r i e s  i n  t h e  a r e a  r e s u l t e d  i n  s u b s t a n t i a l  m eas­
u r e  from  t h e  n e e d  to  e n s u r e  t h a t  E uropean  pow ers d id  n o t  g a in  new 
f o o t h o l d s  t h e r e .  Under t h e  te rm s  o f  th e  Monro D o c t r i n e ,  t h e  U n i te d  
S t a t e s  had  lo n g  opposed  any E u ropean  a t t e m p t  to  g a in  c o l o n i e s  i n  th e  
A m e r ic a s ,  b u t  t h e  p r i o r i t y  o f  t h i s  g e n e r a l  a im  was g r e a t l y  i n c r e a s e d  
i n  t h e  C a r ib b e a n  and  C e n t r a l  A m erica  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  d e c i s i o n  to  
c o n s t r u c t  th e  Panama C ana l and  t h e  c o n s e q u e n t  need  to  s a f e g u a r d  i t s  
a p p r o a c h e s .  I t  was f e a r e d  t h a t  t h e  d a n g e r  to  f o r e i g n  p r o p e r t y ,  f i n a n ­
c i a l  c la im s  and l i v e s  a r i s i n g  from  p o l i t i c a l  and f i n a n c i a l  i n s t a b i l ­
i t y  m ig h t  become t h e  c a u se  o r  o c c a s i o n  f o r  i n t e r v e n t i o n  by E u ropean
43pow ers  l e a d i n g  t o  some fo rm  o f  p e rm a n en t  c o n t r o l .
Am erican Government a c t i o n s  i n  t h e  r e g i o n  w ere  a l s o  j u s t i f i e d  
by p o l i c y  m akers  on o t h e r  g r o u n d s ,  i n c l u d i n g  th e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  
s a f e g u a r d i n g  U. S .  i n v e s tm e n t s  i n  t h e  a r e a ,  t h e  t r a d i n g  a d v a n ta g e s  
w hich  would f o l l o w  from  p r o s p e r i t y  i n  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  c o n c e r n e d ,  and th e  
b e n e f i t s  i n  te rm s  o f  p r o s p e r i t y  and p e a c e  w hich  would  r e s u l t  f o r  t h e i r  
p e o p l e s .  These  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  a l s o  seem to  have  m o t iv a t e d  A m erican  
p o l i c y  i n  p a r t ,  a t  l e a s t  i n  some i n s t a n c e s .  A f t e r  W orld War One, t h e  
d a n g e r  o f  E u ropean  i n t e r v e n t i o n  was s l i g h t ,  b u t  p o l i c i e s  d e s ig n e d  to  
a v o id  p o l i t i c a l  an d  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t a b i l i t y  w ere  c o n t i n u e d  by th e  Repub­
l i c a n  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s  w h ich  s u c c e e d e d  W ilso n  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e s e
additional factors, and because of the responsibilities which had
44been acquired in the previous period.
To realise its objectives in the region, the United States 
made use of four principal instruments. First, on some occasions, 
as in Cuba between 1898 and 1902 and 1906-1909, and in the Dominican 
Republic from 1916 to 1922, the United States intervened to assume 
complete control of the government and administration of the country 
for a limited period. Second, it acquired by treaty or executive 
agreement certain powers over some governments in the region without, 
however, extending its control over all government activities. The 
most far reaching of these instances was perhaps the Platt Amendment 
which gave the United States the right to intervene in Cuba "for the 
preservation of Cuban independence, (and) the maintenance of a govern­
ment adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual 
liberty and, in addition, forbade Cuba to enter into arrange­
ments with foreign powers which might tend to impair the independence 
of the island, to provide military facilities to other powers, and to
contract public debts which could not reasonably be discharged from
45the revenues of the government. However, treaties with other 
countries gave the United States power to collect customs revenue 
(the principal form of taxation) and to veto government borrowing 
programmes.
Thirdly, the United States threatened or actually carried out
military intervention, without however, assuming complete control
over the territory in question. According to Bryce Wood, U.S. marines
or soldiers entered the territory of states in the Caribbean area no
46less than twenty times between 1898 and 1920, but there were a 
number of other occasions where the United States merely made its
44.
presence felt by the dispatch of a naval force. Fourthly, economic 
instruments were employed: in general, however, these do not qualify
as economic assistance under the definition given in this paper. One 
such instrument was the reciprocal trade treaty negotiated with Cuba, 
which granted concessions on the admission of Cuban sugar in return 
for reductions in tariffs on American manufactures. Despite the 
reciprocal nature of the treaty, American policy makers seemed to view 
it chiefly as a means of promoting Cuban prosperity, and thereby, in 
their view, its political stability. More frequently, the United 
States Government took steps to facilitate loans from banks within 
the United States, usually securing them on customs revenue collected 
by an official whose appointment required American approval.
Having made the above general points, particular instances of 
American policy under successive administrations can be briefly dis­
cussed, commencing with the policies adopted by the Theodore Roosevelt 
Administation in the Dominican Republic and Cuba. In the former 
country, internal disorder and excessive overseas borrowing had by 
1904 led the regime to bankruptcy, and created a danger of European 
governments intervening to collect claims owing to their nationals.
The United States responded by acting to establish a customs receiver­
ship over the Dominican Republic. Under the arrangement finally 
worked out and established by treaty in 1907, the Dominican Govern­
ment obtained a loan from New York banks which enabled it to pay off 
its considerable public debt. The American Government made this loan 
possible by assuming power over the collection of customs receipts, 
and obtaining a veto over any proposals the Dominican Government might 
make for the alteration of customs dues or the enlargement of its 
public debt. It was agreed that a proportion of the funds collected
45.
by American appointed officials would be turned over to the Dominican
47Government to meet its immediate budgetary needs.
The institution of a customs receivership in the Dominican 
Republic under U.S control was justified by American policy makers 
on a number of grounds. It was held that the receivership would pro­
mote the interests of the Dominican Republic themselves by contribut­
ing to peace and prosperity; that the scheme would benefit the South 
Atlantic and Gulf states of the United States which traded extensive­
ly with the island; that the United States was under a moral obli­
gation to collect debts that the Dominican Republic owed since it was 
unwilling to allow European countries to do so; and that, if the 
United States declined to take action, and left the resolution of
Dominican indebtedness to others, the latter would be entitled under
48Hague Court rulings to preferential payment on their claims. How­
ever, it is evident that the dominant consideration was the desire
49to avoid European intervention, which appeared imminent in 1904. 
Anglo-German attempts to collect claims owing to their nationals by 
blockading Venezuela in 1902-1903 evidently convinced American policy 
makers of the danger of intervention. In this case, as Calicott 
notes,
Germany with poor grace had submitted 
to the idea of arbitration just a little 
too late and had accepted the sponsorship 
of the United States just a bit too reluctant­
ly to offset the growing suspicion in 
Washington.
The view that the United States acted largely to protect its own 
investments is not plausible in this instance: before the danger
of European intervention became evident, the American Government had 
been reluctant to give strong support to the U.S. based Santo Domingo 
Improvement Company and other Americans with claims against the
46.
Dominican Government.
In Cuba, different methods were used by the United States, 
though the goals remained, in general, those of avoiding political in­
stability and financial disorder. During the period of American 
occupation, from 1898 to 1902, the United States sought to create 
conditions which would be conducive to future stability, introducing 
reforms designed to establish a ’sound* financial system, effective 
political and judicial arrangements, and a healthy, literate popula­
tion: these were, however, financed from revenues collected by the
colonial administration in Cuba, and not from funds allocated by the 
U.S. Government. Particular emphasis was placed on education, consi­
stent with Secretary Root’s belief that it was impossible that "any 
people, three fourths of whom are contented to remain unable to read 
and write, can for any long period maintain a free government".
One quarter of government expenditure during the occupation went 
towards education.^
On relinquishing the occupation, the American Government imple­
mented two further measures intended to promote stability, and pre­
serve U.S. influence. The first of these was the Platt amendment 
which gave the United States extensive powers to intervene in Cuba, 
and limited the powers of the Cuban Government in important areas.
The second was the reciprocal trade treaty, which provided for con­
cessions on tariffs applied to Cuban goods, most notably sugar, in
exchange for reductions on the duties levelled on a wide range of
53American products sold to Cuba. American policy makers argued
that the treaty was commercially advantageous, but evidently consi­
dered it more important for its impact on political stability and 
cooperative relations with the United States. Secretary Root noted
47.
that
aside from the ordinary considerations 
of commercial advantage involved in a 
reciprocity treaty, there are the 
weightiest reasons of American public 
policy pointing in the same direction; 
for the peace of Cuba is necessary for 
the peace in the United States; the 
health of Cuba is necessary to the health 
of the United States. The same consider 
ations which led to the war with Spain 
now require a commercial agreement under 
which Cuba can live. ^4
The measures described above were not sufficient to prevent 
renewed instability arising from conflict over the conduct of the 
1905 election. The United States accordingly intervened, and after 
making some initial efforts to arrive at some solution acceptable to all 
factions as well as to itself, assumed complete control of the govern­
ment and administration. This second occupation was continued 
until 1909.55
The Taft Administration (1909-1913) adhered to the same basic 
aims of creating conditions conducive to political and financial stabi­
lity in Central America and the Caribbean. It was, however, charact­
erised by its emphasis on the use of private foreign capital as an 
instrument to further these objectives: the Administration itself
described its policy as one of ’dollar diplomacy’, involving ’the 
substitution of dollars for bullets’.^ Encouraged by what was seen
as the success of the arrangement which the Roosevelt Administration 
had concluded with the Dominican Republic,Taft’s Administration 
sought to extend this to Nicaragua and Honduras, and would doubtless 
have attempted such a policy in other cases had it not been for the 
opposition to the policy within the United States Senate.
Payments on the debts of the Government of Honduras were, by
48.
1909, considerably in arrears. The U.S. Government accordingly sought 
to encourage American banking groups to negotiate a loan. An agree­
ment was reached between the Honduran representative and American 
bankers for the provision of a $10 million loan, on condition that
the American and Honduran Governments concluded a treaty broadly simi-
58lar to that arranged with the Dominican Republic. A treaty of
this type was signed by the executives of both countries in 1911, but
was almost immediately rejected by the Honduran Congress. A new
government, formed through U.S. mediation after a period of internal
disorder, proved reluctant to accept the treaty, and in any event,
the possibility of it coming into effect was effectively ended when
it was not reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 
59Washington.
In Nicaragua, the Taft Administration, having supported in 1909 
the ousting of Zelaya who was considered hostile to American interests, 
arranged a political settlement in which the new government agreed 
to 'request’ a loan from American banks guaranteed on a proportion 
of its customs receipts. A treaty broadly similar to that arranged 
with the Dominican Republic was signed by the two governments in 1911, 
and New York bankers agreed to extend a $15 million loan. As in the 
case of Honduras, the United States Senate set aside the treaty, but 
the State Department was able to arrange a smaller loan of $1.5 
million from the banks on the security of customs revenue and railroad 
stock, but without the treaty guarantee.^
The Taft Administration made a strong effort to secure Senate
approval for the treaties negotiated with Honduras and Nicaragua. It 
61was argued that the loans provided, and the American Government 
supervision entailed in the collection of customs revenue, would
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c o n t r ib u te  to  th e  f i n a n c i a l  r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  (and th e re fo re  th e  p ro s ­
p e r i t y )  o f  th e  two c o u n t r i e s .  The same m easures would a ls o  prom ote
p o l i t i c a l  s t a b i l i t y ,  b o th  b ecau se  o f a g e n e ra l c o n n e c tio n  betw een
62p r o s p e r i ty  and p e a c e , and b ecau se  r e v o lu t io n a r i e s  would no lo n g e r
be a b le  to  s e iz e  custom s hou ses  in  some p o r ts  and use them to  f in a n c e
6 3f u r th e r  o p e r a t io n s .  I t  was h e ld  th a t  a l t e r n a t i v e  means o f  prom ot­
in g  s t a b i l i t y ,  such a s  m i l i t a r y  in te r v e n t io n  in  th e  e v e n t o f i n t e r n a l
64d is o r d e r ,  were c o s t ly  in  te rm s o f b o th  l i v e s  and money.
I t  i s  p ro b a b le  t h a t  th e  A d m in is tra tio n  saw th e  reduced  l i k e l i ­
hood o f  f o r e ig n  in te r v e n t io n  a s  th e  main c o n s id e ra t io n  j u s t i f y i n g  
i t s  e f f o r t s  to  r e h a b i l i t a t e  f in a n c e s  and prom ote p o l i t i c a l  s t a b i l i t y  
in  b o th  H onduras and N ica ra g u a : c e r t a in l y  t h i s  was a p rom inen t
p u b lic  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  th e  p o l i c y . B u t  th e  p ro p o s a ls  w ere a ls o  
j u s t i f i e d  on th e  g rounds t h a t  th ey  would h e lp  th e  p eo p le  o f  th e  two 
c o u n t r i e s ,  and b ecau se  o f th e  a l le g e d  ad v an tag es  fo r  American commerce. 
On th e  l a t t e r ,  T a f t  a rg u ed :
The second ad v an tag e  to  th e  U n ited  S ta te s  
i s  one a f f e c t in g  c h i e f ly  a l l  th e  so u th e rn  
and G ulf p o r ts  and th e  b u s in e s s  and 
in d u s tr y  o f th e  S outh . The R ep u b lic s  o f 
C e n tra l  America and th e  C aribbean  p o sse ss  
g r e a t  n a t u r a l  w e a lth .  They need o n ly  a 
m easure o f  s t a b i l i t y  and th e  means o f 
f i n a n c i a l  r e g e n e ra t io n  to  e n te r  upon an 
e r a  o f  peace and p r o s p e r i ty ,  b r in g  peace 
and h a p p in e ss  to  th em se lv es  and a t  th e  
same tim e c r e a t in g  c o n d it io n s  su re  to  
le a d  to  a f lo u r i s h in g  in te rc h a n g e  o f  t r a d e  
w ith  t h i s  c o u n try . ^6
A somewhat d i f f e r e n t  e x e rc is e  in  'd o l l a r  d ip lo m acy ' was 
c a r r i e d  o u t by th e  T a f t  A d m in is tra tio n  in  th e  ca se  o f H a i t i ,  w hich 
was a t te m p tin g  to  r a i s e  a lo a n  from  th e  form er c o lo n ia l  pow er, F ra n c e , 
in  co n n e c tio n  w ith  th e  r e o r g a n is a t io n  o f  th e  N a tio n a l Bank o f th e  
c o u n try . The U .S . Government e x e r te d  s tro n g  p re s s u re  in  an e f f o r t
50,
to secure the participation of American bankers, and was successful 
in having 20% of the stock subscribed in this way. Washington was 
not, in this case, concerned with assisting Haitian finances, for 
the magnitude and terms of the loan arranged were not significantly 
altered by virtue of American participation. However, it does not 
follow that U.S. policy was simply an attempt to secure economic ad­
vantages for American interests.*^ It is more likely that the pre­
dominant consideration was the belief that American participation 
was necessary to secure some counter to European influence (not only 
because of the loan, but because the bank in question discharged 
important functions for the Haitian Government), and to secure a
stronger case for American involvement if action was required against
68Haiti in the event of it defaulting on foreign loans.
As noted above, the Taft Administration saw its policy as an 
attempt to 'substitute dollars for bullets' in seeking American 
objectives in the region. Nonetheless, the Administration continued 
to resort to direct military action and gunboat diplomacy. In the 
case of Nicaragua, a revolution of 1912 threatened to restore politi­
cal power to the Liberals, followers of Zelaya (whose ouster the 
United States Government had supported in 1909). This would have 
jeopardised American efforts to establish financial and political 
stability through a customs receivership, and would in other ways
have been contrary to U.S. interests: accordingly, 2700 marines were
69landed to prevent this from eventuating. Again, warships and 
troops were dispatched to Cuba in 1912 following renewed instability?^
Like its predecessors, the Wilson Administration grappled with 
the problems of political and financial instability in the Caribbean and 
Central America. The Administration was immediately confronted with the
51.
problem of Nicaragua. Taft had preserved the existing government by
dispatching a contingent of American troops, but there remained the
problem of Nicaraguan finances, given the failure of the United States
Senate to ratify an arrangement similar to that negotiated with the
Dominican Republic. By 1913, the state of Nicargua’s finances was
such that, as Munro notes,
The salaries of many employees were 
still in arrears, and many other 
creditors, including native and 
foreign ... were clamouring for 
payment. ^1
In grappling with this problem, Secretary of State Bryan began by 
taking up a treaty which the Taft Administration had negotiated (the 
Chamorro-Weitzel canal option treaty) which gave the United States 
the option over an isthmian canal in Nicaragua, and the right to 
establish naval bases in return for $3 million. Although it was not 
imprudent for the United States to foreclose the possibility of a 
European Government obtaining canal rights in Nicaragua by the pur­
chase of the option, the chief reason for the Taft Administration 
rushing the treaty to the Senate was evidently to demonstrate continued 
support for the existing Nicaraguan Government after the United States
Senate had set aside its proposals for a customs receivership and 
72bankers’ loan. To this treaty, Bryan added a provision which was
broadly similar to the Platt Amendment which had been applied to Cuba: 
it was his hope that these measures would be adequate to encourage 
a loan from bankers without the requirement of a customs receivership 
guaranteed by the United States.
It became clear to Bryan, however, that there was considerable 
Senate opposition to the inclusion of the 'Platt Amendment' provision. 
Accordingly, he advanced as a solution a proposal for the provision
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of economic aid, not only to Nicaragua, but to any Latin American
73country in serious financial difficulty. He wrote to Wilson in
August, 1913, that:
They [the Latin American Republics] are 
now compelled to pay a high rate of interest 
and to sell their bonds at a discount ...
If the United States offered to lend them 
its credit to the extent that such a loan 
is safe, the bonds could be made to draw 
four and a half per cent, which would be 
an immediate saving to them in the way of 
interest, and the difference of a (per) 
cent and a half between their bonds and 
ours could go into a sinking fund which 
would, in a reasonable time, at compound 
interest, pay off their debts and leave 
them free. We could, in this way, relieve 
them of the debts which embarrass them, and 
enable them to construct such railroads as 
are imperatively necessary for the develop­
ment of their countries.
The second advantage would be that the plan 
would give our country such an increased 
influence ... that we could prevent revolutions, 
promote education, and advance stable and 
just government ...
... We could in the end profit, negatively, 
by not having to incur expense in guarding 
our own and other foreign interests there, 
and, positively, by the increase of trade 
what would come from development and from 
the friendship which would follow from 
conferring of the benefits named.
Wilson rejected Bryan's proposals for the extension of the
credit of the United States as an idea that "would strike the whole
country .. as a novel and radical proposal" at a time when "so many
75matters of difficulty and delicacy are pending." Bryan accordingly 
sought to arrange a private loan to Nicaragua. Under the agreement 
finally arrived at, the New York bankers who had previously extended 
loans under the Taft Administration purchased part of the stock of 
the Nicaraguan Government's Pacific Railroad, provided some capital 
to the National Bank, provided funds for the extension of the railroad,
53.
and made loans to the Nicaraguan Government (the latter being secured 
on customs, and the share of the railroad and National Bank still 
owned by Nicaragua). The amount provided was, however, small in 
relation to Nicargua’s requirements, and Bryan continued with his 
efforts to secure ratification of the canal option treaty. The 
’Platt Amendment’ provision was dropped in 1914, but even so, the 
amended treaty was not ratified by the United States Senate until 
1916.^ Acceptance of the treaty by no means solved Nicaragua's 
financial problems, both because the amount provided for the base 
rights and canal option was small, and because there was a delay in 
making the funds available owing to a dispute over their allocation. 
Subsequent efforts to deal with Nicaragua's financial rehabilitation 
are not, however, discussed here.^
There was, apart from the question of finances, the problem 
of maintaining in power the Conservative regime in Nicaragua. As 
already noted, the United States maintained a military force in the 
country for this purpose, but additional steps proved necessary when 
the question of the selection of a new Conservative leader arose in 
1915. The American Government encountered some difficulties initial­
ly in attempting to obtain a succession acceptable to itself, but 
following the dispatch of two warships the Conservative Party united 
behind a leader of the American Government's chosing, while the 
Liberal leader withdrew from the election after being informed by 
the U.S. representative that any Liberal candidate would have to 
comply with existing arrangements made with the United States, and
establish that he had not taken an objectional role in the Zelaya
78Administration or in any subsequent revolutionary movement.
In Nicaragua, the United States pursued its objectives without
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d i r e c t l y  a ssu m in g  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  th e  governm ent and  a d m in is t r a ­
t i o n  o f  t h e  c o u n tr y .  T h is  was n o t  to  be th e  c a se  i n  H a i t i  and th e  
D om inican R e p u b lic . In  th e  l a t t e r  c a s e ,  renew ed  i n s t a b i l i t y  i n  1912 
had  l e d  th e  T a f t  A d m in is t r a t io n  to  d i s p a tc h  m a r in e s  to  f o r c e  ch an g es 
i n  th e  C a b in e t  and o th e r  r e f o r m s .  S u b s e q u e n tly , th e  t h r e a t  o f 
w i th h o ld in g  th e  D om inican G overnm en t’ s s h a re  o f  th e  custom s re v e n u e  
c o l l e c t e d  by th e  U n ite d  S t a t e s  was u sed  to  d ep o se  th e  e x i s t i n g  g o v e rn ­
m en t, and a new lo a n  from  New Y ork b a n k e rs  was a r r a n g e d  to  b o l s t e r  
t h e  c o u n t r y ’ s f i n a n c i a l  p o s i t i o n .  N o e n th e le s s ,  i n s t a b i l i t y  p e r s i t -  
e d , ev en  a f t e r  A m erican s u p e r v i s io n  o f  e l e c t i o n s  in  1914 , and a f t e r  
W ils o n 's  A d m in is t r a t io n  had  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  i t  w ould s u p p o r t  th e  g o v e rn ­
m ent by f o r c e .  W ith  renew ed d i s o r d e r ,  th e  U n ite d  S t a t e s  p ro c e e d e d  
in  1916 to  assum e c o m p le te  c o n t r o l  o v e r  th e  governm en t and a d m in i­
s t r a t i o n  o f  th e  c o u n tr y .  A m erican o c c u p a t io n  l a s t e d  u n t i l  1924 , though  
a p r o v i s i o n a l  D om inican  G overnm ent was e s t a b l i s h e d  in  192 2 . The U .S . 
G overnm ent m a in ta in e d  a cu stom s r e c e iv e r s h ip  even  a f t e r  i t s  w i th -
79d ra w a l a s  s e c u r i t y  f o r  bonds w h ich  had  b een  i s s u e d  in  1918 and 1922 .
I n  H a i t i ,  th e  U n ite d  S t a t e s  was c o n f r o n te d  w ith  th e  m ost
e x tre m e  exam ple  o f  i n s t a b i l i t y  in  th e  r e g io n .  As a S e n a te  S e le c t
Com m ittee l a t e r  p o in te d  o u t ,  in  th e  te n  y e a r s  p re c e d in g  A m erican
i n t e r v e n t i o n  in  1915
. . .  no l e s s  th a n  e ig h t  p r e s i d e n t s  
assum ed o f f i c e  . . .  f o r  th e  n o m in a l 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  te rm  o f  se v en  y e a r s  
e a c h . T h ree  o f  th e  e ig h t  f l e d  th e  
c o u n tr y ;  one was blow n up in  th e  
p r e s i d e n t i a l  p a la c e ;  a n o th e r  d ie d  
m y s t e r io u s ly ,  and a c c o rd in g  to  p o p u la r  
b e l i e f  by p o is o n ,  w h ile  two w ere  
m u rd e red . The l a s t  H a i t i a n  P r e s id e n t  
who h e ld  o f f i c e  b e f o r e  th e  la n d in g  o f  
A m erican  f o r c e s  . . .  was d rag g e d  from  
th e  F re n ch  l e g a t i o n  by a mob, h i s  head  
and lim b s  w ere  t o r n  from  h i s  body to  be  
c a r r i e d  a l o f t  on s t i c k s  and b a y o n e ts ,  w h ile
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h i s  b le e d in g  t ru n k  was d rag g e d  
th ro u g h  th e  s t r e e t s  o f  th e  c a p i t a l  
c i t y .  80
F o llo w in g  o c c u p a t io n ,  th e  U n ite d  S t a t e s  im posed a t r e a t y  w hich  p ro ­
v id e d  f o r  an A m erican  custom s r e c e i v e r s h i p ,  a  H a i t i a n  c o n s ta b u la r y  
t r a i n e d  and c o n t r o l l e d  by th e  U n ite d  S t a t e s ,  and a p r o v i s i o n  b ro a d ly
s i m i l a r  to  th e  P l a t t  Amendment. An A m erican  m i l i t a r y  p re s e n c e  was
81
m a in ta in e d  u n t i l  1934 .
The c o n s id e r a t io n s  w hich  p rom pted  c o n c e rn  i n  W ash ing ton  w ith  
th e  p o l i t i c a l  and  f i n a n c i a l  s t a b i l i t y  o f  th e  D om inican  R e p u b l ic , 
N ic a ra g u a  and H a i t i  i n  th e  f i r s t  p a r t  o f  W ils o n ’s te rm  o f  o f f i c e  w ere 
b r o a d ly  s i m i l a r  to  th o s e  in  e a r l i e r  A d m in is t r a t i o n s ,  th o u g h  d e t e r ­
m in a t io n  to  s e c u r e  s t a b i l i t y  was p ro b a b ly  in c r e a s e d  by th e  d e s i r e  to
a v o id  h a v in g  to  do so  s u b s e q u e n t ly  when A m erican  t r o o p s  m ig h t be  r e -
82q u i r e d  in  th e  c o n f l i c t  i n  E u ro p e . C oncern  w ith  a v o id in g  th e  p o s s i ­
b i l i t y  o f  f o r e ig n  i n t e r v e n t i o n  was p a r t i c u l a r l y  e v id e n t  in  th e  c a se  
o f  H a i t i .  B o th  F ra n c e  and Germany had  so u g h t p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  a 
cu stom s r e c e i v e r s h i p  in  H a i t i  and had  r e s i s t e d  u n i l a t e r a l  a c t i o n  by 
th e  U n ite d  S t a t e s  G overnm ent. M o reo v er, a s  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  L a n s in g  
r e c a l l e d  in  a  s u b m is s io n  to  th e  U .S . S e n a te  S e l e c t  C om m ittee on H a i t i  
and S an to  Domingo in  192 2 , th e  S t a t e  D ep artm en t s u s p e c te d  Germany o f  
s e e k in g  to  o b t a in  a  c o a l in g  s t a t i o n  i n  th e  a r e a ,  and  c o n s id e r e d  t h a t  
" a  c o a l in g  s t a t i o n  d i r e c t l y  o r  i n d i r e c t l y  c o n t r o l l e d  by  a n o th e r  power 
w ould be a m enace to  th e  p o s i t i o n  o f  th e  U n ite d  S t a t e s  in  th e  C a rib b e a n  
S e a , to  th e  s e c u r i t y  o f  th e  Panama C anal a n d , c o n s e q u e n t ly ,  to  th e  
p e a c e  o f  th e  h e m is p h e r e .” One o f  th e  two d o m in a tin g  c o n s id e r a t io n s  
b e h in d  U .S . p o l i c y  in  H a i t i ,  L a n s in g  a rg u e d , was th e  d e s i r e  to  a v o id  
f o r e ig n  i n t e r v e n t i o n  o f  th e  above k in d ,  th e  o th e r  b e in g  th e  v iew  t h a t  
th e  r e s t o r a t i o n  o f  s t a b i l i t y  w ould e n a b le  th e  p e o p le  o f  H a i t i  to
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" e n jo y  a p r o s p e r i t y  and an econom ic and i n d u s t r i a l  d ev e lo p m en t to
83w hich  e v e ry  p e o p le  o f  an A m erican  n a t i o n  a r e  e n t i t l e d . "
The d a n g e r  o f  f o r e i g n  in v o lv e m e n t a r i s i n g  from  i n t e r n a l  d i s ­
o r d e r  was a l s o  a c o n s id e r a t io n  in  th e  D om inican R e p u b lic :  p o l i c y
m akers a p p a r e n t ly  c o n s id e r e d  t h a t  th e  m ain d i s s i d e n t  g ro u p s  w ere  p r o -  
84German. I t  i s  n o t  u n l ik e ly  t h a t  t h i s  was a l s o  a f a c t o r  i n  th e
c a s e  o f  N ic a ra g u a . In  a l l  c a s e s ,  h o w ev er, i t  i s  l i k e l y  t h a t  p o l ic y
was p a r t l y  m o tiv a te d  by th e  d e s i r e  to  p r o t e c t  A m erican  p r o p e r ty  and
econom ic  i n t e r e s t s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  by th e  b e l i e f  t h a t  i t  w ould  b e  in  th e
85i n t e r e s t  o f  th e  p e o p le s  c o n c e rn e d .
I l l
In  th e  p e r io d  s in c e  th e  Second W orld W ar, a  c o n s id e r a b le  p ro ­
p o r t i o n  o f  A m erican  econom ic a id  h a s  b een  p ro v id e d  l a r g e l y  f o r  th e  
p u rp o se  o f  p r e s e r v in g  p o l i t i c a l  and econom ic s t a b i l i t y  in  th e  r e c i p ­
i e n t  c o u n tr y ,  and  to  e x e r c i s e  in f lu e n c e  o v e r  th e  p o l i c i e s  o f  i t s  
g o v e rn m en t. No a t te m p t  w i l l  b e  made a t  t h i s  s ta g e  to  s u b s t a n t i a t e  
t h i s  p o i n t ,  b u t  i t  w i l l  be  am ply d e m o n s tra te d  i n  s u b s e q u e n t  c h a p te r s  
o f  t h i s  d i s s e r t a t i o n .
I t  h a s  b e e n  se e n  t h a t  th e  A m erican G overnm ent so u g h t to  p r o ­
m ote th e s e  same o b j e c t i v e s  i n  th e  p e r io d  p r i o r  to  th e  New D e a l, b u t  
t h a t  i t  u se d  m ethods w hich  d id  n o t  n o rm a lly  in v o lv e  th e  p r o v is io n  o f  
econom ic a id  a s  d e f in e d  h e r e .  Nor w ere th e s e  aim s c o n f in e d  to  th e  
c a s e  s t u d i e s  ex a m in ed . P r e v e n t in g  i n t e r n a l  d i s o r d e r  was a m a t te r  o f  
c o n s id e r a b l e  c o n c e rn  to  A m erican p o l ic y  m akers in  th e  P h i l i p p i n e s ,  
f o r  ex a m p le ; and th e  U n ite d  S t a t e s  so u g h t to  i n f lu e n c e  governm en t 
p o l i c i e s  i n  C hina  and in  L a t in  A m erican c o u n t r i e s  o th e r  th a n  th e  ones
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considered above. In these instances too, economic aid was not,
as a rule, employed in anything other than a very minor way.
Why did the American Government not employ economic assistance 
to realise its objectives of stability and influence in the period 
under discussion? One possible explanation is that these aims were 
of relatively low priority at this time, and were thus not important 
enough to induce policy makers to spend American funds to contribute 
to their realisation, or to make it politically possible for them to 
do so. The evidence does not, however, support this view. In the 
case of Central America and the Caribbean, it has been seen that Ameri­
can policy makers were concerned with the region for more than trivial 
reasons - it was regarded as important for safeguarding the approaches 
to the Panama Canal, and for ensuring the security of the United
States. Moreover, the method of military intervention frequently
87used by policy makers was recognised as being costly. One of the 
main justifications which the Taft Administration offered for its 
policy of 'dollar diplomacy' was that it would reduce the cost in 
lives and money to the United States entailed by frequent military 
intervention. Again, Secretary of State Bryan argued for his proposal 
for the 'extension of the credit of the United States' on the ground 
that this could prevent revolutions and maintain and increase Ameri­
can influence in the region at less cost to the United States than 
that involved in military intervention and occupation. The notion 
that the aims in question were not considered worth the volume of 
funds which economic assistance would have required must be rejected.
Of course, the areas of the world in which the United States 
had important interests was more limited than that after World War 
Two. Even if policy makers had used economic aid for the purpose
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o f p rom oting  s t a b i l i t y  and e x e r c is in g  in f lu e n c e  (where th e se  aims 
e x is te d )  to  th e  same e x te n t  as  s u b se q u e n tly , th e  q u a n t i ty  o f  a id  
p ro v id ed  would have been  sm all by th e  s ta n d a rd s  o f th e  p o s t-w a r 
p e r io d .
A second p o s s ib le  e x p la n a tio n  fo r  th e  p a u c i ty  o f  econom ic 
a id  i s  th a t  c irc u m sta n c e s  o r  th e  b e l i e f s  o f  p o lic y  m akers w ere such 
a s  to  make i t  seem i n e f f e c t i v e  as  a means o f p rom oting  s t a b i l i t y  and 
in f lu e n c e .  The id e a  t h a t  econom ic a s s i s ta n c e  would have been an 
i n e f f e c t i v e  means o f  e x e r c is in g  in f lu e n c e  can be o b ta in e d  by e x te n d ­
in g  one th e o ry  which has been  used to  accoun t f o r  th e  grow th o f eco ­
nomic a id .  A ccord ing  to  t h i s  e x p la n a tio n  (w hich t h i s  w r i t e r  f in d s  
p e r s u a s iv e ) , a id  l e v e ls  have in c re a s e d  p a r t l y  b ecau se  th e  governm ents 
o f l e s s  developed  c o u n t r ie s  have g iv en  much g r e a te r  p r i o r i t y  to  
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n  and econom ic developm ent as  an o b je c t iv e ,  and have
a c c o rd in g ly  been  more i n t e r e s t e d  in  g a in in g  a c c e s s  to  s u p p lie s  o f
88c a p i t a l  th an  h i t h e r t o .  In  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n ,  i t  i s  h e ld ,  r ic h  
c o u n t r ie s  have found i t  e x p e d ie n t to  p ro v id e  such c a p i t a l  as a way o f 
e x e r c is in g  in f lu e n c e  ov er governm ents, m a in ta in in g  t h e i r  c o o p e ra tio n , 
and so on. A p o s s ib le  e x te n s io n  o f t h i s  argum ent i s  t h a t  l e s s  d e v e l­
oped c o u n t r ie s  w ere n o t g r e a t ly  i n t e r e s t e d  in  econom ic developm ent 
o r  in  o b ta in in g  s u p p lie s  o f  fo r e ig n  c a p i t a l  in  th e  p e r io d  under d i s ­
c u s s io n , and th a t  econom ic a id  would n o t th e r e f o r e  have been an 
e f f e c t iv e  means o f e x e r t in g  in f lu e n c e .
T here a r e ,  how ever, s e v e r a l  c o n s id e ra t io n s  w hich su g g e s t th a t  
th e  argum ent i s  f a l s e  in  t h i s  ex ten d ed  form . To b eg in  w ith ,  i t  i s  
n o t e n t i r e l y  a c c u ra te  to  su g g e s t t h a t  governm ents o f l e s s  developed  
c o u n t r ie s  w ere u n in te r e s te d  in  econom ic developm ent in  th e  p e r io d  
under d is c u s s io n .  I t  h as  a lre a d y  been n o te d  th a t  th e  D iaz regim e in
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Mexico placed a high priority on industrial development, while the
Argentine Government at the first Pan-American Conference of 1889-
1890 made no secret of its ambition to achieve a level of economic
89development comparable to that of the United States. Moreover, even 
where governments were not greatly concerned with long run develop­
ment, they did seek funds from abroad to build public works and to 
preserve financial and political stability. These governments would 
presumably have welcomed economic aid for these purposes: that they
did not make strong efforts to seek it is probably largely attribut­
able to the fact that it was not thought that there was any reason­
able chance of obtaining it.
Again, American policy makers were well aware of the power 
which could be exercised by denying or facilitating the flow of pri­
vate capital, having made use of this technique as a weapon in bar­
gaining from soon after the time when American capital began to seek 
90outlets abroad. It has been seen in the case studies earlier in
this chapter that this was one of the principal instruments used by 
Washington in its efforts to influence the course of the Mexican 
revolution and Mexican Government policy. The Harding Administration 
went so far as to establish a number of guidelines as to circum­
stances in which loans from private banks might be subject to veto,
91and required bankers to consult with it before making loans.
Given this awareness of the influence which could be wielded by plac­
ing controls on private loans to foreign governments, it is not 
plausible to suggest that policy makers would have seen economic aid 
as an ineffective weapon had it been available to them. Further, 
it has been noted that Secretary of State Bryan argued for his pro­
posal to ’extend the credit of the United States’ to Latin American
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countries partly on the ground that it would give the American Govern­
ment substantial influence. The view that economic assistance would 
have been seen as ineffective for this purpose during the period 
under discussion must therefore be rejected.
Nor is it plausible to suppose that policy makers would have
seen economic aid as ineffective in promoting economic and political
stability. The problem of bringing about financial stability in the
period under discussion was comparable to that of achieving economic
stabilisation in subsequent periods. Policy makers saw the problem
as essentially one of changing the economic and financial policies
of the government concerned and providing it with the funds needed
to restore balance in the short term. Whereas after World War Two,
they sought this objective by providing aid after obtaining agreement
92on policy changes from the recipients, in the period under discus­
sion they achieved these results by the provision of private capital 
guaranteed on the customs receipts of the recipient, and by the 
direct assumption of power over areas relevant to the finances of 
the government concerned.
As far as the question of political stability is concerned, 
it has been seen that policy makers in this period considered that it 
could be promoted by the use of economic instruments. The belief, 
widespread in the post-war period, that prosperity was conducive to 
political stability was, as noted in the case studies on the Caribbean 
and Central America, also accepted at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. It has been noted that policy makers sought to preserve 
stability in Cuba by negotiating a reciprocal trade treaty which pro­
mised benefits for that country's sugar industry, that they pursued 
similar policies in the Philippines, and that it was thought that
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one of the advantages of establishing customs receiverships in 
Central America and the Caribbean was that this would, by contributing 
to financial stability, also promote prosperity and thereby render 
internal disorder less likely. (Of course, customs receiverships 
were also thought to promote stability in other ways - by preventing 
revolutionaries from obtaining finance to further their operations 
through the seizure of one or more customs houses, for example.)
If the explanation for the relatively small amount of aid 
provided for purposes of stability and influence does not lie in the 
low priority of these objectives, or in any judgment by policy makers 
that economic aid would not have promoted these aims, where is it to 
be found? It is argued here that three points account for the 
paucity of economic assistance.
First, it was possible for American policy makers to make 
extensive and effective use of three other techniques for the purpose 
of exercising influence and promoting financial and political stabi­
lity - military intervention and gunboat diplomacy, the direct assump­
tion of powers over other governments, and the use of private foreign 
investment. These instruments subsequently became less effective, 
or most costly to employ, thereby encouraging resort to economic 
assistance.
The frequency with which military intervention, or the threat 
of military intervention, was used has already been noted. It has 
been seen that U.S. marines entered the territory of states in the 
Central America-Caribbean region no less than twenty times between 
1898 and 1920. Force was employed or threatened to induce govern­
ments to change their policies, to replace one government by another, 
or to achieve stability under some order preferred by Washington.
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American policy makers were gradually brought to the conclu­
sion that the repeated use of force in this way was detrimental to 
American interests. The principal factor which led to this changed 
perception was the same as that which led to the demise of the major 
colonial empires: the growth of nationalism in less developed
countries. It gradually became difficult for governments to accede 
quietly to demands backed by the use or threat of force, and for even 
the beneficiaries of intervention to lend political support to it. 
Military intervention of this kind was not only found less easy to 
carry out effectively: it was also seen to carry the cost of arous­
ing resentment, both in the country subject to it and in other less 
developed countries.
Of course, the growth of nationalism occurred slowly and un­
evenly in less developed countries, and it was not the only factor 
operating to bring about a diminished reliance on the use of force 
as an instrument of stability and influence. Its impact was height­
ened by the emergence of rival powers willing to make use of national­
ist grievances, by the increased strategic importance of less develop-
93ed countries arising from changes in the technology of warfare, 
and by other factors.
In the case of Latin and Central America, the shift away from 
repeated reliance on coercive instruments of diplomacy occurred in 
the late twenties and early thirties. The right of the United States 
to intervene militarily in defence of American property and lives
94was last strongly defended by President Coolidge’s Administration.
Under President Hoover (1928-1932), the American Government took a
number of steps which signalled a change in policy regarding military 
95intervention, while Roosevelt's first Administration went further
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to commit itselt to non-intervention as one component of its Good 
Neighbour policy.^ The Roosevelt Administration’s desire to avoid 
military intervention in the region was severely tested in the case 
of Cuba where a regime considered hostile to American interests was 
in power during the fall and winter of 1933: nonetheless, U.S.
97troops were not landed, though warships were dispatched to the area. 
Policy makers did not resort to military intervention in World War 
Two, despite significant differences with Argentina, which was consid­
ered to be sympathetic to the Axis powers: even the proposal to 
freeze funds held by Argentina in the United States was initially
opposed by Cordell Hull on the grounds that it marked a return to
98’big stick' methods of diplomacy. It was not until the landing of 
troops in the Dominican Republic in 1965 that the United States re­
sorted to the kind of massive military intervention which had so 
often occurred in the first two decades of the twentieth century. 
('Covert' operations were launched against Guatemala in 1954 and 
Cuba in 1961.)
Three factors were important in bringing about this change in 
policy towards Latin America during the Hoover and Roosevelt Admini­
strations. First, there was a desire to improve relations with 
Latin American countries, a desire rendered more important by the
fact that policy makers already recognised the threat posed by Japan
99and the new regime in Germany, and by the need for economic co­
operation in order to solve the economic problems which the Depression 
had created. It was realised that repeated intervention in the past 
had embittered relations in the hemisphere, and that a change in 
policy was a precondition for their improvement. Second, it was 
becoming more difficult to use military intervention successfully.
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After landing troops in Nicaragua in 1927, for example, the American 
Government found itself unable to establish order effectively. 
Guerrilla forces boldly continued to make raids, and their leader 
Sandino not only proved impossible to capture, but also achieved the 
status of a Latin American hero."^^ Third, the Hoover and Roosevelt 
Administrations were attempting to restrain Japan’s expansion at 
the expense of China, and found it difficult to argue against this 
while the United States employed similar methods in its own neigh­
bourhood.
The direct assumption of powers over other governments by
the United States, as in the case of the Platt Amendment and in the
establishment of customs receiverships, has been noted previously.
As with military intervention (and for broadly the same reasons),
this method became increasingly difficult to employ effectively.
The first Roosevelt Administration abandoned the practice as far as
Latin and Central America was concerned. Thus, the notorious Platt
Amendment was abrogated in 1934, and in the same year, the United
States handed back to the Haitian Government those powers over the
103supervision of finances then carried out by American officials. 
Although the U.S. Government occasionally made agreements with other 
governments in the post-war period in which they accepted policy 
changes or the presence of American advisers in return for other 
advantages, these did not involve the direct assumption of powers 
over tax collection, finances, and the like.
Finally, the flow of private foreign investment from the 
United States prior to the Depression was sufficient to enable Ameri­
can policy makers to utilise it to further their objectives. The 
way in which this was accomplished has already been noted in the
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case studies discussed in the second section of this paper. With
the Depression, the flow of private capital abroad slowed to a
104trickle. Although it recovered substantially after World War
Two, American interests had by this stage been greatly extended. 
Moreover, it was not, by this time, possible to use the methods pre­
viously employed to ensure the security of private loans provided to 
regimes which were unstable or in dire financial straits - assuming 
direct powers over taxation in the recipient, or providing an effect­
ive threat of military action if American property rights were 
infringed.
A second factor which must be introduced to explain the 
relative absence of economic assistance prior to the New Deal is that 
the actions of other powers did not impel the United States to uti­
lise this instrument. Had other great powers employed economic aid 
as a way of gaining the cooperation of LDC governments, it is likely 
that the American Government would have been forced to respond in a 
similar manner. It will be noted subsequently in this dissertation 
that the United States was forced to make economic concessions in 
Latin America in the late nineteen thirties partly because Germany 
began to negotiate trade and barter arrangements highly favourable 
to the countries in the region: and that one factor contributing to
the expansion of assistance in the mid-fifties was the effort of the 
Soviet Union to woo a number of important less developed countries 
with trade and economic aid. But in the first part of the twentieth 
century, as noted in the case material on Central America and the 
Caribbean, the concern of American policy makers was rather that the 
zeal with which rival European Governments defended their economic 
interests would lead them to assume control over countries of
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importance to the United States. It is true that Germany did offer 
concessions to Mexico to gain its cooperation during World War One, 
but these seem not to have entailed economic aid as defined here.
As with the United States, rival powers did not go much beyond faci­
litating or denying access to their private capital markets as a way 
of inducing cooperation by economic means.
The above two points do not entirely explain the absence of 
significant quantities of economic assistance. It has been seen in 
the case studies that Secretary of State Bryan saw benefits in the 
initiation of a programme of economic aid for Latin America, but that 
this was rejected by Wilson as politically unacceptable. Moreover, 
it has been seen that policy makers sometimes resorted to what appear 
to have been disguised ways of providing economic aid, such as the 
purchase of base rights which were not of high priority in terms of 
U.S. i n t e r e s t s T h i s  suggests that the domestic climate for aid 
was unfavourable. It was not, of course, so unfavourable as to 
prevent the transfer of assistance to Europe during and after the 
First World War, but it is likely that larger quantities of economic 
aid would have been provided to less developed countries had attitudes 
in the domestic arena offered greater support.
There are several possible explanations for the unfavourable 
domestic political climate. One hypothesis is that it was simply 
a product of the two points already discussed: that is, the avail­
ability of other methods such as direct military intervention and 
the use of customs receiverships, along with the fact that other 
great powers did not utilise economic aid, made the idea that the 
United States should use it seem novel and unacceptable. It is prob­
able that this does account for the phenomena in substantial measure,
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though it will be argued below that it was not the only source of 
domestic opposition.
A second possibility which must be considered is that the unfav­
ourable domestic political climate was the result of the political 
power of the private banks, and of resistance by them to any action 
which would have entailed government involvement in the making of over­
seas loans. The idea that the banks wielded substantial political 
power in this period was widespread. Critics of the Taft Administra­
tion’s policy of dollar diplomacy frequently saw it as nothing more 
than an effort to benefit the private b a n k s , w h i l e  the theories of 
Hobson, Hilferding and Lenin attributed the banks with considerable 
influence over the foreign policy of advanced capitalist societies.
And in the view of the Nye Committee of the U.S. Senate, a combination 
of bankers and munitions manufacturers was largely responsible for the 
entry of the United States into the First World War.^^ However, the 
evidence does not support the idea that American policy makers acted 
at the behest of private banks in making their decisions during the 
period under discussion: rather, they sought to use the banks for the
realisation of broader objectives. It has already been noted that 
policy makers frequently restricted the lending of private banks in 
order to promote American foreign policy objectives.
The above explanation is more reasonable if it is presented 
in modified terms, deleting the emphasis on the political power of 
the private banks, but retaining the thesis that part of the domestic 
opposition to economic aid stemmed from the belief that governments 
should not involve themselves in the provision of loans for economic 
purposes. Seidel has noted of men such as Elihu Root, Herbert 
Hooever, and Charles Hughes (the ’progressive Pan Americans' in his
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terminology) that,
Imbued with a faith in progress and in 
the efficacy of a body of modified liberal 
economic theory and institutions, they 
considered the limited use of government 
to be a proper means of reconciling economic 
interests and promoting economic growth. 108
It was not until the New Deal that men more attracted to the use of
109government enterprises became influential in American Government. 
Even after the New Deal, there was still resistance to economic aid
on the grounds that it represented government interference 
in areas thought to be the proper preserve of private enterprise. 
Baldwin, referring to the period after 1943, notes that there was 
still "some question as to whether lending money was the proper
function of any government.„no It is therefore probable that some
part of the domestic opposition to economic aid in the period under
111discussion stemmed from this source.
A fourth possibility which must be examined is that it was
difficult to provide economic aid for the purposes of influence and
stability in this period because its use was not supported by other
considerations such as guilt over the gap in living standards between
advanced capitalist countries and less developed countries, humani-
112tarian concern with poverty, or the belief that economic progress 
in the recipient would contribute to the prosperity of the donor.
It has been seen, however, that an important argument used 
by policy makers to justify their actions in the Caribbean was that 
they would improve the living conditions of the peoples in those 
countries. Statements by Knox and Taft justifying dollar diplomacy, 
for example, made reference to the desire to improve living standards 
in the recipients. In urging ratification of the financial agree­
ment with Honduras, Secretary Knox made detailed reference to the
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famished and discouraged state of its population. Again, accord­
ing to the testimony of Secretary Lansing (given in 1922), one of 
the two dominating considerations behind American policy in Haiti 
was the desire that its inhabitants should "enjoy a prosperity and
an economic and industrial development to which every people of an
114American nation are entitled". Even the idea of the United States
as an affluent society with an obligation to utilise its excessive 
wealth for the benefit of other nations is not absent in the period 
being discussed: President McKinley, at an election rally in 1901,
"called for an increase in the merchant marine to spread the fruits 
of American prosperity - which he found so great as to be ’almost 
appalling' - to less favoured lands.
Again, it has been noted in the second part of this paper 
that policy makers frequently used the argument that actions to pro­
mote prosperity and stability in Central America and the Caribbean 
would also result in expanded trade for the United States, especially 
in the Southern and Atlantic Gulf States. It does not, therefore, 
seem reasonable to attribute the unfavourable domestic policital 
climate towards foreign aid to the absence of these considerations.
It has been argued above that the relative absence of econo­
mic assistance in the period under review was the result of three 
factors: the ready availability and effectiveness of alternative
instruments of stability and influence; the absence of any substan­
tial economic aid effort by rival powers; and domestic impediments 
to the provision of aid, arising partly from the foregoing points and 
partly from reluctance to expand the functions of government in areas 
thought to be the preserve of private enterprise. There is a further 
question which can be asked of this explanation as an additional
>
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test: namely, how consistent is it with the growth of economic
assistance? Since this question is dealt with in the following 
chapters, discussion here will be limited to some brief observations. 
Moreover, it will be confined to Latin America.
When Franklin Roosevelt assumed the Presidency at the begin­
ning of 1933, two of the above three factors were no longer present 
to the same degree. The new Administration was, as we have seen, 
determined to avoid further military intervention in Latin America if 
possible, and it did not wish to undertake any new action which would 
impair the sovereignty of countries in the region. Indeed, its aim 
was to terminate existing situations of this type as soon as practic­
able. Again, the flow of private capital abroad had plunged to virt­
ually negligible proportions, and the Administration was not unwill­
ing to expand the functions of government into areas previously left 
to private enterprise.
The altered circumstances did give rise to the first institu­
tionalised programme providing significant quantities of economic aid
to Third World countries. The Export-Import Bank was created in 1934
X16primarily to deal with the problem of instability in Cuba. But
Eximbank initially operated on only a small scale. Its loans for the 
period 1934-1938 were only of the order of $61 million, not all of 
which went to less developed countries, and much of which was provid­
ed for purposes other than promoting stability and influence.'^'7
The question arises as to whether the small amount of aid 
provided for these objectives in this interval is in conflict with 
the explanation outlined previously in this section. Given that the 
Administration no longer had recourse to the type of instruments
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which have long been used, and given that the domestic resistance 
to economic assistance had been weakened, should not one have expect­
ed more aid, and assistance for many more countries?
Several points can be made in reply to this objection.
Firstly, and perhaps most important, American policy makers had, by 
this time, developed new objections to the provision of economic aid 
to other governments. These objections were based on reactions to 
the earlier repayment on loans made to European governments during and 
after the First World War, and other factors. It was believed that 
providing aid to governments was more likely to damage relations than 
improve them. Evidence of this attitude is provided in the second 
chapter of this dissertation. It will be seen that it was an import­
ant factor in the rejection of proposals for economic aid to Latin 
American governments in the mid-1930s. By the late 1930s, many 
policy makers had reverted to the view that aid could serve as an 
effective instrument of foreign policy.
Second, American interest in promoting stability and exercis­
ing influence at this particular time, while considerable, was not 
quite of the same priority as it had been at an earlier stage. Thus, 
under the Administrations of Theodore Roosevelt, Taft and Wilson, 
there was a danger that internal disorder would give rise to European 
intervention, but as already noted, this was not a serious possibil­
ity after World War One. American interest in the region did in­
crease substantially towards the end of the thirties when the acti­
vities of the Axis powers again gave rise to concern on the part of 
U.S. policy makers as to the possibility of hostile European involve­
ment in the area. Third, there was still no significant pressure 
to give aid from other powers. It was not until the latter part of
72.
the thirties that the Axis powers began to use economic instruments
in a way which forced the United States to respond in a similar
fashion. Perhaps the first instance of the United States providing
economic assistance to counter the similar inducements of other
powers occurred with the provision of a $5.5 million credit to Haiti
in 1938: it was widely believed that this was made in order to fore-
118stall a loan from Germany. These points, then, account for the
relatively small amount of economic assistance provided in the first 
years of Roosevelt's period as President. By the end of the nine­
teen thirties, the amount of assistance provided was, as will be 
seen in the following chapter, increasing rapidly.
IV
The preceding section has provided an explanation of why the 
United States used comparatively little economic assistance to pro­
mote its objectives of influence and stability prior to the Admini­
strations of Franklin Roosevelt. However, economic assistance has 
been provided for purposes other than these two. The question arises 
as to why these other objectives did not give rise to the provision 
of significant quantities of economic assistance in the period under 
discussion.
Some assistance provided during and after World War Two has 
had the objective of developing new sources of raw materials (espec­
ially those of strategic significance) where the existing supply has 
been considered inadequate or insecure. Thus, during World War Two, 
the American Government's Rubber Development Corporation carried out 
programmes and provided finance for the expansion of production of 
that commodity in Latin America, Japan having cut off a considerable
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proportion of the existing supply through its occupation of South 
East Asia. Again, an important reason for expanding Eximbank’s
lending authority in 1951 by one billion dollars was the desire to 
develop secure supplies of raw materials abroad. According to inform­
ation given in Senate hearings, approximately half of the total was
120to be used in this way, mainly in less developed countries.
The use of economic assistance for this purpose was not absent 
prior to the New Deal. It has already been noted that the U.S. Con­
gress made billion available in 1923 so that the American Govern­
ment might investigate, in assocation with other governments, the 
possibility of developing rubber plantations in the Philippines and 
Latin America. But the amount of aid provided was very small.
Of course, the dependence of the United States on external
supplies of raw materials was much less in this period than it was to
become later. Whereas the United States was a net earner in trade
in minerals and commodities at the beginning of the century, it was by
1956 relying on imports for over fifty percent of its supply of 54
necessary commodities, and for over ten percent of its requirements 
121for a further 20. Moreover, the level of industrial production
which had to be maintained to successfully wage war against a great 
power had increased markedly over the period, thereby increasing the 
strategic significance of securing adequate supplies of raw materials. 
But it should not be concluded from this that raw material supplies 
were matters of small priority before 1932, or that this was the main 
reason for the relatively small amount of aid provided for this pur­
pose. There were cases where policymakers were concerned about the 
adequacy and security of supplies of important materials, but for the 
most part they were able to leave the task of developing new sources
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to private capital (backed, where necessary, by diplomatic efforts 
by the American Government).
This was, for example, the case with oil. Writing of the 
early twenties, Williams notes that
The sense of the enormous importance of 
oil, combined with a dread of the coming 
scarcity and the belief that the door 
abroad was closed against the United 
States, produced a frame of mind among 
public officials, certain congressmen, 
officers of oil companies, some journalists 
and a part of the general public which was 
almost akin to hysteria. The United States 
was, they believed, in a position of a 
strong man deprived of his rights and shut 
in by potential enemies. 122
The response of the U.S. Government was not, however, to provide
economic assistance as a means of developing supplies elsewhere:
rather it sought an entry of American private capital to fields from
which the action of European powers, or of LDC governments
123subject to their pressure, had excluded it. Again, in the case
of rubber, the government investigation referred to was intended only 
to identify suitable areas which American private capital might 
develop, not to assist in that task itself. There was, as it turned 
out, no real reluctance on the part of private firms (such as that
124owned by Firestone) to move abroad to develop the needed supplies.
In the case of manganese, tin and nickel, on which the United States 
was almost wholly dependent on external sources for supplies, the
expansion and diversification of production was apparently again left 
to private capital. (With manganese, a tariff was maintained on
125imports, presumably in an effort to develop domestic production.)
Foreign aid had also been provided as a means of disposing 
of commodities produced in larger quantities than could be sold at
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'reasonable' prices within the United States or abroad. The most 
notable example of aid provided for this purpose was the PL480 pro­
gramme, which was initiated in 1954 largely as a way of reducing 
the embarrassingly large government stockpiles of agricultural 
commodities. These had accumulated under schemes whereby the govern­
ment's Commodity Credit Corporation acted as a buyer of last resort
in order to maintain price levels for a number of agricultural
, „ 126 products.
The desire to dispose of surpluses was not absent from pro-
127posals for private philanthropy prior to the new Deal, or from
arguments for the provision of relief aid to Europe following the
First World War, but the first significant instance known to this
writer of the American Government providing a substantial amount of
aid with this as the main motive occurred in 1933, when problems of
excess production, leading to falling prices, caused the United States
to make available a $50 million credit to China for the purchase of 
12 8wheat and cotton. It would seem that an important reason for the
relative absence of aid of this category prior to the New Deal was 
that American policy makers did not see it as part of the function 
of government to provide this type of price support by the public 
purchase of surpluses. Moreover, it would have been more difficult 
to provide aid for this reason when its use as an instrument of 
foreign policy had not been established. There was, of course, con­
cern with the problem of finding outlets for American production 
prior to the New Deal, as, for example, in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century when the production of American manufactured goods 
began to outrun home demand. However, this led, not to attempts to 
dispose of the commodities through economic aid, but rather to a
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vigorous effort to open new trade outlets.
A further aim of American economic assistance has been to 
finance the export of American products. This was first undertaken 
in a significant way by the Export-Import Bank. The explanation 
for the absence of this category of economic assistance previously 
does not lie in any absence of concern with promoting exports, which 
was, as already noted, a preoccupation of American policy makers in 
much earlier periods. Rather, as Chapter Two indicates, it resulted 
from:
* the adequacy of private sources of finance prior to the 
Depression.
* the fact that other governments provided only limited
amounts of public finance for the purpose of promoting 
130exports.
* the reluctance, already noted, of policy makers to extend 
the scope of government operations in ways which would 
interfere with existing private institutions.
Again, small quantities of economic assistance have been 
provided in the post-war period for what seems to have been partly a 
humanitarian concern for the alleviation of severe distress caused 
by famine, earthquakes, and other natural disasters. (Of course, 
other motives, such as the desire to influence attitudes in the 
recipient by demonstrating concern for its problems, have frequently 
also been present.) In the period under review, however, policy 
makers seemed to regard this as a task more appropriate, in most 
cases, to private philanthropy. In some instances, as in the case 
of the Nicaraguan famine of 1912, the American Government requested 
private philanthropic organisations (in this instance the Red Cross)
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to provide supplies, and offered to help with their distribution,
131without, however, itself providing relief.
V
To conclude: the reasons for which assistance was given
during and after World War Two - promoting stability and American 
influence, developing raw material supplies, disposing of surplus 
production, promoting exports, and providing humanitarian relief - 
were also present prior to the New Deal. But they did not, as a 
rule, give rise to significant quantities of economic aid in this 
period. Three principal factors account for this. First, it was 
possible to employ alternative methods to achieve these aims, as a 
result of the adequate flow of private capital abroad, and of the 
ability of the U.S. Government to repeatedly use force and to
directly assume powers over LDC governments. Second, rival powers 
provided little economic aid, and thus did not exert pressure on the 
United States to respond with its own programme, either as a way of 
containing their influence or maintaining its markets. Thirdly, 
attitudes within the United States were unfavourable to the utilisa­
tion of economic assistance. This was, in part, a product of the 
foregoing two factors, but it was also derived from preference for 
a more limited role of government in such areas as providing credits, 
giving price support to commodities by the public purchase of 
surpluses, and using public funds for humanitarian relief purposes.
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CHAPTER TWO.
THE EMERGENCE OF ECONOMIC AID TO 
LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, 1933-1947.
Over the period 1933-1947, American policy makers established 
a number of programmes which had, as part of their purpose, the pro­
vision of economic aid to countries which are now classed as less 
developed. The aim of this chapter is to account for extensive re­
course to economic aid for less developed countries in this interval. 
The first section of the chapter undertakes the preliminary task of 
describing the various programmes through which aid was transferred 
to LDCs. In the second section, an attempt is made to identify the 
factors which explain extensive resort to economic aid. The third 
part contains some case studies which are referred to in the main 
argument, but which, for reasons of space, are examined in detail 
separately.
1. The Emergence of Aid : Description of Programmes
It is convenient to identify three stages in the emergence of 
economic aid over the period reviewed in this chapter. Until 1938 
very little economic aid was provided. Agreement was reached in May, 
1933, for a credit of $50 million to enable China to purchase wheat 
and cotton from the United States. However the terms on which the 
loan was made were quite onerous, and only 17.1 million dollars was 
actually utilised by China, partly because of opposition to the loan 
from Japan, and partly because China was itself faced with a bumper 
crop.’' The Second Export-Import Bank, created in March, 1934, made
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some loans to less developed countries, but its operations were on a
2very limited scale prior to 1938.
During the second stage, extending over 1938-1943, there was 
a considerable expansion in the amount of economic aid provided to less 
developed countries by the United States. It will be seen subsequently 
that much of the increase was prompted by conflict with the Axis 
powers. Economic assistance was provided through several channels. To 
begin with, the activity of Eximbank in less developed countries was 
increased. This was particularly noticeable in the case of Latin Amer­
ica, though the Bank's operations also expanded in other areas, such 
as China. The Table below gives some indication of the increase in 
Eximbank lending to Latin America, though the figure for 1942 is some­
what misleading. By that time, commodities and the shipping space re­
quired to transport them abroad were in short supply, and were allo­
cated with the material requirements of the American war effort very 
much in mind. As a consequence, Eximbank credits could not always be
utilised by the recipient, or if utilised, were expended in some cases
3on items relatively low on the list of priorities of the government. 
Partly for this reason, new Eximbank credits were cut back substant­
ially by 1943, though they remained well above the levels prevailing 
4prior to 1938.
Table 1. Eximbank Loans to Latin America : 1938-44
(in millions of U.S. dollars)
1938 5.5
1939 22.3
1940 65.1
1941 95.2
1942 185.4
1943 30.2
1944 34
Source: W. Binning, The Role of the Export Import Bank in
Inter-American Affairs: Ph.D. dissertation, University 
of Notre Dame, 1970, p.89.
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Lend-Lease provided some assistance to less developed countries 
which would qualify as economic aid under the definition adopted in 
this dissertation. While the Lend-Lease Act (officially An Act to 
Promote the Defence of the United States) authorised the provision of 
’defence articles' and 'defence information', this was understood 
broadly to cover all items, services and credits contributing to the 
war effort.^ From the data available, it is difficult to ascertain 
how much lend-lease assistance fell into the category of economic aid 
as defined here, but some instances can be mentioned in order to illu­
strate the point. Following the invasion of North Africa, the United 
States made available relief supplies and items required for the ex­
pansion of agricultural production under the lend-lease programme.^ 
Again, silver was lent to other countries for industrial and coinage 
purposes from 1943 onwards: India received silver to the value of
more than $150 million under lend-lease, while smaller loans were made 
to Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia.^ Even before the silver loan, India 
received a substantial amount of lend-lease aid which would qualify 
as economic assistance under the definition given here. A report to 
Congress noted that, "emphasis is being placed in lend-lease operations 
on the development of India's own natural resources, her factories 
and her arsenals, and her transportation system", in order that the
g
Burma-China-Indian war front might be supplied more effectively. To 
give a final example, in Liberia the construction of port together 
with the necessary facilities and access roads was financed by a lend- 
lease credit, this being according to Hull one component of a "long 
range policy ... designed to lift the standard of living in this 
traditional godchild of the United States and to strengthen our eco­
nomic and political ties". The credit was to be repaid from harbor
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9revenues.
A variety of other channels provided capital and commodity aid 
to less developed countries in the interval under discussion. Thus 
some economic aid, including a $50 million loan to China, was provided 
by the U.S. Treasury's Stabilisation fund.^^ Again, a special joint 
resolution of Congress in 1942 resulted in the authorisation and appro­
priation of $500 million for financial aid to China, though not all 
of this was utilised during the war period.“^  The Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation and its subsidiaries also provided some economic 
aid to less developed countries: thus the Rubber Development Corpor­
ation, a subsidiary of the R.F.C., provided financial and technical
aid for the expansion of rubber production in Latin America during the 
12Second World War. Relief and other economic aid to areas where 
battle was in progress, or where the population had recently been 
'liberated" by Allied forces was made available through channels other 
than lend-lease: and some part of this went to less developed
countries. One such source of relief was the 'civilian supply' pro­
gramme administered by the armed forces of the United States: another,
though of less significance, was the funds Congress appropriated for
13distribution through the Red Cross.
The interval under discussion also saw the introduction of the 
first significant programmes of technical assistance for underdeveloped 
countries. In the case of Latin America, the main recipient of this 
aid, the programmes may be divided into two groups. The first set was 
carried out under arrangements made immediately prior to the outbreak 
of war in Europe. Under Acts of June, 1938 and May, 1939, the Admini­
stration obtained authority to lend officials and experts to govern­
ments in Latin America (as well as the Philippines and Liberia) which
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requested their services. This was used to make available a number
of officials for advisory services in such areas as engineering and
transportation, customs and immigration procedure, agriculture,
library organisation, and taxation and monetary problems. The United
States continued to pay the salaries of the experts transferred,
though in many cases the recipient governments reimbursed the American
Government for a significant proportion of the costs under separate 
- 14arrangements.
Again, under legislation of August 9, 1939, titled "An Act 
to Authorise the President to Render Closer and More Effective the 
Relationships between the American Republics", the executive was given 
authority to carry out the undertakings made at the inter-American 
conferences of Buenos Aires (1936) and Lima (1938) in such fields as 
health, education and cultural relations. A number of departments and 
agencies, including Agriculture, the Office of Education, Commerce, 
the Library of Congress, and State, participated in this programme. 
Funds required for the programme were provided by appropriations to 
the State Department beginning in fiscal year 1940.^“* Responsibility 
for distributing the funds amoung the various departments and welding 
the projects into a coherent programme was vested in the Interdepart­
mental Committee on Co-operation with the American Republics.^ This 
body had been established in May, 1938, and was comprised of the 
various agencies (initially 13) with an interest in relations with 
Latin America.^ It might be noted that many of the activities car­
ried out under this act were concerned with promoting general cultural 
relations and with diseminating propaganda rather than with economic 
assistance. This was, in particular, true of the State Department's 
contribution, which included distributing documentaries dealing with
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the United States, sponsoring radio programmes, contributing finance 
for the exchange of academics, artists and other professionals between 
the United States and Latin America, and like activities. Other 
aspects of its work, such as equipping libraries and providing scholar­
ships and grants to Latin American students could more reasonably be 
classed as economic aid, though even here, many involved exchanges
with the Latin American countries rather than contributions by the
18United States alone.
The other major technical assistance programme dealing with
Latin America was carried out by the Office of the Co-ordinator of
Inter-American Affairs, with funds appropriated by Congress to the
19Office of Emergency Management of the President. Established under 
a slightly different name in August, 1940, and directed by Nelson 
Rockefeller,^ the technical assistance activities of this agency 
included projects and training in the area of public health and sani­
tation, agriculture, and education. Like the State Department, it 
also carried out projects concerned with promoting general cultural 
relations and distributing propaganda, in addition to its other re­
sponsibilities of co-ordinating and reviewing those activities of the
government (particularly in the field of cultural and commercial
21relations) relevant to hemispheric defence.
Some technical assistance activities were carried out beyond 
Latin America. Thus in the case of China, a programme was initiated 
by the State Department in January, 1942, with a grant from the Presi­
dent's Emergency Fund. According to Under Secretary of State 
Stettinius, this covered "the provision of technical and educational 
leaders to China; the extension of aid to Chinese students in the 
United States thus augmenting China's supply of skilled technicians;
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and the furnishing of certain urgently needed scholarly and scientific
22articles and books, and documentary and educational motion pictures."
The emergency Fund was also used in 1943 to commence a programme in
the Near East and Africa covering public health, education, engineer-
23ing and agriculture.
Estimating the value of the projects described above is some­
what difficult because of the difficulty of drawing a clear distinction 
between technical assistance and other programmes designed to promote 
cultural relations and distribute 'information' of a very general 
nature. A Department of Commerce study, including only "technical 
and scientific activities" in its definition, places the value of eco­
nomic aid from the Co-ordinator of Inter-American Affairs at $50 
million over the period of fiscal years 1941-45, while the amount made
available under the other programmes for co-operation with the Ameri-
24can republics is estimated at $5 million for the same period. No 
data is available on the level of technical aid outside Latin America.
In the third stage identified, extending from 1943 to 1943, 
a number of new programmes, many of them designed with America's post­
war objectives in mind, were added. Among the most important of these 
were two multilateral institutions created at the Bretton Woods Con-
25ference in 1944 - the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
Neither the Bank nor the Fund was extensively involved in transferring
aid to less developed countries before 1948. The Bank did not commence
any major programmes to LDCs before this date, though it subsequently
devoted increasing attention to this task. (From fiscal years 1949-
52 inclusive, Bank lending to less developed countries in Africa, Asia,
26the Near East and Latin America totalled over $600 million, ) Again, 
the volume of funds which the IMF loaned to less developed countries
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in the first years of its operation - not counting instances where
members simply withdrew their 'gold tranche* (the twenty-five percent
of their quote which they had paid in gold or dollars) - was very
small. In 1947, for example, the Fund made two advances to countries
in the region of Latin America: one of $22.5 million to Mexico, and
27another of $8.8 million to Chile. In both cases, however, the
amounts were within the gold tranche and cannot therefore be classed
as aid. In subsequent years, the Fund did provide extensive balance
of payments support, in amounts in excess of the gold tranche, to a
28number of less developed countries. Despite the fact that signi­
ficant lending operations in LDCs did not begin until after the end 
of 1947, it is convenient to consider the two institutions in this 
chapter, for they were established, and payment of American contri­
butions was authorised, during the period under review. The United
States provided $635 million in paid-in capital to the World Bank,
29while its quota for the Fund was fixed at $2750 million.
A further set of programmes which operated over 1943-47 were
concerned with relief in war-devastated countries. The United
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, instituted in November
1943, provided a significant amount of aid to less developed countries,
though the bulk of its assistance went to South and Eastern Europe.
China obtained $518 million over 1945-57. Since the United States
provided 72% of UNRRA funds, it is possible to regard the U.S. 'share'
of this as $373 million. Small amounts were provided to Korea and 
30the Philippines. There were three other bilateral programmes of
31importance concerned with relief. The Civilian Supply Programme 
of the War Department provided extensive aid to Korea. Aid under 
the Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 1946 functioned as the equivalent
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of relief aid, though its ostensible purpose was to compensate for
damage to Philippine property incurred during the Second World War.
A third programme, initiated under the Relief Assistance Act of 1947,
was designed to replace UNRRA, which had fallen from favour among
32American policy makers by that date. Under these three programmes,
China, Korea and the Philippines received almost $900 million, though
33not all of this was allocated prior to the fall of 1947.
Other programmes introduced included small multilateral schemes
34such as the Food and Agriculture Organisation. There were also 
special loans to less developed countries, such as a Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation credit, arranged for the Philippines under special 
Congressional authorisation.
Some of the programmes discussed previously were continued in 
this interval. This was the case with the technical assistance pro­
grammes described above. Those under the Co-ordinator’s Office were 
transferred to the Institute of Inter-American Affairs within the 
State Department in the post-war period. Programmes subject to the 
co-ordination of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Scientific and
Cultural Co-operation continued on an expanded scale until transferred
35to the Technical Co-operation Administration in 1950. Eximbank
also continued its operations: from July 1, 1945 to the fall of 1947,
it authorised credits for Latin America totalling $222 million, while
in the less developed countries of Asia and the Near East, loans of
36approximately half that amount were approved.
11. The Emergence of Aid : Explanation
A number of factors account for the emergence of programmes 
providing significant amounts of aid to less developed countries.
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First, for at least part of the period under review, there were strong 
reasons for providing aid as a means of developing markets and out­
lets for American products. This concern was, to a large extent, a 
consequence of the Depression and of fears of a new depression follow­
ing the Second World War. It was largely the problem of falling 
commodity prices and inadequate demand brought about by the Depression 
which prompted the Roosevelt Administration to undertake its first 
major initiative in the field of economic aid - the agreement of May, 
1933, providing for a credit of $50 million to enable China to purchase 
wheat and cotton from the United States. Cotton prices, which had 
been 16q/pound or better over 1927-29, plummeted to approximately 
6q/pound in 1931-32, with only a mild recovery to 10q/pound in 1933. 
Similarly, wheat prices, which averaged well over lOOq/bushel in the
period 1927-1929, dropped to under 40c/bushel in 1931 and 1932, and
37were still under 75q/bushel in 1933. In these circumstances,
American policy makers adopted a number of measures designed to re-
38store price levels. The Morgenthau diaries provide direct evidence
that the China loan was largely seen in these terms. According to the
diaries, Morgenthau, then Director of the Farm Credits Administration,
supported the credit on two principal grounds. First, he believed
that the credit, even if never repaid, would substantially boost
domestic prices, raising the value of cotton stocks by up to $100
million. Second, he considered that it would help undermine Secretary
of Agriculture Wallace’s strategy of emphasising acreage and crop
39reduction as a way of restoring prices. The credit finally gained
40Roosevelt’s approval, evidently on the first ground.
Concern with markets abroad was also behind most of the loans 
which the Second Export-Import Bank made in LDCs before 1938.
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Although the Bank was established in March, 1934, with the problem
of political instability in Cuba largely in mind, foreign policy
considerations were not of great importance in its other operations
41in less developed countries prior to 1938. Indeed, as will be seen 
subsequently, many U.S. officials were reluctant to allow the Bank to 
lend to governments at all, especially in Latin America, for it was 
believed that this would damage relations with the countries concerned. 
Cuba apart, such loans as the Bank made to LDCs in its first years 
were essentially the result of a desire to promote exports. Assist­
ance in financing exports was, by this time, attractive on two counts. 
There was first the problem, already mentioned, of finding outlets
for American agricultural products. It was in this field that the
42Bank’s first President, Peek, saw its primary role. Eximbank did 
make a number of loans in its first years for the purpose of financing 
agricultural exports, but for the most part they were extended to 
European countries, and they are not therefore of principal concern 
to this dissertation. The other problem was that of financing the 
export of capital goods such as heavy machinery and railway equipment. 
Such exports frequently required long term credit arrangements, but 
with the Depression, as the Executive Vice President of the Bank noted, 
private sources of credit on this basis had become far more difficult 
to obtain. In the twenties, a considerable volume of long term 
credit had been provided by the successive extension of ninety day 
bank loans, but this source was greatly curtailed with the recall of 
a considerable quantity of short term money under the impact of the 
Depression. Another source of long term finance - the foreign bond
market - had likewise ceased to generate an adequate volume of funds. 
The problem was rendered more difficult for American exporters, since
43
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their competitors in Great Britain, Italy, France and Japan could 
draw on governmental institutions which those countries had esta­
blished to promote exports in the period since the end of the First 
44World War. Eximbank therefore took on the function of providing
relatively long term export credits (1-5 years) to finance the export
of durable manufactured goods. For the most part, they financed sales
to Latin America and the Far East, which were the chief markets for
45American products of this type.
As conflict with the Axis powers intensified, the immediate 
problem of expanding markets for American products became less pres­
sing. Supplies to allies and the American war effort itself increas­
ingly absorbed U.S. agricultural and industrial production. But as 
policy makers turned their attention to post-war problems, the question 
of outlets for American products again came to the forefront of 
attention. With the experience of the Depression and its aftermath 
in mind, and aware of the vast increase in industrial and agricultural 
production which had occurred under wartime mobilisation, policy makers
were apprehensive over the problem of maintaining prosperity in the 
46post-war world. The thirties, as Under Secretary of State Welles
noted, in a statement typical of those made in 1943 and 1944, had:
seen our export industries all but 
destroyed, our surpluses backed up on 
the domestic market with ruinous effects 
on prices. Our export industries were 
sick and the buying power of the large 
and important interests dependent on foreign 
trade was rapidly shrinking. We saw that 
sickness spread throughout our economy.
The decline of our foreign trade had 
contributed materially to creating the 
worst depression in our history.
An expansion of international trade was necessary, in part, because:
when the war is over we will be faced with 
domestic problems of the utmost difficulty.
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We have enormously expanded our productive 
facilities in many lines of industry and 
agriculture. We shall be faced with the 
problem of maintaining the present level 
of employment and at the same time re­
absorbing millions of demobilised soldiers.
The Under Secretary of Commerce noted in May, 1943:
The United States will emerge from the War 
with an enormously expanded industrial and 
agricultural capacity and will be confronted 
with grave difficulties of readjustment to 
peacetime conditions. ... A healthy and 
continuing foreign demand for American goods 
will greatly facilitate these adjustments, 
minimize the dangers of economic collapse 
and unemployment, and generally assist in 
the maintenance of production and national 
income at high levels.
In the understanding of many U.S. policy makers, the problem 
of obtaining markets for American products in the post-war period 
could be handled, within the framework of capitalism, by a series of 
measures designed to achieve a restoration of economic growth in other 
countries, an international economy in which nations were relatively 
open to trade and investment from abroad, and an increasing volume of 
international commerce. For the sake of brevity, this objective will 
be described as that of an expanding, liberal world economy. The 
various aspects of this objective were understood to be mutually re­
inforcing. Thus, prosperity abroad would create a greater demand for 
goods and services from the United States and other economies, and 
weaken those forces seeking to shelter the overseas economies from 
increased international trade. And an expanding international commerce 
would promote growth in the United States and abroad by adding to
domestic demand, and through the advantages of international special- 
49isation. Markets for American products were not the only sources
of impetus for a strategy of the kind described. As noted below,
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it was also considered that economic expansion and increasing inter­
national trade would contribute towards peace and stability in the 
post-war world.
There were several conditions for the establishment of an 
expanding liberal international economy as American policy makers 
conceived it. First, a theme particularly dear to Cordell Hull, but 
by no means confined to him, it was thought necessary to liberalise 
trade and to begin to dismantle the special tariffs and import quotas 
which had been imposed to an increasing extent from the end of the 
First World War and raised to new heights in the thirties. Further, 
a need was seen for some stability in the exchange rates of currencies, 
as well as provisions ensuring, as far as possible, against the impo­
sition of restrictions on the convertibility of currencies. The 
experience of competitive currency devaluations and exchange controls 
of the thirties had convinced American policy makers that such measures 
were entirely inimical to the expanding volume of international com­
merce which they wished to encourage in the post-war world.
It was also thought necessary to restore the flow of product­
ive investment from the United States to other countries. As noted 
previously, the flow of private investment from the United States had 
declined abruptly with the onset of the Depression.Special arrange­
ments were deemed necessary, both to restore it and to ensure that, 
unlike many of the loans which went to Latin America in the twenties, 
it was channeled into projects which would directly or indirectly
contribute to generating the foreign exchange necessary for repay- 
52ment. As policy makers in the Administration saw it, this flow of 
foreign investment would be advantageous, not only to the recipients, 
but also to the United States, for it would, among other benefits,
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provide foreign countries with the dollars needed to purchase American 
goods, and promote that prosperity and growth which would provide for 
increased markets and trade in the future. Private and public invest­
ment by the United States in less developed countries was seen as an 
important component of the total flow, though there was disagreement 
as to the amount required, and the emphasis which would have to be 
placed on public channels. One report, warmly received by Roosevelt, 
indicated that the United States should be ready to invest up to $3.5
billion over a decade in Latin America, of which three quarters might
53have to be under government auspices. But whatever the amount and
form thought desirable, there was widespread agreement that the flow 
would dovetail with the general strategy described above, and contri­
bute to the objective of American prosperity. A Department of Commerce 
study noted that:
The great task of economic development 
throughout the world in general and 
especially in areas which have hitherto 
enjoyed few of the benefits of progress 
... will entail procurement of American 
goods in heavy volume. They will 
immediately require machinery and equip­
ment of types in the manufacture of 
which American industry excels. In the 
long run, moreover, the increase in 
industrialisation and living standards 
abroad should provide a strong and 
enduring demand for our producer’s goods 
and also for ... American manufactured 
consumers' goods so attractive to people 
with rising incomes. 54
Finally, it was understood within the Administration that 
special measures for immediate relief and reconstruction of devastated 
economies would be necessary if the goal of an expanding liberal world 
economy was to be achieved. The Director of the Office of Foreign 
Relief and Rehabilitation Operations noted in June, 1943, that:
Unless the United States, in concert with
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the other United Nations, extends a helping 
hand ... we can anticipate with certainty 
that the liberated areas for decades will 
suffer from disrupted economies, crushing 
burdens of unemployment, shattering inflations, 
and the internal turmoil which adds up to 
chaos ... if America is to have any hope of 
lasting peace and a stable world economy it 
must help to see to it that the liberated 
peoples of the world are restored as rapidly 
as possible to a self-sustaining basis ... 
International trade cannot flourish or sound 
economic expansion take place in a world 
tormented by expectations of the violence 
that is born of suffering and misery. And 
the United States, in the period after this 
war, will need the outlets of a total world 
market unless our economy is to face a 
terrific contraction in a shattering post-war 
depression. 55
A number of the programmes of economic aid established either
by the United States or under its leadership were designed with the
aim of an expanding liberal world economy largely or partly in mind.
This was the case with the International Monetary Fund and the World 
56Bank. The importance of the Fund, as American officials saw it,
was that it would promote stability of exchange rates (avoiding, in
particular, competitive currency devaluations of the type which had
characterised the thirties), and inhibit resort to special exchange
controls and restrictions hampering the expansion of international trade
and investment. The Fund would perform this task in several ways.
The articles of Agreement themselves imposed certain obligations on
members in these respects. As Acheson noted:
A member of the Fund agrees upon four 
principles: First, to define its money
in terras of gold; second, to keep its 
money within 1 percent of its defined 
value; third, not to restrict current 
transactions in its currency; and fourth, 
to consult with the Fund whenever a problem 
comes up which it feels makes a change in 
the value of its currency necessary.58
Again, the Fund provided an alternate means of dealing with immediate
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balance of payments difficulties, since it could provide countries 
with resources from subscriptions paid in by other members. Finally, 
the Fund could attempt to influence the policies of countries experi­
encing balance of payments difficulties in ways considered conducive 
to restoring equilibrium and contributing to the realisation of the 
Fund’s other objectives. The idea of attaching conditions of this 
type to drawings on the Fund’s resources had been an important aspect 
of early plans drafted by Harry Dexter White, and while the British 
had raised certain objections to this, it remained possible for the
I.M.F. to impose such conditions under the articles agreed upon at 
59Bretton Woods.
The purpose of the World Bank as American policy makers saw it, 
was to promote the flow of capital abroad for both post-war recon­
struction and development. The Bank was to stimulate private foreign 
investment by participating in, or guaranteeing, loans from private 
investors, and was,
when private capital is not available on 
reasonable terms, to supplement private 
investment by providing, on suitable 
conditions, finance for productive 
purposes out of its own capital, funds^ 
raised by it, and its other resources.
The function of the Bank as a guarantor of private capital was evi­
dently seen as more important, and direct lending less significant, 
than was actually to be the case when the Bank commenced operations.^ 
There was some difference of opinion among American policy makers and 
others at the Bretton Woods Conference as to the relative priority
which the Bank should accord to reconstruction of war torn areas as
62opposed to the claims of less developed areas.
The objective of an expanding liberal world economy was also
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part of the justification for American participation in the United 
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and other relief 
programmes, as the statement by Lehman cited earlier indicates. How­
ever, these programmes were also justified on humanitarian grounds, 
on the basis of the contribution they were thought to make to immed­
iate political stability, and on the ground that relief efforts would 
shorten the war, both by expanding the quality and quantity of man­
power and resources available from liberated countries, and by strength­
ening the spirit of resistance among those still subject to pro-Axis 
- 63governments.
A second factor accounting for the emergence of significant 
programmes of economic aid for LDCs over 1932-47 was the presence of 
strong foreign policy and defence motives for providing aid, arising 
principally from the conflict with the Axis powers and from the nature 
of American post-war objectives. Foreign policy considerations were 
important even earlier in contributing to the creation of the Second 
Export-Import Bank in 1934. Having succeeded in displacing the radical 
government of Grau San Martin in Cuba, policy makers evidently esta­
blished the Bank as one of a series of measures designed to stabilise
64the situation and strengthen the position of the Mendieta regime. 
However, this case aside, foreign policy considerations were not parti­
cularly Important Ln promoting the transfer of economic aid up to 
1937. The United States was interested in promoting co-operation with 
many LDCs in this interval, but economic aid was not, in general, con­
sidered a suitable instrument for this purpose. Thus although aiming 
to promote better relations with Latin American countries under the 
terms of the Good Neighbour policy, American decision makers tended 
to reject proposals which involved the transfer of economic aid to
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these countries: indeed, as already noted, the United States was
reluctant to lend money to governments at all, even where the purpose
65was essentially commercial.
It will be noted subsequently that this attitude had changed 
by 1938. Accordingly, the way was cleared for American policy makers 
to provide increasing amounts of aid as an instrument of foreign and 
defence policy as the conflict with the Axis powers intensified. From 
1938 through the war period, aid was used to increase influence over 
other governments or deny it to hostile powers, to create good will 
for the United States and its cause, to strengthen the capacity of 
recipients to resist the Axis powers, to contribute to political stab­
ility where this was considered important to the effort against the 
opposing powers, and to add to the production of resources needed for 
the war effort. The importance of these considerations in contribut­
ing to the expansion of economic aid over 1938-43 is illustrated in 
four case studies in the third section of this chapter,
America’s post-war foreign policy objectives contributed to 
the introduction of new programmes of economic aid, and to the contin­
uation of these established earlier. A principal objective of U.S. 
policy was that of promoting the conditions for a more peaceful and 
stable post-war world. In the understanding of policy makers, this 
required arllon In prmunle a relurn to pronperllv «broad, and In eu 
sure liberal trading and financial arrangements among countries. As 
they saw it, increasing protection, competitive currency devaluations, 
and other failures in the international economic system had played an 
important part in the rise of totalitarian militarist states in the 
thirties and In the drill towards war. Action to promote the goal 
described caillet - that ot an expanding liberal world economy - was
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therefore important, not only because it would contribute to American
prosperity, but also because it would promote the conditions for a
66stable, peaceful post-war world. It has already been seen that the 
objective of an expanding liberal world economy led policy makers to 
support new programmes of economic aid, most notably the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund.
Apart from this general objective, the United States had more 
specific goals in particular regions and countries. In many cases, 
interests in influencing the character or policies of other govern­
ments, maintaining or promoting stability, or similar objectives, 
encouraged new commitments of aid, or the continuation of programmes 
which owed their origins to other circumstances. Three examples can 
be mentioned briefly here: they are taken up in greater detail in
the case material in the third section of the chapter. In Latin 
America, the United States remained interested in promoting more 
cordial relations with the Latin American republics. This was an 
important factor in the continuation of technical assistance programmes 
in the region. In Saudi Arabia, interest in the stability of King Ibn 
Saud's regime, and in access to Saudi oil reserves led to the provision 
of economic assistance during and after the Second World War. In 
China, the attempt to build a stable political accord between the 
communist forces and the Kuomintang was partly responsible for a 
decision to earmark $500 million in Eximbank credits for that country 
in 1946. However, in this case, the aid was not actually provided 
for relations between the two forces quickly deteriorated.
A third factor encouraging the emergence of economic aid for 
LDCs was a change in attitudes on the part of American policy makers 
concerning the effectiveness of aid as a foreign policy instrument.
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As noted earlier, policy makers tended to reject the idea of providing 
aid to other governments during the thirties, even if its purpose was 
essentially commercial. In their understanding, the provision of 
economic aid was likely to damage relations with other governments.
If the aid was provided as credits, it was thought that the problem 
of obtaining repayment might well lead to tension between the United 
States and the recipient. Examples of this problem were not difficult 
to find. The United States had itself found problems of this kind 
after providing loans to European countries during and after the First 
World War. Again, it was considered that the provisions of loans to 
one government could lead to problems in relations with other govern­
ments not so favoured. It was also thought that the transfer of 
economic aid might well give rise to suspicion of American motives.
In Latin America, in particular, the Good Neighbour policy was only 
of recent origin: past experience of American ’dollar diplomacy’ of
the kind outlined in Chapter One, and the record of American inter­
vention in the region, had given rise to considerable suspicion of 
American objectives.^
While these beliefs did not completely rule out aid to other 
governments, they did make policy makers reluctant to provide it.
There were a number of instances where the attitudes described were 
important factors in the rejection of proposals to transfer economic- 
aid to less developed countries. In 1933, for instance, Roosevelt 
suggested to Cordell Hull, then at the Montevideo Conference, that 
the United States offer to provide $5 million to finance a corporation 
for the purpose of improving civil aviation facilities in Latin 
America. Hull notes in his memoirs that:
I was forced to cable in reply that
the reaction to any offer of money was
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unfavourable. 'One reaction', T said,
'is that of Inquiring at once what the 
United States is after now. This warped 
state of mind, which seems to be widespread 
just now, does not look with favor even on 
benefactions or accommodation loans or 
advances to these people, especially by 
our Government.' In other words, no 
dollar diplomacy whatever. 6®
Again, State Department opposition, stemming partly from the
considerations described above, seems to have been an important
factor in the rejection of a number of proposals for Eximbank loans
69to Latin American governments. Thus the State Department opposed 
proposals for loans to Nicaragua and Brazil when asked to comment by 
the Export Import Bank. The governments of these countries, like a 
number of others in Latin America, had imposed foreign exchange ration­
ing with the onset of the Depression. American exporters to the two 
nations were generally provided with notes from government controlled 
banks, but the notes were not immediately convertible into dollars.
The exporters therefore requested, first, the Eximbank purchase these 
notes, and second, that the Bank should bear the risk of the notes not 
ultimately being convertible into dollars. With respect to Nicaragua, 
the Department argued that the Bank should not become a creditor to a 
Central American government in this way, since it would mark a return 
to 'dollar diplomacy', with the result that "instead of being a good 
neighbour, we should again be regarded as an International Shy lock".
In the case of Brazil, the Department held that it would damage tela- 
tions with other countries if the United States dealt with the obli­
gations of some countries and not those of others. It was also argued 
in this instance that the loan would be inconsistent with American 
trade policy, and that the government would be accused of providing 
funds for corporations which could well carry on without aid.
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The State Department also opposed proposals for Eximbank loans 
to Costa Rica, Venezuela and Peru, either because the Bank would have 
become a creditor of the governments concerned, or become involved 
in the foreign exchange situation of those countries. In a further 
case involving Brazil in 1936, the State Department did approve the 
purchase of up to $27 million in notes issued by the Bank of Brazil, 
but it successfully sought as a condition that American exporters 
incur the risk of the notes not ultimately being exchangeable for con­
vertible currency, presumably calculating that, under these conditions 
relations with Brazil would not be unduly strained if that country 
defaulted. The Department also agreed, in 1935, to some dealings 
with agencies of Mexico's federal and provincial governments - over 
the opposition of Welles who referred to an earlier policy decision 
that:
It would be decidedly prejudicial to our 
present policy on this Continent if the United 
States Government through the Export-Import 
Bank were at any time forced into the position 
of becoming the creditor of the government 
of an American republic or of any provincial 
or municipal government of one of the American 
republics. 71
The reason for this exception is not entirely clear.
By the late thirties, reluctance to provide aid to other govern 
ments had largely given way to the view that economic assistance 
could serve as a useful means of enlisting co-operation and promoting 
other foreign policy objectives. The case material in the third 
section of this chapter notes that Eximbank made sizeable loans to 
governments in 1938 and 1939, and that loans from this date were fre­
quently made with a view to promoting more favourable relations with
other governments.
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Several factors seem to have been important in contributing to, 
and confirming, the changed assessment of the effectiveness of aid 
as a foreign policy instrument. The Axis powers made extensive use 
of economic instruments as a means of extending their influence. As 
the case material in section three indicates, American policy makers 
were alarmed at the way in which the Axis powers, especially Germany, 
employed these instruments in Latin America. The successful use of 
these measures by other governments doubtless contributed to a change 
in American attitudes. The urgency of wartime requirements was also 
important. Not only did this contribute to a reappraisal of existing 
policy: it also focused attention on the immediate advantages of
credits rather than on the long term problems which might arise from 
attempts to secure repayment. Moreover, by the late thirties, there 
was somewhat closer accord, and rather less suspicion of the United 
States in Latin America than had been the case a decade earlier. It 
is likely that this, too, made the climate for extending loans more 
favourable. Experience with aid programmes seems to have frequently 
confirmed the view that they were effective instruments of foreign 
policy. In recommending the continuation of technical assistance 
programmes in Latin America in 1944, Under Secretary of State Stettinius 
was able to argue that they had been effective in their purpose of 
establishing closer relations with the American republics. Similarly, 
Secretary of State Marshall argued in 1947, when supporting the ex­
tension of similar programmes, that an exhaustive review of the effect­
iveness of the programmes by the State Department had concluded that
they had made an important contribution to relations with Latin Ameri- 
72can countries. Finally, less developed countries themselves made
strong efforts to obtain economic assistance from the United States
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or its rivals over the period reviewed. The existence of aid pro­
grammes, new opportunities to exact aid from the United States as the 
price of wartime co-operation, and increased requirements for aid in 
less developed countries, were probably responsible for this. Liberia's 
efforts to involve the United States in construction of a harbour, 
and Brazil's attempts to obtain finance for the Volta Redonda steel 
mill, both discussed in the case material in section three, provide 
examples of this. The importance which less developed countries 
attached to aid doubtless served to confirm to American policy makers 
that it was a useful source of influence.
It must be added that the change in attitudes regarding the 
effectiveness of aid as a foreign policy instrument opened the way for 
all types of loans and grants to other governments, even those not 
made with foreign policy purposes in mind. Concern over the foreign 
relations problems likely to arise from the provision of aid had tended 
to prevent even export credits to other governments during the thirties, 
as the previous case studies have made clear. By the end of the Second 
World War, Eximbank had largely reverted, in Latin America, to the
73role of financing exports by reference to strict commercial criteria.
But given the changed attitude, it was not prevented from making large 
loans to governments where its criteria regarding repayment and bene­
fits to American industry were satisfied.
A fourth factor contributing to extensive use of economic aid 
in less developed areas was the substantial requirements of these 
countries for aid in the period reviewed. There were several reasons 
for this. To begin with, a number of countries found their economies 
disrupted as a result of the Second World War. In some cases, this 
was because of damage caused by occupation or armed combat. The United
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States frequently provided aid in such cases, both for immediate 
relief purposes, and to assist in the restoration of production. This 
was an important function of the various relief agencies to which the 
United States contributed. But loans for this purpose were also made 
under other programmes. Thus Eximbank provided a number of small 
credits to China, totalling over $66 million in the first part of 1946: 
of this amount, $33 million was to finance the export of raw cotton, 
while the remainder was for railway, mining and shipping equipment. 
These were evidently not used as an instrument in the Administration's 
effort to bring about an accord between the Communist Party and the 
Kuomintang, but were, as President Truman stated, "Minor credits to 
the Chinese Government in an effort to meet emergency rehabilitation 
needs as it was doing for other war devastated countries throughout 
the world.
Other countries experienced economic dislocation as a result 
of the collapse of foreign markets or sources of supply under the 
impact of war. As the case material in section three of this chapter 
notes, the Latin American economies faced severe problems following 
the outbreak of war in Europe in late 1939. Europe as a whole absorbed 
more than half of Latin America's exports, and a good deal of this, 
including trade with Germany, and with neutrals subject to Allied em­
bargo, was affected. This loss was not Immediately offset by increased 
purchases from the Allies. As the case material indicates, the sever­
ity of Latin America's economic problems was a significant factor in 
the expansion of Eximbank lending to the region. It also helps to 
account for the fall off in new Eximbank loans in 1943 and 1944 noted 
in Table 1. By this time, the Latin American countries had little 
need for new loans, for they could not effectively utilise the dollars
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which they had already acquired. By mid-1941, U.S. imports from 
Latin America were running at around one billion dollars a year, 
compared with the $450 million in purchases made in 1938. The 
increased purchases arising from the war supply effort, together with 
the shortages and restrictions on exports to Latin America, meant 
that the unfavourable foreign exchange position of the Latin American 
republics of 1940 had been reversed by 1943, and substantial reserves 
were being accumulated.^
The requirements of less developed countries also increased as
a result of the sharp decline in private capital flows from the United
States, Great Britain and other creditor countries following the on-
76set of the Depression. Evidence of this decline, for the case of
the United States, is given in Table 2. This shows that the United
Table 2: Net Long Term Private Capital Outflow from
The United States, 1925-1939._____________
(data in millions of U.S. dollars. Negative signs 
denote net capital inflow.)
1925 543
1926 696
1927 991
1928 798
1929 240
1930 221
1931 -194
1932 -225
1933 - 77
1934 -200
1935 -436
1936 -777
1937 -521
1938 - 97
19 39 - 27
Source: D. Snider, Introduction to International Economics:
Irwin, 3rd ed., 1963, pp. 114, 116.
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States changed from being a significant source of private long term 
capital in the nineteen twenties to a position where it was a net 
importer in the nineteen thirties. There was a small outflow of 
private long term capital during and after the Second World War, but 
it was not until 1956 that this reached, in real terms, the peak ob­
tained in the late nineteen twenties.77 Great Britain also became a
78capital importer in the thirties.
Loans from private banks and capital markets of rich countries 
had been an important source of funds for less developed countries 
prior to the Depression. Had private lending of this type continued 
to expand over the period reviewed, it is likely that there would have 
been less recourse to special government sources of finance. Eximbank 
lending would presumably have been at much lower levels, for it has 
already been seen that an important factor in the initial extension 
of Eximbank credits to less developed countries was the curtailment of 
private sources of finance following the Depression. Again, a central 
purpose of the World Bank, as it was conceived by those at Bretton 
Woods, was that of restoring the flow of capital to less developed 
countries which had been disrupted from the onset of the Depression.
Finally, there were important changes occurring in many less 
developed countries over the period under review - changes which tended 
to increase their requirements for aid. Whether these changes are 
discussed under the heading of 'the revolution of rising expectations’, 
'economic nationalism', or some other label, their import was that 
governments of LDCs tended to place a higher priority than hitherto 
on achieving high rates of economic growth, particularly the growth 
of Industrial production; and that political movements within them 
w i o  uu--icayiuy.lv dole twined to overcome a situation in which their
117.
economies were subject to the domination of foreign interests, and
functioned largely as suppliers of agricultural products and raw
79materials for industrialised countries. Industrialisation and a
greater role for governments in promoting economic development tended 
to add to the requirements for economic aid. Brazil’s efforts to 
obtain finance for a major steel industry of its own, discussed in 
section three of this chapter, provides one example of this.
Fifth, the emergence of economic aid was encouraged by a shift 
away from alternative methods of influencing events in less developed 
countries. These alternatives included direct military intervention, 
the use of customs receiverships, gunboat diplomacy, and measures to 
facilitate or deny loans from private sources. The use of these techni­
ques in Latin American in the first part of the century has been exam­
ined in Chapter One. As noted in that chapter, recourse to these 
instruments became less feasible during the nineteen thirties. In 
Latin America, the Roosevelt Administration committed itself to non­
intervention as one component of its Good Neighbour policy. And with 
the marked decline in private capital flows, the technique of facili­
tating loans from private sources, or denying access to them, became 
less viable.
Two examples may be taken to illustrate the way in which 
reluctance to use the techniques discussed above contributed to the 
use of economic assistance. In 1933 and early 1934, 11.S. officials 
were evidently concerned with the political situation in Cuba - 
characterised by unrest and the emergence of a radical regime under 
Grau San Martin. The American Government had encountered broadly 
similar circumstances in the region on a number of occasions. In the 
past, it had frequently responded with military intervention, and
action to arrange loans from private sources, usually with customs
80receipts as security. By the early thirties, however, such measures
were considered unacceptable. Though the American Ambassador Welles
recommended military intervention following the assumption of power
by Grau, the Administration was determined to avoid landing troops,
and accordingly sought more indirect methods of influencing the course 
81of events. These measures included the offer of economic advantages
82in order to encourage the displacement of Grau, and the creation of 
Eximbank to stablise the situation once a regime acceptable to the 
United States had emerged.
Argentina offers a second example. The government of this
country was a source of some difficulty for the United States during
the course of the Second World War, for it often failed to line up
with other Latin American countries in support of American policy;
indeed, many American policy makers considered it to be sympathetic
to the Axis powers. An important objective of American policy during
this period was that of inducing Argentina to adopt a stance which
involved closer alignment with the United States. However, policy
makers did not resort to military action, and for some time, rejected
sanctions of any kind. Thus Hull was initially opposed to a proposal
to freeze funds held by Argentina in the United States on the ground
8 Ithat this marked a return to 'big stick’ diplomacy. In place ot
such methods, aid and other economic instruments were employed. 
Approval was given in late 1940 for a $60 million Eximbank credit and 
a $50 million loan from the Treasury’s Stabilisation Fund, apparently 
as one means of containing Axis influence. (The credit was not, how­
ever, utilised, since the Argentine Congress failed to enact the
84necessary legislation. ) Subsequently, in 1941, the United States
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concluded a new trade agreement, apparently designed to some extent
to ease Argentina's economic position, and according to Hull made
possible in part by the "growing realisation by Americans that good
trade relations with other American republics, notably Argentina, were
85essential to effective hemispheric co-operation." These measures
failed to bring Argentina into line. Thus at the Rio Conference of
American states in January, 1942, Argentina was the chief obstacle to
U.S. efforts to obtain a joint declaration severing diplomatic rela-
86tions with the Axis powers. As the price of maintaining hemispheric
unity, the American delegation under Welles was forced to accept a
milder resolution which merely recommended suspension of diplomatic
relations in accordance with the procedures and circumstances of each 
8 7country. Welles subsequently wired Hull that,
Although he was not going to put 
direct pressure on Argentina, he 
had let it be known that the United 
States could not aid those countries 
which did not co-operate fully as 
much as it could those who did so 
wholeheartedly. ^8
Later, the United States approved a major loan to Uraguay designed,
according to the U.S. Ambassador to that country, to show "that Uraguay
89appears to achieve substantially better treatment than Argentina."
A sixth factor in the emergence of aid was a relatively favour­
able political climate arising from increased acceptance of govern­
ment intervention in the economy, and the way in which economic aid 
was linked with other issues with broad support. It has been suggested 
In the first chapter that reluctance to accept wider government involve­
ment in the economy was a factor discouraging resort to aid in the 
first part of the century. Between 1933 and 1947, this was much less 
significant as a constraint on economic aid, though more conservative
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members of Congress still raised objections to some proposals seen 
as attempts to extend New Deal measures into international economic 
relations.^
There would doubtless have been increasing acceptance of govern­
ment intervention in the normal course of events, for there was a 
persistent tendency in this direction in the first two thirds of the 
present century. But several factors accelerated the change over the 
period reviewed. First, the Depression gave rise to demands for much 
broader intervention in the economy and was responsible for the 
extension of government activity in a number of areas including assist­
ance to business, regulation of economic activity and welfare measures. 
Again, as a result of the Second World War, the Federal Government 
assumed much broader control of the economy, with extensive regulation 
of production, distribution and exchange. Finally, the election of 
the New Deal Administration, and its continuance in office over the 
period reviewed, tended to encourage the extension of government 
activity.
While the general change in attitudes described probably en­
couraged resort to economic aid, and helped to make possible measures
91of the kind proposed at Bretton Woods, there were also instances 
where specific government powers acquired to deal with depression and 
war proved helpful in introducing programmes of economic aid. Thus, 
it was under the broad powers granted to the government to enable it 
to deal with the Depression that the China credit was made, and the 
Export Import Bank first established by executive order. Again, funds 
appropriated to the office of Emergency management of the President 
to deal with wartime contingencies were used to finance technical 
assistance programmes in Latin America, China, the Near East and
1 2 1 .
A f r i c a  i n  1942 and 1943. 92
A number o f  a i d  programmes i n t r o d u c e d  d u r in g  t h e  p e r i o d  u n d e r  
r e v ie w  w ere  n o t  c o n f in e d  t o  l e s s  d e v e lo p e d  c o u n t r i e s ,  b u t  c o v e re d  a id  
t o  E uropean  c o u n t r i e s  o r  w ere  p a r t  o f  more g e n e r a l  p r o p o s a l s .  T h is  
p r o b a b ly  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  e x p a n s io n  o f  a i d  i n  l e s s  d e v e lo p e d  
c o u n t r i e s  w here  t h e r e  was w id e s p re a d  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  b r o a d e r  p r o ­
grammes. Thus a i d  t o  c o n s t r u c t  a  h a rb o u r  i n  L i b e r i a  c o u ld  be  f i n a n c e d
93from  fu n d s  a v a i l a b l e  u n d e r  t h e  much b r o a d e r  programme o f  L e n d -L e a s e .  
A g a in ,  C ong ress  a p p ro v e d  a m a s s iv e  i n c r e a s e  i n  Exim bank’ s l e n d i n g  
a u t h o r i t y  i n  J u l y ,  1945 , from  $700 m i l l i o n  t o  $3500 m i l l i o n .  T e s t i ­
mony r e p o r t e d  to  t h e  S e n a te  Committee on B anking  and C u r re n c y  had  
i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  E x im b a n k 's  p o s i t i o n  i n  m id-1945 was such  t h a t  o n ly
$150 m i l l i o n  i n  new l o a n s  c o u ld  b e  made b e f o r e  th e  l i m i t  o f  i t s  l e n d -
94in g  a u t h o r i t y  was r e a c h e d .  The i n c r e a s e  was v o te d  by C o n g re s s  w i th  
t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  European  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  and A m erican  t r a d i n g  
i n t e r e s t s  i n  Europe l a r g e l y  i n  m ind . The W orld Bank, i n t e n d e d  a s  th e  
m ain  v e h i c l e  f o r  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  l e n d i n g ,  was a t  t h e  same t im e  p r e p a r ­
i n g  i t s e l f  f o r  o p e r a t i o n s ,  w h i l e  t h e  o t h e r  p o s s i b l e  c h a n n e l  o f  a s s i s t -
95a n c e ,  L e n d -L e a s e ,  had  been  p r e c i p i t o u s l y  t e r m i n a t e d .  The f a c t  t h a t  
t h e  i n c r e a s e  was a im ed a t  Europe made i t  p o s s i b l e  f o r  t h e  m easu re  to  
o b t a i n  a  h ig h  l e v e l  o f  s u p p o r t  i n  C o n g re s s .  Thus t h e  House Committee 
on B anking  and C u rren c y  r e p o r t e d  t h e  m easu re  1 8 - 2 ,  w h i l e  t h e  S e n a te  
a p p ro v e d  i t  u n a n im o u s ly .  By c o n t r a s t ,  t h e  e x t e n s i o n  o f  Eximbank 
o p e r a t i o n s  in  L a t i n  A m erican had been  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  i n  t h e  p a s t .  
S u p p o r t e r s  o f  th e  1945 l e g i s l a t i o n  i n c lu d e  t h o s e ,  such  a s  T a f t ,  who 
had lo n g  opposed  t h e  e x p a n s io n  o f  t h e  B a n k 's  o p e r a t i o n s  i n  L a t i n  
A m erica ,  b u t  who f a v o u r e d  t h e  i n c r e a s e  u n d e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  a s  a  tem p­
o r a r y  m easu re  f o r  t h e  p u rp o s e  o f  a s s i s t i n g  European  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n .
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Even so, the increase made possible increased lending to Latin
96America, as well as to Europe.
Seventh: there were some senses in which a growth in the
capacity of the United States to provide aid encouraged use of it.
The United States emerged from the Second World War with a Gross
National Product which was, in real terms, substantially above pre-war
or pre-Depression levels. Government revenue and the American trade
surplus had also increased significantly. Tables 3 and 4 provide
97evidence on these points. Had these changes not occurred, production 
shortages, budgetary problems, or foreign exchange difficulties might 
have kept aid to less developed countries at lower levels during and 
after the Second World War. As it was, shortages during the Second 
World War imposed constraints on economic aid. It has already been 
noted that Eximbank credits could not always be utilised by recipients; 
even if used, they were expended in some cases on items relatively 
low on the recipient's list of priorities. Agreements for the provi­
sion of Eximbank loans typically made note of the point that commo­
dities were in short supply and that they would be allocated with the 
requirements of the American war effort in mind. Thus in a letter 
of April, 1942, to the Peruvian Minister of Finance and Commerce on 
a $25 million loan to finance public works and agricultural, mining 
and industrial projects, Secretary of State Hull noted that:
The United States cannot undertake to 
furnish machinery and equipment in short 
supply due to the exigencies of war, and 
... priorities necessary to acquire such 
items will be granted only after careful 
study and determination that the establish­
ment of the industry for which they are 
needed will contribute directly in important 
measure to the war effort of the United 
States and the security of the Hemisphere. 98
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Table _3: United States: Gross National Product,
Government Receipts, 1929-1947.______
Gross National Federal Budget
Product in Receipts,
1958 dollars. Current dollars
1929 203.6 billion 3862 million
1933 141.5 1997
1939 209.4 4979
1940 227.2 6879
1941 263.7 9202
1942 297.8 15104 "
1943 337.1 25097
1944 361.3 47818
1945 355.2 50162
1946 312.6 43537
1947 309.9 43531
Source: Economic Report of the President,
Transmitted to the Congress, January, 1973, 
together with the Annual Report of the 
Council of Economic Advisers:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973, 
pp. 194, 267.
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Table 4:^ United States: Exports, Imports, 1926--1947.
(data in millions of current dollars.)
Exports Imports Excess of
(merchandise) (merchandise) over In
1926 4809 4431 378
1927 4865 4185 681
1928 5128 4091 1037
1929 5241 4399 842
1930 3843 3061 782
1931 2424 2091 334
1932 1611 1323 288
1933 1675 1450 225
1934 2133 1655 478
1935 2283 2047 235
1936 2456 2423 33
1937 3349 3084 265
1938 3094 1960 1134
1939 3177 2318 859
1940 4021 2625 1396
1941 5147 3345 1802
1942 8079 2745 5334
1943 12965 3381 9584
1944 14259 3919 10339
1945 9806 4147 5659
1946 9739 4909 4831
1947 14456 5733 8724
Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States3 1948.
Because of rounding, the data in columns 2 and 3 
may not add precisely to that in column 1.
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Eighth: improved relations between the United States and less
developed countries facilitated the extension of economic aid in 
some cases. This was a factor in Latin America, where a number of 
countries had defaulted on loans made by American banks or other 
private sources. As conflict with the Axis powers intensified, the 
U.S. Administration sought to reach agreement on the question of repay­
ment. In many instances, it was successful (though this may have been 
partly because the urgency of securing the co-operation of the Latin 
American republics led it to settle for lower amounts than would pre­
viously have been considered acceptable). This improved the climate
99for large scale lending by Eximbank. Again, Mexico’s nationalisation 
of British and American petroleum holdings in 1938 strained relations 
between that country and the United States. Although Treasury Secre­
tary Morgenthau was willing to use the instruments at his disposal to 
provide assistance to Mexico, the State Department opposed loans or 
other aid to Mexico while the issue of compensation remained unre­
solved. Eximbank was therefore prevented from providing credits until 
the two countries reached agreement.
Some observers have suggested a further factor in the growth 
of economic aid - the development among some sections of the public 
of concern for the position of poor people in other nations. The 
emergence of this internationalist humanitarian sentiment is variously 
attributed to work highlighting the problem of world hunger, to a 
reaction from the barbarism of war, and to increased interaction with
-4 101poorer nations.
The widespread destruction brought about by the Second World 
War probably did give rise to some support for relief measures based
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on essentially humanitarian considerations. But this was only one 
of several motives for providing immediate relief aid to affected 
areas. There is evidence of a growth of concern, over the period re­
viewed, on issues such as world hunger and over the long term problem
102of raising living standards in poor nations. But the influence of
this seems to have been relatively weak. The principal justification 
for programmes such as the World Bank was the contribution which an 
expanding liberal world economy would make to peace and American pros­
perity. Even in the case of the Food and Agriculture Organisation, 
other considerations seem to have been predominant. In approaching
the organisation of a United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture,
103three considerations seem to have guided American policy makers.
One was that the conference would be a forum where the United States
could raise the problems of expanding food consumption, dealing with
food surpluses, and relating these issues to the broader questions of
international trading and financial arrangements in the post-war 
104period. Another consideration, supported by comments in Hull’s
memoirs, is that it would be relatively easy to reach satisfactory 
agreement on questions such as food and agriculture, for they were 
relatively uncontroversial and fairly concrete issues were involved.
It would therefore be a useful place to start post-war planning, and 
a testing ground to ascertain the measure of co-operation which could 
be expected on subsequent questions. There was also the view that 
it would assist in prosecution of the war if it was known that the 
United States and its allies were taking action to deal with economic 
problems in the post-war w o r l d . T h e  idea of establishing an 
agency to provide assistance for agriculture in poor nations was not 
therefore the only, or even the main ground for holding the conference.
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Indeed, at the Hot Springs Conference in 1943, and at subsequent
meetings of the Interim Commission set up by the Conference, there
was some difference of opinions as to the functions of the proposed
food and agriculture organisation. According to one viewpoint, the
agency should itself take action to foster economic expansion, while
a second strand of opinion considered that its role should be largely
106confined to gathering information and tendering advice. The out­
come was something of a compromise, with the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation being given some functions in the field of technical 
assistance. Its annual budget was planned for five million dollars 
of which the United States was to contribute one quarter.
111. Case Material
The third section of this chapter contains a number of detailed 
studies, already mentioned in the main argument, but separated from 
it for reasons of space. The first four studies deal with the expan­
sion of American economic assistance over 1938-43. The studies are 
mentioned at a number of points in the main argument, but their prim­
ary purpose is to support the view, advanced in section two, that 
foreign policy and military objectives arising from the struggle with 
the Axis powers were dominant motives for the expansion of economic 
aid in this interval.
The Expansion of Eximbank lending in Latin America
It is convenient to commence with the case of Eximbank lending 
in Latin America, and to discuss its operations in two periods, with 
the first extending from the beginning of 1938 to the outbreak of 
war in Europe in September, 1939. In this interval, the chief
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consideration prompting the executive to increase Eximbank lending 
was its concern with the extent to which the Axis powers, and Germany 
in particular, were increasing their trading and other economic links 
with the region. Over the period 1934-37, Germany's share of commo­
dities imported by Brazil, Mexico, and Chile had jumped by 10, 10.7,
and 15.8 percent respectively. Germany's activity had intensified
X08in 1938, while that of Japan and Italy was also not negligible.
Policy makers were disturbed at this trend, not only because it was 
not to the economic advantage of the United States, but because it 
threatened, in their view, a substantial measure of Axis political 
influence in a region judged to be of vital significance to the secur­
ity of the United States.
Evidence of the concern described above is not difficult to
discover in the writings and statements of senior U.S. officials.
As early as 1936, Hull noted that the Latin America which he had just
visited for the Buenos Aires Conference,
differed from the Latin America I saw 
just three years before, because Axis 
penetration had made rapid, alarming 
headway under various guises, For 
many months we had received reports from 
our representatives in the countries to 
the south of us, which, added together, 
created a picture of threatening colours.
Nazi Germany, in particular, was making 
intensive efforts to gain ascendancy among 
our neighbours, but Ttaly and Japan were 
working feverishly as well.
After referring to the activities of German minorities in Latin
America, and to Nazi propaganda and espionage activities, Hull goes
on to note in his memoirs.
The Germany of Hitler and Schacht was 
straining every tendon to undermine 
United States trade relations with 
l.atin America. In September, 1935,
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Schacht launched an ambitious plan 
for barter trade with Latin America on 
a large scale ... Germany's percentage 
of the total trade of Latin America began 
to rise perceptibly. 1^9
The Secretary to the Treasury, Morgenthau, was similarly con­
cerned over Axis penetration of Latin America, and by 1937 was using 
the instruments at his disposal in Treasury in an effort to counter 
this. His concern increased after Munich, and in a memo sent to 
Roosevelt in October, 1938, it was argued that the Latin American 
countries needed capital to develop their resources, and that,
Unless we assist them, they will 
become a helpless field for political 
and economic exploitation by the aggressor 
nations. Already some inroads have been 
made in that direction. Now, after the 
Munich agreement, we may expect that 
Germany, Italy and Japan will become 
bolder and more effective in their 
attempts to establish areas of economic 
and political support to the south of us.
Again, Pierson, the President of Eximbank, recommended to Hull in
February, 1938, that the bank increase its functions throughout Latin
America, and warned that aggressive European nations, especially
Germany, were in danger of replacing the United States in Latin
American markets.
Cases of loans approved in 1938 and 1939 provide evidence that 
the considerations mentioned above were important in causing policy 
makers to expand the operations of the Bank in 1938 and 1939. In 1938, 
the Bank abandoned its previous policy of not becoming a creditor to 
Latin American governments when it provided a $5 million loan to Haiti 
to cover the construction of public works. It had been learnt that 
the firms dealing with the project for the Haitian Government had 
planned to employ a German enterprise to handle the work, and the
1 3 0 .
A m erican lo a n  was a r r a n g e d  to  p r e v e n t  t h i s .  A v i c e - p r e s i d e n t  o f  th e
Bank, W. W h it te m o re ,  n o te d  t h a t  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  r i s k s  o f  t h e  p r o j e c t
w ere  c o n s i d e r a b l e ,  b u t  t h a t  th e  o v e r r i d i n g  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  was t h a t  i t
"w ould  n o t  be i n  t h e  b e s t  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  to  have
a n o th e r  E u ropean  power a c q u i r e  a  p o l i t i c a l  and econom ic ( i f  n o t  m i l i -
t a r y )  b a s e  r i g h t  i n  o u r  f r o n t  y a r d . "  A g a in ,  i n  1929, r a t h e r
th an  r i s k  i n c r e a s e d  European  i n f l u e n c e  (m a in ly  German i n f l u e n c e )  and
l o s s  o f  t r a d e ,  t h e  E x p o r t - I m p o r t  Bank a p p ro v e d  a $19 m i l l i o n  lo a n  to
B r a z i l ,  t h e r e b y  r e v e r s i n g  d e c i s i o n s  o f  1938 and 1936 t h a t  no lo a n  o f
113t h e  ty p e  i n  q u e s t i o n  s h o u ld  be made.
T here  were o t h e r  f a c t o r s  w hich  e n c o u ra g e d  i n c r e a s e d  Eximbank
l e n d i n g  i n  t h i s  p e r i o d .  D uring  1 9 3 7 -3 8 ,  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  s u f f e r e d
a s h a rp  r e c e s s i o n ,  w i th  i n d u s t r i a l  p r o d u c t i o n  d e c l i n i n g  by a t h i r d
11Ab e tw e en  S ep tem ber  1937 and June  1938. To some e x t e n t ,  p o l i c y  m akers  
may have  s e e n  expanded  Eximbank a c t i v i t y  a s  a  way o f  o v e rc o m in g  th e  
d o m e s t ic  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in d u c e d  by th e  r e c e s s i o n ,  b u t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  o f  
t h i s  ty p e  seem to  have  b e e n  w h o l ly  s e c o n d a ry  to  c o n c e rn  w i t h  th e  l o s s  
o f  t r a d e  t o  th e  A x is  p o w ers .  I t  i s  a l s o  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  th e  r e p l a c e ­
ment o f  P eek  by P i e r s o n  a s  d i r e c t o r  o f  th e  Bank t e n d e d  to  e n c o u ra g e  
i t s  o p e r a t i o n s  i n  L a t i n  A m erica ,  f o r  Peek had  shown a l a c k  o f  e n th u s ­
iasm  f o r  t h e  b a n k ' s  o p e r a t i o n s  i n  t h i s  a r e a . ^ ^ 5 But a g a i n ,  t h i s  
f a c t o r  was o n ly  o f  m a r g in a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  when compared w i th  t h e  co n ­
c e rn  o v e r  L a t i n  Am erican t i e s  w i th  th e  Axis p o w e rs .
C o n t in u e d  l e n d i n g  by Eximbank was made p o s s i b l e  by C o n g r e s s io n ­
a l  a c t i o n ,  i n  e a r l y  1939, t o  e x te n d  th e  l i f e  o f  t h e  Bank. N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  
C ong ress  was u n w i l l i n g  to  e n d o rs e  e x t e n s i v e  use  o f  th e  Bank a s  an 
In s t ru m e n t  o f  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  a t  t h i s  s t a g e .  T here  was c r i t i c i s m ,  
p u i l i o u l i i l v  t iom Re p u b l i c a n  l e a d e i s ,  o f  the  loan  to  H a i t i ,  and o f
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the way the Roosevelt Administration was using the Bank to extend 
American political influence in Latin America and elsewhere. Reflect­
ing this concern, Congress imposed a limit of $100 million on the 
value of loans which Eximbank could have outstanding at any one time.
This ceiling was to act as a brake on the further expansion of Exim-
liftbank lending in the latter part of 1939.
Even prior to the outbreak of war in Europe, the Administration 
made an attempt to rid itself of the constraint which the Congress 
had placed on its capacity to extend loans. In mid-1939, Roosevelt 
made a general proposal for an additional $500 million in authority 
for loans to foreign governments. Needless to say, the proposed 
increase represented a massive expansion of lending authority, and it 
is unlikely that the executive had any immediate intention of disburs­
ing more than a small fraction of the amount requested. It is prob­
able that the concern of the Administration was rather to provide 
itself with the authority to deal with more threatening possibilities 
which it envisaged. In April, two months before making the request, 
Roosevelt had noted in a press conference that his advisers forecast 
a 50-50 chance of war in Europe, with an equal probability that war 
would be followed by German victory. The latter outcome would, 
Roosevelt argued, lead to a German attempt to bring Latin America 
under its control, and in this effort economic instruments would play 
an important part. Argentina would be particularly vulnerable because 
of the importance of European markets for its cattle, wheat and corn, 
but in the case of Brazil, and even Mexico as well, totalitarian
control of Europe could well mean the end of any possibility of inde- 
118pendence. Again, on April 4, 1949, Roosevelt informed the Pan
American union that.
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Should the method of attack be that 
of economic pressure, I pledge that 
my own country will also give support, 
so that no American nation need surrender 
any fraction of its sovereign freedom 
to maintain its economic welfare.!-^
It was presumably with these contingencies in mind that the Admini­
stration sought the additional lending authority. Congress, however, 
refused to agree to the proposal, and even a smaller request for a
$100 million increase in Eximbank's lending authority had not been
120passed by the time Congress adjourned for the year.
In the period from late 1939, there were two developments which 
underlined the need for additional economic aid to Latin America. The 
first of these was the outbreak of war in Europe, and the consequent 
dislocation of much of Latin America’s trade. Europe as a whole ab­
sorbed more than half of Latin America’s exports, and a good deal of 
this, including trade with Germany and with neutrals subject to Allied 
embargoes was affected. In contrast to World War One, this loss was 
not mitigated to any marked degree by additional purchases from the
belligerents, Britain preferring to hold down domestic consumption
121and rely as far as possible on the resources of the Empire.
The effect of this situation was twofold. First, there was an
immediate impact on the stability of the Latin American economies.
As Hull noted, the result of the war was that,
Some export markets, sources of 
supply, and shipping services were 
cut off or curtailed, prices were 
fluctuating, and currencies were 
endangered. 1^2
Second, there began to accumulate large surpluses of commodities which
could not be sold abroad: this was particularly serious in the case
of countries such as Chile, Uraguay, and Argentina which relied heavily
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on trade with Europe and produced commodities which were competitive 
with those of the United States.
The other development was the rapid success of the German 
armies in France and the Low Countries in May and June of 1940. As 
the American Administration saw it, this had two consequences of im­
portance to Latin America. First it increased the danger that Axis 
powers would seek to bring Latin America under their control in the 
immediate future. Binning notes that by mid-1940, those in the execu­
tive concerned with Latin American security operated on the assumption 
that Germany would win the struggle for Europe and that its success 
in this theatre would be followed by a strong economic, and perhaps
military, offensive in Latin America. This judgement was endorsed
by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff who saw the Nazi threat to South America
124as the most pressing and immediate threat to national security.
Second, the German victories, together with the impact of the 
War on Latin America as described previously, was thought to add to 
the capacity of the Axis powers to draw Latin America into their sphere, 
since:
(1) German control of a larger section of Europe would 
increase the leverage which it could apply to Latin American countries, 
since it would control a larger share of their markets,
(2) the buildup of surpluses would create an additional
inducement to countries in South America to accept Axis terms for
125the restoration of trade.
(3) the victories gave a "tremendous psychological spring­
board" in Hull's view to the
Nazis to intensify their penetration 
of Latin America, both politically and 
economically. The conquest of France and
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the Low Countries had scarcely begun 
when reports from our diplomatic missions 
in Latin America started coming to my 
desk that the Nazis were preparing to 
make Central and South America an economic 
appanage of Germany ... The Nazis in 
Latin America, officials and private 
citizens alike, sedulously spread the 
thought that Germany would soon control 
the whole economy of Europe and therefore 
any country or company in Latin America 
wishing to deal with ... Europe had 
better negotiate at once with the nearest 
German representative. 1^6
By mid-1940, the Administration was considering the question of
an appropriate response to these developments as a matter of urgency.
Indeed in May, proposals were being studied, not only in the State
Department, but in Commerce, Treasury, Agriculture and a number of
127other government agencies and private organisations. From the
welter of suggestions, Roosevelt selected as a basis for Administration 
thinking a memo from Nelson Rockefeller which he found particularly 
impressive. Titled Hemispheric Economic Policy, this argued at the 
outset that:
Regardless of whether the outcome of the 
war is a German or Allied victory, the 
United States must protect its inter­
national position through the use of 
economic measures that are competitively 
effective against totalitarian techniques.
If the United States is to maintain 
its security and its political and economic 
hemisphere position, it must take economic 
measures at once to secure economic prosperity 
in Central and South America, and to 
establish this prosperity in the framework 
of hemisphere economic co-operation and 
dependence.
The scope and magnitude of the measures 
taken must be such as to be decisive with 
respect to the object desired. Half 
measures would be worse than wasted; 
they would subject the United States to 
ridicule and contempt.
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It went on to detail a number of specific policy measures which the 
United States should adopt, including the expansion of U.S. Govern­
ment investment in the region, and the formation of a single agency 
to receive and dispose of surpluses in the hemisphere. The last 
point - the notorious 'cartel’ proposal - had been suggested in an 
earlier memo by Berle, and was apparently calculated to prevent a 
situation in which individual countries might be forced to make sub­
stantial concessions to the Axis powers as the price of securing
12 8outlets for their surpluses.
The Rockefeller memo served as a starting point for a report 
to Roosevelt by the Secretaries of State, Agriculture, Commerce, and 
Treasury on June 20, 1940. The Secretaries underlined the need for 
U.S. action to supplement its military defense in the region by 
strengthening the Latin and Central American economies. Their report 
endorsed the idea of an inter-American cartel for joint marketing of 
the export staples of all of the American republics, and pending the 
formation of the organisation, recommended action by the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation to purchase and dispose of Latin American sur­
pluses. The provision of new credits was also suggested in order to
develop new industries and lines of production for which markets 
129could be found.
There reinn I tied the problem ol financing thcHO measures. Earlier
In the year the Administration had secured an additional $100 million
in lending authority for the Export Import Bank from Congress in a
debate focusing almost exclusively on the question of American aid
for Finland's defence against the invasion which had just been mounted
130by the Soviet Union. The amount of this which remained was,
however, entireIv Inadequate for the scale of operations which the
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A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  now had  i n  m ind . A n o th e r  p o s s i b i l i t y  was t h e  T r e a s u r y ' s
S t a b i l i s a t i o n  Fund, b u t  S e c r e t a r y  M orgen thau  had  c o n s i s t e n t l y  r e f u s e d
t o  u s e  i t  f o r  su c h  p u r p o s e s  e x c e p t  u n d e r  s p e c i f i c  C o n g r e s s io n a l
a u t h o r i s a t i o n ,  and  h i s  p o s i t i o n  was unchanged  when th e  q u e s t i o n  was
131r a i s e d  i n  May, 1940. A c c o r d in g ly ,  t h e  June  20 r e p o r t  recommended
132an a p p ro a c h  to  C o n g ress  to  s e c u r e  an a d d i t i o n a l  $1000 m i l l i o n .  
R o o s e v e l t ,  ho w e v e r ,  r e q u e s t e d  o n ly  an a d d i t i o n a l  $500 m i l l i o n  i n  th e  
c a p i t a l  and l e n d i n g  a u t h o r i t y  o f  Exim bank, i n  a  m essage  t im ed  to  co­
i n c i d e  w i t h  C o r d e l l  H u l l ' s  a d d r e s s  t o  t h e  Havana C o n fe re n c e  o f
A m erican  R e p u b l ic s  on J u l y  22 . 133
A s m a l l  p a r t  o f  t h e  $500 m i l l i o n  r e q u e s t e d  was n o t  i n t e n d e d
f o r  u se  a s  econom ic a s s i s t a n c e  a s  d e f i n e d  i n  t h i s  d i s s e r t a t i o n ,  s i n c e
134i t  was t o  f i n a n c e  th e  s a l e  o f  arms to  L a t i n  A m erican  c o u n t r i e s .
The b u lk  o f  t h e  fu n d s  w e re ,  how ever ,  i n t e n d e d  f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e s  i d e n t i ­
f i e d  i n  th e  R o c k e f e l l e r  memo, and t h e  Ju n e  20 r e p o r t .  Thus p a r t  o f  
t h e  fu n d s  w ere  t o  f i n a n c e  th e  h a n d l i n g  and o r d e r l y  m a r k e t in g  o f  s u r ­
p l u s e s :  th e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  p l a n ,  a s  W e lle s  o u t l i n e d  i t  t o  t h e  I n t e r -
A m erican  F i n a n c i a l  and Economic A d v is o ry  Com m ittee on J u l y  1 1 ? e n t a i l ­
ed  Eximbank f i n a n c i n g  o f  t h e  s t o r a g e  o f  s u r p l u s e s  u n t i l  th e y  c o u ld  be
s o l d :  i n  some c a s e s ,  repaym en t o f  t h e  l o a n s  m ig h t  be a r r a n g e d  i n
135c o m m o d it ie s . Beyond t h i s ,  t h e  i n c r e a s e d  l e n d i n g  power was to  be
used  f o r  th e  more g e n e r a l  p u r p o s e s  o f  d e v e lo p in g  p r o d u c t i o n  and e c o -
136nom ic s t a b i l i s a t i o n .  These  m e a su re s  w ere  e v i d e n t l y  th o u g h t  to
137y i e l d  b e n e f i t s  to  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  by :
(1) r e d u c in g  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  L a t i n  A m erican  Governments
b e in g  d i s p l a c e d  by th o s e  l e s s  f a v o u r a b le  t o  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  p a r t l y  
b e c a u s e  o f  a  g e n e r a l  c o n n e c t io n  be tw een  econom ic  p r o s p e r i t y  and p o l i ­
t i c a l  s t a b i l i t y ,  and p a r t l y  b e c a u s e  t h e r e  would be l e s s  r e a s o n  f o r
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businessmen and others to support pro-Axis factions because of the 
economic benefits which closer alignment with Germany might bring.
(2) serving as a direct means of leverage over the policies 
of existing governments, especially those policies relevant to the 
conflict between the Allied and Axis powers.
(3) generating good will to the United States on the part 
of people and governments in South America.
(4) providing the necessary funds to counter new barter and 
aid agreements offered by the Axis powers.
(5) expanding the production of commodities required in the 
United States, especially of those commodities and resources 
demanded for the war effort.
In addition to the above considerations arising from the
conflict with the Axis powers, the Administration sometimes made
reference to other grounds - for example increased American exports,
or the benefits of orderly marketing of Latin American surpluses for
138those in the United States producing the same commodities. However,
these aims were only of secondary significance in bringing about Admin­
istration support for increased Eximbank lending, and were evidently 
presented chiefly with a view to allaying domestic criticism.
The proposed increase in Eximbank lending authority was approved
by Congress, with the measure passing the Senate 43-27, and the House
183-144. The amended legislation made it possible for Eximbank to
extend an additional $500 million in order to
assist in the development of the 
resources, the stabilisation of 
the economies, and the orderly 
marketing of the products of the 
countries of the Western Hemisphere.
It also removed a number of restrictions on Bank lending, including
138.
one which had limited to $20 million the value of loans which could
139be outstanding to any one country.
It Is unlikely that Congressional support for the Increase 
was prompted by renewed concern with such economic considerations as 
promoting American exports. Of course, supporters of the measure re­
ferred to export promotion as one justification for the increase, and 
it is quite probable that the impact of the increased lending author­
ity on exports was seen as one advantage of it. But considerations 
of this kind could not reasonably account for the change in Congress­
ional attitudes which had occurred on the question of expanding the 
Bank’s operations. While the Latin American countries faced increased 
trade problems as a result of the European War, this was not the case 
with the United States. As a report from the Department of Commerce 
noted, exports in 1940 were 27 percent above those in 1939, and exceed­
ed $4 billion for the first time since 1929. The increase reflected
the expanding role of the United States in supplying materials to
140Britain and its Empire. A further indication that concern with
promoting exports was not central to the expansion of the bank's lend­
ing authority is that the new legislation did not confine its role to 
financing trade, but included the broader functions described in the 
preceding paragraph.
Reference to other economic grounds was made by the Administra­
tion in attempts to justify the increase. In his message to Congress, 
Roosevelt alluded to the economic advantages of orderly marketing to 
the United States, arguing that,
it is in the interest of the producers 
of our country, as well as in the interest 
of producers of other American countries, 
that there shall not be a disorganised 
or cut-throat market in those commodities
139,
142which we all export.
However, there was strong criticism of this idea from Congress. Some 
of this was doubtless based on ideological opposition to the extens­
ive government involvement in the process of marketing which had 
characterised the New Deal within the United States, and which it now 
proposed to extend into the international arena. But much is based 
on the fear that assistance to Latin America with financing surpluses 
of commodities (such as agricultural products) which the United States 
also produced would be damaging to the economic interests of American 
suppliers. In an apparent effort to facilitate the passage of the 
Eximbank legislation, the Administration emphasised that the Bank 
would not concern itself in any major way with financing agricultural
surpluses. 143 It had already publicly abandoned its ambitious cartel
plan on August 9, in response to its own internal differences on the
144question, as well as to both domestic and Latin American criticism.
Security considerations were evidently the dominant consider­
ation behind Congressional approval of the increase in lending author­
ity. The majority report of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee
thus called for the expansion of Bank operations in order to secure
145the total defence of the United States. There was, of course,
criticism of the measure on the same grounds, particularly from the
'isolationist' Republican minority typified by Senators Taft and
Vandenberg. In these quarters, there was scepticism over the security
and political benefits which would accrue to the United States from
146action to promote prosperity abroad, and evident concern that the
measure would drag the United States closer to war with the Axis 
147powers.
With the additional lending authority obtained from Congress,
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the Administration was able to extend a number of new loans to Latin 
American countries. As the instances examined helow indicate, the 
considerations which prompted particular loans varied, including all 
of the five factors mentioned above on different occasions.
In the case of Brazil, Eximbank provided considerable assist­
ance to cover construction of the Volta Redonda steel mill, an initial 
loan for $20 million being approved for this purpose on September 26 - 
the same day that the new Bank legislation was signed into law by 
President Roosevelt. At this stage, American support for the project 
was evidently based on the belief that Brazil would otherwise negoti­
ate an agreement with German interests covering construction of the 
mill. The State Department had been concerned at this possibility 
from early in 1940, and its fears increased in June when it received 
word that Krupp was offering favourable terms to Brazil, and that the 
Brazilian president, Vargas, was under some pressure to accept. On 
August 7, Welles wrote to Jones expressing the view of the State Depart­
ment that United States’ interests should finance the project, and 
noted that failure to reach an agreement would
result in the immediate acceptance by
Brazil of a German offer to build the
plant, which the Germans are prepared
to do on terms which they will allowJ 148the Brazilians to write themselves.
The agreement was justified by U.S. officials on other grounds as well, 
including the fact that Britain would give up iron ore holdings as 
part of the deal; that it would contribute to American exports both 
because of the immediate demand for plant equipment and because indu­
strial progress would make Brazil a better customer in future; and
that it would produce strategic materials required for the war effort. 
However, these considerations seem to have been wholly secondary to
149
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the desire to avoid an agreement between Brazil and German interests.
Continued support for the Volta Redonda project must be explain­
ed on other grounds, for there was subsequently no real prospect of 
an effective contribution by Germany. Nevertheless, special action 
was taken in July, 1941, to insure the supply of the required equip­
ment from the United States, and subsequently, additional Eximbank 
loans were made for this and associated projects. It would seem that 
support for the project was continued chiefly for the sake of main­
taining co-operative relations with Brazil. A State Department 
release justified the priority rating on the grounds that it would 
"improve the general standard of living of the country and thereby 
increase the market for products of the United States”, and that its 
output would "relieve the pressure on American industries in the prose­
cution of the Brazilian rearmament programme", but neither reason is 
convincing in the circumstances. As the release itself noted, comple­
tion of the mill was not expected for 2^-3 years, during which time 
it would require materials and equipment subject to wartime shortages'!'^ '*'
In the case of Cuba_, which received a $30 million credit in 
1941 to cover the purchase of surplus sugar and the construction of 
some public works, a number of considerations were evidently signifi­
cant in determining American policy. Messersmith, the American Ambas­
sador to Cuba, was the principal advocate of the loan: indeed it was
probably only his strong support which resulted in it being approved.
As already noted, there had been strong opposition during the debate 
on the new Eximbank legislation to the idea that the Bank should 
extend loans against surplus agricultural production. The proposed 
Cuban credit marked a significant step in this direction, and apparent­
ly for this reason, attracted strong criticism within the United States.
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H u l l  made a l a s t  m in u te  a t t e m p t  to  d e la y  th e  f i n a l  a g re e m e n t ,  and 
M e sse r sm i th  found  i t  n e c e s s a r y  to  t h r e a t e n  to  r e s i g n  a s  a means o f  
p u s h in g  t h e  m easu re  th r o u g h .
The Ambassador j u s t i f i e d  t h e  c r e d i t  on f o u r  main g ro u n d s :  th e  
n e e d  t o  m a i n t a i n  a  m a rk e t  f o r  Am erican goods i n  Cuba; t h e  d a n g e r  
t h a t  f a i l u r e  to  c o n c lu d e  t h e  ag reem en t  w ould r e s u l t  i n  econom ic ,  
s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  i n s t a b i l i t y ;  t h e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  k e e p in g  th e  way 
open  f o r  c lo s e  c o - o p e r a t i o n  in  d e fe n c e ;  and i t s  im p o r ta n c e  a s  "an 
a c t  o f  f a i t h  f o r  a l l  L a t i n  A m e ric a" .  The l a s t  g round  p re su m a b ly  
r e f e r r e d  t o  t h e  im p o r ta n c e  o f  th e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  u p h o ld in g  p ro m is e s  to  
L a t i n  A m erican  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  i t  w ould  p r o v id e  a s s i s t a n c e  i n  th e  f a c e  
o f  t h e  d i f f i c u l t  econom ic  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  a r i s i n g  from  t h e  E uropean  
War. I t  i s  n o t  c l e a r  w hat p r i o r i t y  M e sse r sm i th  a c c o r d e d  t h e s e  d i f f e r ­
e n t  r e a s o n s ,  o r  w h e th e r  o t h e r  A m erican p o l i c y  m akers  s u p p o r t i n g  th e
152m easu re  w ould  have  a c c e p t e d  a l l  o f  them.
A $25 m i l l i o n  Eximbank lo a n  to  Pevu in  1942 i l l u s t r a t e s  th e
u se  o f  th e  Bank to  p rom o te  i n c r e a s e d  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  com m od it ies  -  in
153t h i s  c a s e  r u b b e r  -  r e q u i r e d  f o r  t h e  A m erican war e f f o r t .  N in e ty
p e r c e n t  o f  th e  e x i s t i n g  s u p p ly  o f  n a t u r a l  r u b b e r  had  b een  c u t  o f f  by
t h e  J a p a n e s e  o c c u p a t io n  o f  t h e  Malay S t a t e s  and t h e  N e t h e r l a n d s  E a s t
154I n d i e s  i n  l a t e  1941 , l e a v i n g  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  u n p r e p a r e d .  As
S e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  I n t e r i o r  I c k e s  n o t e d  i n  a l e t t e r  to  B a ru ch :
One o f  t h e  w o r s t  r e s u l t s  o f  P e a r l  
H arbou r  was th e  d i s c o v e r y  t h a t  J e s s e  
Jo n e s  h a d n ' t  b u i l t  up a s t o c k p i l e  o f  
r u b b e r  t h a t  he had  been  i n s t r u c t e d  
to  b u i l d  up . . .  He had even  s l e p t  
p e a c e f u l l y  on t h e  s y n t h e t i c  r u b b e r  
program me. So we w ere  h i t  i n  a  v i t a l  
s p o t .  155
The l o a n t o  P e ru  r e p r e s e n t e d  one s t e p  w hich  th e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  to o k  to
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gain access to additional supplies of rubber: others included
special agreements with rubber producing countries in Latin America
concerning U.S. purchase of the entire export surplus, and special
programmes by the Rubber Development Corporation (a subsidiary of
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation) to increase production in
156Brazil, Haiti and elsewhere.
The Growth of Technical Assistance in Latin America
The growth of technical assistance to Latin America will be 
taken as a second case study on the reasons for the expansion of 
economic aid after 1938. In the case of the first group of programmes 
identified earlier in this chapter, the public statements of policy 
makers provided justifications in terms of the contribution which 
could be made to such goals as understanding between the United States 
and the recipient, mutual good will, closer relations, greater co­
operation, peace, friendship, and like considerations. In one 
sense the programmes of technical co-operation and educational exchange 
were a logical extension of the Good Neighbour policy, and they may well 
have found some support among American policy makers on this ground.
The timing of the introduction of these measures suggests, however, 
that they were initiated with the specific requirement in mind of 
maintaining hemispheric solidarity in the face of penetration by the 
Axis powers. Reference to this more specific concern was indeed im­
plied in some statements. Thus Stettinius, commenting on the programme 
under the Act "To Authorise the President to Render Closer and More 
Effective the Relationship Between the American Republics", argued:
That progress has been made toward the 
establishment of closer and more effective 
relationships among the American Republics
144.
is indicated by their unity of thought and 
action at the conferences of Foreign 
Ministers of the American Republics at 
Havana in July, 1940, and again at Rio 
de Janeiro in January of 1942; and by 
the general support of hemispheric soli- 
darity by the people of the twenty one 
nations.
In the case of the second programme, operated by the Co-ordin- 
ator of Inter-American Affairs, the interest in maintaining hemis­
pheric solidarity against the Axis powers, and in other ways contri­
buting to the defence of the United States was more clearly indicated. 
The agency was set up in August, 1940, as a subordinate body of the 
Council of National Defence at a time when - as noted already - 
American policy makers considered the hemisphere highly vulnerable 
to the Axis powers. The executive order establishing the agency noted 
its purposes as including review and co-ordination of
the activities of the Government with 
respect to hemisphere defence, with 
particular reference to the commercial 
and cultural aspects of the problem,
and assisting in carrying out Congressional resolutions regarding the
expansion of the military and naval establishments of the American
Republics, and
the execution of a programme in co-operation 
with the State Department which, by effective 
use of Governmental and private facilities 
in such fields as the arts and sciences, 
education and travel, the radio, the press, 
and the cinema, will further the national 
defense and strengthen the bonds between 
the nations of the Western Hemisphere.
The subsequent executive order of July, 1941, which renamed the agency, 
and established it as an independent body within the Office of Emer­
gency Management of the President, and added a separate provision 
charging it with formulating and executing
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programmes in the commercial and 
economic fields which by the effective 
use of governmental and private 
facilities will further the commercial 
well-being of the Western Hemisphere,
was declared to be made
to provide for the development of 
commercial and cultural relations 
between the American republics thereby 
increasing the solidarity of this 
Hemisphere and furthering the spirit 
of co-operation between the Americas 
in the interest of Hemisphere defense ...
Again initial appropriations legislation allocating funds to the
agency for grants and assistance noted that they were made available
for the purpose of furthering the 
national defense and strengthening 
the bonds between the United States 
and other American Republics.161
U.S. Officials and Congressmen apparently saw the various tech­
nical assistance and training programmes in the above programmes con­
tributing to hemispheric solidarity and U.S. defence in a number of 
ways, including: (1) the development of general attitudes of friend­
ship and good will, believed to result from increased contact between 
officials and peoples of the American Republics and the United States; 
(2) by contributing to the general programme of helping to promote 
the prosperity of the Latin American republics - it has already been 
seen that policy makers saw this programme as yielding benefits in 
terms of security and co-operation; and (3) by making direct contri­
butions to certain defence interests. This last applied even in the 
case of technical assistance in health and sanitation, for it was to 
some extent in the interest of the United States to improve health 
services where its own troops or those of other American republics 
were located, or where poor conditions impeded the production of
146.
strategic materials. 162
The Growth of Economic Aid to China
In a third case to be considered - that of China - the growth
of American economic aid arose almost entirely from increased U.S.
efforts to strengthen the resistance of the Nationalist regime to
Japanese encroachment. The United States had, of course, opposed
Japan's attempts to extend its influence in China well before 1938.
Thus it had joined in condemning Japan's occupation of Manchuria, had
refused to recognise the Manchukuo regime established by Japan, and
had protested at the Amau declaration of 1934 under which Japan claimed
16 3a special relationship with China.* However, the objective of
limiting Japan's encroachment on China was accorded relatively low 
priority at this stage, and American protests were not supplement by 
stronger action involving the use of economic or military instruments.
Indeed, in 1934, the Administration allowed domestic consider­
ations to outweigh its interest in assisting China by engaging in a 
policy of buying silver in the world market at rising prices. As 
Hull noted,
China, which was on the silver standard, 
found herself in the throes of a disastrous 
flight of silver ... [andj in November, 
1935, ... was forced to go off the silver 
standard, call in all silver currency, and 
replace it with paper. It was not until 
May, 1936, when the Chinese Government 
reached an agreement with the Treasury 
for the purchase of gold with silver, 
that the confusion in China began to be
resolved.164
Specifically, the Amau doctrine held that China should progress 
by her own efforts, and opposed joint or individual action by 
other powers to provide financial and technical aid. It was 
held that such aid should come from Japan if at all.
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In the face of reports that the American silver policy was creating 
anti-American feeling in China, undermining stability, and playing 
into the hands of Japan, there was discussion within the Administration 
during 1934 and 1935 of the possibility of moderating the silver 
purchasing policy, or of providing a credit and extending other co­
operation to China to compensate for the damage caused by American 
actions and facilitate currency reorganisation. However, the first 
course of action proved politically impossible, and the second was 
ruled out by State Department opposition to any attempt to confront 
Japan flatly on the Amau doctrine. It was believed that the United 
States could become deeply involved in China’s affairs, and that this 
might well lead to direct confrontation with Japan, for which little 
public support could be expected in the isolationist climate of opinion 
prevailing in the United States in the mid-thirties. In any event,
the conflict between U.S. silver policy and its desire to assist China 
was removed after China left the silver standard, since silver pur­
chases from China were then to that country’s immediate advantage.
There was continued unwillingness to provide strong support for
China, even after the outbreak of active hostilities between China and
Japan in mid-1937. A proposed Eximbank credit was cancelled in August
166of that year in view of the worsening situation. The United States
did support a declaration, at the Brussels Conference of November, 1937,
kwhich reaffirmed the Nine Power Treaty of 1922 , but it was careful 
to steer clear of proposals for sanctions against Japan, or for joint 
action on the question with Britain and France.1^7 In January, 1938, 
a request by China for assistance was rejected, and subsequent dis­
cussions on the question of a credit for China did not give rise to
k One of the provisions of this treaty pledged respect for 
China's independence and integrity.
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any immediate action. The Treasury continued its policy of purchas­
ing silver from China, and it is evident that an important motive for
this by now was the desire to strengthen the position of the National- 
169ist regime. However, it is difficult to class these purchases as
economic assistance as the term is used in this dissertation.
Proposals for a loan to China were made on several occasions in 
the latter part of 1938. Morgenthau was strongly in favour of the 
move as a way of strengthening Chinese resistance, supporting efforts 
to organise credits in June and September. After Munich, he became 
even more anxious to extend economic support, arguing in a memo to 
Roosevelt that,
Sanguine as I desire to be, I am forced 
to the view that without substantial aid 
given promptly the Chinese resistance may 
soon disintegrate. By risking little 
more than the cost of one battleship 
we can give renewed vitality and effective­
ness to the Chinese. We can do more than 
that. By our action we can further the 
struggle of democracy against aggression 
everywhere.
Morgenthau added that
All my efforts to secure immediate 
substantial aid to China have proved 
to no avail against the adamant foreign 
policy of doing nothing which could 
possibly be objected to by an aggressor 
nation. 170
Secretary of State Hull remained opposed to the credit. In 
his view, it would be understood as a measure specifically directed 
against Japan, and might well lead to a weakening of moderate elements 
in the Japanese Cabinet. The climate of opinion in the United States 
was, as Hull saw it, still too much influenced by isolationist atti­
tudes to lend support to a stronger policy, and would need time to 
perceive the issues involved. Percipitate action might well strengthen
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isolationist influence.
Approval of a loan was continually delayed in response to doubts
such as those expressed by Hull, but in December, 1938, Roosevelt
agreed to a $25 million Eximbank credit despite the Secretary of State’s
opposition. Repayment of the credit was to be made over five years
172from the proceeds of sales of tung oil to the United States. It is
not entirely clear what caused Hull and others opposing the loan to be 
overruled at this particular stage, but a more threatening international 
situation may have been one factor. In November, the Japanese Govern­
ment had openly announced its intention of setting up a new order in 
Asia, and had called upon the United States and other interested powers 
to adapt to the new conditions in Asia. Moreover, such hopes as had
been entertained by the Munich agreement had been largely dispelled by 
173this time. It is also quite possible that Roosevelt detected signs
of domestic support for a firmer policy, though there is no direct 
evidence of this.
The Administration's opposition to Japan's activities in China
and other Asian countries hardened appreciably in 1939 and 1940. In
April, 1939, the U.S. fleet was transferred to the Pacific and on
July 26, Washington gave Japan the required six months' notice of its
desire to terminate the 1911 Treaty of Commerce between the two countries,
thus keeping open the possibility of economic sanctions after the ex-
174piration of that interval. It is likely that additional economic
aid would have been provided to China in 1939, but as noted in the case 
study on Latin America, Eximbank's available funds were extremely 
limited at this stage. On March 7, 1940, following passage of legis­
lation increasing Eximbank's lending authority, a $20 million credit 
(the maximum possible under the new measure) was approved. The credit 
was to be repaid in tin. A proposal for additional aid from Treasury's
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Stabilisation Fund was made by the chief adviser on Far Eastern
Affairs in the State Department, apparently with Hull's reluctant
approval, but Morgenthau was no more willing to use the Fund for this
175purpose in China than in Latin America at this stage. From Sept­
ember, 1940, the Administration was able to make additional credits 
to China, the new Eximbank legislation having gained Congressional 
approval, and Treasury Secretary Morgenthau having altered to some 
extent his previous opposition to use of the Stabilisation Fund. On 
September, 25, 1940, one day before the new Eximbank legislation was 
signed into law by Roosevelt, a further Bank credit of $25 million 
for China was announced. The timing of the announcement was apparent­
ly influenced by a declaration from the Vichy Government of the pre­
vious day, falsely stating that the United States had given its approval 
to an agreement between France and Japan of August 30. Under the 
terms of this, France recognised Japan's predominant interest in the
Far East, as well as making other concessions.^^
American policy makers still desired to avoid open struggle 
with Japan in order that they might concentrate on supplying Britain 
and rearming: to this end, the President and Hull agreed that the
United States should "continue our economic pressure and aid China, 
but not push Japan to the point where her military elements would 
demand war".'*'^ Nevertheless, in November, the Administration hardened 
its position still further. Controls already existing on exports to 
Japan were extended, and the establishment of a puppet government at 
Nanking on November 30 resulted in the announcement of a $50 million 
Eximbank credit to Nationalist China on the same day, with an equal
sum being foreshadowed from the Treasury Stabilisation Fund at a later
. , 178date.
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During 1941, the American Government continued to hope that it
could avoid, or at least delay, armed confrontation with Japan in the
Far East, and for this reason entered into a series of discussions
with Japan beginning early in the year. These continued, not without
interruption, until just before the attack on Pearl Harbour, though
179it was clear to policy makers by November that war was imminent.
Following the outbreak of war, the Administration moved quickly to
make available substantially increased economic assistance to the
Nationalist Government. On February 3, 1942, an appeal by Hull for
$500 million in economic aid for China was read to the House Foreign
Affairs Committee: the speech emphasised the importance of China in
180the struggle against the Axis powers. A joint resolution of
February 7 authorised this request, noting as grounds that
China has for more than four years 
valiantly resisted the forces of 
Japanese aggression; and 
financial and economic aid to China 
will increase her ability to oppose 
the forces of aggression; and 
the defense of China is of the greatest
possible importance.181
Earlier, in January, the United States commenced a programme of tech­
nical assistance to China. This had apparently been requested by 
Hull as a matter of urgency in November, 1941, on the ground that a 
programme of this type would strengthen Chinese national resistance 
and build closer ’understanding’ between China and the United States.
The Expansion of Economic Aid in Africa
The growth of economic aid to Africa will be taken as a 
further case study on the reasons for the expansion of aid to less 
developed countries after 1938. For reasons of space, only two pro-
182
grammes In this region will be discussed: one involving the
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provision of economic aid to Liberia, and the other the transfer 
of relief to areas occupied by the American and Allied forces.
The United States had, of course, been closely involved in
Liberian affairs on a number of occasions since the founding of that
Republic in 1847, and had, at different times granted the country a
gunboat (1867) , participated in a joint customs receivership with the
British and French (1912), dispatched commissions of inquiry to report
on its circumstances, and provided a credit of $26,000 under the
Liberty Loans Act of 1917. However, the United States did not provide
183any substantial quantity of economic aid to Liberia before 1941.
The basis for some technical assistance was established in 1938, when
Liberia was belatedly included with the American Republics and the
Philippines as a country to which the United States might lend officials
and experts. But this does not seem to have resulted in any immediate
184provision of technical aid.
The importance of Liberia to the United States increased sub­
stantially in 1941. American policy makers were, by June, extremely 
interested in the construction of airport facilities in that country, 
with a view to providing an alternate landing point to Bathurst and 
Freetown in ferrying aircraft to the British forces in the Near East.
The idea of a formal military base was passed over at this stage, but 
in the latter part of 1941 the Administration proceeded with a proposal 
whereby Pan American constructed an airport under arrangement with
the War Department. The United States was to approach Liberia subse-
185quently if the airport was needed for military aircraft. A second
factor enhancing the strategic significance of Liberia was the import­
ance, after Pearl Harbour, of the rubber produced in that country
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by the American based Firestone Company. 186
By January, 1942, it had been determined that an approach should
be made to the Liberian Government regarding use of the Pam Am air-
port by military aircraft, further work on airport facilities, and
other matters. The American Government was unwilling to accede to a
request from Liberia that the United States undertake in return to
187defend Liberian territory, but it did agree to make available $1
million in Lend Lease or other aid, partly as a concession to Liberia,
and partly to improve the operations of facilities which it wished 
188to use. The aid was primarily for the purpose of road construction,
but it is not clear how much of it could be reasonably regarded as 
economic aid as defined in this dissertation. State Department records 
indicate that President Barclay of Liberia subsequently expressed con­
siderable disappointment that:
United States Army engineers were 
building roads which suited them, 
without reference to the needs of 
the country and of no practical help 
to Liberia after the war .... He 
desired to open up the interior of 
the country and did not see how this 
was to be done under the present 
apportionment and use of the funds
by the Army.189
A subsequent agreement concerning the extension of Lend Lease 
aid to Liberia falls more clearly within the category of economic 
aid. By September, 1943, the U.S. Administration had agreed to pro­
vide a credit to finance the construction of a port and related faci­
lities. The cost of the facility was estimated at over $8 million, 
and repayment was to be made from harbour revenues.
It is probably that one reason for the Administration’s 
decision to go ahead with the project was the desire to maintain
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satisfactory political relations with the Liberian Government. 
President Barclay had pressed strongly for American aid to cover con­
struction of a port during his visit to the United States in mid-1943,
191indicating that it was the uppermost issue in his mind. In a 
letter to Harry Hopkins (Roosevelt's Special Assistant), Barclay 
noted that
In placing the resources and territorial 
facilities of the Republic at the dis­
posal of the Government of the United 
States so readily and fully to serve its 
war objectives, Liberia had expected that 
comparable consideration would be given 
to her basic requirements for economic 
development.192
A more important consideration, however, seems to have been the mili­
tary significance of the facility, arising from its proximity to the 
strategic points of Ascension Island and Dakar, and its potential 
value in safeguarding the east coast of the South American continent 
from attack. In a communication to Hull concerning the proposed port, 
Roosevelt noted that
The Secretary of the Navy desires 
that provision be made in the port 
for establishment of an outlying 
base for submarines and patrols. The 
interest of the Navy is associated with 
the security of South America, particu­
larly Brazil, but the value of a port 
in Liberia is largely dependent upon 
continued use by the United States of 
Ascension Island and Dakar and the 
airfields at those places.193
The military value of the facility was presumably not understood to 
apply to the immediate struggle against the Axis powers, for the port 
and associated works would take some time to complete (as it turned 
out, Liberia was still receiving funds for the project in 1950), and 
it was directed that construction should proceed through private con­
tracting arrangements so as not to impede prosecution of the war
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effort.194
Other economic aid was provided by the United States in this 
period as technical assistance under the legislation discussed pre­
viously. Thus, in 1943, in response to a request from Liberia, the 
American Government dispatched several experts to survey iron ore 
deposits. This was presumably regarded as a way of promoting co-oper­
ative relations with the Liberian Government. The cost of this and
other technical assistance projects is not clear. The Liberian Govern-
195ment defrayed a percentage of the cost in the case mentioned.
It would appear then, that there were two main reasons for the 
expansion of economic aid to Liberia in this period. First, aid was 
provided to secure Liberia's co-operation, primarily of importance 
because of the strategic significance of that country in the conflict 
with the Axis powers. Second, provision of economic assistance tied 
in with American interests in military facilities. In the case of the 
harbour project, this interest was not of immediate relevance to the 
war against the Axis powers, though the Lend Lease legislation under 
which the funds were provided had been passed by Congress with the 
immediate war effort largely in mind.
The final case to be considered concerns the provision of
supplies to North Africa following the invasion and occupation of that
196region by Allied forces in late 1942 and early 1943. The commodi­
ties and equipment distributed in this case were designed both to make 
immediate provision for the essential consumption needs of the civilian 
population, and to restore and expand production. It was emphasised
by U.S. officials that the effort was undertaken, not merely for human-
19itarian reasons, but also on important political and military grounds. 
First, it was held that the supplies would promote the production of
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food and raw materials of value to the war effort, both by providing
the necessary resources (seeds, capital equipment, etc.) and maintain-
198ing the strength and health of the work force. Second, as
Roosevelt noted,
food supplied to liberated peoples 
... is a potent psychological and 
morale weapon for those starving 
people whose countries are still 
overrun by the Axis. While starvation 
has been the weapon used by the Axis 
resulting in disease, misery, and 
death, the United Nations are using 
food as one of their most potent 
weapons to shorten the war .. . ^ 9
A further ground for the relief programme, though it seems not to have
been publicly and explicitly stated, was that it would contribute to
stability in areas subject to occupation.Unlike a number of other
American relief efforts, the programme does not appear to have derived
any substantial measure of support from the desire to dispose of
domestic food surpluses: indeed, as the statements of policy makers
noted, supplies in the United States were under some pressure at the
time, and the value of the programme lay partly in the contribution
the occupied territories could make in adding to food production avail-
201able to the Allied forces.
Aid as a Foreign Policy Instrument in the Post-War 
____________________Period .__________________ _
A final group of case studies are designed to illustrate the 
way in which foreign policy objectives in particular regions and 
countries throughout the world in the post-war period continued to 
encourage resort to aid. Three cases are considered - Latin America, 
Saudi Arabia, and China.
In Latin America, the United States remained interested in
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promoting co-operative relations in the post-war period. This was 
evidently an important consideration in the decision to continue those 
technical assistance programmes which had been introduced immediately 
prior to, and during, the Second World War. The programmes were, of 
course, compatible with the general interest of policy makers in pro­
moting the expansion of economies in less developed countries, and they
202presumably attracted some support on this ground. But statements
suggest that such objectives as maintaining friendly relations and pro­
moting a favourable image of the United States in Latin America remained 
important. According to Secretary of State Marshall, in a statement 
recommending continuation of the programmes under the Institute of 
Inter-American Affairs, a thorough review of their effectiveness by the 
State Department had concluded that they "had made a highly important 
contribution to our relations with the other American republics". In 
his opinion, the programmes were
tangible and effective demonstrations 
of the objectives of American democracy.
As such they constitute strong support 
for our hemisphere and world-wide^^reign 
policy, and should be continued.
In an earlier statement in 1944, dealing with those programmes under the
Inter-Departmental Committee on Scientific and Cultural Co-operation,
Under Secretary of State Stettinius suggested that such efforts would
have to be continued and even enlarged in the post-war period. He
noted that they were conducive to mutual understanding and that they
204could form the support of co-operative efforts of a broader nature.
Eximbank lending in the post-war period was apparently governed 
by strict commercial criteria in Latin America. Relatively few loans 
appear to have been made simply on foreign policy grounds: rather,
U.S. officials appear to have been more interested in the contributions 
of proposed loans to American exports, the recipient's capacity to
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repay the loan, and similar criteria. One piece of evidence for
this view is provided by the distribution of Eximbank loans: as
Binning notes, the smaller Central American and Caribbean countries
received relatively few loans, as might have been expected from a
2Q5return to the commercial principles mentioned. Further evidence
can be found by examining instances of loans considered by Eximbank.
Thus an application for a credit of only one million dollars for
Paraguay was rejected in 1946, despite strong representations by the
American Ambassador to that country, and by officials of the Govern- 
2o6ment of Paraguay. The main grounds for rejecting the proposal
were that Paraguay's economic prospects were considered to be poor,
207and that its capacity to service increased debt was doubtful. It
was explained to the Charge d'Affairs of Paraguay that the Bank was 
making an effort
to reorientate its activities along 
the original concept of granting credits 
only for purchases in the United States 
or for the stimulation of trade that 
would develop foreign exchange with 
which the credits might be repaid. ^ 8
Of course, there were some instances where foreign policy consider­
ations seem to have made the difference between an application fail­
ing and being approved. A decision to provide a $50 million credit 
to Brazil provides one example. According to the Director of the 
Office of Financial and Development Policy,
Consideration in the Staff Committee 
showed sharp differences of opinion, 
with Federal Reserve and Treasury being 
opposed to a Brazilian credit. State 
continued to support the credit largely 
on political grounds. Eximbank strongly 
favours the credit and Commerce has also 
supported it. 209
The National Advisory Council on Financial and Monetary Problems, which 
had been set up under the terms of the Bretton Woods legislation to
159.
co-ordinate overseas lending, subsequently approved the credit on
August 13, 1946, by a 3-1 vote, with the Federal Reserve Board oppos-
210ing the loan and Treasury abstaining. The support of the State
Department thus provided the necessary majority on NAC in this case,
and while it is unlikely that State was solely motivated by political
considerations, it was a significant factor in its attitude if the
211memorandum cited can be accepted as accurate.
The provision of economic aid to Saudi Arabia in the post-war 
period represented a continuation of a policy commenced in the course 
of the Second World War. During this period, American policy makers 
came to view Saudi Arabia as a country of particular importance to the 
United States; first, because it occupied an important position in 
military supply lines; second, because stability in other parts of 
the Near East and North Africa was assumed to be connected with stabi­
lity in Saudi Arabia; and third, as a result of American interests in 
Saudi oil reserves. The last interest did not arise merely from a 
concern with the position of the two American companies, Standard Oil 
and the Texas Company, which had acquired extensive exploration and 
development rights through a subsidiary, the Arabian American Oil 
Company. During 1943, the Government had received reports that demands 
for oil in the post-war period would be greatly enlarged, and that 
the United States could well be faced in the future with difficulty 
in securing supplies to meet its economic and military requirements. 
Policy makers were accordingly keen to secure definite access to Saudi 
reserves, even if this involved direct operations by the U.S. Govern­
ment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended on one occasion that the 
American Government should negotiate its own oil concessions in Saudi 
Arabia, and attempts were made by the Government to purchase the
160.
stock of the Arabian American Oil Company. 212
The above interest gave rise to two specific objectives.
First, the American Government sought to promote close relations with
the Saudi Government, and to increase its own influence over that
Government. Second, it sought to preserve the stability of the regime
of King Ibn Saud. Since the outbreak of war had led to severe finan-
213cial difficulties in Saudi Arabia, and since the British Govern­
ment exercised considerable political influence in Saudi Arabia, these 
aims led the United States into rivalry with Britain, and to involve­
ment in subsidising the Saudi Government's budget.
Technical assistance and a silver loan were provided to Saudi
Arabia by the United States in 1942 and 1943, but a larger programme
was commenced in 1944, primarily through Lend-Lease, Hull notes in
his memoirs that in April of that year:
I outlined the situation to the President 
... stating our belief that we should 
extend additional financial and economic 
assistance to Saudi Arabia so as to safe­
guard our national interest in her petroleum 
resources ... I informed the President that 
we had now ascertained that the British 
Government proposed in 1944 to subsidise 
Saudi Arabia to the extent of nearly 
$12,000,000, which was approximately six 
times the value of Lend-Lease aid our 
Government contemplated extending in 1944.
After citing the activities of the British in the region, Hull noted
that
If Saudi Arabia is permitted to lean too 
heavily upon the British, there is always 
the danger that the British will request 
a quid pro quo in oil. To obviate this 
danger, it is recommended that this Govern­
ment share the subsidy on an over-all equal 
basis with the British.
This proposal was approved by Roosevelt, and the British Government
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agreed to investigate the possibility of a joint subsidy for Saudi 
Arabia, assuring the American Government that they had not intended 
to prejudice U.S. oil rights. A joint supply programme was arranged 
in July, 1944, though there was no agreement on the separate question 
of a joint economic and financial mission, since neither Washington 
nor London was prepared to allow the other party the right to lead 
it. ^  A joint British-U.S. subsidy programme was continued in 1945, 
though the British were reluctant to provide aid on the same scale as 
previously, and accordingly the United States provided a considerable 
quantity of supplementary assistance in addition to its share of the 
combined aid programme.
The problem of continuing aid to Saudi Arabia arose in 1945 
as a result of doubts as to the future availability of Lend-Lease aid. 
Eximbank loans were one means then canvassed whereby the United States 
might continue to subsidise the Saudi budget. Discussion on this 
question involved both policy makers within the Administration, and 
selected Senators and Representatives, the latter presumably being con­
sulted in view of the possibility that special legislation might be 
necessary to make a continued subsidy possible. Summarising the 
results of one such discussion in a memorandum of May 17, 1945, Acheson 
noted that:
The Senators agreed that the United 
States had a vital interest in Saudi 
Arabia, both in order to prevent internal 
disturbance and foreign intervention and 
to protect American national interests 
in the oil reserves of that country.
They also agreed that some action was necessary to meet the budget
deficits of the Saudi Government, but did not want a gift or unsecured
loan. This left the alternatives of purchasing oil in the ground,
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or providing an Eximbank loan.
A decision to extend a $25 million line of credit to Saudi 
Arabia was made by the Board of Directors of Eximbank at a meeting 
on January 3, 1946: this followed termination of Lend-Lease as a
source of funds from December 31, 1945. Five million dollars of 
this amount represented a credit for public works and other develop­
ment projects, and had been promised to the Saudi Government in 
August, 1945, during the course of a visit to the United States by 
Prince Faisal. The remainder was connected with the programme design­
ed to subsidise the Saudi Government’s budget until oil revenues 
made the country self sufficient. It was intended that $11 million 
of the latter amount would advanced in calender 1946, with smaller 
quantities in subsequent years as requirements lessened. In deter­
mining these amounts, American officials proceeded on the assumption
217that Britain would not be involved as a major donor.
The decision to make available an Eximbank loan was evidently
not based on strict commercial criteria. Indeed, some difficulty was
anticipated in obtaining repayment of the loan, since the immediate
market for Saudi Arabian oil was thought to be limited to countries
whose currency might not be readily convertible into dollars. In
making this observation, the Director of the Office of Financial and
Development Policy noted that "straight dollar loans to Saudi Arabia
218seemed to be outside the realm of sound banking practice." American
objectives in deciding to extend Eximbank aid were, rather, those
already identified. Thus the statement mentioned above noted that:
there is general agreement that the 
national interest in the American oil 
concessions in Saudi Arabia requires 
that financial assistance be provided
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to the extent necessary to enable 
the King to maintain political and 
economic stability until oil revenues 
make the country self-sufficient. 219
As it turned out, only $10 million in Eximbank credits were provided,
220arrangements for the remaining $15 million not being finalised.
In Chzna, The United States sought, in 1945 and 1946, to bring 
about a political accord between the Kuomintang and the Communist 
Party, apparently concluding that this was the best outcome that could 
be achieved given the weakness of the former. To this end, a special 
mission was dispatched to China under General Marshall. The Admini­
stration employed promises of economic aid as one means of adding 
negotiating leverage to General Marshall's mission. Truman, in a 
letter of December 18, 1945, indicated to a number of departments and 
agencies that:
all conversations with Chinese officials 
regarding extension of American economic and 
financial aid to China [should] be suspended, 
and ... for the time being no member of 
your staff [should] engage in conversations 
with Chinese officials which might encourage 
the Chinese to hope that this government 
is contemplating the extension of any type 
of assistance to China except in accord 2 2 1
with the recommendations of General Marshall.
A few days earlier, the President had indicated publicly that:
it is in the most vital interest of the 
United States and all the United Nations 
that the people of China overlook no 
opportunity to adjust their internal 
differences promptly by methods of peaceful 
negotiation ... [The] United States strongly 
advocates that ... representatives of 
major political elements in the country 
agree upon arrangements which would give 
those elements a fair and effective 
representation in the Chinese National 
Government ... As China moves toward peace 
and unity along the lines described above, 
the United States would be prepared to 
assist the National Government in every
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reasonable way to rehabilitate 
the country, [and] improve the 
agrarian and industrial economy ...
Some small Eximbank credits were provided after Marshall had
22indicated that he did not wish to use them for bargaining purposes.
The much larger amount of $500 million was earmarked for China by
Eximbank in March, 1946, following a favourable report of the state
of negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. Needr-
less to say, the apparent accord of early 1946 did not long continue,
and the $500 million was not actually made available. In a statement
of December 18, 1946, President Truman noted that
Agreement to extend actual credits 
for such projects would obviously 
have to be based upon this Government’s 
policy as announced December 15, 1945.
So far this $500 million remains earmarked, 
but unexpended. 224
IV. CONCLUSIONS
To conclude: a number of factors account for the provision
of significant amounts of economic aid to less developed countries 
over the period under review. For at least part of the period dis­
cussed, there were strong reasons for providing aid as a means of 
developing markets and outlets for American products. This concern 
was, to a large extent, a consequence of the Depression and of fears 
of a new depression following the Second World War. There were also 
strong foreign policy and defence motives for providing aid, arising 
principally from the conflict with the Axis powers and the broad nature 
of American post-war objectives. Third, there was a change in atti­
tudes on the part of American policy makers concerning the effective­
ness of aid as a foreign policy instrument. Aid to governments was
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thought of, at the outset if the period reviewed, as likely to damage 
relations rather than improve them in most cases. This attitude had 
changed by the late thirties. Fourth, the requirements of less 
developed countries for aid was quite considerable in the period under 
discussion. This was a consequence of the disruption of economies 
arising from the Second World War, the sharp decline in private capital 
flows following the onset of the Depression, and greater interest in 
industrialisation and economic development in LDCs. Resort to econo­
mic aid was encouraged by a shift away from alternative techniques of 
influencing events in less developed countries. Alternatives no longer 
favoured included military intervention, the use of customs receiver­
ships, gunboat diplomacy, and measures to facilitate or deny loans 
from private sources. Again, there was a relatively favourable poli­
tical climate for the emergence of aid: this resulted from increased
acceptance of government intervention in the economy, and the way in 
which economic aid was linked with other issues with broad support. 
Other trends, for example, increased production and expanded govern­
ment revenues, increased the capacity of the United States to provide 
economic aid. In some instances, improved relations between the United 
States and other less developed countries facilitated the extension 
of economic aid. Finally, the widespread destruction brought about by 
the Second World War appears to have given rise to some support for 
relief measures based on essentially humanitarian considerations.
166.
FOOTNOTES
1. See A. Young, China's Nation Buildvng Effort, 19X7-37: the
Financial and Economic Record: Hoover Institution Press, 1971,
pp. 382-385. The Hoover Administration had in 1931 made a nine 
million dollar loan to China to cover the purchase of American 
wheat.
2. Two Export-Import Banks were established, though they were in fact 
controlled and staffed by the same persons, and were to be merged 
in 1936. The First Export-Import Bank was set up in February,
1934, to finance trade with the Soviet Union, which the United States 
had only recently recognised. However, negotiations between the 
two countries over a trade agreement broke down, and no loans were 
made for this purpose. The Second Export-Import Bank was estab­
lished in March, 1934, to deal with Cuba, its sphere of operations 
being extended at the end of June to cover all other countries 
but Russia. See Charles Whittlesay,"Five Years of the Export- 
Import Bank", American Economic Review, Vol. XXIX, 1939, pp.487-489.
For details of the lending operations of the Second Export-Import 
Bank, see ibid., pp. 493-495.
3. Agreements for the provision of Eximbank loans typically noted that 
the United States could not undertake to supply machinery and 
equipment in short supply because of wartime requirements. For
an example, see the letter of April, 1942, to the Peruvian Minister 
of Finance and Commerce concerning a $25 million Eximbank loan to 
finance public works and agricultural, mining and industrial pro­
jects. "Secretary of State Hull to the Peruvian Minister of 
Finance and Commerce (Dasso)", Documents on American Foreign Relations, 
Vol.4, 1941-42, p.372. For a general statement of American policy 
on the question of restrictions on commodities available to Latin 
America, see "Export Licensing and Priorities Control. Statement 
of the Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the Inter-American 
Financial and Economic Advisory Committee, December 5, 1941", 
ibid.* pp. 386-389.
4. See W. Binning, The Role of the Export-Import Bank in Inter-
American Affairs: Ph.D. dissertation, University of Notre Dame,
1970, pp.88-89. There was little need for new loans by this time, 
since the Latin American countries could not effectively utilise 
the dollars which they had already acquired. Increased purchases 
arising from the war supply effort, together with the shortages
and restrictions on exports to Latin America, meant that the unfavour­
able foreign exchange position of the South American republics in 
1940 had been reversed by 1943, and substantial reserves were 
accumulating. See R. Hodge, Lining up Latin America: the United
States Attempts to bring about Hemispheric Solidarity: 1939-1941:
Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1968, pp. 409-410.
See U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign A'ld by the United States 
Government: 1940-1951: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952, p.2.
Also see Documents on American Foreign Relations,Vol.5,1942-1943, 
pp. 105-106.
5.
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6. See 'Relief in Liberated Areas. Seventh Report of the President 
to Congress on Lend-Lease operations, December 11, 1942 (excerpt)’ 
ibid., Vol.5, 1942-1943, pp. 264-265. Much of the lend-lease 
shipments to French North Africa was actually paid for, but this 
does not affect the point being made here.
7. See U.S. Department of Commerce, op.cit., p.37.
8. 'Eighth Quarterly Report to Congress on Lend-Lease
for the Period ended March 11, 1943'. Extract in Documents on 
American Foreign Relations, Vol.5, 1942-43, p.481.
9. For details of the credit, see U.S. Department of Commerce, 
op.cit., pp. 32,37. The quotation is from C. Hull, op.cit.,
p. 1186. The reasons for the provision of this loan are discussed 
subsequently.
10. For the announcement of this loan, see Documents on American Foreign 
Relations, Vol.3, 1940-41, pp. 243-244.
11. For the relevant resolutions and announcements, see vbid., Vol.4, 
1941-1942, pp.536-540. On utilisation of the credit by China, 
see U.S. Department of Commerce, op.cit., pp. 27-28.
12. See. E. Guerrant, op.cit., pp. 198-199.
13. On civilian supply, see U.S Department of Commerce, op.cit., 
pp. 38-40. See ibid., p.46, on the Red Cross programme. The 
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration will be 
discussed subsequently.
14. See 'Act Authorising Temporary Detail of United States Employees 
to Certain Governments, Approved May 3, 1939', Documents on 
American Foreign Relations, Vol.l, 1938-1939, pp.61-64. Also 
Ellis Briggs, Assistant Chief of the Division of the American 
Republics in the State Department, 'Loan of Civilian Technical 
and Administrative Experts', ibid., Vol.2, 1939-1940, pp.169-172.
15. For details of the appropriations made to the State Department
under this Act, see Treasury Department, Division of Bookkeeping 
and Warrants, Digest of Appropriations for the Support of the 
Government of the United States, U.S. Government Printing Office. 
1940, p .545; 1941, pp.559-560; 1942, pp.499-500; 1943, pp.602-
603; 1944, pp.452-463; 1945, pp.553-554.
16. See 'Report to the President from the Under Secretary of State 
(Stettinius), February 21, 1944', Documents on American Foreign 
Relations, Vol.6, 1943-44, p.483.
17. See R. Hodge, op.cit., pp. 132-133; E. Guerrant, op.cit., 
pp. 117-118.
18. On the State Department's work under the Act, see the statement of 
Stettinius cited in footnote 16, pp.483-484. It might be noted 
that the involvement of the Department in cultural relations was 
itself of very recent origin, and arose from the same considerations
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w hich r e s u l t e d  i n  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  o f  t e c h n i c a l  a s s i s t a n c e .  The 
C u l t u r a l  R e l a t i o n s  D i v i s i o n  o f  t h e  S t a t e  D ep a r tm en t  was e s t a b l i s h e d  
o n ly  i n  1938.
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o r d i n a t i o n  o f  Com m ercial and C u l t u r a l  R e l a t i o n s  Between t h e  
A m erican  R e p u b l i c s ,  a s  a  s u b o r d i n a t e  body to  t h e  C o u n c i l  o f  
N a t i o n a l  D e fe n s e .  F o r  t h e  r e l e v a n t  e x e c u t i v e  o r d e r ,  s e e  Documents 
on American Foreign R e la tio n s ,  V o l .3 ,  194 0 -1 9 4 1 ,  p p .  1 0 9 -1 1 0 .
For  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  o r d e r  w h ich  r e p l a c e d  he above  body by th e  O f f i c e  
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22 . See t h e  s t a t e m e n t  o f  S t e t t i n i u s  c i t e d  i n  f o o t n o t e  16 , p .  485 .
And Documents on American Foreign R e la tio n s ,  V o l .6 ,  1 9 4 3 -4 4 ,  
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23. i b i d . ,  p p . 4 8 1 -4 8 2 .
24 . See U .S . D ep a r tm en t  o f  Commerce, o p . c i t . ,  p p . 2 4 -2 5 ,  64 .
25 . On t h e  d e v e lo p m en t  o f  p l a n s  f o r  th e  W orld Bank and  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
M one ta ry  Fund, s e e  R o b e r t  O l i v e r ,  Early Plans fo r  a World Bank.: 
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26. D a ta  i s  from  t a b l e s  i n  S t a t i s t i c s  and R e p o r ts  D i v i s i o n ,  Agency f o r
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The i n t e r e s t  r a t e  on l o a n s  was b e tw e en  f o u r  and s i x  p e r c e n t .
I b i d . ,  p .2 3 .
2 7 .  See I n t e r n a t i o n a l  M onetary  Fund, Balance o f  Payments Yearbook
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the  t r a n s a c t i o n  can  be  r e g a r d e d  a s  a  lo a n  by th e  I .M .F .  to  th e  
c o u n t r y  c o n c e rn e d .
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29 . In  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  World Bank, members were r e q u i r e d  to  pay two 
p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  s u b s c r i p t i o n  a l l o c a t e d  to  them i n  g o ld  o r  American 
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The t o t a l  s u b s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  was f i x e d  a t  $3175 
m i l l i o n ,  and 635 m i l l i o n  d o l l a r s  was p a id  i n .  See A r t i c l e  2 , 
s e c t i o n  7 , and S c h e d u le  A o f  t h e  A r t i c l e s  o f  Agreem ent o f  t h e  
World Bank. On t h e  amount p a i d ,  s e e  U.S. Overseas Loans and 
Grants . . . :  p .1 6 6 .
In  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  M onetary  Fund, members w ere  
a l l o c a t e d  q u o ta s  and  were to  pay  25% o f  th e  amount ( o r  10% o f  t h e i r  
r e s e r v e s  i f  t h i s  was l e s s )  i n  g o ld  o r  U .S . d o l l a r s ,  w i th  t h e  b a la n c e  
i n  t h e i r  own c u r r e n c y .  See A r t i c l e  3 , s e c t i o n  3 o f  t h e  A r t i c l e s  
o f  A greem ent o f  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  M onetary  Fund. On th e  U .S . q u o t a ,  
se e  S c h e d u le  A o f  t h e  A r t i c l e s  o f  A greem en t.
30 . For t h e  f a c t u a l  m a t e r i a l  on UNRRA p r e s e n t e d  a b o v e ,  s e e  L e g i s l a t i v e  
R e fe re n c e  S e r v i c e ,  L i b r a r y  o f  C o n g re s s ,  U.S. Foreign A id; i t s  
Purposes, Scope, A d m in is tra tio n , and R e la ted  In fo rm a tio n :  Greenwood 
P r e s s ,  1968 , ( O r i g i n a l l y  U .S . Government P r i n t i n g  O f f i c e ,  1 9 5 9 ) ,  
pp .  2 1 - 2 3 .  C h a r le s  W o lf ,  Foreign A id: theory  and P ra c tice  in  
Southern A sia :  P r i n c e t o n  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1960 , p . 1 6 .
31. On t h e  t h r e e  programmes d e s c r i b e d  b e lo w , s e e  ib id »  , C h a p te r  2.
32. See D. A c h e so n , P resen t a t  th e  C reation  : p .2 0 1 .
33. C. W o lf ,  o p . c i t . ,  p .1 6 .
34. On th e  Food and  A g r i c u l t u r e  O r g a n i s a t i o n ,  s e e  Gove Ham bidge,
The S to ry  o f  FAO: Van N o s t r a n d ,  1955.
35 . For t h e  above  d e t a i l s ,  s e e  E. W e id n e r ,  Prelude to  R eorg a n isa tio n :  
the  Kennedy Foreign A id  Message o f  March 22, 1961: I n t e r  U n i v e r s i t y  
Case Program me, 1969 , p p .  2 - 3 ;  U .S . D e p a r tm en t  o f  Commerce,
Foreign A id  by th e  U nited  S ta te s  Government, 1940-1951: p p . 2 4 -2 5 .
36. The above d a t a  h a s  b e e n  c a l c u l a t e d  from  " S ta t e m e n ts  o f  C r e d i t s  
A u th o r i s e d  by t h e  E x p o r t - I m p o r t  Bank from  J u l y  1 ,  1945 to  
December 31, 1 9 4 6 " ,  and " S ta t e m e n ts  o f  C r e d i t s  from  J a n u a r y  1 ,
1945, to  December 3 1 ,  19 4 7 " ,  i n  Documents on American Foreign  
R e la tio n s , V o l .8 ,  1 9 4 5 -4 6 ,  p p .  64 0 -6 4 2 ;  and V o l . 9 ,  1947 , p p .4 3 8 -  
440. A $100 m i l l i o n  c r e d i t  f o r  t h e  N e t h e r l a n d s  I n d i e s ,  and a f u r t h e r  
$15 m i l l i o n  c r e d i t  f o r  S au d i  A r a b ia  w ere  n e v e r  f o r m a l i s e d ,  though 
th e y  a p p e a r  i n  t h e  t a b l e s  m e n t io n e d  ab o v e .  A c c o r d in g ly  th e y  have  
been  e x c lu d e d  from  t h e  t o t a l s  g i v e n .  See K eesing rs Contemporary 
A rc h ive s , 1 9 4 6 -4 8 ,  V o l .6 ,  p .  8914.
37 . The p r i c e s  r e f e r r e d  to  a r e  fa rm  p r i c e s ,  n o t  w h o l e s a l e  v a l u e s .
See S t a t i s t i c a l  A b s tra c t o f  the  U nited S ta te s ,  1935 , T a b le  65 1 ,  
p .6 5 2 .  W hile  a  m ild  r e c o v e r y  commenced a s  e a r l y  a s  A p r i l ,  1933 , 
farm  c a sh  incom es d id  n o t  im m e d ia te ly  b e n e f i t ,  inasm uch  as  
r e l a t i v e l y  l i t t l e  g r a i n  and c o t t o n  was s o ld  a t  t h a t  t im e .  See U .S . 
D epar tm en t  o f  Commerce, B ureau  o f  F o r e ig n  and D om estic  Commerce, 
Survey o f  C urrent B u sin ess ,  V o l .1 3 ,  1933 , May, N o .5 ,  p . 5 ;  and 
J u l y ,  N o .7 , p . 5 .
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38. These steps included measures to encourage restriction of production 
and acreage reduction. For details, see Keesing rs Contemporary 
Archives, Vol.l, 1931-34, pp. 680, 694, 926, 915.
39. On the above points, see John Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries:
Years of Crisis, 1928-1938: Houghton Mifflin, 1959, Chapter Two,
and especially pp. 53-54.
40. Undermining Wallace's strategy was evidently not part of the 
President's design, for he had indicated sympathy with it in 
discussions early in May. IbicL., p.51.
In his memoirs, after referring to the Japanese invasion of 
Manchuria in 1931, and the request of the League of Nations in 1933 
that the United States join in specific steps to demonstrate non­
recognition of Manchukuo, the then Secretary of State Cordell Hull 
comments that the "League members were joining together to aid 
China and the United States kept pace by agreeing to extend 
$50,000,000 ...". But foreign policy grounds of this kind do not 
seem to have been important motives for the credit. In a subse­
quent meeting with the Japanese Ambassador, Hull explained that 
the United States had "made the credit to aid our price situation 
at home and had no purposes in mind to affect adversely Japan's 
affairs", thereby undermining much of the impact the measure might 
have had as a device for signalling opposition to Japan. It is 
possible that Hull saw some value in the credit as a device for 
indicating that the United States was 'keeping pace' with other 
League members, but this does not seem to have led him to support 
the measure. According to Blum's rendering of the Morgenthau diaries, 
the State Department opposed the loan, partly because China was 
not proceeding to its satisfaction in repaying debts owed to private 
American citizens, and partly because it was concerned to avoid 
offending Japan. C. Hullyop.cit., p.274; and J. Blum, op.cit., 
p .53.
41. Evidence on these points is given subsequently in this chapter.
42. On Peek's attitudes, see J. McHale, The New Deal and the Origins 
of Public Lending for Foreign Economic Development: 1933-1945:
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1970, pp.85-87.
43. Ibid., pp. 87-89.
44. See F. Adams, The Export-Import Bank and American Foreign Policy,
1934-39: Ph.D., Cornell University, 1969, p.56.
45. On the volume of lending, see C. Whittlesey, art.cit., p.493.
46. For studies on the attitudes of American policy makers concerning 
foreign economic policy in the post-war world, see Gabriel Kolko,
'The Politics of War: Allied Diplomacy and the World Crisis of
1943-45: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969, Chapter 11; D. Baldwin,
op.cit., pp. 13-15; D. Green, The Containment of Latin America: 
Quadrangle, 1971, Chapter 5.
47. "Address by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) before the 
Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York, New York City,
April 1, 1943" (excerpts), in Documents on American Foreign Relations, 
Vol.5, 1942-43, esp. pp. 610-612.
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48. See the foreword, written by Under Secretary of Commerce Wayne 
Taylor, and dated May, 1943, in the Department of Commerce Study,
The United States and the World Economy: the International 
Transactions of the United States during the Inter-War Period:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943.
49. For statements by American policy makers on this objective, see the 
sources cited in footnotes 47 and 48. Also see "Statements of the 
Secretary of State (Hull), May 19, 1944", Documents on American 
Foreign Relations, Vol.6, 1943-44, pp. 327-329: "Report of the 
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency to Accompany H.R.,
3314 ..., July 6, 1945", zbid., Vol.7, 1944-45, pp. 528-537;
Henry Wallace, Sixty Mil Lion Jobs: Heineman, 1946, pp. 95-107.
50. On the need for the above points, see, for example, "Statement of 
the Secretary of State (Hull), May 19, 1944", p.328. Also 
"Address by the Under Secretary of State ...» April 1, 1943",
p,611-612. D. Acheson, Morning and Noon: Houghton Miffin, 1965,
p.274. The latter includes the text of an address which Acheson 
gave in November, 1939.
51. Table 2 below provides further evidence on this point.
52. On the need to restore foreign investment, see, in particular, the
Department of Commerce study cited in footnote 48, pp. 19-20.
53. See D. Green, op.cit. , pp. 12 3-124. Roosevelt did not actually
endorse the proposed total, but declared himself satisfied with 
another major conclusion of the report: namely that the flow of
capital would be economically beneficial both to the United States 
and the recipient.
54. U.S. Department of Commerce, The United States and the World 
Economy: p.14.
55. "Address of the Director of the Office of Foreign Relief and 
Rehabilitation Operations (Lehman) before the Foreign Policy 
Association, New York City, June 17, 1943", Documents on American 
Foreign Relations, Vol.5, 1942-43, pp. 275-276. Of course, there 
were a number of other justifications for relief measures.
56. On the development of plans for the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, see the sources mentioned in footnote 25. On 
objections which the British representative Keynes had to U.S. 
proposals drafted by Harry Dexter White, and on Keynes’ own plan 
for an "International Clearing Union" see, L. Gardner, Economic 
Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964, 
pp. 285-287; and Teresa Hayter, Aid as Imperialism: Pelican 
Original, 1971, pp. 35-36.
57. See "Statement of Assistant Secretary of State Acheson before the 
House Committee on Banking and Currency, March 8, 1945", Documents 
on American Foreign Relations, Vol.7, 1944-45, esp. p.527. Also 
see H. Wallace, op.cit., p.104; L. Gardner, op.cit., pp.285-288;
D. Green, op.cit., pp. 120-121.
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58. "Statement of Assistant Secretary of State Acheson before the 
House Committee on Banking and Currency, March 8, 1945" p,527.
For details see the relevant section of the Articles of Agreement 
of the International Monetary Fund, in Documents on American 
Foreign Relations., Vol.6, 1943-44, pp. 338-373. Articles 1, 4
and 8 are of particular relevance. It was understood that a number 
of members would find it difficult to relinquish exchange controls 
immediately after the war, and use of such measures was therefore 
sanctioned in a transition period from the end of World War Two 
until 1952. See article 14 for details.
59. See Article 5, sections 3 and 5; and other articles such as 15, 
section 2a. Article 5, section 5 noted that:
Whenever the Fund is of the opinion that any 
member is using the resources of the Fund in a 
manner contrary to the purposes of the Fund, it 
shall present to the member a report setting 
forth the views of the Fund and prescribing 
a suitable time or reply. After presenting such 
a report to a member, the Fund may limit the 
use of its resources by the member.
On the subsequent use of policies of leverage adopted by the Fund 
in its dealings with less developed countries, see Teresa Hayter, 
op.cit.; and Cheryl Payer, "The I.M.F. and the Third World", 
in S. Weissman, et at. (eds.), op.cit., pp.61-72.
60. The passage cited is from Article l(ii) of the Articles of 
Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. Documents on American Foreign Relations, Vol.6, 
1943-44, pp. 373-398.
61. See "Statement of Assistant Secretary of State Acheson before the 
House Committee on Banking and Currency, March 8, 1945", pp.527-528.
62. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: p.84, noted that:
Keynes and I favoured equitable consideration 
of both, the criteria being the need for and 
efficacy of the project rather than the cause 
of it. White disagreed. The solid weight of 
the Latin American delegations threw the 
decision our way.
This decision was embodied in Article 3, section la, which referred 
to use of the resources of the Bank "with equitable consideration 
to projects for development and projects for reconstruction alike". 
Equitable consideration in this sense, did not, of course, mean 
that the volume of funds going to less developed areas would be 
equivalent to those going to countries subject to devastation 
during the Second World War.
63. On these justifications, see "Address by the Director of the Office 
of Relief and Rehabilitation Operations (Lehman) before the Foreign 
Policy Assocation, New York City, June 17, 1943", pp. 271-277.
For other statements, see "Message of the President to Congress 
on United States Participation, November 15, 1943", ibid., Vol.6, 
1943-44, pp. 294-295; "Letter of Secretary of State (Hull) to the 
Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee (Bloom), December 7, 
1943", ibid., pp.295-296; "Report from the Senate Committee on
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Foreign Relations to Accompany H.J. Resolution 192, February 14, 
1944" (excerpts), ibid., pp. 296-302. Also see C. Wolf, op.ait,3 
p.15.
64. Useful studies on the involvement of the United States in Cuba 
in the early thirties are to be found in Bryce Wood, op.cit.3 
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CHAPTER THREE
THE GROWTH OF CONCESSIONAL ECONOMIC AID 
TO LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES:
PART ONE
Over the period 1948-66, there was a substantial increase in 
the quantity of economic aid provided to less developed countries by 
the United States. Both this chapter and the following one are con­
cerned with the problem of explaining this increase. While the subse­
quent chapter deals with surplus agricultural commodity aid, this 
section examines the growth of concessional economic aid under a 
variety of other programmes including those administered by the prin­
ciple U.S. aid agencies.
One possible explanation for the growth of economic aid under 
the programmes considered in this chapter can be briefly stated as 
follows. From the mid-fifties onward, American policy makers became 
increasingly concerned with the danger that internal political change 
within less developed countries, together with the expanded use of eco­
nomic aid, trade and other instruments by communist powers, would
•klead to growing communist' influence and control in those regions.
While not absent in the first part of the period under review, concern 
with this problem had greatly increased by the early sixties, replac­
ing the previous focus on the danger of economic collapse and left
American policy makers over this period understood 'communist' 
influence to exist in a number of circumstances where other 
observers would suggest a different conclusion: hence the use 
of quotation marks. According to their criteria, the capture 
of power by radical nationalist movements could be included as 
communist control.
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wing influence in Europe and the possibility of expansion of areas 
under communist control by use of the conventional military force.
Economic aid for less developed countries was accordingly given a new 
priority in order to meet this challenge.
From a reading of some of the literature on American economic 
aid, one might suspect that this represents a satisfactory account of 
the growth of aid. Thus a number of writers have argued that the de­
sire to preserve existing regimes in less developed countries against 
internal communist challenge and to counter blandishments of the Soviet 
Union were central objectives of the American economic aid programme 
during the period under discussion.^ Accordingly, it might be thought 
that the expansion of aid to LDCs stemmed from increasing concern with 
these objectives. Again, this type of explanation is given a great 
deal of prominence in accounts of the growth of aid in particular 
regions and countries. In Latin America, for example, the expansion 
of American economic aid (through the Alliance for Progress and other 
channels) is frequently attributed to a changed perception as to the
vulnerability of the region to radical movements in the aftermath of
2the Cuban revolution and other political disturbances. Finally, an 
explanation of the type outlined is given a prominent place in one work 
which takes up the question of why the United States increased the
3emphasis on economic aid for LDCs in the late fifties and early sixties.
It will be argued in this chapter that the account sketched 
above points to one extremely important cause of the growth of conces­
sional economic aid to less developed countries, but that it leaves 
out a number of other important factors. Before proceeding to this 
argument, it will be as well to provide a factual basis for the dis­
cussion by describing the extent and nature of the increase in aid
under discussion.
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The increase in aid levels dealt with in this chapter is 
broadly indicated in the table which follows, The data covers aid
provided under a number of different programmes. A major component 
consists of aid provided through the Agency for International Develop­
ment (A.I.D.) and predecessor organisations. 'Predecessor agencies'
cover a wide variety of agencies, for the aid programme has been char-
4acterised by the frequency with which it has been reorganised. The 
main 'predecessor' agencies over the period under review were:
The Economic Co-operation Administration (E.C.A.), 1948-51.
Though mainly concerned with European recovery, this provided some 
aid to less developed countries. In some cases, aid was allocated 
directly to LDCs, while in other instances, funds were initially made 
available to European countries and then transferred to their colonies.
The Mutual Security Agency (M.S.A.), 1951-53.
The Technical Co-operation Administration (T.C.A.), 1950-53.
This administered the Point Four programme initiated by President Truman 
and was separate from the principal aid agency until 1953.
The Foreign Operations Administration (F.O.A.), 1953-55.
This replaced the Mutual Security Agency and Technical Co-operation 
Administration.
The International Co-operation Administration (I.C.A.), 1955-61.
The Development Loan Fund (D.L.F.), 1958-61.
This remained outside the principal aid organisation until 1961 when 
it was absorbed into A.I.D. along with I.C.A.
I
A separate programme covered by the above data is the Peace
1 9 0 .
T ab le  1 . O f f i c i a l  Developm ent A s s is ta n c e  fo r
L ess D eveloped A reas .
(D ata r e p r e s e n ts  commitments in  m i l l io n s  o f 
U .S. d o l l a r s .  Annual av e ra g es  a re  g iven  w here 
i n t e r v a l s  o f  lo n g e r  th an  one y e a r  a re  ta k e n . 
D ata does n o t in c lu d e  a id  made a v a i la b le  
th ro u g h  PL480 and r e l a t e d  l e g i s l a t i o n . )
T o ta l o f  w hich S e c u r i ty  
S u p p o rtin g  a id .
1949-52 
( a n n .a v .)
932.5 (7 1 .1 )
1953-61 
( a n n . a v .)
1644.8 (8 4 9 .1 )
1962-65 
( a n n . a v .)
2903.9 (5 7 8 .7 )
1966 3318.1 (9 0 4 .6 )
1967 3029.6 (7 7 2 .7 )
iSource: Agency f o r  I n te r n a t io n a l  D evelopm ent,
U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: O b lig a tio n s  
and Loan A u th o r iz a tio n s , Ju ly  1, 1945 -  
June 503 1974: W ash ing ton , D .C ., 1974.
D ata i s  c a lc u la te d  from f ig u r e s  g iv e n  fo r  in d iv id u a l  
r e g io n s  and c o u n t r i e s .  ’L ess developed  a r e a s ’ f o r  th e  
p u rp o ses  o f  t h i s  t a b l e  ex c lu d es  a l l  b u t E urope, Canada, 
Jap an , A u s t r a l ia n  and New Z ea lan d , Aid f o r  I n te r r e g io n a l  
programmes i s  in c lu d e d .
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Figure 1 . Changing Levels of American Economic Aid
________ to Less Developed Countries.____
(Does not include PL480 aid, which is discussed 
in the following chapter.)
19671949-52 53-61 62-65
Annual averages
Source: Table 1.
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Corps, established by the Kennedy Administration in 1961, The Peace 
Corps has been administered by a separate organisation within the 
Department of State and has provided middle level technical assistance 
to a number of countries. Its contributions to the totals in Table 1 
are not great: thus in 1966, assistance provided through this programme
was valued at 113 million dollars, while other economic assistance of 
the type discussed in this chapter amounted to more than 4000 million 
dollars.
Contributions to international lending organisations, such as 
the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank and the Interna­
tional Development Association are included in the totals given.^ 
Contributions to these organisations have normally been made under 
special legislation. However, contributions to a number of other U.N. 
agencies, such as the United Nations Development Programme have usually 
been made with funds appropriated in the first instance to the princi­
pal aid agency (A.I.D. and its predecessors).
Finally, the above data covers a number of special programmes, 
most of them operating prior to 1953. These include, for example, 
assistance through the Philippine Rehabilitiation Act, Government 
Relief in Occupied Areas and like programmes.
In general, the above data covers all aid defined in U.S. A.I.D. 
statistics as ’Official Development Assistance’ except for that pro­
vided through the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act 
of 1954 and related legislation. It must be added that U.S. statistics 
include in ’official development assistance’ some aid which is not 
normally thought of as falling into that category: for this reason,
the term ’concessional economic aid’ is normally used in this chapter.
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Thus U.S. statistics include ’security supporting assistance' as 
’Official Development Assistance’, but this has generally consisted 
of aid made available where specific objectives of a political, mili­
tary or security nature were considered to justify assistance even 
though the country concerned would not qualify under strict development 
criteria.^ Again, direct relief assistance, compensation payments 
under the Philippine Rehabilitation Act, and other programmes of like 
nature are included in A.I.D. statistics as ’Official Development 
Assistance’.
The picture of substantially increased levels of economic aid 
suggested in Figure One applies even if a more detailed examination 
is undertaken and allowance is made for changing prices, altered terms 
on which assistance is made available, and restrictions on the way in 
which the recipient might use aid. The question of changing prices 
may be taken first. The data given indicates the current dollar value 
of aid made available to less developed countries, but in a period of 
rapid inflation it would be possible for the real value of aid to fall 
while figures for assistance in current dollars grew steadily. One 
rough indication of changes in the real value of aid can be obtained 
by examining the International Monetary Fund index of prices for com­
modities and services imported by less developed countries. As the 
table below indicates, the index for LDC import prices fluctuated over 
the period under review, but showed no marked tendency to increase in 
the long run. Thus price changes do not affect the conclusion that the 
totals in Table 1 reflect a real increase in the value of aid made 
available.^
There was a tendency for economic assistance of the type underg
dicussion to be provided on more onerous financial terms over the
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Table 2. Import Prices for LDCs, 1948-64
(Index of prices of commodities and services 
imported by less developed areas. 1958=100.)
1948 110
1949 .. .
1950 90
1951 106
1952 108
1953 101
1954 97
1955 98
1956 100
1957 103
1958 100
1959 98
1960 99
1961 98
1962 97
1963 98
1964 99
Source: International Monetary Fund,
International Financial Statistics3 
Supplement to the 1965/66 issue, p.xv.
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period under review. This is reflected in the increasing proportion 
of ’Official Development Assistance’ provided as loans rather than 
grants. (Table 3) Nevertheless,this was not sufficient to offset 
the increase in gross aid totals noted in Table 1. Loans provided by 
the Agency for International Development were on relatively liberal 
terms. Under the policy adopted during the Kennedy Administration, 
loans were repayable in dollars, but had maturities of up to forty years 
with a grace period of up to ten years. The minimum interest rate was 
only .75% in 1962,but was raised in January, 1964, to an effective 1.7%, 
and again in October to an effective 2.1% (one percent during the grace 
period and 2.5 percent for the remainder of the loan). These minimum 
rates were not markedly out of line with the average terms on which 
A.I.D. made available assistance: as late as 1968, A.I.D. loans had
9average maturities of 39.7 years and average interest rates of 2.4%. 
Calculations (given in the footnotes) which convert loans on approxi­
mately these terms to a ’grant equivalent’ suggest that there was a 
significant increase in the value of aid between 1953-61 and 1962-65 
despite the more onerous financial terms on which it was provided.
There was, further, a tendency to increasingly ’tie’ aid by 
restricting the opportunity of recipients to make purchases outside 
the United States. Although a sizable proportion of aid had always 
been used for purchases within the United States, a rigorous policy of 
reducing offshore procurement was not initiated until 1959 when the 
United States began to encounter increasing problems with its balance 
of payments. Table 4 illustrates the resulting trend in procurement 
for assistance provided by A.I.D. and its predecessor agencies.
In general, tying aid reduces its value by restricting the
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Table 3. Official Development Assistance; Loans and Grants
(The totals given refer to Official Development 
Assistance provided to all regions, not simply 
less developed areas. They exclude aid made 
available through PL480 and related legislation. 
Figures refer to aid totals for the whole period 
and are in millions of U.S. dollars.)
1949-52 1963-61 1962-65 1966
Loans 2551 5850 8346 2238
Grants 16082 18203 8693 2546
Total 18633 24054 17039 4784
% Loans 
in total 14% 24% 49% 47%
Source: A.I.D., U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants3
p.6.
* * * * * * * * *
Table 4. A.I.D. Commodity Purchases by Source of Purchase
Fiscal Year
a.
% used 
the United 
States
for commodity purchases in:
b. Offshore 
Developed 
Countries
c. Less 
Developed 
Countries.
1959 47.4% 42.1% 10.5%
1960 40.6 % 49.4% 10.0%
1961 44.2 % 47.1% 8.8%
1962 66.3% 15.7% 17.9%
1963 79.4% 6.7% 13.9%
1964 86.6% 3.3% 10.1%
1965 92.1% 1.7% 6.2%
1966 90.2% 0.9% 8.9%
Source: Agency for International Development, Operations
Report for Fiscal Year 1973: Washington, D.C., 1973, p.56.
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o p p o r t u n i t y  o f  r e c i p i e n t s  t o  c h o se  t h e  most e c o n o m ic a l  s o u r c e s  o f  
s u p p l y . ^  I n c r e a s e d  t y i n g  by t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  was n o t ,  ho w ev er ,  o f  
s u f f i c i e n t  im p o r ta n c e  t o  o u tw e ig h  i n c r e a s e s  i n  t h e  g r o s s  l e v e l  o f  
a s s i s t a n c e .  C a l c u l a t i o n s  p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h e  f o o t n o t e s  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e r e  
was a s i g n i f i c a n t  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  v a lu e  o f  a i d  even  when a l lo w a n c e  i s
12made f o r  t h e  com bined e f f e c t  o f  t y i n g  and more o n e ro u s  f i n a n c i a l  t e r m s .  
Ty ing  was p r o b a b l y  l e s s  e f f e c t i v e  th a n  th e  f i g u r e s  on t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  
o f  c o m m o d it ie s  p u r c h a s e d  i n  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  would  i n d i c a t e ,  f o r  i t  
i s  p o s s i b l e  f o r  r e c i p i e n t s  t o  spend  a g r e a t e r  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  U. S .  a i d  
fu n d s  on A m erican  co m m o d it ie s  and u s e  an i n c r e a s e d  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t h e i r  
own r e s o u r c e s  f o r  p u r c h a s e s  i n  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s .  I t  was n o t  u n t i l  1967 
t h a t  t h e  A m erican  Government so u g h t  to  a d m i n i s t e r  t h e  programme so a s  
to  e n s u r e  t h a t  a id  fu n d s  c r e a t e d  a d d i t i o n a l  s h ip m e n ts  from  t h e  U n i te d  
S t a t e s
A f u r t h e r  o b s e r v a t i o n  a r i s e s  from  b r e a k i n g  down f i g u r e s  o f  t o t a l  
a i d  t o  l e s s  d e v e lo p e d  c o u n t r i e s  i n t o  p a r t i c u l a r  r e g i o n s  and c o u n t r i e s .  
I t  can  b e  s e e n  from  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t a b l e  t h a t  t h e  e x p a n s io n  o f  a i d  was 
n o t  c o n f in e d  t o  any  one  r e g i o n  o r  c o u n t r y :  t h e r e  w ere  s u b s t a n t i a l
i n c r e a s e s  i n  L a t i n  A m e ric a ,  A f r i c a ,  and t h e  N ear E a s t  and South  A s ia .  
M oreover, i t  i s  e v i d e n t  t h a t  th e  t r e n d s  d e s c r i b e d  e a r l i e r  c o n c e a l  v e r y  
d i f f e r e n t  p a t t e r n s  f o r  p a r t i c u l a r  c o u n t r i e s ,  b o th  w i th  r e s p e c t  to  t h e  
t im in g  and  m a g n i tu d e  o f  i n c r e a s e s  i n  th e  l e v e l  o f  a i d .  In  some c a s e s  -  
t h e  P h i l i p p i n e s  i s  one i n s t a n c e  n o te d  i n  t h e  t a b l e  be low  -  a i d  l e v e l s
d e c l i n e d .
1 9 8 .
T a b le  5 . T ren d s  i n  O f f i c i a l  D evelopm ent A s s i s t a n c e :
P a r t i c u l a r  R eg ions  and C o u n t r i e s . ___________
( d a t a  r e p r e s e n t s  m i l l i o n s  o f  U .S . d o l l a r s  and 
e x c lu d e s  a i d  made a v a i l a b l e  th ro u g h  PL480 and 
r e l a t e d  l e g i s l a t i o n .  Annual a v e r a g e s  a r e  g iv e n  
f o r  p e r i o d s  o f  m ore t h a n  one  y e a r . )
1949-52
L a t i n  Am erica  
24 .4
A f r i c a
1 .3
1953-61 1 1 5 .7 9 5 .1
1962-65 9 2 0 .6 2 5 7 .3
1966 1 0 8 9 .0 21 1 .4
1967 9 1 7 .6 2 30 .8
N ear E a s t  and 
S ou th  A s ia
1949-52 1 4 3 .8
1953-61 4 9 2 .9
1962-65 8 8 8 .8
1966 7 0 4 .0
1967 5 8 6 .2
E a s t  A s ia V ie tnam
1949-52 4 5 5 .7 -
1953-61 742 .5 1 6 3 .0
1962-65 4 4 9 .6 1 6 4 .5
1966 885 .2 59 3 .5
1967 81 8 .1 4 9 4 .4
o f  w h ich  I n d i a P a k i s t a n
6 2 .0 2 .8
1 0 8 .8 1 11 .4
371 .2 21 6 .7
3 3 4 .8 127 .6
2 1 7 .8 1 36 .7
P h i l i p p i n e s  S. K orea  Taiwan
1 4 1 .0 12 1 .3 1 1 6 .8
2 7 .1 25 1 .7 9 8 .0
2 5 .2 1 2 2 .8 6 9 .7
8 .4 1 4 7 .3 0
1 5 .3 11 6 .1 0
Source: A . I . D . ,  U.S. Overseas Loans ccnd. Grants.
T o t a l s  f o r  t h e  N ear E a s t  and  S o u th  A s ia  g iv e n  i n  
th e  above  t a b l e  do n o t  i n c l u d e  G re e c e ,  u n l i k e  t h e  
d a t a  in  T a b le  1 ,
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It is clear that the explanation sketched in the introductory 
remarks to this chapter points to an important factor generating 
increased economic aid. U.S. officials and Congressmen perceived, in 
many countries within the Third World, a greater danger from the possi­
bility of increased communist or radical influence through internal 
political change. Of course, this was not the case in every country.
In Malaya and the Philippines, it was generally recognised that the
internal threat posed by insurgent forces was much less in the early
14sixties than it had been previously. But in many areas, as subse­
quent discussion on particular regions will suggest, there was greater 
concern.
There were several reasons for this altered perception. First, 
there were political disturbances, or changes in the perceived strength 
of communist or radical forces in a number of areas. Mention has al­
ready been made of the importance of the Cuban revolution in Latin 
America, but as will be seen below, there were other political changes 
and disturbances which underlined the vulnerability of the region to 
American policy makers. In the Middle East, to cite another example, 
a succession of changes - the achievement of powerby Nasser, the nation­
alisation of the Suez Canal, the uprising in Lebanon, and the coup in 
Iraq among them - had the same effect of generating concern that the 
region would fall to forces much less sympathetic to the United States 
than those which had previously held power, and which still clung to 
it in traditionalist regimes as in Jordan and Saudi Arabia.
A second source of increased concern was the change in Communist 
policy perceived by some American policy makers: a change understood
II
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to involve greater emphasis than hitherto on the use of national liber­
ation wars in less developed countries as a means of expansion. Evi­
dence of this belief can be found in the following statement from 
President Kennedy.
In 1952, the United States was concerned 
about Korean type control and invasions 
with actual military forces. Now, however, 
we have seen an entirely different concept 
which the Communists are frankly and 
generously explaining to us at great length,
Mr. Khrushchev’s speech in January, he 
reiterated it .... In Vienna ... the so-called 
war of liberation which is not the Korean type 
war, where armed forces of one side pass 
across en mass the frontier of another country, 
but instead the seizure of power internally 
by what he considers the forces of liberation 
but which are, as we know, in many cases 
forces which are Communist controlled, and 
which are supported from outside the country, 
but which are internal in their operation.
It is for these reasons and because of this 
change in Communist strategy, which they 
believe offers them the best hope of success, 
that this work [foreign aid] is more important 
than it has ever been before.15
Again, following talks with Krushchev in Vienna in 1961, Kennedy
reported that the Russian leader was
certain that the tide was moving his way, 
that the revolution of rising peoples would 
eventually be Communist revolution, and that 
so-called wars of liberation, supported by 
the Kremlin would replace the old methods of 
direct aggression and invasion.
Of course, American policy makers had long considered 'subversion' 
and internal insurgency to be important components of 'communist' 
strategy. Even after the outbreak of the Korean War, some high level 
officials considered that the use of this strategy was more probable 
than conventional invasion in South East Asia. Thus a policy statement 
by the national Security Council in 1952 argued that while
the danger of an overt military attack
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against South east Asia is inherent in 
the existence of a hostile and aggressive 
Communist China, ... such an attack is 
less probable than continued communist 
efforts to achieve domination through 
subversion.^
The degree of concern with this problem was partly concealed by the 
fact that aid provided to a number of countries in the region was 
labelled ’defence support’ even where its primary purpose was to pro­
mote economic development as a means of strengthening the position of
18incumbent regimes. But while Kennedy's statement requires qualifi­
cation, it does indicate the belief of a number of American policy 
makers of the period that the emphasis of communist strategy had 
shifted markedly in the direction indicated, and that greater priority 
should therefore be according to the task of preventing internal 
challenge to regimes in less developed countries.
Increasing economic difficulties in some countries also contri­
buted to the belief that some areas were more vulnerable to radical 
movements than hitherto. As will be seen subsequently, this was the 
case in Latin America. In a number of areas (including the Middle East, 
discussed later in this chapter), the withdrawal or reduced role of 
other Western powers was seen as a development increasing the vulnera­
bility of existing regimes. Finally, there was a belief in the late 
fifties and early sixties that the importance of the less developed 
countries in terms of U.S. interests was greater than reckoned pre­
viously. Given the existence of a military stalemate between the United 
States and the Soviety Union; given the recovery of Europe; it was 
considered that there was a greater probability that the outcome of 
the Cold War might be decided by the internal course taken by less 
developed countries.
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In the understanding of many American officials and Congress­
men, there was a close connection between the provision of economic 
aid and the preservation of political stability in less developed 
countries. Accordingly, concern with the strength of radical and 
communist movements arising from the above sources tended to generate 
increased economic aid. Policy makers justified the link between aid 
and stability on a number of grounds. To begin with, it was held that 
political instability and the growth of movements of the ’extreme left’ 
were fostered by conditions of poverty, unemployment, ill health and
lack of education, and that economic assistance could ameliorate these
19circumstances, or at least prevent them from deteriorating. Again,
it was argued that instability was less probable insofar as people in
underdeveloped countries perceived, first, that some improvement was
occurring in their living conditions, and second, that there was a
reasonable prospect of further improvement in the future within the
20framework of existing institutions. Economic assistance to the
country concerned would, it was held, influence both of these factors. 
Further, the second belief could be promoted throughout the under­
developed world as a result of the rapid development of certain ’show­
case' recipients. For example, the relative economic and social
progress of India and the People's Republic of China would influence
21attitudes elsewhere. It was also maintained that political extrem­
ism and instability were promoted by the stress inherent in the rapid
changes occurring in underdeveloped countries, and that the provision
22of development assistance would help overcome these stresses.
Finally, it was suggested that stability required the provision of 
sufficient external resources to maintain basic government services 
and economic viability: this consideration was important in the case
2 0 3 .
o f  econom ic  a i d  p r o v id e d  to  c o u n t r i e s  su c h  a s  S o u th  V ie tnam , L a o s ,
23
J o rd a n  and Z a i r e  ( f o r m e r ly  t h e  B e lg ia n  C ongo) .
I t  i s  n o t  a rg u e d  t h a t  t h e r e  was any s im p le  r e l a t i o n s h i p  be tw een  
t h e  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  A m erican  p o l i c y  m akers  a s  t o  t h e  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  o f  
c o u n t r i e s  t o  communist movements and th e  q u a n t i t y  o f  a i d  t h e y  w ere  
w i l l i n g  t o  make a v a i l a b l e .  The amount o f  a i d  was a l s o  i n f l u e n c e d  by 
o t h e r  f a c t o r s  such  a s  ju d g e m e n ts  a b o u t  t h e  im p o r ta n c e  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  
t o  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s ,  t h e  c a p a c i t y  o f  t h e  in cu m b e n t  reg im e  t o  u se  a i d  
e f f e c t i v e l y ,  i t s  n e e d  f o r  e x t e r n a l  r e s o u r c e s ,  t h e  c a p a c i t y  o f  t h e  
U n i te d  S t a t e s  to  p r o v id e  a d d i t i o n a l  a i d ,  and t h e  p r e s e n c e  o r  a b s e n c e  
o f  o t h e r  i n t e r e s t s  i n  p r o v i d i n g  a i d .  In  some c a s e s ,  r e g im e s  f a c i n g  
a  s h a rp  c h a l l e n g e  r e c e i v e d  r e l a t i v e l y  l i t t l e  econom ic  a s s i s t a n c e .  T h is  
was t h e  p o s i t i o n  w i t h  t h e  N a t i o n a l i s t  reg im e  p r i o r  t o  i t s  l o s s  on th e  
m a in la n d  o f  China i n  1949. - I n  t h e  u n d e r s t a n d in g  o f  many A m erican  
p o l i c y  m ak e rs ,  and e s p e c i a l l y  o f  t h o s e  in  t h e  e x e c u t i v e ,  t h e  d i f f i c u l ­
t i e s  o f  t h e  Kuom intang w ere  due to  i t s  own c o r r u p t i o n ,  i n e f f i c i e n c y  
and  p o l i c i e s  r a t h e r  t h a n  t o  any l a c k  o f  e x t e r n a l  r e s o u r c e s ,  and i t  was
2
t h o u g h t  u n l i k e l y  t h a t  a i d  would h av e  any marked e f f e c t  on t h e  s i t u a t i o n .  
But i n  s p i t e  o f  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  any s im p le  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e tw e e n  th e  
l e v e l  o f  a id  and t h e  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  t o  com m unist move­
m e n ts ,  i n c r e a s e d  c o n c e rn  w i t h  t h e  l a t t e r  p ro b le m  i n  l e s s  d e v e lo p e d  
c o u n t r i e s  d id  te n d  to  g e n e r a t e  i n c r e a s e d  a s s i s t a n c e  o v e r  t h e  p e r i o d  
d i s c u s s e d  in  t h i s  c h a p t e r .
The growth o f  econom ic  a i d  was a l s o  p rom o ted  by i n c r e a s e d  a c t i ­
v i t y  o f  t h e  S o v ie t  U nion  i n  l e s s  d e v e lo p e d  c o u n t r i e s  i n  su c h  f i e l d s  
a s  a i d ,  t r a d e  and d ip lo m a c y .  A f t e r  t h e  d e a th  o f  S t a l i n ,  t h e  S o v i e t  
Union u n d e r to o k  new i n i t i a t i v e s  to w a rd s  l e s s  d e v e lo p e d  c o u n t r i e s  o u t -
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side the communist bloc, embarking on a programme of economic aid,
and following up early efforts in this field with much publicised
visits by Khrushchev, and Bulganin to India, Burma and Afghanistan in 
251955. The scale of economic aid increased quickly in the first
years following initiation of the programme, with India, Syria,
26Afghanistan and Indonesia as major recipients.
There are several reasons for supposing that the trend towards
expanded bloc activity in less developed countries had the effect of
generating increased American economic aid for the same region. First,
it is clear that American policy makers paid close attention to the
efforts of the Soviet bloc in this area. The new Soviet policy was
27the subject of detailed reports almost from its inception. Moreover, 
policy makers were well aware of the increasing scope of bloc activity. 
This awareness is illustrated in the figure below which is drawn direct­
ly from the summary presentation to Congress of the Act for Internat­
ional Development for fiscal year 1962.
Second, statements from policy makers indicated that bloc ef­
forts were viewed with concern and suggested that the United States 
should respond with a larger aid effort of its own. Thus the public­
ation referred to in the preceding paragraph noted that:
This large Communist economic and technical 
effort in the less developed countries is 
obviously a development of major importance 
that the United States cannot ignore. It 
reinforces the need for a major U.S. effort 
in these countries, bearing in mind, however, 
that the United States is not merely responding 
to Communist initiatives but carrying forward 
a program that has its own importance ...
Growing Communist bloc aid to the less developed 
countries of the non-Communist world offers 
several dangers to the United States. If any 
of these countries were to be dependent only 
on the Communist bloc for its foreign aid,
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this would give cause for concern as it could 
set the stage for a political takeover. The 
large numbers of bloc aid personnel are an 
obvious means of extending Communist influence 
to other countries, even though most bloc 
personnel have confined themselves to their 
proper fields of activity. The total effect 
of the bloc aid effort, together with evidence 
of achievement by the bloc countries at home, 
is to enhance the image presented ... 28
Third, policy makers indicated that some loans and grants had
been made specifically in order to avoid a situation in which the
29recipients relied heavily on the Soviet bloc for aid. This was the 
case, for example,with some programmes in Africa. It was understood 
that some countries sought additional aid in order to avoid excessive 
reliance on the former colonial power: by providing aid itself, the
United States could reduce the likelihood that the Soviet Union would 
become a major alternative source of assistance.
Fourth, it has already been seen that the special aid and trade 
agreements which the Axis powers (especially Germany) concluded with 
Latin American governments in the late thirties and early forties had 
the effect of forcing the United States to increase its own loans and 
grants in the region. In this case, State Department internal corres­
pondence and memoirs (mentioned in Chapter Two) clearly indicate the 
concern of policy makers that the influence of the Axis powers might be 
expanded through this technique and make it clear that U.S. loans were 
frequently made for the specific purpose of preventing increased links 
between the recipient and the Axis powers.
Having sketched the general reasons for supposing that increas­
ed concern with ’communist* influence in less developed countries was 
important in generating additional American economic aid to the area,
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Figure 2. Tables from Department of State, An Act for
International Development: Fiscal Year 1962.
A Summary Presentation, June 1961.
U.S. Government Printing Office, 161, pp. 186, 188.
"The Communist effort to win the Underdeveloped World 
has many phases ..."
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an attempt will be made to examine the impact of this factor in particu­
lar regions and countries. In each case, two points must be estab­
lished: first, that there was increased concern with communist or
radical influence of the type under discussion; and second, that this 
was important in generating increased economic aid.
In Latin America, policy makers had long been concerned with 
the problem of communist and radical movements, and in some cases - 
the Bolivian revolution of 1952 and the course taken by the Arbenz 
regime prior to its ouster in 1954 are examples - it was evidently be­
lieved that there was a considerable danger of eventual control by 
these forces. However, there was a greater depth of concern with this 
problem from the end of the 1950s as a result of several developments. 
One change, discussed in greater detail subsequently in this paper, 
was the increasing economic difficulties faced by some Latin American 
countries from the mid-fifties: difficulties that were understood by
many American policy makers to increase the likelihood of political 
30upheaval. Another was the violent reception which Vice-President
Nixon encountered on his tour of Latin America in 1958. In Caracas,
Venezuala, the danger to Nixon was considered so great that troops were
ordered to Guantanamo Bay and Puerto Rico in case it was necessary to
mount a rescue operation. In his memoirs, Eisenhower notes that,
the events of that week in May, 1958 
brought home to us the clear truth that, 
as the Vice President reported at the 
end of his trip, ’the threat of Communism 
in latin America is greater than ever 
before ’ .31
More important still was the course taken by the Cuban Revolu­
tion in 1959 and 1960. Not only did U.S. officials consider that there 
was a danger that Castro would act as an agent for ’subversion’ on
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the continent: there was also the example and inspiration which he
provided to revolutionary movements. As Eisenhower notes:
One thing we did know: Fidel Castro was
a hero to the masses in many Latin American 
nations. They saw him as a champion of the 
downtrodden and the enemy of the privileged 
who, in most of their countries, controlled 
both wealth and governments. His crimes and 
wrongdoings that so repelled the more informed 
peoples of the continent had little effect 
on the young, the peons, the underprivileged, 
and all others who wanted to see the example^ 
of revolution followed in their own nations.
By the time the New Frontier came to assume office, concern
among policy makers seemed ever greater: thus a 1961 task force set
up by Kennedy concluded that the threat to the United State arising from
the attempt of communist forces to ’’convert the Latin American social
revolution into a Marxist attack on the U.S. itself” was more danger-
33ous than the Nazi-Fascist threat of the Roosevelt era,
A number of considerations suggest that heightened concern with 
the danger of communism in Latin America was extremely important in gen­
erating the very substantial increases in aid identified in Table 5. The 
timing of the aid increases provides one pointer. American agreement
to the creation of the Inter-American Bank followed Nixon’s 1958 tour 
34of Latin America. Proposals for such an institution had previously 
35been rejected. A series of further steps, precursors to the Kennedy
Administration's Alliance for Progress, were taken as the Eisenhower
Administration came to a clearer appreciation of the challenge posed by
Cuba and the need to take action against it: as Eisenhower notes,
On the day I signed the proclamation 
reducing imports of Cuban sugar, I met 
with foreign policy advisers to discuss 
a new aid policy for Latin America.
These initiatives involved an approach to Congress for approval for a
37500 million dollar inter-American fund for social development : a
209.
promise that additional resources on a large (though still unspecified)
38scale would be made available in future ; and an attempt to induce
the Latin American nations through the Bogota Conference to press for-
39ward with social and economic reforms. The Kennedy Administration
carried this policy a stage further with its "Alliance for Progress"
40concept, originally announced on March 13, 1961, and formally insti­
tuted at the Inter-American Economic and Social Conference at Punta 
del Este in August of the same year. It was intended that ten billion 
dollars be provided by the U.S. Government over a decade: this was to
include loans from Eximbank, contributions to multilateral organisations,
and surplus commodities, as well as assistance provided under the
41Alliance for Progress section of the A.I.D. programme.
Beyond this, there is direct evidence from statements and mem­
oirs linking concern with communism with the increase in economic aid. 
Eisenhower's memoirs provide this as far as the initiatives of 1960 
are concerned, while for the Kennedy Administration and the views and 
documents discussed by Schlesinger indicate that the vulnerability of 
Latin American was a dominant consideration leading to support for the 
programme within the executive. A view widely held within the Admin­
istration was that the economic and social conditions in Latin America, 
combined with the attempt to exploit this situation by Cuba and the 
Soviet Union, created a grave threat to U.S. security, and that unless
development was accelerated, as it could be by a major economic assist-
42ance programme, "new Castros would arise". Similar views were held
by policy makers outside the executive. Broadly this justification
43was given by a number of Senators in the 1963 debates on foreign aid, 
while the Clay Committee, expressing its support for the Alliance for 
Progress, noted that the U.S. "cannot allow another Castroite-Communist
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Cuba to come into existence".
In the case of Africa, increased concern with actual or poten­
tial communist and radical influence was an important factor (though 
not the only one) generating the increase in economic aid indicated 
in Table 5 - from negligible quantities in the period 1949-52 to an 
annual average of over 300 million dollars for the 1962-65 interval.
One change which gave rise to this concern was the emergence of a 
number of new states in the region in the late fifties and early sixties. 
As Table 6 indicates, there were only 4 independent states prior to 
1955 (including South Africa, but not counting Egypt), but 5 more 
achieved independence between 1956 and 1959, while 24 new states emerged 
in the 1960-63 interval. In testimony to Congress on the Foreign 
Assistance Act for 1962, policy makers from the executive made repeated 
reference to the stress of change on the continent and to the problem 
which the limited resources, unrealistic boundaries, strong tribal
feelings and absence of national loyalties characteristic of many of
45the new states posed for their political stability. While it was
admitted that no African country had yet been lost to Communism, it was
argued that "dangerous inroads have been made in more than one nation",
and that a strong aid programme was required to promote conditions
46more favourable to stability.
The problem of political instability in the newly independent 
states of Africa was most directly evident in the Belgian Congo (now 
Zaire), where independence sparked off mutiny from the army, a proclam­
ation of seccession from one region, and renewed involvement by Belgium. 
Concern with the possibility of unilateral Soviet intervention and with 
the prospect of increased influence for the radical Congelese political 
leader Lumumba were among factors which prompted American policy makers
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to provide financial and other support through the United Nations
and through bilateral agencies. Following the ouster of Lumumba,
and the seizure of power b-y the ’pro-Western’ officer Mobutu, it was
an important objective of the United States to strengthen this regime
by the provision of financial and other support. Zaire was a large
recipient of economic aid in the period, obtaining over twenty percent
47of the amount provided to Africa over the 1962-65 interval.
In addition, executive spokesmen made reference to the increased 
activity of the Soviet bloc on the continent. According to Assist­
ant Secretary of State Williams in testimony on the 1962 Act:
During the last two party congresses, 
they have indicated an interest in 
penetrating into Africa. If you look 
at the number of people they have there, 
they are certainly going about [it] - 
lumping all of the Communist groups 
together, roughly they have over 600 
diplomats and something over 2000 
technicians ...
The Soviet opening of credit started 
very slowly with only about $3 million 
in 1959, In 1960, it went up to $206 
million, 1961 $234 million, and so far 
this year, 171 million ...
All of this hasn't been drawn down, 
but it does indicate the vigor with 
which the Soviets are attacking this 
problem.
In particular, policy makers were concerned that the desire to escape
dependence on the former colonial power would lead African states
into reliance on Soviet aid. As Williams pointed out to Congress:
I cannot stress too strongly the significance 
to the Africans of avoiding economic dependence 
on the former colonial power. Moderate political 
leaders are open to severe attack from 
extremist elements within their countries 
unless they can demonstrate that they have 
developed new contacts in the world, as 
befits an independent nation, and that 
they are no longer solely dependent on the
212.
Table 6. African States: Dates of Independence
States independent prior to 1956: 4
Ethiopia (never colonised)
S. Africa (independence 1910),
Liberia (1847), and Libya (1951).
States achieving independence between
1956 and 1959. 5
Ghana (1957), Guinea (1958)
Morocco (1956), Sudan (1956)
Tunisia (1956).
States achieving independence, 1960-63. 24
In 1960: Cameroon, Central African
Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville),
Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy 
Republic, Mali, Mauritania, Niger,
Nigeria, Senegal, Somali Republic,
Togo, Upper Volta, Zaire, Tanganyika 
(later part of Tanzania).
1961: Sierra Leone.
1962: Algeria, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda.
1963: Kenya. Also Zanzibar and Pemba,
later part of Tanzania.
States achieving independence, 1964-66. 5
Malawi (1964), Zambia (1964) Gambia (1965) 
Botswana (1966), Lesotho (1966)
Source : From information given in Agency for International
Development, Statistics and Reports Division,
Office of Financial Management, Africa: Economic 
Growth Trends: Washington, D.C., October,'1974, p.2
The United Arab Republic is considered part of the Near 
East and is therefore not included in this table. Tanganyika 
Zanzibar and Pemba, which later became Tanzania, are counted 
only once in the above table.
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m etro p o le  fo r  a id .  By p ro v id in g  
v i s i b l e  ev id en ce  o f  t h e i r  change in  
s t a t u s  to  one o f so v e re ig n  e q u a l i ty ,  
h e lp  from  th e  U nited  S ta te s  makes i t  
e a s i e r  f o r  th e  A fr ic a n  n a t io n s  to  
m a in ta in  th e  c lo se  t i e s  w ith  Europe ^  
t h a t  a re  in  th e  i n t e r e s t  o f  a l l  o f u s .
In  E a st A s ia _, a s  a l re a d y  n o te d , th e  tr e n d  in  a id  l e v e ls  d i f f e r s  
a p p re c ia b ly  from  th a t  shown in  o th e r  r e g io n s .  The t a b le  c i t e d  p r e ­
v io u s ly  shows a h ig h  l e v e l  o f  a id  ( in  e x c e ss  o f  450 m illio n /an n u m  
f o r  th e  i n t e r v a l  1949-52 , and would in d i c a te  a h ig h e r  t o t a l  i f  in ­
d i r e c t  a s s i s ta n c e  to  V ietnam  v ia  m e tro p o li ta n  F rance  were in c lu d e d .
The P h i l ip p in e s  re c e iv e d  more in  t h i s  i n t e r v a l  than  i t  d id  su b se q u e n t­
ly .  A gain , th e  q u a n t i ty  o f  a id  p ro v id ed  to  E a s t A sia  on a v e ra g e , 
o v e r 1962-65 , was l e s s  th a n  t h a t  ov er 1953-61 , a consequence p r i n c i ­
p a l ly  o f  reduced  re q u ire m e n ts  in  two m ajor r e c i p i e n t s ,  South Korea 
and T a i w a n . N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  th e  t o t a l  f o r  1966 was h ig h e r  than  
an n u a l a v e ra g e s  f o r  any o f th e  p re v io u s  i n t e r v a l s :  as  th e  d a ta  in
T ab le  5 i n d i c a t e s ,  t h i s  was a t t r i b u t a b l e  a lm o st e n t i r e l y  to  th e  en o r­
mous jump in  a id  to  South V ietnam  as  American p o lic y  m akers e s c a la te d  
su p p o r t in  an a t te m p t to  s ta v e  o f f  th e  c o l la p s e  o f th e  S a ig o n -b ased  
reg im e. In c re a s e d  concern  w ith  communist in su rg e n c y  was th u s  im p o rt­
a n t in  h e lp in g  to  g e n e ra te  a h ig h  l e v e l  o f a id  f o r  t h i s  re g io n  in  
1966.
In S o u th  A s ia 3 a good d e a l o f  th e  in c re a s e  in  econom ic a id  
o v e r th e  p e r io d  under rev iew  w ent to  I n d ia .  P re s s u re  to  com pete w ith  
S o v ie t econom ic a id  was n o t th e  dom inant f a c t o r  beh ind  th e  grow th o f 
a s s i s ta n c e  to  In d ia  (though  i t  was a m ajor o b je c t iv e  o f  a id  to  a n o th e r  
co u n try  in  th e  re g io n  -  A fg h a n is ta n ) .^ ^  In  I n d ia ,  U.S.  a id  was 
much g r e a te r  th a n  S o v ie t a id  l e v e l s ,  and th e  l a t t e r  was n o t ,  a t  l e a s t  
by th e  1960s seen  as  a m ajor th r e a t  to  American i n t e r e s t s . Indeed
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it was suggested by one spokesman for the American executive in 1962
that Soviet aid had the effect of reducing the amount of assistance
which the United States had to provide to support India’s develop- 
53ment. Nor was the growth of aid to India attributable to any 
direct challenge to the regime from communist parties or other radical 
movements within the country. The Communist vote at the 1962 election 
was, at ten percent of the total, no higher than it had been in 1957, 
and the party was subsequently weakened by rifts arising from the 
Sino-Indian border war of 1962, the general international Communist 
schism of the same period, and differences over strategy within its 
own ranks. Within particular regions, such as Kerala, the party was 
very strong, but this did not pose any immediate challenge: indeed,
in that state, the minority communist government was dismissed in 
1959, and an anti-communist alliance was successful in subsequent 
elections.^
What was important in the case of India was the increased atten­
tion to development arising from the belief that the outcome of the 
Cold War might well be decided, not by direct military conflict be­
tween the United States and the Soviet Union, but by the long run 
viability of Western models of development in the Third World. It 
had been argued by executive spokesmen from the early fifties that 
India's success or failure in economic development would not only de­
termine whether India remained as a non-communist state, but would
also affect the choice between different models of development in 
55other LDCs. But the changing nature of the Cold War added strength
to this argument, and seems to have been one of several factors behind 
the emergence of an increasing number of influential supporters of 
large-scale assistance to India in Congress and elsewhere in the
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latter half of the 1950s.
In the Near East_, American policy makers had been concerned 
with direct Soviet pressure on Turkey and Iran following World War 
Two, and the possibility of direct Soviet expansion was partly respon­
sible for the organisation of the Baghdad Pact of 1955.“^  However, 
the danger that internal political change and Soviet penetration would 
undermine the Western position in the region only came to the fore­
front of attention in the mid-1950s. Several factors were important 
in giving rise to this concern, and each tended to create conditions 
for larger American efforts in the field of economic aid. One was 
the emergence of a nationalist reforming government in Egypt. Al­
though Nasser's regime was effectively ruled out as a recipient of
American economic aid over the period 1956-58 when it was seen as a
58major threat to the Western position in the Middle East, its behav­
iour had the effect of encouraging American support and assistance 
for more traditional and pro-Western governments faced with challenge 
from similar forces. Perceptions of Nasser's regime changed appreci­
ably from 1959, but the existence of nationalist regime now had the 
effect of encouraging aid to Egypt itself as a means of moderating
its behaviour and preventing it from falling under the influence of
59more radical elements.
A second factor was the strength of radical and nationalist 
movements elsewhere in the region, underlined by an uprising by these 
forces in Jordan in 1957, by the subsequent seizure of power by pro- 
Nasser and leftist sections of the Syrian army, by rebellion against 
the pro-Western leadership of Lebanon in 1958, and by the ouster of 
the traditional monarch in Iraq by General Kassim (initially believed 
to be pro-Nasser) in the same year. These developments encouraged
\
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American policy makers to take steps to promote stability in the 
region. Financial support and economic aid was one means to this 
objective, though resort was also had to military aid, and, in the 
case of Lebanon, direct military intervention with American troops.^
The efforts of the Soviet Union and other communist powers 
in the field of economic and military assistance, trade and the like 
was a third change of importance: indeed, it was the major arms agree­
ment between Egypt and the Soviet Union of 1955 which was, in Eisen­
hower’s view, "The first evidence of serious Communist penetration
61in the Middle East". The U.S. Government initially sought to pre­
vent Egypt from concluding major aid agreeements with the Soviet 
Union, dispatching a special envoy to the Middle East prior to the
arms deal to dissuade Nasser from an arms agreement with the Commun- 
6 2ists in 1955, and attaching, as a condition of American support
for the financing of the Aswan Dam, the provision that there should
6 3be no ’side deals’ between Egypt and the Soviet Union. When Egypt 
emerged as a major recipient of American economic aid in the late 
fifties and early sixties, the more limited objective of providing 
some alternative to Soviet aid and thereby moderating Egypt’s behaviour 
was evidently an important consideration.^ It was also an aim of 
American economic assistance elsewhere in the region - for example 
in Yemen.^
A fourth factor of importance was the declining capacity of 
Britain and France to control or shape events in the Middle East.
While the position of these countries was already much weakened by 
the end of the Second World War, it suffered a further decline subse­
quently - a decline rendered starkly visible by the failure of their 
joint military intervention after the nationalisation of the Suez
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Canal. This contributed, along with other changes already described, 
to a greater level of U.S. involvement in the region. Indeed, belief 
that the weakened position of Britain and France had created a ’power 
vacuum’ in the area susceptible to exploitation by the Sovet Union was 
an important consideration prompting the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1956. 
While a key section of the Doctrine contained a request for Congress­
ional approval for the use of armed force in the Middle East to pro­
tect countries from aggression from any nation "controlled by inter­
national Communism", it also sought allocation of greater amounts of
economic and military assistance to countries in the region as a
66means of strengthening their ’independence’.
Ill
The preceding section has suggested the importance of two 
factors in generating increased aid between 1948 and 1966. However, 
the growth of aid cannot be adequately understood by reference to 
these alone. This section and that which follows will examine the 
impact of a number of other possible causes, and will argue that some 
were extremely important in prompting additional transfers to LDCs, 
or in creating the conditions under which this was possible.
One possibility is that changes, independent of those already
discussed, encouraged the transfer of additional aid on foreign policy 
6 7grounds. There is evidence to support this view. Thus some addi­
tional assistance was evidently generated as a result of the desire 
of American policy makers to go some way toward meeting the demands 
made by LDCs in the United Nations and other international forums.
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During the fifties, in particular, the United States came under 
strong pressure from less developed countries to support the creation 
of a Special U.N. Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED). Key 
features of the proposals of Third World countries were that the fund 
should provide capital assistance (not simply technical aid): that 
it should be provided on soft terms; and that the recipients should 
have a significant voice in decision making in the Fund. An arrange­
ment of the kind which operated for the World Bank, where voting 
strength was weighted according to financial contributions, was consi­
dered unacceptable.^
The United States did not agree to proposals of the type des­
cribed, but the need to provide some concession to the demands of 
Third World states seems to have been one consideration supporting 
the establishment of three aid organisations: The International Fin­
ance Corporation (created in 1955), a Special Fund for technical 
assistance within the United Nations (1958) , and the International
Development Association (1860). There were, of course, other reasons
69for U.S. support for these agencies.
Again, the growth of economic aid was supported by the interest 
of American policy makers in promoting a favourable image of the United 
States in less developed countries. The use of aid for the purpose 
pre-dated major initiatives by the Soviet Union in the area of econo­
mic aid: indeed, it was one of several arguments for the expansion
of the Point Four programme in the early fifties. While increased 
Soviet aid had the effect of encouraging decision makers to provide 
additional aid on this ground, there were independent factors at work 
which tended to have the same effect.
Thus the belief was evidently widespread among policy makers
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in the late fifties that previous American contacts with less develop­
ed countries had not always operated to generate a favourable image 
of the United States. Part of this concern can be traced to the 
publication in late 1958 of the best-selling work* The Ugly American' 
which presented a dark picture of the way in which American service­
men and government officials abroad had damaged the standing of the 
United States. Mangan notes that approximately one third of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee and a sizable number of representatives 
on the Committee on Foreign Affairs asked witnesses for their evalu­
ation of the book during the course of Congressional hearings in 
1959.11
Rather than reducing support for aid, this concern was evident­
ly one of several factors encouraging the development of a new type 
of aid programme - the Peace Corps. Under this scheme, volunteers, 
mainly young people, worked in less developed countries in such fields 
as health, education and community development. Since the Peace 
Corps workers were volunteers and since they were required to live 
at the standard of the recipient community, partake in its activities,
and avoid the wealthy and isolated community of American diplomats 
72and businessmen, they served as a convenient way of demonstrating
that Americans were motivated by altruistic considerations and not
simply by the desire for pecuniary advantage. In the assessment of
the American Ambassador in Caracas, they:
worked miracles in changing the 
Venezuelan image of North Americans.
Before the Peace Corps, the only 
Americans the poor Venezuelans ever 
saw were riding around in Cadillacs.
They supposed them all to be rich, 
selfish, callous, reactionary. The 
Peace Corps has shown them an entirely 
different kind of Americans. It is 
transforming the whole theory they
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73have of the United States.
It would seem that U.S. officials also saw the Peace Corps as a means
of demonstrating "understanding” of the United States on more specific
points: thus a deliberate attempt was made to recruit negroes for
74the service, and volunteers were provided with extensive lectures 
on U.S. institutions and current events, the latter including material 
on the U.S. civil rights problem, the Cuban invasion, the U-2 affair, 
the Hungarian Revolution and similar questions.
There were other motives behind the creation of the Peace Corps. 
Apart from the purpose already described - promoting "a better under­
standing of the American people on the part of the peoples served" - 
it was seen as a useful educational experience for young Americans, 
as a means whereby the American people might gain understanding of 
other countries, and as a way of promoting the economic development 
of LDCs. Statements by such supporters of the programme as Kennedy 
and Reuss also made reference to other grounds.^ The point of the 
preceding argument is not to deny these additional considerations, 
but to indicate that the motive of promoting "understanding of the 
American people on the part of the peoples served" was an important 
one, and that the creation of an aid programme with this objective 
in mind stemmed in part from changes which were independent of those 
discussed in the second section of this chapter.
It is also possible to account for changes in the level of 
aid in terms of changing doctrines about the impact of assistance. To 
some extent, the growth of aid was facilitated by the emergence and 
growing currency of beliefs and doctrines which were optimistic in 
their assessment of the way in which large-scale aid could promote 
economic development abroad. One source of this change was the
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burgeoning literature on economic development. The work of academics 
from the Center for International Studies of the Massachusetts Insti­
tute of Technology^ was particularly important in this respect, for 
it influenced American policy makers in a number of ways. Max Milli­
kan, Walt Rostow and others from the Center were in contact with a 
number of government officials; provided testimony to Congressional 
committees examining foreign aid; circulated written reports to the 
executive and Congress (including studies for the Special Senate 
Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Programme in 1957, and for the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1960); spoke to interested
groups around the country; and published a number of works outlining
78policies for dealing with the developing world. These included
79An American Policy in Asia, A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreiqn
80 81Policy, and The Emerging Kations: Their Growth and U.S. Policy.
The last two works represented revised versions of studies initially 
circulated to American policy makers. Finally, some members of the 
Center moved into government, and were able to influence policy from 
this venue. Thus Rostow was appointed Deputy Special Assistant for 
National Security Affairs by Kennedy, was subsequently Chairman of 
the Policy Planning Council at the Department of State and U.S. repre­
sentative on the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress,
and was from 1966-69 Special Assistance for National Security Affairs
82in the White House.
The importance which the M.I.T. doctrines attached to a high 
level of American economic aid stemmed partly from a theory of econo­
mic history. According to this doctrine, societies, once stirred 
from an initial state of "traditional economic stagnation", pass through 
several stages. First, there is a relatively long period during which
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t h e  p r e c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  econom ic p r o g r e s s  a r e  e s t a b l i s h e d .  T h is  i s  
fo l lo w e d  by a s t a g e  o f  ' t a k e  o f f '  " d u r i n g  w hich  th e  c o u n t r y  makes 
t h e  com plex t r a n s i t i o n  to  a p o s i t i o n  w here  s u s t a i n e d  economic grow th 
becomes p o s s i b l e " .
I n  a  d e c ad e  o r  two th e  b a s i c  s t r u c t u r e  
o f  t h e  economy and t h e  s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  s o c i e t y  a r e  t r a n s f o r m e d  
i n  su c h  a way t h a t  a  s t e a d y  r a t e  o f  g row th  
can  be s u s t a i n e d  w i th  a  d i m i n i s h i n g  i n f lo w  
o f  c a p i t a l .
Next comes a p e r i o d  o f  s e l f - s u s t a i n e d  g row th  -  a  " lo n g  p e r i o d  o f  r e g u ­
l a r  i f  f l u c t u a t i n g  p r o g r e s s " ,  f o l lo w e d  u l t i m a t e l y  by t h e  s t a g e  o f  h ig h
83mass c o n su m p tio n  t y p i f i e d  i n  t h e  f i f t i e s  by t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s .
The M .I .T .  w r i t e r s  p l a c e d  e x i s t i n g  LDCs a t  d i f f e r e n t  p o i n t s
i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  s t a g e s  d e s c r i b e d  a b o v e ,  and t h e  same c o u n t r i e s  w ere
som etim es p l a c e d  i n  d i f f e r e n t  p o s i t i o n s .  However, i t  was a c c e p te d
t h a t  many LDCs w ere  e i t h e r  i n  t h e  t a k e  o f f  s t a g e  o r  w ere  e n t e r i n g  i t ,
e v e n  th ough  some, e s p e c i a l l y  i n  A f r i c a  and  t h e  M idd le  E a s t ,  w ere
s t i l l  i n  t h e  e a r l y  s t a g e s  o f  d e v e lo p in g  t h e  p r e - c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  e c o n o -  
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m ic g ro w th .  I n  a  memo to  Kennedy w r i t t e n  on March 2 , 1961 , Rostow 
a rg u e d  t h a t :
B a r r i n g  a  c a t a s t r o p h e ,  i t  i s  l i k e l y  
t h a t  a good many o f  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  i n  
t h e  u n d e rd e v e lo p e d  w o r ld  w i l l ,  d u r in g  
t h e  1 9 6 0 s ,  e i t h e r  c o m p le te  t h e  t a k e - o f f  
p r o c e s s  o r  be  v e r y  f a r  advanced  i n  i t .
To be  s p e c i f i c ,  i t  s h o u ld  be p o s s i b l e ,  
i f  we a l l  work h a r d ,  f o r  A r g e n t i n a ,
B r a z i l ,  C o lum bia , V e n e z u e la ,  I n d i a ,  
t h e  P h i l i p p i n e s ,  T a iw an , T u rk e y ,  G reece  
-  and p o s s i b l y  E g y p t ,  P a k i s t a n ,  I r a n ,  
and I r a q  -  t o  have  a t t a i n e d  s e l f - s u s t a i n ­
i n g  g row th  by  1970 . . . ^ 5
T h ere  w ere  s e v e r a l  ways i n  which t h i s  d o c t r i n e  l e n t  i t s e l f  t o  
t h e  c o n c lu s i o n  t h a t  a  h ig h  l e v e l  o f  A m erican  econom ic  a i d  was d e s i r ­
a b l e .  S in c e  many LDCs w ere  a t ,  o r  c l o s e  t o ,  t h e  t a k e - o f f  s t a g e ,
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their requirements for foreign capital were extremely high. By con­
trast, there was only a limited ability to make effective use of
86capital while the preconditions for growth were being established.
Again, capital from outside, at least for countries adopting Western
8 7models of development during the period in question, was crucial.
According to A Proposal:
External capital is required to prepare 
countries for the transition to self- 
sustained long-run economic growth. In 
the transition itself external capital 
will often make the critical difference 
between an upward spiral of economic, 
social and political development and gg
a downward spiral of stagnation and decay.
Finally, the requirement for special sources of capital would be of
limited duration. As countries moved beyond the stage of take-off
into self sustained growth, the need for special government sources
of capital diminished, since.
First, the country is now generating 
out of its own rising output the 
resources to plow back into its own 
capital formation; and second, invest­
ment opportunities are emerging which 
compare favourably in profit prospects 
with those in other developed countries.
Thus the normal channels of international 
capital supply can be relied on to take 
over the burden of any net capital inflow 
still required. 89
The significance of this point was underlined by the authors of 
A Proposal.
[It] is essential to note that the proposals 
set forth in this paper do not open the 
United States up to an endless, open-ended, 
world-wide claim on its resources. The 
American purpose would be to assist countries 
in establishing the preconditions for growth 
(mainly through technical assistance) and 
to assist them with capital, notably in the 
decisive period of transition. The objective 
is not to redistribute income as between the 
industrialised nations: the objective is to
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help the underdeveloped nations into 
the stage of self-sustained growth.
When a country has passed the transition, 
it should be in a position to operate 
on its own with help only from the normal ^  
international capital market institutions.
It is not argued here that the M.I.T. doctrine was universally 
accepted among those concerned with formulating American foreign 
policy. However, there is evidence that the theory underlying it be­
came part of the assumed framework of a number of those concerned with 
policy making. The language in which it was formulated - take off,
self-sustaining growth, and similar terms - were frequently used in
91Congressional hearings and debates. The same is true of some exe­
cutive statements on foreign aid. To take an example from Kennedy’s 
1961 message on foreign aid:
There exists in the 1960s, a historic 
opportunity for a major economic assistance 
effort by the free industrialised nations 
to move more than half the people of the 
less-developed nations into self-sustained 
economic growth, while the rest move substant­
ially closer to the day when they, too, 
will no longer have to depend on outside 
assistance. ^2
There is also the point, noted previously, that the M.I.T. writers were
able to communicate their ideas to policy makers in a number of ways,
and were, on occasions, able to directly participate in policy mak- 
93ing. It seems likely therefore, that these doctrines facilitated 
the growth of economic aid from the United States.
A further source of optimism as to the impact of aid arose
94from the experience of the Marshall Plan. While American policy 
makers seem to have distinguished between the conditions existing in 
Euorpe and those in less developed countries, the magnitude of the 
difference seems not have been properly understood, and the success
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of large scale capital aid in promoting relatively optimistic notions 
as to what might be achieved in less developed countries. One indi­
cation of the lack of recognition of the difficulties facing the United 
States in LDCs as compared with Western Europe can be found in Kennedy's 
statement launching the Alliance for Progress.
I propose that the American Republics begin 
on a vast new 10-year plan for the Americas, 
a plan to transform the 1960s into a historic 
decade of democratic progress. ... if our 
effort is bold enough and determined enough, 
then the close of this decade will mark the 
beginning of an new era in the American 
experience. The living standards of every 
American family will he on the rise3 basic 
education will he available to all3 hunger 
will he a forgotten experience3 the need 
for massive outside help will have passed3 
most nations will have entered a period of 
self-sustaining growth, and, although there 
will still be much to do, every American 
Republic will be the master of its own 
revolution and its own hope and progress.
... if the countries of Latin America are 
ready to do their part - and I am sure they 
are - then I believe the United States, for 
its part, should help provide the resources 
of a scope and magnitude sufficient to make 
this bold development plan a success, just 
as we helped to provide3 against nearly equal 
odds3 the resources adequate to help rebuild 
the economies of Western Europe. ^ 5
The targets mentioned in the speech were not attained, as can be seen
by taking education as an example. By 1971, only 58 percent of the
5-14 age group were enrolled as primary students in Latin America,
compared with the 1960 figure of 46 percent. 36 percent of the 15-19
age group were enrolled as secondary students in 1971, compared with
9618 percent in 1960. Yet the speech suggests that basic education
t
for all, along with a number of other ambitious objectives, might 
be achieved by 1970, with slightly betters odds than those which faced 
the United States in its task of European reconstruction. While it 
is conceivable that U.S. officials sought, in some measure, to
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d e l i b e r a t e l y  ’o v e r s e l l '  a i d ,  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  such  a n a l o g i e s  and e x p e c t ­
a t i o n s  c o u ld  be i n c l u d e d  i n  s p e e c h e s  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e r e  was a c o n s id ­
e r a b l e  d e g re e  o f  m is u n d e r t a n d in g  c o n c e r n in g  t h e  m ag n i tu d e  o f  t h e
97
d e ve lopm en t t a s k  i n  L a t i n  A m erica  and o t h e r  l e s s  d e v e lo p e d  a r e a s  as  
compared w i th  t h a t  w h ich  had  f a c e d  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  i n  W e ste rn  E u ro p e .
A t h i r d  p o s s i b i l i t y  i s  t h a t  i n c r e a s e d  r e q u i r e m e n ts  f o r  a i d  on 
th e  p a r t  o f  l e s s  d e v e lo p e d  c o u n t r i e s  c o n t r i b u t e d  to  th e  g row th  o f  
A m erican econom ic  a s s i s t a n c e .  As t h e  f o l l o w i n g  d i s c u s s i o n  w i l l  make 
c l e a r ,  t h i s  w r i t e r  p l a c e s  a  good d e a l  o f  e m p h a s is  on t h i s  f a c t o r .  I t  
i s  n o t  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  v a r i o u s  e s t i m a t e s ,  sum m arized i n  T a b le  7 , o f  
t h e  c a p i t a l  n e e d s  o f  l e s s  d e v e lo p e d  c o u n t r i e s  show any t r e n d  to w ard  
i n c r e a s e d  a i d  r e q u i r e m e n t s .  Such s t u d i e s  h av e  a r r i v e d  a t  v e r y  d i f f e r ­
e n t  e s t i m a t e s  o f  t h e  n e e d s  o f  LDCs f o r  c a p i t a l  a i d ,  d e p e n d in g  on:
a .  t h e  t a r g e t s  f o r  econom ic and s o c i a l  p r o g r e s s  a d o p te d ;
b .  t h e  l e v e l  o f  i n e f f i c i e n c y  i n  a i d  u t i l i s t a t i o n  w hich i s  c o n s id e r e d  
t o l e r a b l e .  Any r a p i d  e x p a n s io n  o f  t h e  q u a n t i t y  o f  a i d  i s  l i k e l y  to  
l e a d  to  i n e f f i c i e n t  u t i l i s a t i o n  o f  fu n d s  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  a p p e a ra n c e
o f  a  v a r i e t y  o f  c o n s t r a i n t s  and b o t t l e n e c k s ,  such  a s  s h o r t a g e s  o f  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  and s k i l l e d  p e r s o n n e l .  E s t im a t e s  on a i d  r e q u i r e m e n t s  
n o r m a l ly  a t t e m p t  to  k e e p  a i d  w i t h i n  a  l i m i t  -  t h e  ’ a b s o r b t i v e  c a p a ­
c i t y ’ -  beyond w h ich  a i d  programmes w ould become e x t r e m e ly  i n e f f i c i e n t ;
c .  a s s u m p t io n s  made i n  c a l c u l a t i n g  th e  amount o f  c a p i t a l  r e q u i r e d  
to  a c h ie v e  t h e  d e v e lo p m en t  g o a l s  assum ed . Two p r i n c i p a l  m ethods have  
b een  u s e d .  One, t h e  s a v in g s  gap a p p ro a c h ,  assum es t h a t  a  c e r t a i n  
l e v e l  o f  i n v e s tm e n t  i s  r e q u i r e d  and a t t e m p t s  to  e s t i m a t e  t h e  amount 
by w hich  d o m e s t ic  s a v in g s  m ust b e  s u p p le m e n te d  so  t h a t  t h i s  t o t a l  may 
b e  r e a c h e d .  Under t h e  f o r e i g n  exchange  gap m eth o d ,  im p o r t  r e q u i r e ­
m ents  a r e  e s t i m a t e d  s e p a r a t e l y  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  v a r i o u s  a s s u m p t io n s  
a b o u t  t h e  way i n  w h ich  t h e y  a r e  r e l a t e d  to  econom ic  g row th  and
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Table 7. Estimates of Foreign Aid Requirements
1) Savings Gap Method
Total and
Projection target Additional foreign
Reference
Year
for annual growth 
in per capita 
income:
Capital (billions 
of dollars/annum),
Total Addi‘-ional.
A. United Nations 1949 2.0% over 1950-60 14.0 13.0
United Nations
(excluding China, 
Mongolia) 1949
V V i i  i i 8.5 7.5
B. Millikan-Rostow 1953 2.0% 6.5 3.5
C. Tinbergen/EEC 1959 2.0% 7.5 3.5
D. Hoffman 1959 2.0% over 1960-69 7.0 3.0
E. Rosenstein-Rodan 1961 1.8% over 1962-66 6.4 2.4
1966 2.2% over 1967-71 6.4 -
1971 2.5% over 1971-76 5.0 _
2) Foreign Exchange Gap Method
Reference 
Year, and 
year of 
projection.
Import Require­
ments
($ billions)
Foreign 
Exchange Gap 
($ billions)
A. United Nations 1959, 1970 41.0 20.0
B. G. Blau/FAO 1959, 1970 41.0 18.0
C. Balassa/OECD 1960, 1970 38.0 10.5
1960, 1975 48.7 13.7
Source: Goran Ohlin, Foreign Aid Policies Reconsidered:
O.E.C.D., 1966, pp. 77, 79.
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d ev e lo p m en t: e s t im a te s  a r e  th e n  made o f  f o r e ig n  exchange  r e c e i p t s
from  e x p o r t s ,  p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l  f lo w s  and o th e r  s o u rc e s  in  o r d e r  to  
d e te rm in e  t h e  am ount by  w hich th e s e  m ust b e  su p p le m e n te d  to  a c h ie v e  
th e  g iv e n  volum e o f  im p o r ts .  E i th e r  m ethod in v o lv e s  a num ber o f  im­
p r e c i s e  e s t im a te s  and a s su m p tio n s  and  th e  m arg in  o f  u n c e r t a i n t y  i s  
a c c o r d in g ly  l a r g e .  N o rm a lly , th e  r e q u ir e m e n ts  f o r  a i d ,  m easu red  by 
th e s e  m e th o d s , h a v e  b e e n  a good d e a l  l a r g e r  th a n  a c tu a l  a id  f lo w s  a t  
th e  t im e .
H e re , i t  w i l l  b e  s a id  t h a t  r e q u ir e m e n ts  f o r  a id  in c r e a s e d  i f  
th e  economy o r  governm ent p o l i c i e s  o f  th e  LDC c o n c e rn e d  changed  in  su ch  
a way t h a t  g r e a t e r  l e v e l s  o f  a s s i s t a n c e  w ere  n e e d ed  to  a c h ie v e  d e v e lo p ­
m ent program m es. In  some c a s e s ,  t h e  r e q u ir e m e n ts  o f  l e s s  d e v e lo p e d  
c o u n t r i e s  have  in c r e a s e d  b e c a u s e  t h e i r  d ev e lo p m en t o b j e c t iv e s  h av e  b e ­
come m ore a m b i t io u s ,  c a l l i n g  f o r  s u b s t a n t i a l  i n c r e a s e s  i n  im p o r ts  i n  
o r d e r  to  make p o s s ib l e  th e  e x p a n s io n  o f  heavy  in d u s t r y  o r  th e  a c h ie v e ­
m ent o f  h ig h e r  g row th  r a t e s .  In  o t h e r  i n s t a n c e s ,  a id  r e q u ir e m e n ts  h av e  
in c r e a s e d  b e c a u s e  o f  a  d e c l in e  in  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s ,  th e  d iv e r s io n  o f  
an i n c r e a s i n g  p r o p o r t io n  o f  f o r e ig n  exchange  r e c e i p t s  to w ard  s e r v i c in g  
e x t e r n a l  d e b t ,  and th e  d i s s i p a t i o n  o f  p r e v io u s ly  a c c u m u la te d  f o r e ig n  
exchange  r e s e r v e s .
The c a s e s  o f  I n d ia  and L a t in  A m erica i l l u s t r a t e  th e  im p o rta n c e  
o f  t h i s  f a c t o r  in  g iv in g  r i s e  to  in c r e a s e d  a i d .  T h ere  w ere  s e v e r a l  
r e a s o n s  f o r  I n d i a ’ s  g row ing  a id  r e q u i r e m e n ts .  P e rh a p s  m ost im p o r ta n t  
was th e  g row ing  gap b e tw een  I n d i a ’ s im p o r t r e q u ir e m e n ts  and i t s  e x p o r t  
e a r n in g s .  As T a b le  8 show s, I n d i a 's  e x p o r t  e a r n in g s  to w ard  th e  end 
o f  t h e  p e r io d  u n d e r  re v ie w  w ere  o n ly  s l i g h t l y  h ig h e r  th a n  th e  l e v e l s  
re a c h e d  in  1951 . On th e  o t h e r  h a n d , im p o r t r e q u ir e m e n ts  in c r e a s e d  
s u b s t a n t i a l l y ,  w i th  a p a r t i c u l a r l y  l a r g e  jump o c c u r r in g  in  1956.
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C o n se q u e n tly , th e  t r a d e  d e f i c i t  ( th e  gap b e tw een  im p o r ts  and e x p o r t s )  
w hich  had  a v e ra g e d  l e s s  th a n  one b i l l i o n  ru p e e s  o v e r  1 9 4 7 -5 5 , was 
o v e r  t h r e e  b i l l i o n  ru p e e s  f o r  e v e ry  y e a r  from  1956-64  and a v e ra g e d  
o v e r  4 b i l l i o n  ru p e e s  o v e r  t h e  same i n t e r v a l .  The in c r e a s e d  need  f o r  
im p o r ts  was p a r t l y  a  co n seq u en ce  o f  a  change i n  I n d i a 's  d ev e lo p m en t 
s t r a t e g y ,  though  o t h e r  f a c t o r s ,  su ch  a s  i n c r e a s e d  d ep en d en ce  on im­
p o r te d  fo o d , w ere  a l s o  im p o r ta n t .  The F i r s t  F iv e  Y ear P la n ,  c o v e r in g  
1 9 5 1 -5 6 , was m odest i n  i t s  o b j e c t iv e s  f o r  p u b l i c  and p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  
in v e s tm e n t ,  and in  i t s  t a r g e t  f o r  econom ic g ro w th : m o re o v e r, i t  was
d i r e c t e d  p r i n c i p a l l y  to w a rd  i n c r e a s i n g  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t io n  and 
im p ro v in g  f a c i l i t i e s  i n  i r r i g a t i o n ,  pow er and t r a n s p o r t .  The Second 
F iv e  Y ear P la n  (1 9 5 6 -6 1 ) was f a r  more a m b itio u s  in  te rm s  o f  g o a ls  f o r  
econom ic  g row th  and in v e s tm e n t ,  and  th e r e  was a n  a p p r e c ia b l e  s h i f t  in  
e m p h a s is  to w a rd s  in v e s tm e n t  i n  h eav y  i n d u s t r y .  B ecause  o f  th e s e  c h a n g e s , 
f o r e ig n  ex ch an g e  r e q u ir e m e n ts  f o r  th e  Second P la n  w ere  a good d e a l  
h ig h e r  th a n  th o s e  f o r  th e  F i r s t  P la n .  T a b le  9 i n d i c a t e s  th e  d i f f e r e n c e
b e tw een  th e  two f iv e  y e a r  p l a n s ,  and  n o te s  t h a t  th e  T h ird  F iv e  Y ear
98P la n  d e v e lo p e d  f u r t h e r  th e  em p h asis  e s t a b l i s h e d  in  th e  S econd .
A n o th e r  change w hich in c r e a s e d  I n d i a 's  r e q u ir e m e n ts  f o r  a id
was one w h ich  a f f e c t e d  a num ber o f  o th e r  l e s s  d e v e lo p e d  c o u n t r i e s :
nam ely  t h e  in c r e a s e d  b u rd e n  o f  s e r v i c i n g  lo a n s  and f o r e ig n  in v e s tm e n t
made in  p r e v io u s  y e a r s .  F o r d e v e lo p in g  c o u n t r i e s  a s  a  g ro u p , s e r v i c e
on p u b l ic  d e b t  in  t h e  m i d - f i f t i e s  a b s o rb e d  l e s s  th a n  4% o f  e x p o r t
99e a r n in g s :  by 1964 , t h i s  p r o p o r t io n  was 12% Some i n d i c a t i o n  o f  th e
way in  w h ich  t h i s  a f f e c t e d  I n d ia  i s  g iv e n  by t h e  ite m s  'i n v e s tm e n t  
in co m e ' and  ' l o a n  r e p a y m e n ts ’ in  t h e  b a la n c e  o f  paym ents d a ta  i n  T a b le  
8 . O ver 1949-51  paym en ts on th e s e  i te m s  a v e ra g e d  l e s s  th a n  \  b i l l i o n  
ru p e e s  e a c h  y e a r ,  b u t  f o r  1 9 6 2 -6 4 , th e y  a v e ra g e d  a lm o s t 1 .5  b i l l i o n
r u p e e s .
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T a b le  8 . I n d i a :  B a la n ce  o f  P ay m en ts , 1 9 4 7 -6 4 .^ "
(D a ta  r e p r e s e n t s  m i l l i o n s  o f  I n d ia n  ru p e e s )
1947
A. Goods and S e r v ic e s :  
o f  w h ic h ,
-1299
E x p o r ts  f . o . b . 4735
Im p o r ts  c . i . f . -5347
T rad e  B a la n c e -612
In v e s tm e n t Incom e 54
B. M is c e lla n e o u s  t r a n s f e r  
paym ents and c a p i t a l -829
o f  w h ic h ,
P r i v a t e  t r a n s f e r  
paym ents 105
P r iv a t e  lo n g  te rm  
c a p i t a l -644
R epaym ents on lo a n s  
r e c e iv e d .^ 1
C. E r r o r s  and O m iss io n s : 819
D. T o ta l  (A th ro u g h  C ) : -1309
E. Econom ic A s s i s t a n c e  
and o th e r  o f f i c i a l  l o a n s :  -  
o f  w h ic h ,
U.S.  b i l a t e r a l
I . B . R . D .
F.  M onetary  M ovem ents:^ 1309 1128
1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954
-4 0 8  -1688 439 -916 -558 100 -2 4 8
4366 4295 5561 7495 6491 5360 5476
■4981 -6311 -5378 -8817 -7714 -5909 -6394
-615  -2016 183 -1322 -1223 -549 -9 1 8
-1 7 8  -179 -236 -241 -112 -5 2 -47
-162  -3 0 26 74 43 72 219
99 103 116 134 168 145 62
-1 6 3  -192 -81 -36 -75 -24 58
-24 -28 -2 8 -19 -28 49
-5 5 8  181 -301 -302 -397 -2 8 -45
-1128 -1537 164 -1144 -912 144 -74
70 116 442 672 201 155
- 21 380 569 167 118
70 95 48 27 17 9
1467 -280 702 240 -345 -81
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India: Balance of Payments. Notes.
Data is taken from International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments 
Yearbook, Vol.6, 1955; Vol.ll, 1960; Vol.17, 1966.
The arrangement of tables in the source is slightly different 
for each volume, and accordingly transfers covered by the various 
items in the above table are not always identical. Figures for 
1953 and 1958 are given in more than one volume, and there are 
small discrepancies. Here, data for 1953 is taken from Volume 6 
and that for 1958 from Volume 11.
The breakdown under A, B and E does not include all items, 
and accordingly the figures do not necessarily add to the 
total given.
’Investment income' covers interest on private and government debt, 
as well as dividends and profits remitted abroad. Credit entries 
include earnings from investments by the Reserve Bank of India 
and the Indian Government.
For 1947-53, data for item B is taken from two difference sections 
of the tables in Vol.6: ’Private Donations and Capital', and 
'Miscellaneous official capital and donations'.
Debit items under this heading cover amortization on loans received 
by the Indian Government. These were large items in the early 
sixties, totalling 540 million rupees in 1961, 419 million in 
1962, 501 million in 1963, and 574 million in 1964, On the credit 
side, they include repayments on various 'loans' made by the 
Indian Government, such as payments from the U.K. to India from 
excess pension funds. Data after 1959 includes repayments by 
private recipients of loans from the I.B.R.D. and U.S. bilateral 
sources. These debit items were 77 million rupees in 1960,
99 million in 1961, 123 million in 1962, 84 million in 1963, 
and 103 million in 1964.
Some monetary movements over 1947-49 are excluded from the above 
table since they involved special transactions with the United 
Kingdom, and their inclusion would distort the picture of 
developments in India's balance of payments. For details, see 
Vol. 6 of Balance of Payments Yearbook.
Data for 1964 is preliminary.
233.
Table 9. India’s Plans for Development: 1951-66
First (1951-66) Second (1956-61) Third (1961-66)
A. Planned and Estimated Investment for the Public and Private Sectors.
Net investment
total: 3500 100% 6200 100% 10400 100%
(Rs. crores)
Agriculture 875 25% 1180 19% 2110 20%
Big Industry 805 23% 1810 29% 3632 35%
Other industry 175 5% 270 4% 425 4%
Transport, 775 22% 1360 22% 1736 17%communication
Other 870 25% 1580 26% 2497 24%
B. Planned Investment in the Public Sector.
Net investment
total: 
(Rs crores)
1850 3800 6300
Agriculture 525 780 1310
Big industry 380 1190 2532
Other industry 25 120 150
Transport, 
communication 650 1235 1486
Other 270 475 822
C. Planned rise in national income.
11.2% 25.0% 34,0%
Exports> Imports and Trade balance: Planned and Achieved.
Plan Actual Plan Actual Plan Actual
Exports f.o.b. 2800 3109 2965 3060 3700 3735
Imports c.i.f. -3800 -3651 -4340 -5400 -6350 -6030
Trade Balance -1000 -542 -1375 -2340 -2650 -2295
Source; W. Malenbaum, Modem India's Economy: Two Decades of
Planned Growth: Merrill, 1971, pp. 59, 62, 184.
India’s requirements for aid also increased because of the 
exhaustion of foreign exchange reserves accumulated during the Second 
World War. At the beginning of the First Five Year Plan (1951), India's 
sterling balances exceeded 9 billion r u p e e s . T h e  data on mone­
tary movements in Table 8 indicates that relatively little stress was 
placed on these reserves during the period of the First Plan. However, 
they were run down rapidly during the course of the Second Plan.
Indeed, in 1956 and 1957, drawings on reserves exceeded the level of 
foreign aid. By 1961, India’s sterling balances had declined to 1.36 
billion rupees, and it was noted in the Third Five Year Plan that 
India could no longer finance its development programmes to any signi­
ficant extent by recourse to this source.^'*'
To some extent, the improved prospects for obtaining foreign
aid allowed the Indian Government to let the gap between imports and
exports widen. Thus the Second Five Year Plan was known at the outset
102to require a higher level of external financing than its predecessor,
and was evidently based on the assumption that donors would be willing
to supply the necessary assistance. But increased external financing
was not simply a consequence of an improved climate for aid in donor
countries. The Indian Government concern to push ahead with a major
programme of industrialisation and the other changes described above
acted as a spur to the growth of aid from the United States and other
countries, and pushed aid to higher levels than would otherwise have
been made available. As it turned out, the foreign exchange costs
of the Second Five Year Plan were much greater than those initially 
103anticipated, and the resulting foreign exchange crisis from 1956 
was important in contributing to the growth of American economic aid.
In the case of Latin America, there was increasing difficulty
235.
Table 10. Latin America: Gross Product, Imports, Exports,
Terms of Trade. 1950-63.^
2
1950 1955 1960 1961 1962 1963
Gross Product
(millions of 1960 
dollars)
Volume of exports 
and tourist income
(millions of 
1960 dollars)
Volume of exports 
and tourist income 
as a percentage of 
gross domestic 
product.
Terms of trade 
effect with 
respect to 1960 
(as a percentage 
of gross domestic 
product)
Imports of goods 
and services as a 
percentage of gross 
domestic product
48254 61688 77488
5923 6895 8676
12.3 11.2 11.2
2.9 1.7
12.4 11.7 11.1
81610 84458 86150
8972 9788 10137
11.0 11.6 11.8
0.1 -0.6 -0.3
10.9 10.5 10.1
1950-54 1955-59 1960-63* 2 1961-632
(annual averages, millions of 1960 dollars)
Terms of Trade Effect:
1) With respect to 1960 1279.5 604.6 - -236.2
2) With respect to 1950-54 - -883.5 -1918.0 -2019.5
Net autonomous capital inflows 440.7 1193.9 806.6 789.8
1)Source: Economic Commission for Latin America, Economic Survey
of Latin America 1963: United Nations, 1965, pp. 33,34,49. 
All data excludes Cuba.
2) Provisional data.
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2 3 9 .
from t h e  m i d - f i f t i e s  i n  f i n a n c i n g  a volume o f  im p o r t s  a d e q u a te  f o r
104th e  deve lopm en t programmes o f  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  o f  t h e  r e g i o n .  D a ta
on t h e  l e v e l  o f  im p o r t s  p r o v id e s  one i n d i c a t i o n  o f  t h i s .  Even w i th  
i n c r e a s e d  a s s i s t a n c e ,  im p o r t s  f o r  t h e  r e g i o n  a s  a w ho le  d e c l i n e d  a s  
a p e r c e n ta g e  o f  g r o s s  d o m e s t ic  p r o d u c t .  (T a b le  10) I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  
A r g e n t i n a ,  B r a z i l ,  Columbia and U ruguay , t h e r e  was an a b s o l u t e  d e c l i n e  
i n  o u t l a y s  on i m p o r t s .  (T a b le  12) Even t h i s  l e v e l  was d i f f i c u l t  to  
f i n a n c e .  I t  was n e c e s s a r y  t o  r e s c h e d u l e  d e b t  paym en ts  o f  th e  f o u r  
c o u n t r i e s  m e n t i o n e d ^ ”*; and t h e r e  was heavy  r e c o u r s e  to  r e s e r v e s  
d u r in g  1961 and 1962.
T h e re  w ere  s e v e r a l  r e a s o n s  f o r  t h e s e  f o r e i g n  ex ch an g e  d i f f i c u l ­
t i e s .  To b e g in  w i t h ,  r e c e i p t s  from  e x p o r t s  and s e r v i c e s  f a i l e d  to  
expand  s u f f i c i e n t l y .  T a b le  11 i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  volume o f  e x p o r t s  
d e c l i n e d  s l i g h t l y  a s  a  p e r c e n ta g e  o f  g r o s s  d o m e s t ic  p r o d u c t ,  b u t  th e  
d e c l i n e  i n  e x p o r t  eam -ings  i n  p r o p o r t i o n  to  GDP was much g r e a t e r  a s  a 
r e s u l t  o f  t h e  m arked d e t e r i o r a t i o n  i n  L a t i n  A m e r ic a ’ s  te rm s  o f  t r a d e  
o v e r  t h e  p e r i o d  u n d e r  r e v ie w .  As i n d i c a t e d ,  r e s t o r a t i o n  o f  t h e  te rm s  
o f  t r a d e  p r e v a i l i n g  i n  1950-54 w ould h av e  i n c r e a s e d  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  
by more t h a n  two b i l l i o n  d o l l a r s  p e r  annum o v e r  1 9 6 1 -6 3 ;  more t h a n  
tw e n ty  p e r c e n t  o f  im p o r t s  f o r  t h e  same p e r i o d ,  and a  good d e a l  more 
th a n  a l l  governm en t l o a n s  u n d e r  t h e  A l l i a n c e  f o r  P r o g r e s s .
A g a in ,  t h e  b u rd e n  o f  r e p a y in g  l o a n s  and r e m i t t i n g  i n t e r e s t  and 
p r o f i t s  i n c r e a s e d  m a rk e d ly .  D u r in g  t h e  1955-1960  i n t e r v a l ,  a number 
o f  t h e  A m erican  r e p u b l i c s  i n c u r r e d  a heavy  b u rd e n  o f  i n d e b t e d n e s s .  
B ecause  o f  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  l a r g e  s c a l e  econom ic  a i d  on  s o f t  t e r m s ,  
t h e r e  was e x t e n s i v e  r e s o r t  to  c r e d i t s  w i th  r e l a t i v e l y  s h o r t  m a t u r i t i e s  
and h ig h  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  A m a jo r  f u n c t i o n  o f  e a r l y  l o a n s  u n d e r  t h e  
A l l i a n c e  f o r  P r o g r e s s  was t o  r e f i n a n c e  t h e  d e b t s  b u i l t  up i n  t h e
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preceding period. In addition, the debts of several countries
were renegotiated. Even so, as Table 11, indicates, profits, interest 
and loan amortization, which had averaged less than a billion dollars 
a year over 1951-55, were three times that amount by 1964. Debt 
servicing and profit remittances increased from 15 percent to more 
than 25 percent of current foreign exchange earnings over the same 
period. (Table 13)
Table 13. Latin America: Financial Servicing as a
Percentage of Current Foreign Exchange 
Earnings._______________________________
Year Direct Investment External Debt Servicing
Income Interest Amortization Total Total
1951-55 10.5 1.2 3.9 5.1 15.6
1956-60 11.4 2.1 9.5 11.6 23.0
1960 10.0 2.9 11.9 14.8 24.8
1961 11.0 3.3 12.8 16.1 27.1
1962 10.7 3.4 11.3 14.7 25.4
1963 9.8 3.4 13.3 16.7 26.5
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America, 
Economic Survey of Latin America 1963: 
United Nations, 1965, p.45.
A further factor which increased the requirements for aid was 
a decline in the level of private direct investment in evidence in 
the early 1960s. ^  Table 11 shows that net direct investment was 
much less over 1961-64 than the average for 1956-60. The more detailed 
breakdown in Table 12 indicates that much of the decline can be attri­
buted to special circumstances in Venezuela, but there was a fall 
off in direct investment in many other countries. Finally, outflows
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of capital from Latin America increased over the period under review. 
The magnitude of this trend can be roughly judged from the column in 
Table 12 dealing with "short and long term assets and net errors and 
omissions": this increased from negligible quantities over 1951-55 
to more than billion/annum for the 1961-64 interval.
Needless to say, increased foreign exchange requirements was 
only one factor contributing to the growth of aid to the region. Refer­
ence has already been made to the importance of events such as the 
riots which greeted Nixon’s tour in the region in 1958 and the Cuban 
Revolution as immediate causes of the growth of American economic aid. 
However, the region's increasing requirements encouraged a response 
which involved large-scale capital assistance. There is direct evi­
dence that American policy makers were aware of the general trends 
108described, and much evidence supports the point that foreign ex­
change requirements have been taken into account in determining the 
level of American economic aid to particular countries. It is there­
fore reasonable to conclude that this was an important cause of the 
growth of economic aid through the programmes discussed here.
A fourth possibility is that improved relations between the 
United States and recipients made the transfer of greater amounts of 
economic aid acceptable. Disagreement between the United States 
and other recipients over foreign policy issues, or over economic 
issues such as the nationalisation of American property have not in­
frequently led to reductions or suspension of economic aid: conversely, 
one might expect that improved relations would promote a climate 
more favourable to the provisions of large-scale economic aid.
India is one case where this factor was of some significance. 
Differences between the United States and India over foreign policy
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issues tended to act as a constraint on American economic aid during 
the early fifties. Even during the severe food shortages of 1951-52, 
there were delays in the approval of American economic aid, accom­
panied by criticism of India for its attempts to mediate the Korean
War, and its refusal to sell the United States certain strategic 
109materials. India’s policy of non-alignment and its alleged friend­
ship for the Soviet bloc were frequent targets of attack by Congress-
j ... . 110men during aid hearings.
While there remained many significant foreign policy differ­
ences between the United States and India during the late fifties and 
early sixties, they were evidently considered less important than pre­
viously - at least by many policy makers. To some extent, this change 
can be attributed to a shift in U.S. attitudes towards non-alignment. 
There were signs during the second Eisenhower Administration that a 
policy of underlining American disapproval of non-alignment was giving 
way to a more flexible approach. The Kennedy Administration undertook 
a number of initiatives to indicate that a non-aligned posture was 
not a barrier to close co-operation with the United States.
In addition, many officials and Congressmen perceived India to 
be in closer accord with the United States and its foreign policy ob­
jectives following the border clashes with the Chinese People’s Repub­
lic in 1959 and 1962. Indeed, after the 1962 dispute, the United
States provided India with military aid for the first time since the 
113Second World War. These changes tended to make the provision of
large scale economic aid more acceptable than it would have been 
previously.
There was also somewhat less emphasis on differences over 
’socialism’. Part of the reason for this lies in changes within the
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United States. The Kennedy Administration, less hostile to public 
ownership than its predecessor, followed the recommendations of its 
1961 task force"^^ by modifying American policy on aid to projects 
in the public sector. Previous American policy had been to deny aid 
to government owned enterprises operating in fields in which private 
firms could function. Assistance directed to the public sector was 
generally restricted to projects which were designed to build up the 
recipient’s overall economic infrastructure in areas such as trans­
portation and i r r i g a t i o n . U n d e r  Kennedy's Administration, the 
United States indicated that it was prepared to provide aid to some 
nationalised industries in Bolivia, and did in fact extend credits to 
the Bolivian State Mining Corporation.^^ In the case of India, 
Kennedy indicated willingness to assist India with the construction 
of a large government owned steel mill at Bokara.^^ The proposal 
encountered strong opposition in Congress - much of it evidently a
118result of the fact that the steel mill was to be a state enterprise 
- and India eventually withdrew its request for assistance. Even so, 
the fact that it was supported by a number of officials in the execu­
tive indicates that there had been some change in attitudes within 
the U.S. government.
Differences over 'socialism' were also reduced by changes in 
the Indian Government's policy, which retreated from the bold declar­
ation of the Industrial Policy Resolution of April, 1956, setting
forward "the adoption of the socialist pattern of society as the
119national objective". Since India's attitude to private enterprise
was an issue frequently raised during the course of Congressional
hearings, it is likely that this change facilitated the growth of
120American economic aid.
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In other instances, too, improved relations encouraged the 
growth of aid. In Egypt, increased tolerance for non-alignment, and 
the policy changes introduced by Nasser from 1959 (discussed earlier 
in this chapter) helped to create a climate in which that country 
could emerge as a significant aid recipient. There were, of course, 
instances where relations deteriorated. Under President Goulart, 
Brazil’s foreign policy orientation moved away from close alignment 
with the United States, its government failed to carry through a stabi­
lisation programme on which American aid was conditioned, American 
property was nationalised, and the regime was perceived by American
12policy makers to be increasingly vulnerable to ’leftist’ infiltration.
There was a marked fall off in American economic aid towards the latter
122part of Goulart's term. However, the fall off in aid was of relat­
ively short duration, with substantial commitments being made follow­
ing Goulart’s ouster by the military in the first half of 1964.
In Sri Lanka (then Ceylon), economic aid through the Agency for 
International Development was suspended in 1963 after the government 
had nationalised facilities owned by two American oil companies. The 
programme was not resumed until 1965, when agreement was reached be­
tween the Ceylonese Government and the companies concerned regarding 
123compensation. In this case, the data shows a decline in the level
of economic aid, but since Ceylon was only a small recipient in the 
first place, the decline was not of very great magnitude.
•A fifth possibility is that the growth of aid was promoted by 
the increased capacity of the United States to provide assistance.
In two senses at least, this is true. First, with the economic recov­
ery of most European countries, and consequent decline in the amount 
of assistance required in that region, the United States was able to
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make available increased amounts to less developed countries without 
increasing total outlays on economic aid. Indeed, as Table 14 indi­
cates, the total amount of economic aid provided declined.
Table 14. Economic Aid to All Regions
Data represents annual averages in millions 
of U.S.dollars. It excludes aid provided 
under PL480.
All Regions - - - of which
Europe.
1949-52 
1953-61 
1962-65
4637.5 3398.2 
1959.7 311.1 
2831.0 19.5
Source: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants:
Obligations and Loan Authorizations3 
July 1j 1945 to June 30_, 1974.
Without the decline in requirements for aid elsewhere, it 
would have been difficult for policy makers to have increased the 
amount provided to less developed countries at the same rate. The 
difficulty of providing for additional aid while there was a substant­
ial programme operating in Europe seems to have been one factor
accounting for the relatively small volume of assistance transferred
124to Asian countries in the early part of the period under review.
The Eisenhower Adminstration was, throughout its term of office, 
strongly committed to the objectives of restraining public expenditure 
and avoiding deficit financing, and frequently cited budgetary con­
straints as a reason for not increasing aid to less developed
2 46 ,
countries. It would presumably have been more reluctant to expand
aid to LDCs if aid to other regions had continued at a high level.
The growth of aid was also facilitated by the increase in 
Federal Government revenue over the period under review. Table 15 
indicates the extent of this increase: although the data is in current
dollars rather than constant dollars, allowance for price changes 
would not affect the conclusion that there had been a significant 
expansion. Had the increase in revenue not occurred, budgetary consi­
derations of the type mentioned above would doubtless have acted as 
a stronger constraint on the expansion of economic aid.
Table 15. U.S. Federal Government Revenue
(figures refer to millions of U.S. dollars)
1954. 1959 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
71626 81660 101865 109739 115530 117384 123490
Source : Statistical Office of the United Nations,
Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
Statistical Yearbook 1965: United Nations,
1966, p. 615.
In one sense at least, the capacity of the United States to 
provide assistance did not increase. As noted previously, the American 
balance of payments became a source of increasing concern for policy 
makers after 1958, and gave rise to measures, such as tying aid 
to procurement in the United States, which reduced the real value of 
aid to the recipient.
Sixth: it might be thought possible to account for the growth
of economic aid by a shift by the United States away from alternative
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methods of dealing with less developed countries, or by reduced 
expectations about the efficacy of such alternatives. Military assist­
ance is one alternative instrument, for it may be used in several 
ways to substitute for economic aid. Thus military aid may serve as 
a means of winning co-operation from LDCs; it may be a means of pro­
moting stability in those regions by directly enlarging the capabi­
lity of counter-insurgency forces and strengthening the position of 
groups (such as the military) likely to support the status quo; and 
it may be used to promote economic development, either through civic 
action projects, or by freeing for economic development funds which 
would have been used to purchase military equipment.
Table 16 American Military Aid to Less Developed
_____________Countries.________________
(annual averages in millions of $U.S.)
1949-52 1953-61 1962-65
Near East and South Asia 
(including Greece) 149 388 467
Latin America - 49 122
East Asia (not includ­
ing Japan or Oceania) 103 580 758
Africa - 6 33
Total 252 1023 1380
Source: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and
Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945-June 30, 1974.
The evidence does not support the conclusion that the growth 
of economic aid occurred because of absolute reductions in military 
assistance, with reallocation of the funds saved to economic aid.
As Table 16 indicates, military aid shipments to less developed coun­
tries grew, not only in total, but in each region over the period
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under review. There were indications in the late fifties that many
policy makers considered the share of military aid in the total
Mutual Security Programme to be excessive, and that American interests
would be better served by a more substantial allocation of funds to 
127economic aid. However, this did not lead to a reduction in the
level of military aid: its impact was to raise the proportion of
economic aid in the increasing total. (As Table 17 indicates, however, 
the ratio of economic aid to military aid did not reach the figure 
which had applied over 1949-52.) Even the change between 1953-61 
and 1962-65 cannot be entirely attributed to a shift in attitudes re­
garding the relative effectiveness of military and economic aid. There 
were many independent factors, of the kind already discussed, which 
lent themselves to a rapid expansion of economic aid.
Table 17. Ratio of Economic Aid to Military Aid.
Economic Aid to Military Aid Economic Aid/
LDCs (excluding to LDCs. Military Aid.
PL480) ____________ _____________
Millions of $ U.S. annual averages
932.5 252.0 3.7
1644.8 1023.0 1.6
2903.9 1380.0 2.1
1949-52
1953-61
1962-65
Sowac : Calculated from data in U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: 
Obligations and Loan Authorizations 3 July l3 1945 - 
June 30, 1974.
Other economic instruments may also serve as partial substi­
tutes for concessional economic aid. Alternatives of this kind include 
measures to encourage the flow of private capital; steps to expand 
export earnings of less developed countries by reducing tariff and
249.
other barriers to their products; and the provision of 'hard' loans 
of the kind transferred by Eximbank. The growth of economic aid can­
not be attributed to any deliberate government policies designed to 
reduce use of these instruments and substitute economic aid, but 
policy makers did learn that these alternative instruments were less 
effective than previously thought. Changing doctrines about the ef­
fectiveness of alternative instruments thus helped to facilitate the 
growth of concessional economic aid.
As far as private capital flows are concerned, American policy
makers continuously sought to increase transfers to less developed
countries, by underlining the importance of policies to attract private
capital, by enacting measures designed to add to the security of private
128investment, and in other ways. U.S. officials and Congressmen did
not lose interest in measures of this kind: indeed, such schemes as
the investment guarantee programme were progressively expanded. Never­
theless, many learned that there were limits to the role of private 
capital in LDCs. Whereas statements early in the period under re­
view had suggested that private capital (in conjunction with trade
liberalisation measures, the provision of hard loans and a small meas-
129ure of grant aid) could meet most of the requirements of LDCS, 
later views were generally less optimistic. The flow of private capi­
tal failed to grow as rapidly as hoped, while flows from the United 
States declined abruptly after 1957, and were, in 1966, still below 
the level reached ten years earlier (Table 18.). There were, more­
over, problems in reliance on private capital given the increasing
130indebtedness of many LDCs. Increased awareness of these difficul­
ties led to a more realistic assessment of the possible role of meas­
ures to encourage private capital, thus facilitating the growth of
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economic aid.
Table 18. Private Capital Flows to Less Developed 
Countries and Multilateral Agencies from 
the United States: 1957-68.
(net disbursements in mill
1957 2008.7
1958 1275.0
1959 954.1
1960 1042.2
1961 1101.7
1962 819.0
1963 880.0
1964 1326.0
1965 1897.5
1966 1359.9
1967 1922.4
1968 2070.7
dollars)
Source : Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, Resources for the Developing 
World; the Flow of Financial Resources to 
less-Developed Countries3 1962-68: O.E.C.D.,
1970, p.242.
Similarly, policy makers learned that the other alternatives 
mentioned above - trade liberalisation and the provision of hard loans 
- were of more limited effectiveness than had been previously thought. 
Given the problem of growing indebtedness faced by many LDCs, it was 
increasingly understood that hard loans of the kind provided by Exim- 
bank would be of limited use unless supplemented by grants and by 
loans on more concessional terms. As noted previously in this chapter 
service on public debt for LDCs rose from approximately 4% of export
2 51.
earnings in the mid-fifties to 12% of export earnings in 1964. U.S.
officials did not make absolute reductions in the level of Eximbank
lending to LDCs, but they came to appreciate that it would not be
possible to provide a very high proportion of funds to most LDCs in
131the form of hard loans.
Again, trade liberalisation proved to be difficult to achieve 
in practice, given the constraints imposed by domestic economic inter­
ests and the policies of other governments. Indeed, there is evidence 
of increasing restrictions being imposed on imports over the period 
under review. Between 1950 and 1964, the percentage of imports ad­
mitted to the United States on a duty free basis declined from 54.5%
to 37.8%, while duties rose from 5.97% of all imports in 1950 to
1328.51% of all imports in 1964. These figures apply to imports
from all other countries, but it is likely that data on imports from 
less developed areas would show a similar trend.
IV
The preceding section has suggested six additional factors 
which were important in explaining the growth of American economic 
aid to less developed countries. The fourth part of this chapter 
will examine a further three possible explanations, though it is con­
cluded that they were relatively minor causes of the growth of aid.
The first possibility is that the growth of aid stemmed from 
changes in the requirements (or perceived requirements) of the domes­
tic economy for raw materials, or for outlets for surplus production.
133The work of such writers as Magdoff has emphasised the importance
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of economic objectives of the kind mentioned in shaping the American 
economic aid programme: accordingly, it might be thought that changes
in the domestic economy would help to account for the growth of aid.
It is argued here that this does not provide a satisfactory explan­
ation for the expansion of aid programmes of the type under discussion 
in this chapter. The emergence of agricultural commodity surpluses 
was important in bringing about the introduction of the PL480 programme, 
but this is considered in the following chapter.
The reasons for attributing little weight to this factor can 
be seen by examining the several possible ways in which changes in 
the requirements, or perceived requirements, of the American economy 
might have given rise to increased aid. The growing demand for raw 
materials might have directly generated increased aid as a means of 
developing new supplies for the American economy. It has already been 
seen that aid was used for this purpose during the Second World War, 
though principally where the raw materials needed were of significance 
for the war effort. Thus aid was provided to Latin American countries 
to develop supplies of rubber and to expand the production of critical 
minerals.
However, it is difficult to attribute much of the change in 
aid levels over 1949-66 to this factor, except in the indirect sense 
discussed below. American policy makers placed little emphasis on 
this in their justifications of aid programmes. There was, for example, 
little reference in the early sixties to specific cases where pro­
grammes of the type being discussed here were used directly to promote 
the production of critical materials. This was evidently not due to 
any reluctance to comment on matters of this kind. Other economic 
objectives were discussed in detail. The summary presentation of the
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Act for International Development for Fiscal Year 1962 provided 
details of American dependence on a number of materials essential 
to American industry: the implication, however, was that it was
important to keep the countries concerned in the orbit of 'free 
nations', not that economic assistance was being directly employed 
to increase production.
Again, it is difficult to argue that there was a shift towards
greater emphasis on special government action to obtain supplies of
raw materials from abroad: indeed, in some respects, there was less
emphasis. Thus the American Government accorded very high priority
to securing stockpiles of strategic raw materials in the early fifties,
with funds set aside for this purpose being sharply increased after
the outbreak of the Korean War. Stockpile targets at this stage were
frequently in excess of the actual amounts held and accordingly there
135was considerable interest in securing new supplies. This was not
without impact on government lending abroad: a number of new loans
planned by Eximbank in the early fifties were justified on the ground
136that they would open up new sources of raw materials. By 1958,
however, new and reduced targets for stockpiles had been established,
based primarily on the recommendations of a report, Stockpiling for
Defense in the Nuclear Age, and in particular on the assumption that
any emergency would last three years instead of five. Under the new
procedure, the value of stockpiles exceeded the total required, even
137under 'maximum' objectives. Given reduced interest in acquiring
138stockpiles, and the difficulties of some mining industries in the 
United States, the American Government went so far as to impose re­
strictions on some imports: thus quotas were placed on imports of
lead and zinc in 1958, and an excise duty was imposed on copper imports
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139i n  th e  same y e a r .  I t  was n o t  u n t i l  1966 t h a t  t h e  l e a d  and z i n c
im p o r t  q u o ta s  w ere  a b o l i s h e d  and t h e  im p o r t  d u ty  on c o p p e r  t e m p o r a r i l y  
l i f t e d  ( a lo n g  w i th  e x c i s e s  w h ich  had  b e e n  p l a c e d  on a lu m in a  and 
b a u x i t e  im p o r ts )
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  a v a i l a b l e  d a t a  does  n o t  s u g g e s t  t h a t  a  h ig h  p r o ­
p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  programme u n d e r  d i s c u s s i o n  h e r e  w ent to  t h e  m in in g  
141s e c t o r .  Over t h e  p e r i o d  1 9 5 8 -6 0 ,  f o r  e x a m p le ,  A m erican  g o v e rn ­
ment a g e n c i e s  ( e x c l u d i n g  Eximbank) o p e r a t i n g  i n  L a t i n  A m erica  p r o v id e d
1 2 .4  m i l l i o n  d o l l a r s  to  t h e  m in in g  s e c t o r ,  o f  w hich  $ 1 0 .4  m i l l i o n
142w ent t o  B o l i v i a  and t h e  b a l a n c e  t o  C olum bia . One w r i t e r  h a s  s u g ­
g e s t e d  t h a t  e x p a n d in g  s u p p l i e s  o f  raw m a t e r i a l s  was a  p r im a ry  f u n c t i o n  
o f  t h e  P o i n t  Four programme a f t e r  1950, b u t  th e  e v id e n c e  does  n o t  
s u p p o r t  t h i s  c o n t e n t i o n .  D a ta  on t h e  s e c t o r i a l  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  fu n d s  
i n  one c a s e ,  B r a z i l ,  w hich  i s  g iv e n  a s  an i n s t a n c e  o f  t h e  u s e  o f  P o i n t  
Four to  open up m in e r a l  s u p p l i e s ,  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  i t  can  o n ly  have  b e e n  
a m inor f u n c t i o n .  Of a t o t a l  o f  more th a n  $56 m i l l i o n  p r o v id e d  to  
t h e  end o f  f i s c a l  y e a r  1961 , l e s s  t h a n  4^ m i l l i o n  w en t  t o  " i n d u s t r y
m in in g  and l a b o r " ,  w h e re a s  more t h a n  $40 m i l l i o n  w en t to  h e a l t h ,  a g r i -
143c u l t u r e  and p u b l i c  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .
I n c r e a s e d  dep en d en ce  on m a t e r i a l s  from  LDCs may have  c o n t r i b u t e d  
to  t h e  g row th  o f  a i d  i n  a more i n d i r e c t  s e n s e  by r a i s i n g  t h e  s t r a t e g i c  
im p o r ta n c e  o f  t h o s e  c o u n t r i e s  i n  t h e  ey e s  o f  A m erican p o l i c y  m ak e rs .
I t  h a s  a l r e a d y  b e e n  n o te d  t h a t  p o l i c y  m akers  w ere  w e l l  aware o f  th e  
way i n  w h ich  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  depended  on im p o r t s  o f  raw m a t e r i a l s  
from  l e s s  d e v e lo p e d  c o u n t r i e s .  T h is  was u sed  to  s u p p o r t  t h e  v iew  
t h a t  t h i s  p a r t  o f  t h e  w o r ld  was e x t r e m e ly  i m p o r t a n t  t o  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  
and t h a t  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  s h o u ld  keep  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  c o n c e rn e d  w i t h i n  
t h e  o r b i t  o f  ’ f r e e  n a t i o n s ' .
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A nothe r  p o s s i b i l i t y  i s  t h a t  t h e  grow th o f  a i d  stemmed from
i n c r e a s e d  em phas is  on t h e  o b j e c t i v e  o f  d e v e lo p in g  m a r k e ts  f o r  th e
U n i te d  S t a t e s  i n  l e s s  d e v e lo p e d  c o u n t r i e s .  One o f  t h e  a d v a n ta g e s  o f
econom ic a i d ,  i n  t h e  u n d e r s t a n d in g  o f  many p o l i c y  m a k e r s ,  was t h e
i n c r e a s e  i n  t r a d e  w hich  would  r e s u l t ,  i n  t h e  lo n g  r u n ,  from  econom ic
growth i n  LDCs, and from t h e  e x p o s u re  o f  t h e i r  p o p u l a t i o n s  t o  A m erican  
144p r o d u c t s .  The b e n e f i t s  a r i s i n g  from  t h i s  p r o c e s s  w ere  e v i d e n t l y
th o u g h t  by many to  o u tw e ig h  t h e  c o s t s  o f  a d j u s t i n g  t o  g r e a t e r  c o m p e t i ­
t i o n  from  l e s s  d e v e lo p e d  c o u n t r i e s  i n  some a r e a s  o f  i n d u s t r y .
W hile  t h a t  s e r v e d  a s  an  a rgum en t f o r  a i d  o v e r  th e  e n t i r e  p e r i o d  
u n d e r  r e v ie w ,  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  a c c o u n t  f o r  th e  e x p a n s io n  o f  a s s i s t ­
ance  i n  te rm s  o f  g r e a t e r  em p h as is  on t h i s  o b j e c t i v e .  Towards t h e  end 
o f  t h e  Second W orld War, t h e r e  was ( a s  n o t e d  i n  C h a p te r  Two) g r e a t  
c o n c e rn  w i t h  t h e  p ro b le m  o f  s e c u r i n g  a d e q u a te  m a r k e ts  f o r  t h e  U n i te d  
S t a t e s ,  so a s  t o  a v o id  th e  p r o s p e c t  o f  a  new d e p r e s s i o n  i n  th e  p o s t - w a r  
p e r i o d .  But t h e  p e r fo rm a n c e  o f  t h e  A m erican  economy i n  t h e  f i f t i e s  was 
such  a s  to  b e l i e  gloomy e x p e c t a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  s o r t .  T here  had  b e e n  
s h o r t - l i v e d  r e c e s s i o n s ,  b u t  no p ro lo n g e d  dow nturn  by  t h e  s t a n d a r d s  
o f  t h e  p r e - w a r  p e r i o d .  The s t a t e m e n t s  o f  A m erican  p o l i c y  m akers  r e c o g ­
n i s e d  t h i s  p o i n t .  T h e re  was l e s s  e m p h a s is  on th e  lo n g  te rm  p ro b lem  o f  
m a i n t a i n i n g  a h i g h  l e v e l  o f  a c t i v i t y  i n  t h e  A m erican  economy, and on 
t h i s  a s  a r e a s o n  f o r  f o r e i g n  l e n d i n g .  E x p o r t  p ro m o t io n  became more 
im p o r ta n t  when th e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  began  to  e n c o u n te r  p ro b le m s  w i th  i t s  
b a la n c e  o f  paym ents  from 1958. But t h e s e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  te n d e d  to  c r e a t e  
p r e s s u r e  to  r e d u c e  t h e  l e v e l  o f  econom ic a i d  r a t h e r  th a n  i n c r e a s e  i t .  
The o u t f lo w  o f  d o l l a r s  u n d e r  a i d  r e p r e s e n t e d  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  d e f i c i t  
i te m  i n  t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  p a y m e n ts ,  w h i l e  i t s  b e n e f i t s  i n  te rm s  o f  m a rk e ts  
m igh t  be e x p e c te d  t o  a c c r u e  o n ly  i n  t h e  lo n g  t e r m .  As a l r e a d y  n o t e d ,
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th e  U .S . G overnm ent found  i t  n e c e s s a ry  to  i n c r e a s i n g l y  t i e  a id  to  
p ro cu re m e n t i n  th e  U n ite d  S t a t e s  a s  a m eans o f  r e d u c in g  th e  o u tf lo w  
o f  d o l l a r s .
I t  c o u ld  a l s o  b e  a rg u e d  t h a t  a id  was ex panded  a s  a  m eans o f
p r o v id in g  im m ed ia te  b e n e f i t s  to  A m erican  i n d u s t r y .  And in d e e d ,  one
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  econom ic a i d ,  o c c a s i o n a l l y  u se d  d u r in g  th e  p e r io d
u n d e r  r e v ie w , was t h a t  i t  w ould c r e a t e  em ploym ent and  p r o s p e r i t y  i n
th o s e  i n d u s t r i e s  a b le  to  p ro v id e  goods and  s e r v i c e s  f o r  t h e  program m e.
But s e v e r a l  c o n s id e r a t i o n s  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h i s  was n o t  a  v e ry  im p o r ta n t
f a c t o r  in  t h e  g row th  o f  a id  o f  t h e  ty p e  b e in g  d i s c u s s e d .  To b e g in
w i th ,  even  some o f  th o s e  who made much o f  th e  a rg u m en t co n ced ed  t h a t
145i t  was n o t  a  p r i n c i p a l  m o tiv e . I t  i s  a l s o  n o t a b l e  t h a t  i t  was
n o t  u n t i l  1962 t h a t  th e  p r o p o r t io n  o f  a id  s p e n t  in  th e  U n ite d  S t a t e s
146re a c h e d  two t h i r d s  o f  t h e  t o t a l .  Even t h i s  f i g u r e  o v e r s t a t e s
th e  b e n e f i t s  to  A m erican  i n d u s t r y ,  f o r  i t  was p o s s i b l e  f o r  r e c i p i e n t s  
to  u se  A m erican  a id  to  make p u rc h a s e s  i n  th e  U n ite d  S t a t e s  w hich  w ould  
h av e  b e e n  made th ro u g h  co m m erc ia l c h a n n e ls  i n  any e v e n t .  Nor was t h e  
p o l ic y  o f  p r o g r e s s iv e l y  ty in g  a id  to  p u rc h a s e s  i n  th e  U n ite d  S t a t e s  
in t r o d u c e d  to  p r o v id e  b e n e f i t s  to  A m erican  i n d u s t r y ;  i t  a r o s e  from  
c o n c e rn  w i th  th e  b a la n c e  o f  p a y m e n ts . A g a in , econom ic  a i d  i s  o f  
l i m i t e d  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  a s  a  means o f  s t i m u la t i n g  demand o r  em ploym ent. 
G iven  t h e  lo n g  i n t e r v a l  b e tw een  an a id  com m itm ent and  th e  a c t u a l  e x ­
p e n d i t u r e ,  i n c r e a s e s  i n  a id  d e s ig n e d  to  add to  demand m ig h t w e l l  b e g in  
to  have  an im p ac t when r e s t r a i n t  was r e q u i r e d .  F i n a l l y ,  th e  id e a  
t h a t  d o m e s tic  b e n e f i t s  w ere e x tre m e ly  im p o r ta n t  l e a v e s  u n e x p la in e d  
th e  d e g re e  o f  h o s t i l i t y  to  th e  a id  program m es in  C o n g re s s , and  th e  
f i g h t  w hich  th e  e x e c u t iv e  was f o rc e d  to  p u t  up e a ch  y e a r  in  s u p p o r t  
o f  i t s  a id  r e q u e s t .  T r a d i t i o n a l l y ,  program m es w ith  an  im p o r ta n t
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impact on particular sectors of the domestic economy have found 
strong defenders in Congress.
A second possible explanation of the expansion of economic 
aid attributes it to a change in values and attitudes within rich 
countries, resulting in greater emphasis on action to alleviate 
poverty abroad as an end in itself. There are several possible sources 
of such a change. Julius Stone attributes it to an increased accept­
ance of the responsibility of the government to maintain minimum 
living standards for all its citizens, and the partial diffusion of 
this domestic 'principle of justice' to other spheres, leading to its 
application to the poorer regions of the world. In Stone's assessment,
this has been the dominant factor behind the growth of economic aid
147in rich countries. Other possible sources of a change in attitudes
of this kind include increased perception of the United States (and
other rich countries) as affluent or overdeveloped societies; and
148increased contact with or knowledge about the depth of poverty in 
other countries.
The position taken here is that a change of this kind (assum­
ing that it occurred) was not a very significant cause of the growth 
of aid over the period under review. There are several reasons for 
taking this view. First, 'humanitarian' considerations of the type 
described seem to have carried relatively little weight with most of 
those who have been in effective control of economic aid: accordingly, 
one would not expect that a change in emphasis on them would account 
for much of the expansion of economic aid. This is not to say that 
such aims have been of no significance at all: the fact that appeals
have constantly been made to humanitarian sentiments in speeches 
suggests that they have had some impact. Further, there are
2 5 8 .
statements by some policy makers which suggest that some aid would
149have been provided on these grounds alone. But concern with
poverty and distress abroad has generally been subordinate to other 
motives. The statements of many U.S. officials and Congressmen sug­
gest this, but it is also indicated by the allocation of aid. Even 
where the relief of acute distress has been at issue, political differ­
ences and disagreements with the recipient have prevented or delayed the 
the transfer of assistance. Thus the United States withdrew its 
support for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency as 
relations with the Soviet Union d e t e r i o r a t e d . R e l i e f  aid which 
that organisation provided to Eastern Europe was perceived to have 
the adverse political consequence of strengthening the control of 
communist regimes in those countries, perhaps adding to the resources 
of the Soviet Union itself. Famine in communist countries perceived 
to be hostile (for example the Chinese People's Republic in the early 
sixties) has not given rise to the transfer of aid,^1 while foreign
policy differences with India in the early fifties delayed agree-
152 Ti-)pment on the provision of aid to overcome severe food shortages, 
relatively weak role of the general concern to alleviate poverty as 
an end in itself is also evident in the allocation of other types of 
assistance: thus countries such as Taiwan, South Korea and South
Vietnam have at one time or another absorbed a very large share of 
the aid programme for foreign policy reasons.
A further point is that it is difficult to obtain any direct 
evidence that a shift in values and attitudes of the kind mentioned 
occurred. To this writer's knowledge, no attempt has been made to 
assess the weight accorded to such humanitarian considerations, and 
the way this has changed over time: in any case, the problems involved
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in  such  an e n t e r p r i s e  a r e  f o r m id a b l e .  A ppea ls  to  a m oral i n t e r e s t
i n  a l l e v i a t i n g  T h i rd  World p o v e r t y  can  be  found i n  f r e q u e n t  u se  a t
t h e  b e g in n in g  o f  t h e  p e r i o d  u n d e r  re v ie w  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  programmes
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such  a s  P o i n t  F o u r ,  j u s t  a s  t h e y  can  be  found  a t  l a t e r  i n t e r v a l s .  
T h is  does  n o t  r u l e  o u t  a  change  i n  e m phas is  on t h e s e  c o n c e r n s ,  b u t
i t  does  c a u t i o n  a g a i n s t  a s su m in g  a change  i n  v a lu e s  w i t h o u t  f u r t h e r
. , 154e v id e n c e .
F i n a l l y ,  t h i s  e x p l a n a t i o n  i s  n o t  r e q u i r e d  to  a c c o u n t  f o r  th e  
g row th  o f  a i d .  U sing  o t h e r  f a c t o r s  m e n t io n e d  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r ,  i t  i s  
p o s s i b l e  to  g iv e  an  a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  g row th  o f  a i d  -  and an a c c o u n t  w hich  
e x p l a i n s  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  p a t t e r n s  o f  g row th  i n  d i f f e r e n t  r e g i o n s .
B e fo re  p r o c e e d in g ,  two p o s s i b l e  o b j e c t i o n s  t o  th e  above  a r g u ­
ment m ust b e  exam ined . I t  m ig h t  be s u g g e s t e d  th e  i n c r e a s i n g  em p h as is  
on 'd e v e lo p m e n t '  a s  a  r a t i o n a l e  f o r  a id  p r o v i d e s  some e v id e n c e  o f  
ch an g es  i n  v a l u e s  o f  t h e  k in d  d e s c r i b e d  and o f  t h e i r  im p o r ta n c e  i n  
s h a p in g  t h e  a i d  program me. W hile  d e ve lopm en t was a lw ays  a j u s t i f i ­
c a t i o n  o f  much a i d  p r o v id e d  by t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s ,  i t  assum ed a more 
c e n t r a l  p l a c e  i n  t h e  l a t t e r  p a r t  o f  t h e  p e r i o d  u n d e r  r e v i e w .  J u s t i f i ­
c a t i o n  d u r in g  t h e  f i r s t  E isen h o w e r  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  e m p h a s ise d  d e fe n c e  
and s e c u r i t y :  th u s  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  l e g i s l a t i o n  u n d e r  w h ich  a i d  was
t r a n s f e r r e d  was t i t l e d  t h e  M utua l S e c u r i t y  A c t ,  and p r i n c i p a l  c a t e ­
g o r i e s  o f  a i d  w ere  'd e f e n c e  s u p p o r t '  and ( s e c u r i t y )  s u p p o r t i n g  a s s i s t ­
a n c e .  Under t h e  Kennedy A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  t h e  main a i d  o r g a n i s a t i o n  
was t h e  Agency f o r  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  D eve lopm en t,  and  m a jo r  a i d  c a t e g o r i e s  
w ere  'd e v e lo p m e n t  l o a n s '  and 'd e v e lo p m e n t  g r a n t s ' .  F u r t h e r ,  t h e  
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  made an a t t e m p t  to  r e d u c e  t h e  amount o f  a i d  p r o v id e d  
a s  ' s e c u r i t y  s u p p o r t i n g  a s s i s t a n c e ' .  However, t h i s  change  i n  empha­
s i s  d id  n o t  mean t h a t  c o n c e rn  w i t h  p o v e r t y  in  LDCs c a r r i e d  much
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greater weight than hitherto. As already noted, policy makers saw 
political and economic benefits in the development of poor countries; 
and the change in emphasis can be explained in large part as the 
product of a new phase of the Cold War, discussed in the second 
section of this chapter.
The other possible objection is that the preceding account 
places little emphasis on the importance of general public attitudes 
to aid. It has been argued above that the allocation of aid, and 
some of the statements of key policy makers, suggest that ’humani­
tarian1 motives are subordinate to others. But in the case of the
general public, it might be said, this is not so. While the opinions 
of the general public may have had little influence on the allocation 
of aid among recipients, a shift in its values along the lines indi­
cated may have been necessary for the growth of aid.
Now it does not appear to be true that humanitarian consider­
ations have played a more important part in the minds of those of 
the general public supporting aid than they have with many Congress­
men and decision makers within the e x e c u t i v e . B u t  there is little 
evidence of a shift in public attitudes in favour of higher levels 
of aid over the period under review. There seems to have been some 
increase in support for the general principle of providing aid,^^ 
but this does not necessarily imply that the public was more willing 
to support larger amounts of aid. In 1959, when asked, "Do you 
think there is anything for which the government should be spending 
less money than it is at present?", 17% of respondents mentioned 
foreign aid. Asked in 1963, "Can you think of anything which the 
government spends too much money on?", 41% gave foreign aid in 
r e s p o n s e . W h i l e  the second reply was doubtless affected by the
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s t r o n g  c r i t i c i s m  l e v e l l e d  a t  t h e  amount o f  econom ic  a i d  d u r in g  th e  
15 8y e a r ,  i t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  to  c a s t  d o u b t  on t h e  a rgum en t t h a t  a 
ch an g e  in  p u b l i c  a t t i t u d e s  had th e  e f f e c t  o f  p ro m o t in g  s u p p o r t  f o r  
i n c r e a s e d  l e v e l s  o f  econom ic  a s s i s t a n c e .  In  any e v e n t ,  e x i s t i n g  
s t u d i e s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  c o n n e c t io n  b e tw e e n  p u b l i c  o p in io n  on econom ic 
a i d ,  and  t h e  v o t i n g  p a t t e r n s  and d e c i s i o n s  o f  t h o s e  m ost l i k e l y  t o  
be  i n f l u e n c e d  by s u c h  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  -  Congressm en -  i s  a t  b e s t  
h i g h l y  t e n u o u s .
A t h i r d  p o s s i b i l i t y  i s  t h a t  t h e  grow th  o f  econom ic a i d  can  be 
p a r t l y  e x p l a i n e d  a s  a  p r o d u c t  o f  i n c r e a s e d  am ounts made a v a i l a b l e  f o r  
d i r e c t  m i l i t a r y  p u r p o s e s .  'D i r e c t  m i l i t a r y  o b j e c t i v e s '  i n c l u d e  th e  
a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  m i l i t a r y  b a s e s ,  t h e  d ev e lo p m en t o f  s u p p l i e s  o f  raw 
m a t e r i a l s  r e q u i r e d  f o r  s t r a t e g i c  p u r p o s e s ,  and th e  p r o v i s i o n  o f  f i n a n ­
c i a l  s u p p o r t  to  e n a b le  r e c i p i e n t s  t o  r e s i s t  o r  u n d e r t a k e  c o n v e n t io n ­
a l  o p e r a t i o n s .  I t  h a s  a l r e a d y  b e e n  s e e n  t h a t  i n c r e a s e d  r e q u i r e m e n t s  
f o r  raw m a t e r i a l s  from  a b ro a d  d oes  n o t  seem to  h av e  been  a p a r t i c u ­
l a r l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  f a c t o r  a c c o u n t in g  f o r  t h e  change i n  a i d  l e v e l s  o v e r  
th e  p e r i o d  u n d e r  r e v ie w ;  a n d ,  i n d e e d ,  t h a t  governm ent c o n c e rn  w i th  
o b t a i n i n g  s t o c k p i l e s  o f  s t r a t e g i c  raw m a t e r i a l  was g r e a t e r  i n  t h e  
e a r l y  f i f t i e s  t h a n  i n  t h e  l a t e  1950s and e a r l y  1 9 6 0 s .  As f a r  a s  t h e  
o b j e c t i v e  o f  s e c u r i n g  r i g h t s  t o  b a s e s  i s  c o n c e r n e d ,  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  
some a id  wuh p ro v id e d  f o r  thL.s. A c c o rd in g  to  one e x e c u t i v e  s t a t e ­
m en t ,  $60 m i l l i o n  o f  s u p p o r t i n g  a i d  -  a b o u t  10% o f  t h e  r e q u e s t  f o r  
supporting aid -  was i n t e n d e d  f o r  t h i s  p u rp o s e  i n  f i s c a l  y e a r  1962 , 
a l l  o f  i t  g o in g  t o  l e s s  d e v e lo p e d  c o u n t r i e s . E v e n  a l l o w i n g  f o r  
t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  o t h e r  t y p e s  o f  a i d  w ere  t r a n s f e r r e d  f o r  t h i s  
r e a s o n ,  t h e  amount i n v o lv e d  was n o t  l a r g e .  I t  i s  n o t  e n t i r e l y  c l e a r  
how much was p r o v id e d  f o r  b a s e s  d u r in g  t h e  e a r l y  p a r t  o f  t h e  p e r i o d
262 .
u n d e r  r e v ie w ,  b u t  i n  some c o u n t r i e s ,  paym ents  f o r  b a s e s  d id  c o n t r i ­
b u t e  t o  i n c r e a s i n g  am ounts o f  a i d .  In  M orocco, t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  
i n i t i a l l y  r e a c h e d  a g re e m e n t  w i t h  F ra n c e  r e g a r d i n g  th e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  
o f  a i r  b a s e s  i n  1951: how ever ,  n e g l i g i b l e  q u a n t i t i e s  o f  a s s i s t a n c e
w ere  t r a n s f e r r e d  to  th e  c o u n t r y  u n d e r  t h e  M utual S e c u r i t y  Act u n t i l  
a f t e r  i t  a c h ie v e d  in d e p e n d e n c e  i n  1956. The U n i te d  S t a t e s  t h e n  found  
i t  n e c e s s a r y  t o  co n d u c t  new n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  Moroccan a u t h o r i t i e s .  
Though i t  was f o r c e d  to  e v a c u a t e  t h e  b a s e s  by th e  end  o f  1963 , some
a i d  t r a n s f e r r e d  to  Morocco i n  t h e  i n t e r i m  seems t o  have  b e e n  p r o v id e d
161a s  c o m p e n s a t io n  f o r  c o n t in u e d  u s e  o f  b a s e s  by t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e .  To
some e x t e n t ,  i n c r e a s e s  i n  a i d  o f  t h i s  ty p e  may have  b e e n  o f f s e t  by
r e d u c e d  r e q u i r e m e n t s  f o r  b a s e s  a b r o a d .  W ith t h e  d e v e lo p m en t  o f  lo n g
r a n g e  m i s s i l e s  (ICBMs) and n u c l e a r  s u b m a r in e s ,  t h e  need  f o r  b a s e s
162a b ro a d  was somewhat l e s s  p r e s s i n g  t h a n  b e f o r e .  In  any e v e n t ,  U .S .
b a s e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  w ere  n o t  a  v e ry  s i g n i f i c a n t  c a u s e  o f  t h e  g row th  
o f  a i d  b e tw e en  1948 and 1966.
The d e s i r e  to  enhance  t h e  e x t e r n a l  m i l i t a r y  c a p a b i l i t y  o f  
r e c i p i e n t s  ( t h a t  i s  t h e i r  c a p a c i t y  t o  r e s i s t  o r  u n d e r t a k e  a c o n v e n t ­
i o n a l  i n v a s i o n  a c r o s s  f r o n t i e r s )  c o n t r i b u t e d  to  t h e  grow th  o f  econom ic  
a i d  e a r l y  i n  t h e  p e r i o d  u n d e r  r e v i e w ,  b u t  was n o t  a p r i n c i p a l  c a u se  
o f  t h e  s u b s e q u e n t  e x p a n s io n  o f  a i d .  Under t h e  E isenhow er  Adm ini­
s t r a t i o n ,  much econom ic  a id  was t r a n s f e r r e d  u n d e r  t h e  h e a d in g  o f  
'd e f e n s e  s u p p o r t '  and i t  was s u g g e s t e d  by p o l i c y  m akers  t h a t  one 
f u n c t i o n  o f  t h i s  a id  was t o  m a in ta in  a d e q u a te  f o r c e s  a ro u n d  t h e  p e r i ­
p h e ry  o f  t h e  S i n o - S o v i e t  b l o c .  I n  p r a c t i c e ,  much o f  t h i s  a i d  was
d e s ig n e d  to  p ro m o te  econom ic d e ve lopm en t r a t h e r  th a n  to  i n c r e a s e  th e
16 3s i z e  o f  t h e  c o n v e n t i o n a l  m i l i t a r y  f o r c e s ,  b u t  t h e r e  w ere  c a s e s  -
S o u th  K orea  i s  an  exam ple  -  w here  t h e  l a t t e r  o b j e c t i v e  was i m p o r t a n t .
2 6 ) .
A lthough  m a in te n a n c e  o f  a d e q u a te  d e fe n c e  f o r c e s  rem ained  one
o f  t h e  s e v e r a l  d e c l a r e d  o b j e c t i v e s  o f  s u p p o r t i n g  a i d  u n d e r  th e
Kennedy and Jo h n so n  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s ,  i t  i s  d o u b t f u l  i f  v e ry  much o f
t h e  change i n  a v e ra g e  a i d  l e v e l s  b e tw een  1953-61  and 1962-65  can  be
a t t r i b u t e d  t o  i n c r e a s e d  r e q u i r e m e n ts  unde r  t h i s  h e a d in g .  I n  S ou th
K o re a ,  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  m i l i t a r y  b u d g e t  rem a in e d  an im p o r t a n t  f u n c t i o n
o f  U .S . s u p p o r t i n g  a i d ,  w i th  U .S . a s s i s t a n c e  p r o v i d i n g  b e tw e e n  one
t h i r d  and one h a l f  o f  t h e  g o v e rn m e n t’ s b u d g e t  a t  t h e  o u t s e t  o f  t h e
164Kennedy A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  te rm  o f  o f f i c e .  But even  s o ,  a i d  l e v e l s
f o r  1962-65  w ere  s c a r c e l y  h i g h e r  th a n  th o s e  p r e v a i l i n g  i n  t h e  19 4 9 -
16552 i n t e r v a l  and w ere  be low  t h e  a v e ra g e  f o r  1 9 5 3 -6 1 .  M i l i t a r y
r e q u i r e m e n ts  w ere  e x t r e m e ly  im p o r t a n t  i n  p r o g r e s s i v e l y  r a i s i n g  t h e
l e v e l  o f  econom ic a i d  i n  S o u th  V ie tnam , b u t  i t  was t h e  m o u n tin g
166c h a l l e n g e  by f o r c e s  o p e r a t i n g  w i t h i n  Sou th  V ie tnam  w hich  was t h e  
c a u se  o f  i n c r e a s e d  a i d  i n  t h i s  c a s e :  n o t  c o n c e rn  w i th  t h e  d a n g e r  o f
c o n v e n t i o n a l  i n v a s i o n .  A c c o r d in g ly ,  t h i s  h a s  b e e n  d i s c u s s e d  i n  
s e c t i o n  two o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r  t o  i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  way i n  w hich  i n c r e a s e d  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  a r i s i n g  from  i n s u r g e n c y  i n  l e s s  d e v e lo p e d  c o u n t r i e s  
g e n e r a t e d  h i g h e r  l e v e l s  o f  econom ic  a i d .
I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  I n d i a ,  p a r t  o f  t h e  e x p a n s io n  o f  econom ic  a i d
a f t e r  1962 can  p r o b a b ly  be  a t t r i b u t e d  to  A m erican  s u p p o r t  f o r  I n d i a ' s
d e fe n c e  b u i l d  up .  F o l lo w in g  th e  b o r d e r  c l a s h e s  w i th  t h e  C h in e se
P e o p l e ' s  R e p u b l i c ,  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  p ro v id e d  d i r e c t  m i l i t a r y  a i d
( f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t im e  i n  t h e  p o s t - w a r  p e r i o d ) :  a t o t a l  o f  a lm o s t  $130
167m i l l i o n  was com m itted  o v e r  f o u r  y e a r s .  However, t h i s  d id  n o t
c o v e r  t h e  c o s t  o f  t h e  m ajo r  b u i l d  up w hich  t h e  I n d i a n  G overn­
ment l a u n c h e d .  In  t h e  f i s c a l  1964 b u d g e t ,  d e f e n s e  s p e n d in g  a c c o u n te d  
f o r  more th an  h a l f  o f  t o t a l  e x p e n d i t u r e  and r e p r e s e n t e d  a 55%
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increase on outlays in the preceding year. As the data on India’s
balance of payments presented above in Table 8 indicates, there was 
a substantial rise in disbursements of U.S. economic aid to India 
at this stage, and it is likely that the expansion of India's defence 
spending was partly responsible for this. Presumably, an important 
aim of American policy makers was to insure that the Indian Govern­
ment’s emphasis on defence did not cause it to sacrifice its economic
development programmes, but it is likely that the effect of aid in
169helping India to expand its forces was also considered desirable.
V
To conclude: from the mid-fifties onward, American policy
makers became increasingly concerned with the danger that internal 
political change within less developed countries, together with the 
expanded use of trade, economic aid, and other instruments by commun­
ist powers, would lead to growing 'communist' influence and control 
in those regions. While not absent initially, concern with this 
problem greatly increased,replacing the previous focus on the danger 
of economic collapse and left wing influence in Europe and the possi­
bility of direct military expansion by communist powers. Economic 
aid for less developed countries was accordingly given a new emphasis 
in order to meet this challenge.
Rut this was not the only cause of the growth of concessional 
economic aid for LDCs. Other changes encouraged the transfer of 
additional aid on foreign policy grounds. As less aid was required 
in Europe, and as American government revenue expanded, the capacity 
of the United States to provide aid increased. The expansion of aid
265.
was also facilitated by the growing currency of doctrines which 
were optimistic in their assessment of the way in which large scale 
aid could promote economic development abroad; by increased re­
quirements for aid in many LDCs; by improved relations between the 
United States and some recipient countries; and by a more pessimi­
stic assessment of alternatives to economic aid.
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weapons of war so they weren't able to import 
manufactured goods they wanted.
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have cost in 1954 because of the change in the 
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE GROWTH OF CONCESSIONAL ECONOMIC AID 
TO LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: PART TWO: 
PL480 and ASSOCIATED PROGRAMMES.
The p r e s e n t  s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  d i s s e r t a t i o n  a t t e m p t s  t o  a c c o u n t  
f o r  t h e  em ergence  and  e x p a n s io n  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  commodity a i d  u n d e r  
t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  A g r i c u l t u r a l  T rade  D evelopm ent and A s s i s t a n c e  
Act o f  1954 and some a s s o c i a t e d  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  M utua l S e c u r i t y  
A c t .  Aid p r o v id e d  u n d e r  t h e  fo rm er  programme h as  been  p o p u l a r l y  
known a s  PL480 a s s i s t a n c e ,  o r  l a t e r  a s  'Food f o r  P e a c e '  o r  'Food 
f o r  F reedom ’ ( th o u g h  much o f  th e  a i d  h a s  n o t  b e e n  i n  t h e  form  o f  food) 
and t h e s e  l a b e l s  w i l l  be  u se d  i n t e r c h a n g e a b l y  h e r e .  The im p o r ta n c e  
o f  t h e s e  programmes from  t h e  s t a n d p o i n t  o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  d i s s e r t a t i o n  
i s  t h a t  th e y  h av e  co m p r ise d  a v e r y  l a r g e  s h a r e  o f  t h e  econom ic  a i d  
made a v a i l a b l e  by  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  t o  l e s s  d e v e lo p e d  c o u n t r i e s  -  
a p p r o x im a te ly  one t h i r d  o f  t h e  t o t a l  by t h e  m i d - s i x t i e s . ^
A c c o rd in g  t o  t h e  g e n e r a l l y  r e c e i v e d  v iew , commodity a i d  em erged
s im p ly  a s  a r e s u l t  o f  th e  c o n c e rn  o f  Am erican p o l i c y  m akers  t o  f i n d
some o u t l e t  f o r  g row ing  a g r i c u l t u r a l  s u r p l u s e s ,  and was s u b s e q u e n t ly
m o d i f ie d  to  s e r v e  a s  a t o o l  f o r  p ro m o t in g  T h i rd  W orld d e ve lopm en t and
o t h e r  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  o b j e c t i v e s  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  p e r s i s t e n c e  o f
S e n a to r  Humphrey, th e  e l e c t i o n  o f  Kennedy a s  P r e s i d e n t ,  and s i m i l a r  
2
f a c t o r s .  I t  w i l l  be  s u g g e s t e d  h e r e  t h a t  t h i s  a c c o u n t  i s  f a r  from  
an a d e q u a te  e x p l a n a t i o n ,  b u t  b e f o r e  p r o c e e d in g  to  t h i s  a rg u m e n t ,  i t  
i s  c o n v e n ie n t  to  b r i e f l y  d e s c r i b e  t h e  programme and i n d i c a t e  th e  
amount o f  a s s i s t a n c e  p ro v id e d  u n d e r  i t s  t e r m s .
1. The Commodity Aid Programmes
Table 1 provides data on the growth of surplus agricultural 
commodity aid to countries classified here as less developed. While 
the figures given represent only one of the possible measures of the 
value of commodity aid, they do provide an indication of its volume 
and of the way in which aid to less developed countries increased 
between 1955 and 1965. Third World countries gained at the expense 
of other recipients: initially, European countries and Japan were
major recipients, but the share of surplus commodity aid allocated to 
them dropped steadily.
The provision of assistance under the Agricultural Trade Devel­
opment and Assistance Act covered several kinds of aid during the 
period reviewed. Under title 1 of PL480, the largest form of commodity 
aid for most years, agricultural commodities were sold under govern­
ment agreements for currencies of the recipient. These currencies 
were transferred to the account of the U.S. Government in the country 
concerned in the first instance, and were subsequently allowed to accu­
mulate or used for a variety of purposes under the terms of agreements 
with recipient governments. Such purposes included grants and loans 
to the recipient for economic development, loans to private enterprise, 
defence support, and specific U.S. uses - for example, embassy
kexpenses and the provision of currencies to American tourists.
Under title 2, stocks were donated for various relief and 
economic development programmes, operated by the United States itself, 
or by multilateral agencies as in the case of the World Food Programme.
k It would be appropriate to discount the level of PL480 shipments 
by the extent to which barter and use of local currencies by 
the United States for such items as embassy expenses reduced 
foreign exchange earnings to the recipient.
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Table 1. Volume of U.S . Commodity Aid
1 . 2. 3. 4. 5.
Fiscal
Year
PL480:
World
Total
Secs.402,550 Total for 
of Mutual World
Security: under
World Total 1 & 2.
Total to 
LDCs.
Percentage 
to LDCs.
(millions of dollars)
1955 385 450 835 264 32%
1956 984 355 1339 414 31%
1957 1525 394 1919 797 42%
1958 982 227 1209 666 55%
1959 1017 210 1227 709 58%
1960 1116 167 1283 890 69%
1961 1317 186 1503 1031 69%
1962 1496 74 1570 1170 74%
1963 1466 14 1480 1221 83%
1964 1494 24 1518 1326 87%
1965 1671 26 1697 1502 89%
1966 1574 42 1616 1412 87%
Note to Table 1. Data is calculated from figures
on aid to individual recipients given in U.S. Department 
of Agriculture, 12 years of Achievement under Public Law 
480: Washington, D.C., 1967, pp. 78-124. For the purposes
of the table, LDCs are defined to include Turkey, but to 
exclude other countries classified as European in this source. 
Japan, Australian and New Zealand, as well as countries in 
North America, are similarly excluded. The values given 
represent export market values estimated by the Department 
of Agriculture, not the cost of shipments to the Commodity 
Credit Corporation.
289.
Title 3 authorised the United States to provide donations of commod­
ities for voluntary relief agencies and international agencies, and 
in addition, allowed for the exchange of agricultural commodities 
for materials and services procurred abroad. A fourth title, added 
in 1959, made provision for the sale of surplus agricultural commod­
ities for dollars on a credit basis, with repayment periods extend—
3ing up to 20 years.
Section 550 of the Mutual Security Act of 1953, and section
402 of the same Act between 1954 and 1961 required that the executive
use more than a specified amount of the funds under the programme
to finance the sale of surplus agricultural commodities for local 
4currencies. Table 2 indicates the minimum amounts earmarked in 
this way and the amounts actually used by the executive.
Table 2. Sales for Local Currencies of Surplus Agricultural
Commodities under the Mutual Security Programme.
($ U.S. millions)
Fiscal Year: 1954 1955 1956
Minimum amounts 
earmarked under 
sections 550 
and 402 of the 
Mutual Security 
Act.
100 350 300
Actual Sales 236 444 349
Sales to Near 
East, Asia, 60 146 2 32
Latin America
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961
250 175 175 175 175
283 203 186 174 178
189 117 117 111 99
Source : O.E.C.D., Food Aid: its Bole in Economic Development:
O.E.C.D, 1962, p.38. Figures differ from those 
given in Table 1: the latter includes some other
purchases of agricultural commodities under the 
Mutual Security Act and subsequent legislation.
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11. The Emergence of Surplus Commodity
Aid.
In general works on American foreign aid, the introduction 
of a new programme of economic aid under PL480 is usually explained 
simply by the need to find an outlet for growing agricultural sur­
pluses in the United States.^ It is argued here that this was the 
immediate cause behind the introduction of the programme, and that 
very little of the additional aid would have been provided in the
■kabsence of surpluses. But other changes were important in creating 
the conditions favourable to the use of aid as a means of tackling 
the problem of surpluses, and without these changes, the amount of 
assistance provided to less developed countries through the 
programme would have been smaller.
In one sense, it is possible to define a commodity as being 
'in surplus' when special measures have to be used to constrain 
supply or supplement normal commercial demand if prices are to be 
held at 'acceptable' levels. Alternatively, surpluses can be defined
In the case of surplus commodities provided under sections 
550 and 402 of the Mutual Security Act, the position is more 
complex. Here surplus disposal was tacked on to an existing 
programme controlled by different groups in the executive 
and different committees in Congress. It seems reasonable 
to suppose that some of this aid would have been provided 
even in the absence of surpluses - though in the form of 
dollars. This is particularly plausible where the executive 
used more in this way than the minimum earmarked by Congress 
(since the executive normally requested more than Congress 
was willing to provide, and would presumably have made the 
funds available in any event). However, the remarks in this 
section are primarily concerned with the PL480 programme.
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to exist when government price support measures take the form of 
adding to commercial demand by purchasing commodities and stockpiling 
them. It was in this directly visible form that surpluses began to 
accumulate at a very rapid rate prior to the introduction of the pro­
grammes under discussion here. Inventories acquired by the Commod­
ity Credit Corporation as part of its price support operations 
climbed from slightly over one billion dollars in 1952, to more than 
three billion dollars in 1953, and then to almost six billion dollars 
in the following year.^
The origins of the policies which led to the accumulation 
of these stockpiles are complex. A programme of price supports 
commenced in 1933 when the Agricutural Adjustment Act was passed 
and the Commodity Credit Corporation was created.^ Initially, the 
Corporation was concerned with price support operations for corn and 
cotton producers, but over the period 1933-42 there was a rapid in-
g
crease in the number of commodities subject to price supports. The
general aim of the programmes was to provide support for the prices
of the commodities concerned if they fell below a certain percentage
of 'parity*. Parity was subject to varying definition, but was
generally meant to refer to a price which gave the farmer a return in
relation to his purchases and other costs equivalent to that obtained
9in a selected base period.
In 1942, in the context of increased wartime requirements, 
it was determined that the prices of 'basic' commodities (cotton, 
wheat, rice, com, peanuts, tobacco) and of all other commodities 
for which the Secretary of Agriculture requested increased production 
would be supported at 90% of parity rate, not only for the duration
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o f  t h e  w a r ,  b u t  f o r  two y e a r s  from  t h e  p r o c l a m a t io n  o f  c e s s a t i o n  o f  
h o s t i l i t i e s .  T h is  e f f e c t i v e l y  h e ld  p r i c e  s u p p o r t  l e v e l s  a t  t h e  
n i n e t y  p e r c e n t  l e v e l  u n t i l  1948, f o r  i t  was n o t  u n t i l  t h e  c l o s e  o f  
1946 t h a t  P r e s i d e n t  Truman i s s u e d  a p r o c l a m a t io n  o f  t h i s  t y p e . ^ °
Even t h e n ,  t h e r e  was no r e d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  l e v e l  o f  p r i c e  s u p p o r t ,  f o r  
w h i l e  C ong ress  i n  1948 e n a c t e d  l e g i s l a t i o n  w hich  would  have  made 
p o s s i b l e  r e d u c e d  s u p p o r t  from  1950 , t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  1948 e l e c t i o n  
-  R e p u b l ic a n  l o s s  o f  key  m id -W es te rn  s t a t e s  was w id e ly  a t t r i b u t e d  
t o  t h e  p a r t y ’ s p o l i c y  o f  r e d u c i n g  p r i c e  s u p p o r t s  -  in d u c e d  C ongress  
i n  1949 to  p o s tp o n e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  t h i s  schem e. In  1952 , C ongress  
e x te n d e d  p r i c e  s u p p o r t s  a t  t h e  90% r a t e  u n t i l  1 9 5 4 . ^
D e s p i t e  t h e  l o n g  p e r i o d  o f  o p e r a t i o n  o f  a  sy s te m  o f  g u a ra n ­
t e e d  p r i c e  s u p p o r t s  f o r  a  number o f  com m odit ies  a t  t h e  90% l e v e l ,  
t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  managed to  a v o id  a n y th i n g  more t h a n  tem p o ra ry  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  e x c e s s  p r o d u c t i o n  w i th  m ost com m od it ies  u n t i l  t h e  
e a r l y  f i f t i e s .  The r e a s o n s  f o r  t h i s  a r e  com plex , b u t  a  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
i m p o r ta n t  f a c t o r  was t h e  s t i m u lu s  t o  demand a r i s i n g  i n  t u r n  from t h e  
Second W orld War, p o s t - w a r  d e v a s t a t i o n ,  and th e  Korean War. The 
p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e  o f  w h ea t  i l l u s t r a t e s  t h i s  p o i n t .  As t h e  t a b l e  be low  
i n d i c a t e s ,  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  t h i s  commodity was s u b s t a n t i a l l y  g r e a t e r  
f o r  1941-45 t h a n  f o r  1 9 3 6 -1 9 4 0 ,  b u t  t h i s  change was o u tw e ig h e d  by 
i n c r e a s e d  demand stem m ing p r i n c i p a l l y  from r e q u i r e m e n t s  g e n e r a te d  
by th e  Second W orld War. The a d d i t i o n a l  demand was n o t  so much f o r  
w hea t i t s e l f  ( th o u g h  t h e r e  was a s i g n i f i c a n t  i n c r e a s e  i n  d i r e c t  p u r ­
c h a s e s  r e f l e c t e d  i n  th e  d a t a  on m i l i t a r y  p ro c u re m e n t)  a s  f o r  m eat 
and o t h e r  p r o d u c t s  r e q u i r e d  f o r  su c h  programmes a s  L e n d -L e a s e .  
B ecause  o f  t h e  s h o r t a g e  o f  f e e d  g r a i n s ,  w heat was d i v e r t e d  f o r  t h i s  
p u rp o s e  u n d e r  a s e r i e s  o f  a c t s  w hich  p r o v id e d  f o r  th e  r e l e a s e
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of government stocks at feed prices. As the table indicates,
12use of wheat for feed was abnormally high during the war period.
In the immediate post-war period, production was at high
levels, but demand was also particularly strong, mainly because of
the enormous quantities required for shipments to devastated areas
under military relief operations, the United Nations Relief and
Rehabilitation Administration, the Marshall Plan, and other govern-
13ment and commercial channels. It was not until 1949 that the 
problem to come became apparent: although production was not high
compared with preceding years, it was in excess of requirements 
which had slumped with reduced demand from abroad. Surpluses 
began to grow, but the situation was reversed in 1950 and 1951.
The principal cause was increased demand induced directly or indir­
ectly by the Korean War, but slightly reduced production in 1951 
was also a contributing factor.
In 1952 and 1953, exports were again down, but production 
was at higher levels than in 1951. The consequence was the rapid 
accumulation of stockpiles of wheat. Surpluses also mounted in the 
case of a number of other commodities resulting in the rapid build 
up of Commodity Credit Corporation inventories noted previously.
In this context, PL480 and associated provisions of the 
Mutual Security Act represented convenient methods of preventing 
accumulation of further stocks of agricultural commodities and dis­
posing of those already in existence. There are several reasons 
for supposing that it was primarily this consideration which gener­
ated the support for the introduction of a new programme of aid 
under Public Law 480. First, the statements of a number of U.S.
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o f f i c i a l s  and Congressm en i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  t h i s  was t h e i r  p r im a ry  
o b j e c t i v e  i n  p r o v i d i n g  th e  a s s i s t a n c e ,  and i n  some c a s e s ,  t h a t  
th e y  w ish e d  to  s e e  th e  p o l i c y  o f  s u r p l u s  d i s p o s a l  c a r r i e d  o u t  more 
a g g r e s s i v e l y  even  w here  i t  was i n  c o n f l i c t  w i th  t h e  p ro m o tio n  o f  
Am erican f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  o b j e c t i v e s .  The f o l l o w i n g  exchange  p r o ­
v i d e s  one exam ple :
Mr. Hoeven (House Com m ittee on 
A g r i c u l t u r e ) :
I  h a v e  a lw ays  f e l t  t h a t  th e  D ep a r tm en t  o f  
A g r i c u l t u r e  was n o t  a  f r e e  a g e n t  i n  i t s  
a t t e m p t s  t o  d i s p o s e  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
c o m m od it ie s  o v e r s e a s .  I  f e e l  t h e r e  h a s  
b een  to o  much i n t e r f e r e n c e  on t h e  p a r t  
o f  t h e  D epa r tm en t  o f  S t a t e .  Do you f e e l  
t h a t  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  A g r i c u l t u r e  can 
o p e r a t e  a s  a  f r e e  a g e n t  i n  h i s  e n d e a v o u r  
to  d i s p o s e  o f  o u r  s u r p l u s  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
com m od it ies  a b ro a d ?
Mr. B utz  ( A s s i s t a n t  S e c r e t a r y  o f  
A g r i c u l t u r e ) :
. . .  I  w i l l  n o t  sa y  we a r e  n o t  g e t t i n g  
t h e  jo b  done, b u t  we may n o t  be  g e t t i n g  
i t  done  as  r a p i d l y  a s  you would  l i k e .
Mr. Hoeven: Our p r im a ry  i n t e r e s t  i s
t o  g e t  r i d  o f  o u r  a g r i c u l t u r a l  s u r p l u s  
c o m m o d i t ie s .
Mr. B u tz :  T h a t  i s  o u r s  t o o .  I  sa y
t h a t  i s  a  p r im a ry  i n t e r e s t  o f  t h o s e  
c o n c e rn e d  w i th  t h e  d i s p o s i t i o n  o f  
s u r p l u s  c o m m o d it ie s .  Of c o u r s e ,  th e  
p r im a ry  i n t e r e s t  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y ,  I  
t h i n k ,  i s  t o  p r e s e r v e  pe a ce  and b u i l d  
up a f r i e n d l y  o r b i t  o f  n a t i o n s .  Some­
t im e s  t h e s e  two i n t e r e s t s  c o n f l i c t .
Mr. Hoeven: We a r e  a g re e d  th e n  t h a t
we a r e  c o n f r o n te d  w i t h  h a n d ic a p s  i n  
o u r  d i s p o s a l  p r o g ra m .-^
S econd , t h e  PL480 programme d e r i v e d  much o f  i t s  s u p p o r t  
from  s o u r c e s  w hich  had  t a k e n  l i t t l e  i n t e r e s t  i n ,  o r  b e e n  o p e n ly  
h o s t i l e  t o ,  th e  e x t e n s i o n  o f  a d d i t i o n a l  q u a n t i t i e s  o f  econom ic a i d  
a b ro a d .  W ith in  t h e  e x e c u t iv e  b r a n c h ,  i t  would a p p e a r  t h a t  th e
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Department of Agriculture was a key source of support for the pro­
gramme. Within Congress, it derived support from representatives 
from the South and Mid-West who frequently supported reductions 
in other types of aid even where they did not vote against it 
completely.
Third, it was an understandable solution to the difficult
problem of grappling with surpluses for many policy makers. Within
both Congress and the executive there was extreme reluctance to
move away from the concept of a high level of price support for agri-
15cultural commodities. Eisenhower, after much equivocation, de­
clared himself in favour of ’flexible' (in practice, lower) price
16supports varying between 75 and 90 percent of parity. The 1954 
Agricultural Bill made provisions for this, but in 1956 Congress 
passed legislation which would have restored the 90 percent parity 
rate for the six basic c r o p s . T h i s  was vetoed by Eisenhower, but 
it provides some indication of the difficulty of allowing stockpiles 
to be cleared by reducing commodity prices. Even given the intro­
duction of lower levels of price support, and use of a variety of 
other methods (acreage diversion and other forms of production con­
trol, attempts to expand commercial exports and use of surpluses for 
domestic welfare programmes) designed to deal with the problem 3 
there remained an excess of supply as well as a large stockpile of 
commodities accumulated previously. Not only was the storage of 
these surpluses expensive: it was also reasonable for policy makers
to fear that failure to deal with the problem would lead to public
reaction which would force a further reduction of price supports -
18as it had in the case of potatoes in the late forties. Surplus
commodity shipments abroad would not only act as a direct method
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of siphoning off surpluses: they were also expected to develop
new commercial markets abroad for American agricultural products. 
Thus a report of the Department of Agriculture and other interested 
agencies noted that:
Exports under title 1 have been effective 
primarily in helping to reduce large 
accumulated surpluses and in preventing 
further accumulations ... The corollary 
objective of Public Law 480 is to build 
expanded foreign markets for United 
States agricultural products ...
While few immediate results can be 
expected, evidence is growing that 
improved diets abroad as a result of 
title 1 sales and market development 
activities connected with the programme 
will be reflected in future exports. ^
Fourth, there is no other reasonable explanation for the 
abrupt jump in aid levels which occurred with the introduction of 
PL480. As David Baldwin notes, the preoccupation of Congress at 
the time was more with cutting aid levels than increasing them; 
and there were a number of indications that some Congressmen were
interested in using the PL480 programmes as a means of cutting down
_ _ . „ 20 on other types of aid.
While the concern of American policy makers with the need 
for an outlet for growing agricultural surpluses was the immediate 
cause of the introduction of PL480, and while it was initially the 
dominant concern of those supporting the programme, there were other 
underlying changes which encouraged the use of aid as a means of 
solving the problems of American agriculture. In the first place, 
stockpiles emerged in the fifties in circumstances in which the pro­
vision of large quantities of aid on a grant or grant-like basis 
was considered much more reasonable and acceptable than it would
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have been fifteen years previously. As noted already, the sale of 
surplus agricultural commodities for foreign currencies was attached 
to an existing aid programme under the Mutual Security Act a year 
before the PL480 programme was introduced. A little over two 
decades earlier, there would have been no aid programme of any magni­
tude in existence; and from this date up to the Second World War, 
public capital movements were extremely small and were largely con­
fined to credits provided on onerous terms. By the early fifties 
there was more reason for policy makers to provide aid, less skept­
icism of the effectiveness of aid as a means of promoting foreign 
policy objectives, and greater acceptance of the idea of a large 
scale programme carried on by the government. It seems likely that 
these changes encouraged resort to the use of aid as a mean of deal­
ing with agricultural surplus problems, and that in their absence,
greater use would have been made of other methods as a way of prevent-
*ing accumulation of stockpiles.
There is a possible objection to this line of argument on the 
ground that PL480 found little support, even opposition, from sources 
which tended to favour the provision of aid on other grounds. Many 
farm congressmen charged that the State Department opposed the intro­
duction of PL480 and sought to constrain its operations for several
21years subsequently. In Congress, it might be said, support for the 
programme came from those who exhibited little interest in the
Aid would not have been entirely absent had surpluses 
emerged in the conditions of the thirties. As Chapter 
Two notes, problems with falling prices for wheat and 
cotton led to the provision of a small credit (if on 
relatively onerous terms) to China in 1933.
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objectives which aid programmes sought to promote, and who wished 
to promote surplus disposal even where it was in direct conflict 
with these aims.
Now it is clear that there were many in the State Department 
who saw serious disadvantages, as well as benefits, in PL480 in the 
early years of its operation. In statements to Congressional commit­
tees, spokesmen for the Department indicated their concern that major 
sections of the programme were in conflict with the general position
of the United States regarding avoidance of dumping and discrimina-
22tion in international trade ; and that it could sometimes operate 
in ways which were to the disadvantage of the recipient country's 
economy. An indication of the attitudes of many in the State Depart­
ment was given in a statement of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Economic Affairs, Thorsten Kalijarvi, to the Senate Commit-
23tee on Agriculture and Forestry in 1957. On the debit side of
PL480, it was suggested that "disposals under title 1, and under
title 111 barter, have upset some of our best friends abroad", though
these countries had been patient because the programme was regarded
as temporary. Countries which had been "vocal in their complaints
of injury by the United States in the form of displacement of
their exports from the world's import markets" included Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, Denmark, Mexico, Uruguay, Argentina, Burma,
Italy and Peru. Moreover, there were dangers for recipients in
excessive and prolonged assistance through title 1 of PL480 in that
it could lead to a heavy debt burden, "the development of permanent
dependence on essential imports of food and fiber from the United
States under an emergency and temporary programme", and to other 
24problems.
3 0 0 .
However, th e  D epar tm en t  saw s e v e r a l  a d v a n ta g e s  i n  t h e  p r o ­
gramme a c c o r d in g  to  K a l i j a r v i .  D o n a t io n s  u n d e r  t i t l e  11 and d i s ­
p o s a l s  th ro u g h  p r i v a t e  c h a r i t y  u n d e r  t i t l e  111 had  " u n d o u b te d ly  
p ro d u ce d  d iv id e n d s  i n  t h e  f o r e i g n  r e l a t i o n s  f i e l d " .  These h a d ,
u n d o u b te d ly  g e n e r a t e d  good w i l l ,  
i n c r e a s e d  o r  m a in ta in e d  th e  p h y s i c a l  
w e l l - b e i n g  o f  p e o p le  o v e r  what i t  w ould 
o t h e r w i s e  h a v e  b e e n ,  and e x c e p t  i n  a  v e ry  
few i s o l a t e d  c a s e s ,  r e s u l t e d  i n  no d i s ­
p la c e m e n t  o f  com m erc ia l  p u r c h a s e s  w hich  
w ould o t h e r w i s e  have  b e e n  made.
A g a in ,
S p e c i f i c  U n i te d  S t a t e s  o b j e c t i v e s ,  
such  a s  e d u c a t i o n a l  and c u l t u r a l  e x c h a n g e ,  
a s s i s t a n c e  t o  A m erican s c h o o l s  a b r o a d ,  
m i l i t a r y  h o u s in g ,  m u tu a l  d e f e n c e ,  m ark e t  
d e v e lo p m e n t ,  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  s t r a t e g i c  
m a t e r i a l s ,  have  a l l  been  p rom oted  by P u b l i c  
Law 480.
F i n a l l y ,
P u b l i c  Law 480 d i s p o s a l s  u n d e r  t i t l e  1 
h a v e  b e e n  h e l p f u l  i n  te rm s  o f  o u r  r e l a t i o n s  
w i th  c e r t a i n  i n d i v i d u a l  c o u n t r i e s  b e c a u s e  
we a s s i s t e d  them when th e y  w ere  i n  t r o u b l e .
The d i s a d v a n t a g e s  o f  PL480 i n  t h e  ey es  o f  t h e  S t a t e  D e p a r t ­
ment have  som etim es  b e e n  u n d e r s to o d  t o  have  b e e n  much g r e a t e r  th a n  
th e  o u t l i n e  g iv e n  above  would s u g g e s t .  Some w r i t e r s  n o t e  t h a t  much 
a id  u n d e r  PL480 i n  t h e  f i f t i e s  w ent to  I n d i a ,  Y u g o s l a v ia ,  I n d o n e s i a ,  
t h e  U n i te d  Arab R e p u b l ic  and o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  w i th  w hich  t h e  U n i te d  
S t a t e s  m a in ta in e d  o n ly  po o r  r e l a t i o n s .  T h is  h a s  b e e n  t a k e n  to  mean
t h a t  p o l i c y  m akers  w ere  u n w i l l i n g  o r  u n a b le  t o  v e to  t h e s e  t r a n s a c t i o n s
26b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  p r e s s u r e  t o  r e d u c e  e x c e s s  s t o c k s  o f  c o m m o d it ie s .
I t  would p resu m a b ly  f o l lo w  t h a t  t h i s  would be se en  a s  a s i g n i f i c a n t  
c o s t  o f  t h e  programme by t h e  S t a t e  D e p a r tm e n t .  However, th e  o b s e r ­
v a t i o n  i s  open to  a n o th e r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  I t  c o u ld  b e  a rg u e d  t h a t
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p o l i c y  m akers  w i t h i n  th e  e x e c u t i v e  saw a d v a n ta g e s  i n  t h e  u se  o f  a
h i g h  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  s u r p l u s  commodity a i d  in  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  i n  t h a t
t h e r e  would be  l e s s  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  e n c o u n te r i n g  e f f e c t i v e  o p p o s i t i o n
to  t h e  p o l i c y  i n  C o n g ress  o r  i n  u n d e rm in in g  s u p p o r t  (a lw a y s  p r e c a r i o u s )
27f o r  econom ic a i d  u n d e r  t h e  M utual S e c u r i t y  l e g i s l a t i o n .  There
a r e  s e v e r a l  g ro u n d s  f o r  s u p p o r t i n g  t h i s  seco n d  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  I t  
was t h e  D ep a r tm en t  o f  S t a t e  w hich had  b e e n  g iv e n  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  
n e g o t i a t i n g  a l l  PL480 a g re e m e n ts  w i t h  o t h e r  g o ve rnm en ts  and f o r  en­
s u r i n g  t h a t  a g re e m e n ts  w ere  n o t  i n  c o n f l i c t  w i th  t h e  o v e r a l l  f o r e i g n
2 8p o l i c y  o b j e c t i v e s  o f  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s .  More d e c i s i v e l y ,  th e
c o u n t r i e s  l i s t e d  w ere  e v i d e n t l y  n o t  immune from  h a v in g  sh ip m e n ts  u n d e r
t h e  programme s u s p e n d e d .  I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  Y u g o s l a v ia ,  a i d  was c u t  o f f
f o l l o w i n g  an a p p a r e n t  s h i f t  i n  t h e  o r i e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  reg im e  to w a rd s  
29th e  S o v i e t  U nion . A g a in ,  w i th  E g y p t ,  PL480 s h ip m e n ts  w ere  v i r t ­
u a l l y  su sp en d e d  ( a s  t h e  t a b l e  be low  i n d i c a t e s )  f o r  two y e a r s  f o l l o w ­
in g  th e  n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  Suez Canal and t h e  e n s u in g  Suez c r i s i s .  
I t  was n o t  u n t i l  December 1958 t h a t  a  new ag re e m e n t  f o r  p r o v i s i o n  o f
s u r p l u s  c o m m o d it ie s  to  Egypt was c o n c lu d e d ,  e v i d e n t l y  a s  p a r t  o f  a
30s e r i e s  o f  s t e p s  by  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  to  r e p a i r  r e l a t i o n s .  F i n a l l y ,  
t h i s  was n o t  m e n t io n e d  a s  a d i s a d v a n t a g e  o f  t h e  scheme i n  th e  s t a t e ­
ment o f  K a l i j a r v i  d i s c u s s e d  p r e v i o u s l y ,  even  though  th e  s t a t e m e n t  con­
t a i n e d  a f r a n k  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  o t h e r  d i s a d v a n t a g e s .  I n d e e d ,  K a l i j a r v i  
a rg u e d  t h a t  t h e  S t a t e  D epar tm en t  v iew  was t h a t  " g iv e n  t h e  need  to  do
so m e th in g  a b o u t  t h e  s u r p l u s  p ro b le m , we have  s u c c e e d e d  i n  g e n e r a l  i n
31u s in g  s u r p l u s e s  f o r  sound p u r p o s e s . "
Thus i t  c a n n o t  be c o n c lu d e d  t h a t  th e  S t a t e  D epar tm en t  was op ­
posed  to  t h e  programme i n  th e  e a r l y  y e a r s  o f  i t s  o p e r a t i o n ,  even  
though  i t  was c l e a r l y  w o r r i e d  a b o u t  s e v e r a l  a s p e c t s  o f  i t .  M oreover ,
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Table 4. Shipments of Commodities to the United
Arab Republic under PL480 and the Mutual 
Security Act: 1955-1960 (thousand dollars)
Year ending 
June 30.
Title
1
Title
11
Title
111
Mutual
Security
Total
1955 __ 15831 _ 15831
1956 17057 - 19067 5064 41188
1957 - - 965 - 965
1958 - - 1686 - 1686
1959 20901 - 5019 - 25920
1960 76796 163 6490 3935 87384
Note: Values are estimated export market levels.
Data is taken from U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
Economic Research Service, Public Law 480 and. other 
Economic Assistance to the United Arab Republic: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964, p.7.
some statements from members of the Department indicated that the
32advantages of the programme were considered to outweigh its costs.
There is also direct evidence that the State Department did not oppose
the introduction of the scheme. Anderson has drawn attention to the
testimony of Waugh, a Nebraska banker whom Eisenhower selected as
Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. Waugh asserted
in February 1955 that:
The State Department aggressively favoured 
the enactment of legislation to permit the 
$1 billion worth of agricultural products 
to be made available for export on special 
terms over a three year period,
and indeed that,
the decision to propose such a three year
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programme to the Congress was reached 
by an interagency group meeting in my 
office. 33
The State Department would presumably not have supported the 
PL480 programme in the absence of conditions in which foreign aid 
was considered useful as an instrument of American foreign policy.
Even if the above argument is incorrect, and the Department was op­
posed to the programme, its opposition would have doubtless been much 
stronger in a climate in which aid was not favoured for other reasons. 
In this case, the advantages of the programme would have been a great 
deal weaker. Some of the costs might also have appeared weaker (for 
example, concern about the impact of the very high levels of commodity 
aid on Third World development), but it is likely that the reduction 
in perceived advantages would have outweighed this effect.
Within Congress, it is true that much support for the PL480
programme came from those who did not normally support aid, or who
were prepared to push ahead with surplus disposal even where it ran
into conflict with the objectives which assistance programmes sought
to promote. The exchange between Representative Hoeven of the House
Committee on Agriculture, and Assistant Secretary of Agriculture Butz
provides one example of the view, widespread among key supporters of
PL480, that the programme should be expanded even if this was found
to involve foreign policy problems. Nor were some members any more
sympathetic to American government programmes promoting development
if these ran into conflict with the objective of disposing of surpluses
and expanding markets abroad. To provide one illustration:
Mr. Poage (Vice Chairman, House Committee 
on Agriculture):
... the agricultural attaches of the United 
States have promoted and devoted a substantial 
part of their time to showing these people how
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they could get better seed and get it 
from the United States. They have shown 
them how to get better machinery, getting 
it for them have they not?
Mr. Butz: Have the attaches done that, or
has that been under the Point 4 programme?
Mr. Poage: Certainly both have done it.
That has been exactly one of the complaints 
we have had about this attache programme.
We hope we are now improving it. Too often 
our attaches have felt they were foreign 
country agents whose duty it was to simply 
improve the agricultural practices of the 
nation to which they were accredited. I 
think that is all wrong ...
Mr. Butz: As you know, we are trying very
intensively to redirect the activity and 
emphasis of our attaches to make them market 
promoters, and eyes and ears of the Department.
However, members of Congress whose prime concern was with 
American agriculture had to attract support from other areas, and it 
is unlikely that they would have been able to operate a disposal pro­
gramme of the size of PL480 in the absence of an environment in 
which foreign aid programmes were considered useful and acceptable 
on other grounds. Moreover, key supporters of PL480 in Congress 
included those who seemed genuinely attracted by its possibilities 
as a means of promoting economic development abroad and furthering 
other foreign policy objectives. Senator Humphrey was one example.
From the outset a strong supporter of the programme, Humphrey argued 
consistently from 1953 that American agricultural surpluses were an 
asset rather than a liability, and that they were an effective means
of promoting economic development and other foreign policy interests 
35abroad. While Humphrey's state of Minnesota was a significant
beneficiary of PL480, ranking 11th in the list of states gaining from
36agreements over the period 1955-63, it does not seem that these 
arguments were merely a mask for the promotion of American agricultural
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i n t e r e s t s .  Humphrey was a l s o  a s t r o n g  s u p p o r t e r  o f  o t h e r  programmes
37u n d e r  th e  M utua l S e c u r i t y  A c t ,  and h i s  p o s i t i o n  was q u i t e  c o n s i s t ­
e n t  w i th  h i s  b a s i c  p o l i t i c a l  p h i lo s o p h y  o f  ' c o l d  war l i b e r a l i s m ' .
He h a d ,  i n  th e  e a r l y  f o r t i e s  b eg an  a s  a  s t r o n g  s u p p o r t e r  o f  Henry 
W a l la c e ,  and th e n  moved o v e r  in  t h e  l a t t e r  p a r t  o f  t h e  f o r t i e s ,  
i n  company w i th  a number o f  o t h e r  l e f t  l i b e r a l s ,  to  t h e  ty p e  o f  p o s i ­
t i o n  cham pioned by A m ericans  f o r  D e m o c ra t ic  A c t io n .  Fo r  t h i s  p o s i t i o n  
(which i n c l u d e d  a s t r o n g  e le m e n t  o f  c o n c e rn  f o r  t h e  p ro b le m s  o f  u n d e r ­
d e v e lo p e d  c o u n t r i e s ) , Humphrey was a s t r o n g  e x p o n e n t  i n  th e  S e n a te  
38i n  t h e  f i f t i e s .  F u r t h e r ,  S e n a to r  Humphrey som etim es seemed w i l l ­
in g  ( i f  w i th  o b v io u s  h e s i t a t i o n )  to  e n t e r t a i n  th e  i d e a  o f  u s in g  
PL480 f o r  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  p u rp o s e s  in  l e s s  d e v e lo p e d  c o u n t r i e s  even
w here  i t  m ig h t  n o t  be w h o l ly  c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  t h e  n a r ro w e r  i n t e r e s t s
39o f  A m erican a g r i c u l t u r e .
F o r  t h o s e  l i k e  Humphrey, t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  b e n e ­
f i t s  o f  PL480 w ere  c o n s id e r e d  to  b e  o f  r e a l  v a l u e .  The p ro m in en ce  
g iv e n  to  t h e  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  programme in  t h e
s t a t e m e n t  o f  t h e  p u r p o s e s  o f  t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n  p r o v id e s  f u r t h e r  e v i -
40d ence  t h a t  t h i s  c a r r i e d  some w e ig h t  i n  C o n g re s s .  I t  seems r e a s o n ­
a b l e  to  c o n c lu d e  t h a t  t h e  u s e  o f  a i d  as  a means o f  d e a l i n g  w i th  t h e  
p ro b le m  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  s u r p l u s e s  was e n c o u ra g e d  by an e n v iro n m e n t  
i n  w hich  l a r g e  programmes o f  f o r e i g n  a s s i s t a n c e  were c o n s id e r e d  u s e f u l  
on g ro u n d s  o t h e r  t h a n  t h e i r  c o n t r i b u t i o n  to  A m erican  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
p r o s p e r i t y ,  and t h a t  i n  th e  a b s e n c e  o f  t h i s  e n v i r o n m e n t ,  t h e r e  would 
h a v e  b een  more p r e s s u r e  t o  u se  o t h e r  m ethods a s  a way o f  p r e v e n t i n g  
a c c u m u la t io n  o f  s t o c k p i l e s .
A seco n d  u n d e r l y i n g  change r e l e v a n t  to  t h e  em ergence  o f  a  l a r g e  
s c a l e  commodity a i d  programme was t h e  i n c r e a s e d  r e l i a n c e  o f  l e s s
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developed countries on grain imports. Without this change, it seems 
probable that the scope for disposing of American agricultural sur­
pluses within those regions would have been smaller. The shift under 
discussion is broadly indicated in the table below.
Table 5. Grain Trade of Asia, Africa and
Latin America.
1934/38 1948/52 1960 1966
Africa and Asia +3 -6 -19 -41
Latin America +9 +1 0 +5
Source : Barbara Ward, "A Planet to Feed",
The Banker's Magazine, Vol. CCXX,
No. 1585, April, 1976, p.16. Figures 
denote million metric tons, with + denoting 
net exports and - net imports.
The above data conceals differences within regions, some 
countries being major exporters and others, even in surplus regions, 
being significant importers. It also fails to distinguish different 
commodities. To ascertain the significance of these shifts, it is 
therefore necessary to undertake a more detailed examination.
In the case of wheat - a major item in PL480 accounting for 
well over half of the value of shipments - the trend in imports, both 
for various regions and for particular countries is noted in the 
table below. It is clear that there was a major shift towards in­
creased reliance on imports of wheat and wheat flour in less devel­
oped countries. Before the Second World War, imports of these com­
modities averaged only 2\ million tons annually, whereas over the 
period 1955-57, 8.2 million tons were imported each year on average.
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Nor does this provide a complete picture of increased dependence.
Thus India (then including Pakistan) was a net exporter before the
41war, but the table provides information on imports only.
Countries which increased their dependence on wheat imports 
were among those which became major recipients of this commodity under 
Public Law 480 and associated provisions of the Mutual Security Act: 
the trend described did therefore increase outlets for disposal of 
surplus wheat. It is also evident that the shift towards increased 
reliance on imports of wheat set in before the special U.S. disposal 
programmes were initiated, and that even after the introduction of 
these programmes, the total amount of wheat imported exceeded the 
amount which was provided as aid by the United States. Thus the trend 
under discussion did not occur simply because the United States had 
commodities to be disposed of: it was an independent factor.
The fact that this change was a significant factor increasing
outlets for surplus wheat does not mean that it was important for all
commodities. In the case of rice - also a sizable item in PL480
shipments, though the value transferred was little over one tenth that
of wheat - changed import patterns do not appear to have been a
factor facilitating resort to aid. Most U.S. rice exports under
government programmes went to Asian countries: over the period 1955-
61, 374,000 tons were provided to this region out of total shipments 
42of 417,000 tons. But within Asia, imports of rice tended to decline. 
In the selected interval before the Second World War, they averaged 
4.5 million tons annually, whereas over 1952-56, 2.4 million tons 
were imported. American rice disposal under PL480 does not seem to 
have been greatly affected, for the rice deficit was still large, even 
at the reduced level prevailing in the post-war period, and shipments
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Table 6. Wheat and Wheat Flour: Total Imports and
Imports under Special U.S. Programmes in 
Underdeveloped Regions: (data refers to
annual averages in million tons).
1934 / 35 1947/48 1950/51 1954/55 1957/58 1960
1938/39 1949/50 1953/54 1956/57 1959/60
/ 61
Asia (excluding
Japan) .8 3.4 4.5 4.1 8.3 9.6
--  Special U.S. - . . . .. . 2,0 4.8 6.5
India - 1.7 2.4 1.0 3.4 3.8
--  Special U.S. - .7 2.8 3.2
Pakistan - - .4 .3 .8 1.1
--  Special U.S. - .. . .. . .2 .7 1.1
Africa .4 1.1 2.3 1.4 2.6 3.1
-- Special U.S. - .2 .5 1.4
Egypt - .4 .8 .4 1.2 1.3
--  Special U.S. - . .. .1 .5 1.1
South America 1.3 1.4 2.4 2.7 2.8 3.3
--  Special U.S. - ... .5 .7 1.0
Brazil 1.0 .8 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.9
--  Special U.S. - • • • • • • .3 .5 .8
Source : O.E.C.D., Food Aid: its Role in Economic 
Development: O.E.C.D., 1962, p.75.
... denotes not available.
Data for 1960/61 is preliminary only.
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into the Far East under aid programmes only averaged about ten percent
43of the region’s imports. Further, the amount supplied by tradit-
44ional exporters such as Burma and Cambodia had dimished markedly,
and this tended to reduce problems arising from the need to avoid
shipments which would cut heavily into the commercial exports of other
countries. Even so, the trend was not without some impact. As the
table below indicates, India was one country where there was a major
reduction in the level of rice imports. It was noted by a State
Department official in the course of Congressional hearings in 1959
that the American government had been unable to persuade India to
accept shipments of rice under PL480 in that year. In the face of
a bumper crop of its own, and the need to continue imports under
arrangements with Burma, the Indian Government had, the official
noted, "explained that its own supplies, supplemented by its imports
45from Burma, were adequate to meet its needs". This constraint would 
presumably not have arisen in the pre-war circumstances when India was 
a major importer of rice.
Table 7. Net Imports of Rice by Selected Countries in
the Far East (in million tons, milled rice 
equivalent) .________________________________
av. 34-38 av.52-56 57 58 59 60
Ceylon .5 .4 .5 .5 .6 .5
India 2.2 .4 .8 .4 .3 .7
Indonesia .3 .4 .6 .7 .6 1.0
Malaya .5 .3 .3 .4 .4 .4
S.Korea - .1 .2 - - -
Pakistan - .1 .4 .3 .3 .2
Total Far East 
(excluding Japan) 4.5 2.4 3.7 3.1 2.8 3.5
Source : O.E.C.D., Food Aid: its Role in Economic Development:
O.E.C.D., 1962, p.78.
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There are two other factors which may have encouraged resort 
to the use of aid as a means of removing surpluses, and which there­
fore must be examined. First, there is a possibility of increased 
willingness on the part of American policy makers to take action 
which would impinge on the interests of other exporting countries or 
be in conflict with its own general policy of encouraging a liberal 
trading system. (PL480 provided for barter, state involvement in 
trade, subsidised trade and other arrangements which were at odds 
with the general principles which the United States tended to support). 
It has already been seen that policy makers understood that there 
were costs involved in PL480 in these respects. Dirks has suggested 
that considerations such as these tended to restrain the United
46States from aggressive competition in world markets prior to 1954.
This raises the possibility that a general change in the willingness 
of decision makers to resort to ’economic nationalist’ measures faci­
litated the emergence of surplus agricultural commodity aid.
In practice, however, there had been a history of willingness 
to take special measures in defence of agriculture which extended 
well before the Eisenhower Administration. Referring to the differ­
ence between the American Government’s general trade policy empha­
sising liberal principles of international trade, and that concerned 
with agriculture, Diebold notes:
The conflict between them was not a 
post-war development. It stemmed 
directly from the contrast between 
the principles of the Trade Agreements 
Act adopted in 1934 and the agricultural 
policies adopted about the same time to 
cope with the depression and the 'farm 
problem’ that had plagued the United 
States even in prosperity. The trade 
policy sought to lower tariffs and remove 
quotas, while the farm policy aimed at
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raising farm prices in ways that 
virtually required the n
of new restrictions on imports. ^
Again, Anderson notes that the United States was already insisting 
on a double standard whereby agriculture was held to looser 
restraints than industry by 1945 and that GATT reflected this in
trend towards special treatment of agriculture was carried further
49in a number of directions, but it seems more plausible to understand 
this as a result of growing agricultural problems rather than any 
change in basic willingness to breach the general principles of 
liberal international trade. In the period before 1954, government 
stockpiles had not been of the same magnitude, and the tendency to 
avoid aggressive international competition noted by Dirks can reason­
ably be attributed to this.
which discouraged action to reduce stockpiles by essentially domestic 
measures, so that when surpluses emerged on a substantial scale in 
the early fifties, policy makers were driven to seek foreign outlets 
for the products in question. Some of the domestic measures which might 
have been used to reduce surpluses - disposing of stockpiles on the 
open market for example - would have been inconsistent with the poli­
cies which had led to excess commodities in the first place. But 
other methods, the destruction of stockpiles, or the distribution of 
commodities through non-commercial channels within the United States, 
would not have been subject to this difficulty to the same extent.
There is no evidence of increased reluctance on the part of 
American policy makers to distribute commodities through ’non-commercial
its provisions. 48 Under the early Eisenhower Administration, the
The other possibility is that underlying changes had occurred
channels’ within the United States. The table below indicates that
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as surplus commodities were increasingly shifted abroad as foreign
aid, there was a corresponding rise in the value of the commodities
distributed within the United States to needy persons, as part of
social welfare programmes and in other ways."^ As far as the option
of destroying surpluses is concerned, this had been used to some
extent prior to 1954: for example, during the depression years and
52in the potato price support programme discussed previously. (It 
has also not infrequently been used by other countries faced with 
surplus production). It seems likely that policy makers had become 
more reluctant to use this technique, for on both of the occasions 
mentioned, it had been accompanied by strong public criticism. More­
over, in a period such as that in the early fifties when the United 
States found it necessary to be sensitive to the image which it pre­
sented to the world, and to charges raised against it by the Soviet
Union, destruction of foodstuffs would presumably have been much
53less acceptable than previously. As Assistant Secretary of State
Edwin Martin noted when the question was raised in the course of
Congressional hearings in 1961, "in terms of the U.S. position before
the world, with a great deal of hunger and starvation, this would be
54a most unfortunate procedure to follow." But it is doubtful that 
this change was of much significance for the emergence of PL480.
Given the size of the surplus problem, destruction of stocks would 
not have been a politically feasible option even in the absence of 
this change, and in any event, the positive interest of the United 
States in providing commodities as aid rendered interest in this 
option unnecessary. It was not, as far as the writer is aware, even 
considered as a serious alternative in the early fifties.
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Table 8. Federal Food Distribution Programmes:
Cost of Federal Assistance to School 
Lunch and Special Milk Programmes and 
to Institutions and Welfare Cases, 
1944-1960.
Year beginning School Lunch
July, 1. Cash Direction
Distribution 
Sec.6 Sec.32
Special
Milk
Direct distri­
butions and 
needy persons
(millions of dollars)
1944 42 - 6 - 7
1945 51 - 6 - 2
1946 60 6 2 - 3
1947 54 13 19 - 14
1948 59 14 22 - 14
1949 65 17 39 - 24
1950 68 15 35 - 25
1951 66 16 17 - 7
1952 67 15 52 - 17
1953 67 15 94 - 61
1954 69 13 70 17 97
1955 67 15 100 46 135
1956 84 15 132 60 104
1957 84 15 76 66 109
1958 94 43 67 74 137
1959 94 61 71 80 75
1960 94 61 72 84 174
1961 99 69 113 89 253
1962 109 59 121 94 2 33
1963 121 59 136 99 235
1964 130 59 213 97 257
1965 139 59 125 99 225
Source : Data for 1944-48 is from U.S. Department of
Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics 1961:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962, p.576.
Data for 1949-1965 is from Agricultural Statistics 
1966: p.586. Brief descriptions of the programmes 
listed above are given in these sources.
'114.
111. The Expansion of Commodity Aid to 
Less Developed Countries.
As the first table in this chapter indicated, the value of 
aid provided to less developed countries under PL480 and associated 
provisions of the Mutual Security Act increased substantially over 
the period from 1954 to 1965. For the three years 1956-58, transfers 
to LDCs were valued at an annual average of 626 million dollars. For 
1963-65, they stood at more than double that amount - approximately 
1350 million dollars. The present section of the chapter is concerned 
with the problem of explaining this increase.
One conceivable explanation for the expansion of commodity 
aid to less developed countries is that there was increasing pressure 
to dispose of surpluses. However, the evidence does not support this 
explanation. Although there was a considerable increase in aid to 
the Third World, shipments under PL480 and associated programmes to 
all regions rose only slightly (on average) from 1956. For the three 
years 1956-58, the annual average value was $1489 million, while for 
1963-65 it was $1565 million (at current prices). The rate at which 
aid siphoned off surpluses therefore increased only slightly. It is 
doubtful whether even this small increase can be attributed to any 
significant increase in the pressure to dispose of stockpiles. In 
the first place, there is an alternative, and more plausible explan­
ation of the slight rise in commodity shipments, as will be seen 
subsequently. Moreover, stockpiles in the latter period did not reach 
the levels which had accumulated in earlier years. Thus the highest 
value which Commodity Credit Corporation inventories of surplus commo­
dities reached over the period 1961-66 was $7256 million, but this
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•kvalue had been passed three times in the year 1955-1960. Finally, 
shipments continued at a high level in 1965 and 1966 when surpluses 
were declining markedly.
This is not to say that policy makers were unconcerned with
the need to remove surpluses. Their statements indicated that this
56remained an important objective. The point is rather that increased 
aid to the Third World cannot be attributed to pressure to dispose of 
surpluses at a significantly greater rate than hitherto.
A second possible explanation for the expansion of commodity 
aid to LDCs is that there was a diminished willingness on the part 
of policy makers to transfer surpluses to countries outside the Third 
World, leading to the allocation of increasing amounts to the latter 
region. The evidence strongly supports this view. It is clear that 
much of the expansion of agricultural commodity aid to LDCs occurred 
as these countries became recipients in place of Japan and European 
nations. In fiscal year 1956, the first nine recipients of commodity 
assistance were the United Kingdom, Japan, Spain, Yugoslavia, Italy, 
West Germany, France, the Netherlands and Greece. By fiscal year 
1963, only Yugoslavia (ranking third) was a major recipient of agri­
cultural commodities under the programmes in question."^ As the 
first table in the chapter indicated, the total value of agricultural 
commodities shipped increased only slightly in the period under review, 
but the amount and percentage allocated to LDCs expanded by a consid­
erable amount.
Part of this shift in allocation may be attributed to a posi­
tive interest in increasing aid levels to LDCs - a factor which is 
discussed subsequently. But it is also clear that policy makers,
* The table which follows provides data on CCC inventories.
m , .
Table 9 . Commodity Credit Corporation Inventories
and Total Shipments of Commodities under 
Government Programmes.___________________
(millions of dollars)
Fiscal Years Total Commodity 
Shipments:
All regions.
Commodity Credit 
Corporation Inventories 
(at the end of the 
fiscal year).
1955 835 6609.5
1956 1339 7669.3
1957 1919 6704.7
1958 1209 6277.4
1959 1227 7707.5
1960 1283 7323.1
1961 1503 7038.7
1962 1570 6657.0
1963 1480 7256.5
1964 1518 7097.9
1965 1697 6386.6
1966 1616 5312.3
Source : Data on total shipments of commodities
is taken from Table 1 of this chapter. 
Figures on CCC inventories are taken 
from W.D. Anderson, The Intersection 
of Foreign and Domestic Policy: the Examples 
in Public Law 480: Ph.D. in Political 
Science, University of Illinois, 1970, p.6.
Anderson cites as the source of his data, 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Commodity 
Credit Corporation Charts: March, 1967,
P • 8.
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as early as 1957, considered many of the countries in Europe, as 
well as Japan, unsuitable recipients for agricultural commodity aid, 
even under barter arrangements. In statements, U.S, officials made 
it clear that they preferred to provide commodities through commerc­
ial channels, and that they believed Japan and a number of European
5 8countries were able to pay for goods they received with dollars.
A major difficulty faced by the United States in its efforts to trans­
fer more commodities to these countries on a commercial basis was the
extensive import restrictions which many applied - restrictions often
59discriminating against dollar products. However, as recovery pro­
ceeded, the United States was increasingly able to gain entry for 
its products through commercial channels. A major step forward in
this area occurred in December 1958 when the major trading countries
60of Europe made their currencies convertible in international trade.
As the table below indicates, commercial sales in Europe and Japan 
tended to increase as shipments under special government programmes 
declined.
A positive interest in providing additional economic assist­
ance to the Third World was a further factor which contributed to the 
increase in commodity assistance to that region. The reasons for 
this interest, and the way in which it gave rise to increased aid under 
other programmes has been examined in the preceding chapter. From 
1959, there was an extensive debate among American policy makers as
to how far agricultural commodity programmes should be shaped by
. 61 this concern.
Within Congress, one end of the spectrum of opinion on this 
question was represented by Senator Humphrey. In April of 1959, 
Humphrey introduced proposals entailing a considerable expansion of
3 1 8 .
T a b le  1 0 . S h ipm en ts  Through S p e c i a l  Government Programmes
and Commercial C h a n n e ls :  Europe and J a p a n .______
( m i l l i o n s  o f  d o l l a r s )
Ja p an  Europe U n i te d  Kingdom
Gov. Commercial Gov. Commercial Gov. Commercial
1955 53 289 547 1083 74 305
1956 122 249 830 967 155 240
1957 136 322 1048 1407 15 3 346
1958 34 375 565 1352 34 405
19 59 12 305 518 1207 13 387
1960 16 425 427 1700 43 432
1961 22 531 485 1790 34 433
1962 36 448 473 1942 21 439
1963 24 487 280 1888 8 359
1964 15 727 218 2425 3 446
1965 1 750 2 31 2266 2 415
1966 13 900 226 2678 18 417
Source  : U .S . D epar tm en t  o f  A g r i c u l t u r e ,  12 Years  
o f  A ch ievem en t under P u b lic  Law 480:
U .S . Government P r i n t i n g  O f f i c e ,  1967 , pp . 
pp .  98 , 9 9 ,  104.
T urkey  i s  i n c l u d e d  a s  p a r t  o f  Europe i n  th e  
above d a t a ,  though  i n  e a r l i e r  t a b l e s  i n  t h i s  
c h a p t e r ,  i t  was c o u n te d  a s  p a r t  o f  t h e  T h i rd  
W orld .
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PL480 operations, mainly for the benefit of less developed countries. 
Among other points, the Humphrey bill proposed the extension of 
title 1 over five years, with the annual authorisation being increased 
from 1.5 billion dollars to 2 billion dollars, and grants being 
made by the Commodity Credit Corporation to build up food reserves 
in LDCs.62
At the other extreme were a group of Congressmen whose sym­
pathy for aid was limited, at least where the costs and criticism 
were born by agricultural interests, and who accordingly sought to 
have surpluses disposed of in the most business-like fashion possible. 
The concern of these Congressmen was to increase the direct returns 
which the United States might gain by providing commodities - by 
emphasising the possibilities for bartering surpluses for materials 
required by the United States; by seeking to have local currencies
obtained from surplus disposal allocated to U.S. purposes rather than
6 3being transferred to the recipient as grants; and in other ways.
The dominant attitude of the Eisenhower Administration was 
evidently somewhere between these two extremes. In a special message 
on agriculture in January, 1959, Eisenhower had placed emphasis on 
the use of surplus food to promote long-run American objectives abroad, 
using the phrase "food for peace", and outlining a proposal for ex­
ploration of ways in which the United States, in conjunction with 
other food surplus countries, might use surpluses to contribute to 
"the well being of friendly peoples throughout the world".^ At a 
subsequent conference of five exporting countries held in May, 1959, 
Under Secretary Dillon noted that an important American objective was,
to find ways of using food more 
effectively to further the economic 
development of the less-developed areas,
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w hich  a r e  i m p o r ta n t  to  us  a l l  i n   ^
t h e  w o r ld w id e  s t r u g g l e  f o r  f reedom .
T h is  i n t e r e s t  was r e i t e r a t e d  i n  o t h e r  s t a t e m e n t s .  Thus P a a r l b e r g ,
S p e c i a l  A s s i s t a n t  to  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ,  n o te d  i n  November 1959 , t h a t
h e  was i n t e r e s t e d  i n :
. . .  a  m a tc h in g  o f  o u r  a b u n d a n t  a g r i ­
c u l t u r a l  c a p a c i t y  and know ledge w i th  t h e  
g r e a t  n e e d s  o f  d e v e lo p in g  c o u n t r i e s .
. . .  T h e re  a r e  some who v iew  t h e  food  n e e d s  
o f  t h e  d e v e lo p in g  p a r t s  o f  t h e  w o r ld  s im p ly  
a s  a  s a f e t y  v a lv e  to  p e r m i t  t h e  c o n t i n u a t i o n  
o f  unsound p r i c e  s u p p o r t  l e g i s l a t i o n  i n  
t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s .  What I  am s u g g e s t i n g  
i s  s o m e th in g  f a r  d i f f e r e n t :  th e  c o n s c io u s
r e o r i e n t a t i o n  o f  o u r  farm  p o l i c i e s  w i th  
r e s p e c t  to  t h e  n e e d s  and o p p o r t u n i t i e s  
o f  o u r  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .  66
N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  t h e  E isen h o w er  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  made c l e a r  i t s
o p p o s i t i o n  t o  S e n a to r  Hum phrey’s p r o p o s a l s ,  n o t  o n ly  on t h e  ground
t h a t  s h ip m e n ts  o f  t h e  m a g n i tu d e  e n v is a g e d  would damage r e l a t i o n s  w i th
o t h e r  p r o d u c e r s  ( i n c l u d i n g  i n  some c a s e s  LDC p r o d u c e r s  w hich  were
r e c i p i e n t s  o f  A m erican  econom ic  a i d ) , b u t  t h a t  " t h e  a p p a r e n t  s h i f t
o f  em phas is  o f  S1711 [H um phrey 's  b i l l ]  from s u r p l u s  d i s p o s a l  to
i n c r e a s e d  f o r e i g n  a s s i s t a n c e  . . .  would  r e s u l t  in  a  m is l e a d i n g  im p r e s -
6 7s i o n  o f  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  i n c r e a s e d  econom ic d e v e lo p m e n t" .
As f o r  t h e  Kennedy A d m i n i s t a t i o n , t h e  p re d o m in a n t  a t t i t u d e  was
h i g h l y  f a v o u r a b le  t o  t h e  u se  o f  commodity a id  a s  a means o f  ex p a n d in g
econom ic a s s i s t a n c e  t o  LDCs. T h i s  o b s e r v a t i o n  i s  s u p p o r t e d  by th e
68memoirs o f  S c h l e s i n g e r  and S o r e n s e n ,  by th e  s t a t e m e n t s  o f  t h e  P r e s i -
69d e n t  and o t h e r  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  spokesm en , a n d ,  a s  w i l l  be  s e e n ,  by 
t h e  a c t i o n s  o f  t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  r e g a r d i n g  PL480. I t  m ust be  added 
t h a t  S o re n se n  draw s a d i s t i n c t i o n  be tw een  t h e  E isen h o w er  and Kennedy 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s  w hich  i s  f a r  to o  s h a r p ,  th ough  i t  i s  no d o u b t  t r u e  
t h a t  t h e  Kennedy A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  was more f a v o u r a b le  to  t h e  r e o r i e n t a t i o n
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of farm programmes to serve an interest in expanding aid to LDCs 
than was its predecessor.
Thus in the executive under both Eisenhower and Kennedy, 
and within Congress, there is evidence of attitudes favourable to 
the modification of commodity disposal programmes to serve an interest 
in providing additional economic aid to LDCs. These attitudes seem 
to have influenced the growth of economic aid to the Third World under 
these programmes in several ways. To begin with, they probably en­
couraged the redistribution of commodity shipments away from other 
areas such as Europe. Beyond this, concern with providing additional 
aid to less developed countries seems to have been an important fact­
or leading to the increased volume of commodities shipped abroad 
through government programmes. It has been noted that the small in­
crease in the total value of commodities shipped abroad cannot be 
adequately explained on the ground of a need to siphon off surpluses 
at a more rapid rate than previously. The interest of transferring 
additional economic aid to less developed countries provides a reason­
able explanation for the increase, and there is much direct evidence, 
in the statements and memoirs noted previously, to confirm that it 
was important.
Apart from the increase in average annual volume of commod­
ities shipped abroad, there was some improvement in the terms and 
conditions on which they were provided. Part of this can perhaps be 
attributed to an interest in adding to assistance for less developed 
countries. Thus there was diminished use of the Mutual Security 
legislation as a vehicle for disposing of surpluses. It will be 
recalled that section 402 and 550 of the Mutual Security Act had 
specified that a minimum amount of assistance under the Act should be
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made available in the form of surplus agricultural commodities.
While it is not entirely clear that Congress would have provided 
x additional dollars to replace a provision for supplying x dollars' 
worth of surplus commodities, it seems likely that these sections 
did cut into the dollar aid available to recipients to some extent.
This is even more probable where the executive earmarked more for 
this purpose than the amount Congress had specified. The diminished 
resort to this practice - progressively smaller amounts were provided 
under it, and the relevant provisions were dropped from the Act for 
International Development in 1961 - was thus probably of some value 
to recipients, since additional shipments through title 1 of PL480 
more than compensated for the decline, and it seems likely that they 
would have obtained more dollar aid. This improvement can probably 
be attributed in part to increased interest in assisting LDCs. Although 
diminished use of it was sometimes justified by executive spokesmen 
on the ground that it was difficult to induce recipients to forego 
dollar aid for agricultural commodities, the United States had been 
quite successful in having LDCs accept commodities in this way in 
the past (as Table 2 indicates),
Some improvements in the terms on which commodities were 
transferred resulted from other considerations. This was so with 
diminished use of barter. In 1956 and 1957, barter transactions aver­
aged $350 million per annum, whereas they did not, until 1966, come 
within $150 million of this value.^ But most barter agreements in 
the early period had been with developed countries, and the propor­
tion of barter agreements in shipments to less developed countries 
showed no tendency to declined Less resort to barter was therefore 
a consequence of changes in the way commodities were distributed
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among regions, rather than a direct result of increased concern to
improve the quality of assistance for LDCs. Again, the increased
proportion of local currencies granted directly to recipients pro-
72bably resulted from two principal considerations : the fact that
these currencies were accumulating at a rapid rate in a number of 
countries; and the belief that this action and others like it (e.g., 
removing the requirement that recipients maintain the value of its 
local currency holdings with respect to the U.S. dollar after devalu­
ation) would expedite the negotiations of agreements. Executive
73Spokesman made reference to both arguments in testimony to Congress.
A fourth change relevant to increased PL480 and associated 
aid to less developed countries was the increased dependence of a 
number of these nations on imports of relevant commodities, especial­
ly wheat. The table cited earlier indicates that there was a continu-
74ed trend towards reliance on external sources. Statements by U.S.
officials provide direct evidence that increased requirements made
possible additional shinments abroad,^ and that inadequate outlets
had constrained shipments in the past. It was not simply that
the United States could not make available more than the total amount
which the recipient country required. It had also to leave room
for the normal commercial marketings of its own and other producers.
As one State Department official noted:
After a request for Public Law 480 
commodities is received ... we analyse 
the historical trade patterns for a 
past representative period. We evaluate 
the information concerning such factors 
as existing stocks, domestic production, 
estimated consumption, foreign exchange 
reserves and total import requirements.
On the basis of the results we can 
determine how much wheat we can put into 
country A [in the hypothetical example 
taken] without impairing normal commercial
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imports from the United States and 
other suppliers.
... We then consult the other suppliers 
and explain what we have in mind. We 
point out ... that available data show 
that country A should be required to import 
300,000 tons of wheat on a regular commercial 
basis; that we believe that leaves room 
for them as well as ourselves to maintain 
our respective normal commercial imports 
to country A, and that we would like to 
have their views.76
Specific quantities to be imported under normal commercial arrange­
ments were in some cases included in written agreements and notes 
covering PL480 shipments: that with India in 1960, for example, was
accompanied by a note from the Indian Minister of Food and Agriculture 
confirming that imports under title 1 of PL480 would be,
... Over and above usual commercial 
imports from the United States and 
countries friendly to the United States 
during each United States fiscal year 
1961-64 of not less than 400,000 MT.
In the absence of increased requirements by less developed countries, 
the United States would thus have found it difficult to avoid con­
straints imposed by the need to maintain these normal sources of 
supply.
There is a fifth possibility that must be examined: namely
that the expansion of agricultural commodity aid to LDCs was made 
possible by improved relations between the United States and other 
producers of these commodities. Now it would appear that there was 
some improvement in this area: State Department testimony in the
sixties no longer emphasised strained relations with other producers 
as a problem. This change can be attributed to several factors. In 
the first place, the United States took a number of steps designed to 
smooth over points of difficulty. One of the aims of President
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E i s e n h o w e r ' s  i n i t i a t i v e  i n  c a l l i n g  an I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Food f o r  Peace
C o n f e re n c e  i n  1959 was e v i d e n t l y  t o  improve r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  com pe t ing
p r o d u c e r s  o f  w h e a t .  E x e c u t i v e  spokesmen i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  t h e r e  had
been  a modes t  m ea s u re  o f  s u c c e s s  i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t .  Thus a c c o r d i n g  to
C l a r e n c e  M i l l e r ,  A s s i s t a n t  S e c r e t a r y  o f  A g r i c u l t u r e :
T h i s  group a r r i v e d  a t  a  c o n s i d e r a b l y  
b e t t e r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  and s e t  up what  was 
c a l l e d  a  whea t  u t i l i s a t i o n  c o m m i t t e e ,  meant  
t o  be  an i n f l u e n t i a l ,  h i g h - l e v e l  com m it t ee  
o f  t h e s e  n a t i o n s  t o  meet  i n t e r m i t t e n t l y  and 
t o  o p e r a t e  a t  a h i g h  l e v e l  o f  f l e x i b i l i t y  w i t h o u t  
any f o rm a l  s e c r e t a r i a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n  o r  a n y t h i n g  
o f  t h a t  s o r t .  I t  h a s  had one m e e t i n g  h e r e  
i n  W ash in g to n ,  June  15 -17 .  The v i s i b l e  r e s u l t s  
o f  t h i s ,  o t h e r  t h a n  b e t t e r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  
t h e  p rob lem  on t h e  p a r t  o f  wheat  e x p o r t i n g  
n a t i o n s ,  have  be e n  t h e  deve lopm en t  o f  some 
g u i d e l i n e s  f o r  t h e  n o n - c o m e r c i a l  programmes 
t o  be o p e r a t e d  i n  such a way a s  t o  i n c r e a s e  
t o t a l  u se  and n o t  i n t e r f e r e  w i t h  com m erc ia l  
m a r k e t s ,  o u r s  o r  t h e i r s .  78
S p e c i f i c  c ha nges  t o  U.S .  p r a c t i c e s  i n c l u d e d  a b a n d o n in g  t h e  p o l i c y
o f  t i e d  s a l e s  whereby  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  had r e q u i r e d  r e c i p i e n t s  o f
PL480 t i t l e  1 com m od i t i e s  t o  p u r c h a s e  a  g i v e n  volume o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l
p r o d u c t s  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s .  T h i s  p r a c t i c e  had  been  t h e  c a u s e  o f
79
s t r o n g  o b j e c t i o n s  from o t h e r  wheat  e x p o r t i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  A ga in ,  
t h e  r e o r i e n t a t i o n  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  commodity a i d  t o  f o c u s  on LDCs 
p r o b a b l y  e n c o u ra g e d  improved r e l a t i o n s  be tw een  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  and 
o t h e r  p r o d u c e r s ,  f o r  s h ip m e n t s  t o  r i c h  c o u n t r i e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  under  
b a r t e r  a r r a n g e m e n t s ,  c a r r i e d  a g r e a t e r  d a nge r  o f  i n t e r f e r i n g  w i t h  
t h e  comm erc ia l  t r a n s a c t i o n s  o f  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s .  Expanding r e q u i r e ­
ments  o f  T h i r d  World c o u n t r i e s  was p r o b a b l y  a l s o  a c o n t r i b u t i n g  
f a c t o r ,  w h i l e  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  a i d  t o  l e s s  d e v e lo p e d  c o u n t r i e s  unde r  
o t h e r  programmes no doubt  h e l p e d  t o  m o l l i f y  t h e  c r i t i c i s m s  o f  T h i r d  
World p r o d u c e r s  a f f e c t e d  a d v e r s e l y  by U.S .  commodity programmes.
Thus i t  seems e v i d e n t  t h a t  t h e r e  was an improved  u n d e r s t a n d i n g
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b e tw een  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  and o t h e r  p r o d u c e r s .  M oreover ,  i t  i s  t r u e  
t h a t  an i m p o r t a n t  c o n c e rn  o f  p o l i c y  m akers  i n  t h e  i n i t i a l  y e a r s  o f  
o p e r a t i o n  o f  commodity programmes -  and one w h ich  te n d e d  to  impose 
r e s t r i c t i o n s  on them -  was t h a t  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  s h o u ld  a v o id  e x ­
p a n d in g  t h e  scheme so f a r  t h a t  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  would 
be s t r a i n e d .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  r e l a t i v e l y  l i t t l e  em phas is  s h o u ld  be 
p l a c e d  on t h i s  a s  an  in d e p e n d e n t  f a c t o r  e x p l a i n i n g  th e  e x p a n s io n  o f  
commodity a i d  t o  LDCs. The im provem ent i n  r e l a t i o n s  w as ,  t o  a  c o n s i d ­
e r a b l e  d e g r e e ,  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  f a c t o r s  a l r e a d y  c o n s id e r e d  -  i n c r e a s e d  
i n t e r e s t  i n  p r o v i d i n g  a d d i t i o n a l  a i d  to  LDCs, e x p a n d in g  r e q u i r e m e n ts  
i n  T h i rd  W orld c o u n t r i e s ,  and re d u c e d  em phas is  on Europe and Ja p a n  
a s  r e c i p i e n t s .  To t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  t h i s  was t h e  c a s e ,  i t  does  n o t  n eed  
to  be  i n t r o d u c e d  a s  an  i n d e p e n d e n t  c a u s a l  f a c t o r .  F u r t h e r ,  s t r a i n e d  
r e l a t i o n s  i n  t h e  e a r l y  y e a r s  had n o t  p r e v e n te d  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  
from  r u n n in g  a programme w hich w as ,  i n  te rm s  o f  a v e ra g e  s h ip m e n ts  t o  
a l l  a r e a s  o f  t h e  w o r ld  e a c h  y e a r ,  n o t  much s m a l l e r  t h a n  t h e  one w hich  
o p e r a t e d  i n  t h e  s i x t i e s .
S i x t h :  t h e r e  i s  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  r e d u c e d  i n t e r e s t  i n
a l l o c a t i n g  s u r p l u s  c o m m o d it ie s  t h ro u g h  d o m e s t ic  c h a n n e l s  c o n t r i b u t e d  
t o  t h e  g row th  o f  commodity a i d  to  l e s s  d e v e lo p e d  c o u n t r i e s .  However, 
t h e  e v id e n c e  does  n o t  s u p p o r t  t h i s  v ie w .  As t h e  t a b l e  c i t e d  e a r l i e r  
i n d i c a t e d ,  t h e  te n d e n c y  was f o r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  s u r p l u s e s  th ro u g h  
d o m e s t ic  c h a n n e l s  t o  grow a lo n g  w i t h  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  commodity a i d  
to  t h e  T h i rd  W orld .
IV. C o n c lu s io n
To c o n c lu d e :  t h e  im m ed ia te  c a u se  o f  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f
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PL480 was the concern of policy makers to find an outLet for growing 
agricultural surpluses in the United States. However, resort to 
economic aid to tackle the problem of surpluses was facilitated 
by the increased reliance of less developed countries on imports 
of wheat and other relevant commodities; and by the existence of 
a climate in which the provision of large quantities of aid on a 
grant or grant-like basis was considered more reasonable and acceptable 
than it would have been fifteen years previously.
The expansion of commodity aid to less developed countries - 
the average annual value of shipments for 1963-65 stood at more than 
double the level for 1956-58 - resulted from several factors. These 
included a diminished willingness on the part of policy makers to 
transfer surpluses to countries outside the Third World, a positive 
interest in providing additional economic aid to less developed 
countries, expanded requirements for food imports in these countries, 
and (less important) improved relations between the United States 
and other producer countries.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE DECLINE OF CONCESSIONAL 
ECONOMIC AID
From approximately the mid-sixties, there was a decline in 
the amount of concessional economic aid provided by the United States 
to less developed countries. The present chapter attempts to account 
for this change. The first part of the chapter takes up the prelim­
inary tasks of establishing that there was a decline in aid levels; 
identifying those recipients and programmes which received less 
assistance; and indicating where there was an erosion of political 
support for aid. The subsequent section attempts to identify the 
changes which brought about this loss of support, and the consequent 
decline in aid levels.
I
The change in the level of American economic aid to less devel­
oped countries is partly indicated in Table One. This shows that 
the level of U.S. commitments of concessional economic aid to less 
developed countries entered a period of irregular decline after 1966. 
By 1972, gross commitments of concessional aid amounted to slightly 
under 3.6 billion dollars, compared with the 1966 total of 4.6 billion 
dollars. ’Concessional economic aid', as defined here, is equivalent 
to 'official development assistance' in U.S. statistics, and covers 
loans and grants (including supporting assistance) made available 
through the A.I.D., Peace Corps assistance, contributions to inter­
national financial institutions and agricultural commodity assistance.
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Table 1.
Concessional Economic Aid : Commitments 1962-73 
(in millions of U.S. dollars)
1962-65 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
4099 4623 3927 4086 3514 3667 3428 3580 4096
Price Index for Imports to Less Developed Areas
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
94 94 94 94 96 100 104 111 128
D.A.C. Deflator for Disbursements of Official
Development Assistance from the U.S. to Less
Developed Countries and Multilateral Agencies
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
88.0 91.9 94.4 95.5 97.0 100. 105.5 112.8 161.3
Sources: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and
Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945 - June 30, 1974; 
International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics_, Vol.XXVII, No.8, August 1974, p.33. 
Report by the Chairman of the Development Assistance 
Committee, Development Cooperation: 1974 Review: 
O.E.C.D., Paris 1974, p.209.
The countries included as 'less developed' in the above 
table are not exactly the same in different sections.
The D.A.C. deflator cannot be used directly to adjust figures 
given in the first section of the table. The deflator 
refers to disbursements rather than commitments. For an 
explanation of the way in which the deflator is calculated, 
see Report of the Chairman of the Development Assistance 
Committee, Development Assistance: 1971 Review: O.E.C.D.,
1971, pp. 147-150.
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Table One suggests a partial recovery in the level of aid 
commitments in 1973,but this is somewhat misleading since the totals 
given refer to values in current dollars and are unadjusted for changes 
in prices and exchange rates. By 1973, substantial increases in out­
lays on aid in current dollars were required simply to maintain the 
existing value of aid in real terms.
Thus the index of import prices for less developed countries 
(Table One) advanced from 111 in 1972 to 128 in 1973 while the D.A.C. 
index for adjusting disbursements of U.S. development assistance in­
creased from 112.8 to 161.3"*" (suggesting that 161 dollars of U.S. aid 
transferred in 1973 was approximately equivalent in real terms to 113 
dollars made available in the preceding year). The data given in the 
table also suggests that the decline in American aid levels from 1966 
is very much understated in Table One: appropriate adjustment for
inflation would indicate a much greater reduction in aid levels.
The proportion of grants and the financial terms on which loans
are made available must be taken into account in discussing changes
in the level of economic aid. Table 2, which provides relevant data
over the period 1967-73, indicates that changes of this kind do not
alter the conclusion that there was a substantial decline in the volume
2of aid. The overall grant element in commitments of official develop­
ment assistance from the United States - a useful indicator of the 
impact of these factors - fluctuated over the interval, but never rose 
above the 1967 figure of 89.9%.
The extent to which economic aid is tied to purchases in the 
donor also affects the value of aid. By 1966, most assistance provided 
through the A.I.D. was effectively tied with over 90% of A.I.D. com­
modity purchases being made in the United States. (Agricultural
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commodity assistance had always been tied aid.) In 1967 an even 
stricter policy aiming at ’additionality’ was implemented. This sought 
to prevent recipients from circumventing the policy of tying by en­
suring that their 'purchases’ under aid programmes were over and above 
those which would normally have been made from the U.S. through 
commercial channels.
Table 2.
Terms of Performance for U.S. Official 
Development Assistance : 1967-73
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Overall Grant Element
in U.S. Official 
Development Assistance 
(%)
89.9 83.9 89.2 86.4 84.3 87.2 89.9
Percentage of Grants 
in Total Commitments 66.3 52.0 69.6 63.7 59.2 63.2 68.3
Average Terms of Loan 
Commitments:
(a) Maturity (years) 37.0* 38.0* 37.1 37.4 35.7 37.1 40.1
(b) Interest rate - % 2.6* 2.6* 3.0 2.6 2.9 2.6 2.6
(c) Grace Period 9.0* 9.0* 8.7 8.7 8.7 9.7 10.7
(years)
Source: Report by the Chairman of the Development
Assistance Committee, Development Cooperation:
1974 Deview: O.E.C.D., 1974, p. 246.
* Estimate
The policy of seeking additionality was abandoned in 1969, but
assistance made available through aid generally remained tied to pro-
3curement in the United States, just as it had in 1966 (Table 3). 
Thus the changes in policies concerning aid tying do not weaken the 
conclusion that there was a substantial decline in commitments of
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American economic aid over 1966-73.
The decline of aid indicated in Figure 1 refers to commitments 
to provide concessional economic assistance. It would be possible to 
choose other measures of the level of aid: for example, one might
focus on disbursements of aid in relation to gross national product. 
Table 4 provides data on the level of U.S. development assistance as 
measured by these indicators. It indicates that the conclusion that 
there was a decline in economic aid still holds, but the pattern of 
decline, and the point at which aid levels peaked, is not the same 
with these alternative measures.
Table 3.
A.I.D. Commodity Expenditures by
Source of Purchase 
(millions of U.S. dollars)
Purchases Purchases
in U.S. Offshore
1966 • • • • 90.2% 9.8%
1967 96.2% 3.8%
1968 98.4% 1.6%
1969 98.9% 1.1%
1970 98.0% 2.0%
1971 99.7% 0.3%
1972 95.5% 4.5%
1973 # # m # 94.5% 5.5%
Source: Agency for International Development, 
Operations Report, Fiscal Year 1973: 
Washington, D.C., 1973, p.56.
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As Table 5 indicates, the decline in aid levels was not borne 
by any single programme. Commitments to less developed countries 
through the Agency of International Development totalled over $2600 
million per annum in 1966: over 1971-73 they averaged less than $2000
■kmillion per annum. There was a decline in assistance provided under 
PL480, from 1966 when commitments totalled almost $1400 million, to 
1973 when (with wheat prices almost double the 1966 values) the nominal 
value of commitments was a little over $1100 million. The table also 
indicates a decline in the value of aid provided through the much 
smaller Peace Corps programme. Of course, the level of aid did not fall 
off for every programme. Commitments of assistance to international 
lending organisations fluctuated markedly over the period with no clear 
tendency toward decline.
The decline in aid was not confined to any one region or country. 
Table 6 indicates a significant erosion in the level of concessional 
economic aid provided to each of Latin America, Africa and the Near 
East and South Asia. Countries in which there was a marked decline in 
aid levels included Brazil, Chile, Taiwan, Egypt, India, Pakistan and 
Turkey. There were some instances where aid increased. Thus aid to 
Indonesia rose substantially following the destruction of the PKI and 
the ousting of Sukarno.
A further point is that the decline of concessional economic aid 
resulted from an erosion of support on the part of different groups 
within the United States; it cannot be attributed simply to 'disen­
chantment* within one branch of government or from one section of the 
political spectrum. Loss of support was perhaps most visible in Con­
gress, with successively lower appropriations for the Agency of Inter­
national Development in the latter half of the sixties; the
* This understates the magnitude of the decline for 
no adjustment has been made for price changes.
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Table 5
Year
Aid Commitments under Different
Peace
Corps
OtherA.I.D.
Programmes
PL480
: 1962-73
International
Lending
Organisations
1962-65 2374 1288 179 62 197
1966 2677 1397 354 113 82
1967 2419 955 374 104 75
1968 2176 1312 424 107 67
1969 1690 1169 480 100 75
1970 1877 1136 480 91 83
1971 1861 1222 180 85 79
1972 2062 1204 142 75 107
1973 1984 1118 775 81 138
Source: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations
and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945 - June 30, 1974.
Note: Data concerns only aid to less developed countries.
Annual averages are given for 1962-65. The figures 
given are unadjusted for price changes and ordinarily 
understate the decline in aid levels for the various 
programmes where this occurred. (Food prices - as 
measured by the DAC index - actually fell signifi­
cantly over the period 1964-1970, but by 1972 they 
had passed previous levels. In 1973, the index was 
almost double the 1972 value. See Development 
Cooperation:1974 Review, p.209; and Development 
Assistance: 1971 Review, pp. 147-149.)
gradual shift of a number of Congressmen from strong support for the 
Foreign Assistance Act to outright opposition; and the defeat of 
the principal aid authorization bill on the floor of the Senate in 
1971. But reduced support was not confined to any single class of 
legislators. One indication of this is given in Table 7 which lists
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Notes to Table 7.
Source: The voting record of the Senators listed is taken
from Congressional Quarterly Alamanac,
Vol. XXVII, 1971, p. 401. The liberalism/conservatism 
index is calculated from data given in M. Barone,
G. Ujifusa and D. Matthews, The Almanac of American 
Politics: The Senators3 the Representatives3 their
records3 states and districts: 1974: Gambit, 1974.
1. Y and N have somewhat narrower meanings under the column 
’1964 and earlier’ than under the other headings. Thus for 
1965-71, Y covers being paired for or announcing for the bill, 
as well as actually voting for it. But before 1964, it refers 
to only the latter.
2. The 'liberalism/conservatism score’ gives two figures, the 
first a rough measure of how liberal a Congressman is, with 
100 being the maximum score attainable; and the second an 
indicator of conservatism with 100 again being the highest 
possible total. Using this measure, Barry Goldwater obtains 
4/91, while Edward Kennedy is given 93/6.
The basis for the first figures is the rating which three liberal 
groups, Americans for Democratic Action, the Committee on 
Political Education, and the League of Women Voters, gave to 
Congressmen over 1970-72. (Each group selects a number of 
critical votes and gives a rating for legislators representing 
the number of 'correct votes’.) The ratings were simply averaged 
to give the final result.
The second figure is obtained from ratings given by three con­
servative groups, the National Association of Businessmen, the 
American Security Council, and Americans for Constitutional Action. 
The period covered is again 1970-72.
Needless to say, the rating given to a legislator by any one 
group may vary markedly from year to year as the issues 
selected change. For general comments on the way in which the 
above groups calculate ratings, see M. Barone et al.3 op.cit.3 
pp. ix-xi.
347.
those who opposed the foreign aid bill in the Senate in October 1971, 
but who had supported the same measure at least twice during the 1960s.
It can be seen that those changing their allegiance ranged from con­
servative Republicans such as Senator Dominick to liberal Democrats 
like Senators McGovern and Church. They also included those, for 
example, Fulbright and Mansfield, who had been in the vanguard of sup­
port for economic aid in the late 1950s.
There were some instances where the executive was directly re­
sponsible for decisions which reduced aid levels. In August, 1971, 
foreign aid was reduced by 10% as part of a package of measures designed 
by the executive to improve the U.S. balance of payments position. (Other
measures included the suspension of the convertibility of the dollar
4into gold and the imposition of a surtax on dutiable imports.) More 
important, there was first stagnation and then decline in the level of 
aid provided under the PL480 programme, even though the executive was 
not under any immediate constraint from Congress.^ Provisions in the 
basic legislation concerning PL480 gave the executive a substantial 
measure of freedom from annual Congressional authorizations and appro­
priations. Sums authorized in a given year for Title 1 and Title 11 
of the programme, but not utilised in that year, were available for use 
subsequently.^ The authorization accumulated under this carryover prin­
ciple was substantial: as of December 31, 1967, it amounted to $3.1
nbillion in the case of Title 1, and $588 million for Title 11. This 
compared with new annual authorizations of $1.9 billion for Title 1 and 
$600 million for Title 11. Again the executive did not have to secure 
appropriations from Congress to gain the funds necessary to transfer 
commodities; it was able to use the general borrowing authority of the 
Commodity Credit Corporation for this purpose before Congressional
gappropriations for PL480 had been made. The position with PL480 was
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thus quite different from that where aid was made available through 
the Agency for International Development: in the latter case, the
executive was forced to struggle each year, first to have funds auth­
orized, and then to have them appropriated. With PL480, the failure 
to transfer greater amounts of aid often arose directly from decisions 
made by the executive. In some years, domestic budgetary consider­
ations were cited as the reason for not raising shipments to the levels
9made possible by authorizations., In calendar 1973, on the other 
hand, when shipments dropped to their lowest level since the inception 
of the programme in 1954, the judgment of the Secretary of Agriculture 
that commodities were in limited supply was the primary constraint
t. ioon the programme.
With much aid, including that under the Foreign Assistance Act, 
Congressional decisions were the immediate constraint on the size of 
the programme, and the amounts finally appropriated by Congress were 
usually well below the levels requested by the executive. But even 
with these programmes, it seems likely that reduced commitment to aid 
on the part of members of the executive contributed to the declining 
totals voted by Congress.
This is not to say that members of the executive generally en­
dorsed the massive cuts which Congress made in the programme, or that 
they were unconcerned with them. Rather it would seem that the goal 
of obtaining a high level of economic aid ranked somewhat lower in 
the executive's scale of preferences between 1967 and 1973 than it had 
in the first half of the sixties; and that accordingly less of its 
political resources were directed towards the task of rounding up 
support for additional economic aid.
One reason for adopting this view is that it is supported by
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Statements made by persons in close contact with the policy making 
process. Thus Donald Fraser, a representative in the U.S. Congress 
from 1962, argued in 1971 that the Congress had not seen a major 
effort by a president in the aid field for half a dozen years; further, 
he suggested that this was of considerable importance for the aid 
programme since the president could influence Congress more effective­
ly than anyone else.'*“'*'
Again, according to Bill Gaud, Administrator of the Agency for 
International Development from 1966-68, President Johnson spent re­
latively little effort on behalf of development assistance during this 
12period. Whereas Kennedy (and Johnson during the early part of his
Administration) had spent a good deal of time on the phone contacting
13Congressmen and others concerning the aid legislation, very little 
of this lobbying was carried out during Gaud's term as Administrator.
14Similarly, Paul Clark suggests that there was little emphasis 
on development assistance by the president and other members of the 
executive.
President Johnson and people in the 
National Security Council Staff and 
those in the Budget Bureau were so 
constrained by other economic and 
international policy objectives that 
development aid dropped way down on 
the list of priorities.
The position was not very different under President Nixon according 
15to Clark.
Other considerations lend weight to the view that the executive 
was no longer pressing development aid as strongly as it had pre­
viously. The Johnson Administration, towards the end of its term of
16office, was evidently preoccupied with the Vietnam War and with the 
problems of economic management which had largely arisen from the
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problem of financing the war; in these circumstances, reduced emphas­
is on the aid programme and less political support for it is hardly 
surprising. In the case of the first Nixon Administration, there 
were a number of indications that the question of development assist­
ance was not accorded high priority. For example, there was a sub­
stantial delay in submitting recommendations for a revised aid pro­
gramme. The 1968 Foreign Aid Bill had included a provision calling 
upon the President to submit recommendations on this point to Congress 
by March 31, 1970. In May 1969, Nixon indicated that a long term 
study of the aid programme would be undertaken and Rudolph Peterson 
was subsequently commissioned to head a task force on the subject. 
However, the President’s broad proposals for a revised aid programme 
were not outlined to Congress until September 15, 1970, and it was not 
until April of 1971 - more than a year after the due date - that draft 
legislation was submitted. This action was hardly conducive to build­
ing support for the programme. In its report on the 1971 legislation, 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee noted the dissatisfaction which 
members had expressed with the foreign aid programme in previous years 
and indicated that because the President's proposal had been submit­
ted at such a late stage, the Committee "again finds itself recommend­
ing the continuation of a programme for which few members have any 
real enthusiasm".^
Support for the existing programme of economic aid also weaken­
ed outside Congress and the executive. Thus a number of private 
groups became noticeably less enthusiastic in their attitude to the 
programme over the period under review. Sewell and Paolillo, writing 
in 1974, noted that churches and church related groups had,
... virtually ceased to be important
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sources of development aid, partly 
because of Vietnam, but also because 
they now give primary importance to 
problems of domestic poverty.18
The direction in which general public opinion shifted is not entirely 
clear. There was an increase in the percentage of the population 
favouring U.S. assistance to less developed countries - from 51% in 
1958 to 58% in 1966 to 68% in 1972^ - but this does not necessarily 
mean that attitudes towards the level of economic aid shifted in the 
same direction. As indicated in the previous chapter, increased sup­
port for the general principle of U.S. assistance to less developed 
countries had in the past gone hand in hand with a greater inclin­
ation to reduce the amount of money spent for this puprose.
II
The erosion of support described above, and hence the decline 
of U.S. concessional economic aid, can be explained as the result of 
a number of changes. First, there was less emphasis on some of those 
foreign policy considerations which had been extremely important in 
justifying the transfer of aid in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It 
has been seen in earlier chapters that an important motive for the 
transfer of economic aid had been the desire to avoid an tendency 
towards growing ’communist’ influence and control in less developed 
countries. In the understanding of many U.S. officials and Congress­
men there was a grave danger that internal political change within 
less developed countries, combined with the expanded use of aid and 
other instruments by communist powers, would lead to this result. It 
was believed that any tendency of this kind posed a significant threat
to American interests and that economic aid was a suitable instrument
with which the United States might respond.
These 'cold war' justifications for economic aid were not 
absent in the late 1960s and early 1970s, but as a rule they were not 
accorded the same emphasis. To begin with, the danger from 'commun­
ist' and allied movements was generally perceived to be less pressing.
Following the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, relations between the
20Soviet Union and the United States improved markedly. Diminished 
fear of the Soviet Union helped to make possible a series of limited 
arms control measures (beginning with the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 
1963) and other forms of limited co-operation, but it probably also 
contributed to a lower priority for economic aid.
There was also increasing evidence of schism and divergence 
within what had been previously regarded as 'the communist bloc'.
Most important in this respect was the deterioration in relations be­
tween the Soviet Union and China. Differences between the two powers 
came into the open in 1960 (though some policy makers in the U.S. were 
slow to understand its importance) with the effective breakdown of 
state and party relations between the two powers. Subsequent propa­
ganda campaigns by both sides, border clashes, and competition for
allegiance abroad served only to confirm the extent of Sino-Soviet 
21differences. There were some who concluded that growing diversity
among 'communist' and radical movements increased the flexibility with 
which they could operate, and thus the danger which they posed. But 
it was more usual to take the view that the breakdown of unity dimin­
ished the threat which 'communism' posed to the United States. Further, 
governments in less developed countries often seemed less vulnerable 
to the blandishments of other communist powers or to radical movements 
within their own borders. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Latin
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America had  been  c o n s id e r e d  e x t r e m e ly  v u l n e r a b l e  to  C astro ! te -C om m un­
i s t  g u e r i l l a  movements. But by th e  end o f  t h e  Jo h nson  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  
th e  p rob lem  was se en  a s  l e s s  im m ed ia te  and p r e s s i n g ;  a t a s k  f o r c e
on L a t i n  A m erica  w hich r e p o r t e d  to  th e  P r e s i d e n t  was a b l e  to  c o n c lu d e
22t h a t  t h e  t h r e a t  from r u r a l  b a s e d  g u e r i l l a  movements was m in im a l .
Some r e g i o n s ,  n o t a b l y  I n d o c h in a ,  seemed j u s t  a s  v u l n e r a b l e  to  commun­
i s t  movements a s  e v e r ,  b u t  t h i s  was t h e  e x c e p t i o n  r a t h e r  th a n  t h e  r u l e .  
A g a in ,  th e  n o t i o n  t h e  S o v i e t  econom ic a i d  would  l e a d  to  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  
d e g re e  o f  i n f l u e n c e  seemed i m p l a u s i b l e  t o  many p o l i c y  m akers  i n  t h e  
l i g h t  o f  e x p e r i e n c e .  As S e n a to r  Church -  a  fo rm e r  s u p p o r t e r  o f  t h e  
a id  programme -  n o t e d :
When i t  comes to  u s in g  a i d  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  
p u r p o s e s ,  th e  R u s s i a n s  h av e  a g r e a t e r  
t a l e n t  f o r  a l i e n a t i n g  p e o p le  from 
communism th a n  we d o . 23
T here  was s t i l l  o c c a s i o n a l  r e f e r e n c e  to  t h e  p ro b le m  p o se d  by t h e  
S o v ie t  a i d  programme i n  C o n g r e s s io n a l  h e a r i n g s ,  b u t  t h e r e  was n o t h in g  
co m p arab le  to  t h e  c o n c e rn  w hich  had  b een  e x p r e s s e d  i n  t h e  1 950s .
A f u r t h e r  r e a s o n  f o r  r e d u c e d  e m p h a s is  on t h e  ’c o ld  w a r '  j u s t i f i ­
c a t i o n s  f o r  a i d  was t h a t  econom ic  a s s i s t a n c e  seemed l e s s  e f f e c t i v e  
th a n  had  b e e n  p r e v i o u s l y  th o u g h t  i n  p ro m o t in g  t h e s e  o b j e c t i v e s .  The 
s t a t e m e n t s  c i t e d  be low  i l l u s t r a t e  a s h i f t  i n  a t t i t u d e  c o n c e r n in g  t h e  
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  a i d ,  b o th  a s  a  means o f  p ro m o t in g  s t a b i l i t y ,  and a s  
a  method o f  w in n in g  s u p p o r t  f o r  th e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  on f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  
i s s u e s .
F i n a l l y ,  w i t h  i n c r e a s i n g  in v o lv e m e n t  i n  V ie tnam  and h e ig h te n e d  
a w a re n e ss  o f  d o m e s t ic  p ro b le m s ,  p o l i c y  m akers  became i n c r e a s i n g l y  
aware o f  t h e  c o s t  o f  a t t e m p t i n g  to  im pose  t h e i r  p r e f e r r e d  p o l i t i c a l  
o r d e r  i n  l e s s  d e v e lo p e d  c o u n t r i e s ,  and i n c r e a s i n g l y  f a v o u r a b le  t o  a
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policy of scaling down American commitments. For some, the cost of 
direct military involvement merely underlined the importance of using 
less direct techniques such as economic assistance as a means of pro­
moting stability in less developed countries, but there were many 
others who sought to reduce even these less direct forms of involve­
ment. Some Congressmen saw bilateral economic aid as a vehicle lead­
ing to the extension of American commitments and interests abroad and 
ultimately to the type of military intervention which had occurred in 
Vietnam. According to Fulbright, in a speech to Congress in 1966, 
foreign aid while,
not in a literal sense the cause or 
the reason for American military involve­
ment in Vietnam ... was however, an 
important factor contributing to the 
state of mind of policy-makers who 
committed the United States to a major 
land war in Asia after having stated 
forcefully ... that that was exactly 
what they intended not to do.
The fact that aid was becoming a vehicle for extended American involve­
ment and commitment abroad was, in Fulbright’s view, a key reason for 
his opposition to the existing American aid programme; in the case
of multilateral aid which did not suffer from this disadvantage,
25Fulbright remained a supporter.
Direct evidence of the change described above can be found in
the statements of a number of those who occupied or had occupied
positions in the executive or Congress. Galbraith, in 1969, noted
his own change of attitudes thus:
The late 1940s and ... the 1950s was ... a 
period when it was possible to believe 
Secretary of State Rusk's haunting dream 
of a Communist imperium. completely united 
and probing at any soft point in its peri­
meter and without - and with no objective 
short of the ultimate destruction of its 
opposition.
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... We persuaded our people - I was 
in some degree one of those persuaded - 
that the world stood at a decisive 
watershed. The question in India, in 
the Congo, in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, 
was whether they would become part of the 
Communist empire or would follow another 
kind of development.
There was an assumption, certainly on our 
part and I think equally on the part of 
the Soviets, that the superpowers had an 
enormous capacity to influence the direction 
of the development of these countries.
There was also an assumption, largely un­
examined, that the nature of this development 
was of great importance militarily, economi­
cally, and otherwise to the coxmtries involved.
In the last twenty years we have found out 
that these things simply are not true. 26
The views of Senator Church, who supported economic aid early 
in his Congressional career (1957-66) and had by 1968 become an oppon­
ent of it, are also relevant. In a speech in 1971 Church noted that 
economic aid during the 1950s and 60s had been seen primarily as an 
instrument of containment. But U.S. policy had been based on the 
false premise of a Communist monolith. It had also been based on an 
exaggerated notion of what economic aid might achieve, for while mil­
itary assistance could be a potent instrument in counterinsurgency,
U.S. economic support had almost no influence on whether a country 
went communist or not - as the examples of Cuba and Chile had shown.
Nor was there any great case for aid as a means of countering blandish­
ments offered by the Soviet Union, for the Soviet Union, through its 
aid programme, had shown a greater capacity for alienating people 
from communism than the U.S. By 1971, the very objective of prevent­
ing revolutions in less developed countries seemed of doubtful value 
to Church for:
In countries long under the domination of 
corrupt oligarchies, nothing less than a 
radical redistribution of political power
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may be the essential precondition 
for economic development. If the bulk 
of the people are to make the concerted 
effort and accept the enormous sacrifices 
required for lifting a society out of 
chronic poverty, they have got to have 
some belief in the integrity of their 
leaders, in the commitment of those leaders 
to social justice, and in the equality of 
sacrifice required of the people.27
The examples of Galbraith and Church indicate a change of 
attitudes towards cold war justifications at the liberal end of the 
American political spectrum. However, the change in attitudes was 
not confined to this area but extended to groups normally considered 
to be extremely conservative. A 1973 survey of almost 600 vice- 
presidents of the largest industrial and financial corporations in 
the United States indicated that 58% perceived a decline in "the 
external threat of communism to U.S. security ... over the last decade", 
while only 15% saw an increase. Asked to specify the "major problems 
facing the United States today", less than 25% named "national and 
socialist movements in less developed countries" or "military and 
technological advances of China and Russia" - traditional cold war 
concerns - while 75% listed "domestic order and stability", "social 
and racial disparities within the United States" and "world ecological 
problems".^
Diminished emphasis on ’cold war' arguments was not the only 
reason for the decline in economic aid, A second factor, affecting 
the 'Food for Peace’ programme, was the fall in the level of American 
agricultural surpluses. As Table 8 indicates, surpluses had begun to 
decline by the mid-sixties. The trend towards decline was interrupted 
between 1967 and 1969, but surplus levels thereafter fell again, reach­
ing their lowest value for two decades in 1973.
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Table 8.
Commodity Credit Corporation :
Price Supported Commodities Owned and 
Outstanding under Loan, 1963-73.______
(Figures represent millions of U.S. dollars)
Value of all 
commodities owned 
by the Commodity 
Credit Corporation
Value of
commodities out­
standing under 
price support 
loan
1963 5023 2928
1964 4611 2802
1965 411C 2598
1966 2340 2069
1967 1005 2355
1968 1064 3605
1969 1784 3628
1970 1594 2973
1971 1118 3186
1972 830 2438
1973 394 1266
Source : U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Agricultural Statistics 1974:
U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, 1974, pp. 510-511.
The reasons for the decline in agricultural surpluses are com­
plex, but may be illustrated by considering the case of one important 
commodity - wheat. As Table 9 indicates, it was not a decline in pro 
duction which led to the reduction in surplus levels: there was a
general tendency for production to increase over the 1962-73 interval 
However, the volume of wheat utilised also increased, and except for 
the years 1967-69, remained above the amount produced. Surpluses 
accordingly declined. Increased use of wheat for seed and feed
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p u r p o s e s ,  and i n c r e a s e d  s a l e  o f  w hea t  a b ro a d  on a com m erc ia l  b a s i s  
a c c o u n te d  f o r  t h e  g row th  i n  u t i l i s a t i o n  o f  w h e a t ;  d o m e s t ic  demand 
f o r  w hea t a s  food  rem ained  a lm o s t  s t a t i c .  S a l e s  o f  w hea t  a b ro a d  were
e x t r e m e ly  h ig h  i n  1972 and 1973 , a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  l a r g e  p u r c h a s e s  by
29th e  S o v i e t  Union and expanded  s a l e s  t o  W e s te rn  Europe and J a p a n .
I t  i s  n o t  d i f f i c u l t  to  u n d e r s t a n d  why a d e c l i n e  i n  s u r p l u s e s  
s h o u ld  l e a d  to  a  g r e a t e r  r e l u c t a n c e  t o  p r o v id e  commodity a i d .  As 
C h a p te r  4 i n d i c a t e d ,  t h e  p r e s s u r e  t o  d i s p o s e  o f  s u r p l u s e s  was an im­
p o r t a n t  f a c t o r  i n  t h e  em ergence  o f  t h i s  t y p e  o f  a i d . F u r t h e r ,  t h e  
d e c i s i o n  to  p r o v id e  commodity a i d  i n v o lv e d  v i r t u a l l y  no a d d i t i o n a l  c o s t
to  t h e  A m erican  t a x p a y e r  w h i le  l a r g e  s t o c k s  o f  s u r p l u s  com m od it ies  
*
w ere  p r e s e n t .  T here  was even  some s a v in g  on s t o r a g e  e x p e n s e s .
With an a p p r e c i a b l e  d e c l i n e  i n  s u r p l u s e s ,  t h e  d e c i s i o n  to  p r o v id e  a id  
som etim es  in v o lv e d  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  fu n d s  t o  p u r c h a s e  th e  c o m m od it ie s  
r e q u i r e d .  As e a r l y  a s  1966 , p o l i c y - m a k e r s  found  i t  n e c e s s a r y  to  amend
th e  b a s i c  PL480 l e g i s l a t i o n  to  remove t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t  t h a t  c o m m o d it ie s
30t r a n s f e r r e d  u n d e r  t h e  programme s h o u ld  come from s u r p l u s  s t o c k s .
Not o n ly  was t h e r e  a b u d g e ta r y  c o s t :  p u r c h a s i n g  co m m o d it ie s  s p e c i f i ­
c a l l y  f o r  a i d  m eant t h a t  t h e r e  would be  upward p r e s s u r e  on commodity 
p r i c e s  -  b e f o r e  t h e y  had  f a l l e n  to  l e v e l s  w here  governm ent p r i c e  su p ­
p o r t s  would n o r m a l ly  be in v o k e d .  T h e re  i s  d i r e c t  e v id e n c e  t h a t  t h e s e  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  w ere  o f  some im p o r ta n c e .  As i n d i c a t e d  p r e v i o u s l y ,  t h e  
b u d g e ta r y  c o s t  o f  commodity a i d  was m e n t io n e d  a s  a  c o n s t r a i n t  on t h e  
programme i n  D epar tm en t  o f  A g r i c u l t u r e  s t a t e m e n t s .  I n  1973, s h ip m e n ts  
d ro p p ed  t o  t h e i r  lo w e s t  l e v e l  s i n c e  t h e  i n c e p t i o n  o f  t h e  programme i n  
1954 , a s  a r e s u l t  o f  t h e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  by t h e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  A g r i c u l ­
t u r e  t h a t  co m m o d it ie s  w ere  i n  ' l i m i t e d  s u p p l y ' .  With s u r p l u s e s  a t
■k
A c c u m u la t in g  s u r p l u s e s  in v o lv e d  s u b s t a n t i a l  c o s t s ,  
b u t  t h i s  was b a s i c a l l y  done to  s u p p o r t  th e  p r i c e s  o f  th e  
com m od it ies  i n  q u e s t i o n ,  n o t  to  o b t a i n  com m od it ies  f o r  
f o r e i g n  a id  p u r p o s e s .
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their lowest level for two decades, and with a sharp rise in food 
prices, it was evidently considered that additional government pur­
chases to sustain the aid programme would be undesirable. These 
constraints would presumably have been less important had CCC stock 
of surplus commodities remained at the levels existing in the late 
1950s and early 1960s.
A third factor contributing to the decline in U.S. concession­
al economic aid was increased concern with domestic problems. Over
31the period 1965-68, hunger in America emerged as a key public issue ;
widespread urban riots in 1967 and 1968 (extending to almost every
major city in the United States) underlined the problem of urban pover-
32ty and racial tension ; and there was increased attention to the
33question of environmental pollution. There was mounting concern
from 1966 with the problem of inflation, with prices rising more rap­
idly than at any time since the Korean War boom of 1950-51 (see Table 
10) .
Table 10.
Percentage Change in Consumer Price Index, 1948-74 
(Figures represent percentage changes from December to December)
1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958
2.7 i I-* 00 5.8 5.9 .9 .6 -.5 .4 2.9 3.0 1.8
1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
1.5 1.5 .7 1.2 1.6 1.2 1.9 3.4 3.0 4.7 6.1
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
5.5 3.4 3.4 8.8 12.2
Source: Economic Report of the President 3 transmitted
to Congress3 January 19763 together with the 
Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976, p. 224.
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T a b le  11 i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  governm ent s p e n d in g  i n  a r e a s  such  a s  
income s e c u r i t y ,  h e a l t h ,  e d u c a t i o n ,  s o c i a l  s e r v i c e s ,  th e  e n v iro n m en t  
and e n e rg y  grew r a p i d l y  be tw een  1967 and 1972 -  more r a p i d l y  th a n  
t o t a l  e x p e n d i t u r e .  By c o n t r a s t ,  s p e n d in g  ( i n  c u r r e n t  d o l l a r s )  f o r  
n a t i o n a l  d e fe n s e  r o s e  o n ly  s l i g h t l y ,  w h i l e  t h a t  f o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
a f f a i r s ,  s p a c e ,  s c i e n c e  and t e c h n o lo g y  a c t u a l l y  d e c l i n e d .  However, 
th e  g row th  i n  s p e n d in g  on ’d o m e s t ic  p r o b le m s ’ was n o t  a s  r a p i d  a s  many 
-  e s p e c i a l l y  l i b e r a l s  -  would  have  l i k e d .  Given a d e s i r e  to  keep  
t o t a l  governm ent s p e n d in g  u n d e r  c o n t r o l  so  a s  n o t  to  add f u r t h e r  to
■k
i n f l a t i o n a r y  p r e s s u r e s ,  o t h e r  i te m s  became t a r g e t s  f o r  c u t s .
D i r e c t  e v id e n c e  can  be found i n  C o n g r e s s io n a l  h e a r i n g s  and 
d e b a t e s  w hich  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  i n f l a t i o n  and r e q u i r e m e n t s  f o r  d o m e s t ic  
p ro b lem s  w ere  t a k e n  i n t o  a c c o u n t  when c o n s i d e r i n g  e x p e n d i t u r e  on econo ­
mic a id  -  and t h a t  c o n c e rn  w i th  t h e s e  c o m p e t in g  p r i o r i t i e s  e n c o u ra g e d  
r e d u c t i o n s  i n  t h e  l e v e l  o f  econom ic a i d .  Even c o n s i s t e n t  s u p p o r t e r s  
o f  f o r e i g n  a i d  r e f e r r e d  to  a l t e r n a t i v e  p r i o r i t i e s .  Thus S e n a to r  
Sparkman, o f  t h e  F o r e ig n  R e l a t i o n s  C om m ittee ,  a rg u e d  i n  1971:
R e c e n t l y  t h e r e  w ere  a u t h o r i t a t i v e  
e s t i m a t e s  t h a t  t h e  b u d g e t  d e f i c i t  
f o r  t h e  c u r r e n t  and n e x t  f i s c a l  y e a r s  
c o u ld  go a s  h ig h  a s  $55 b i l l i o n .  I t  
i s  i n  t h e  c o n te x t  o f  th e  g row ing  F e d e r a l  
d e f i c i t  and n a t i o n a l  d e b t ,  t h e  m oun ting  
p ro b le m s  o f  o u r  own s o c i e t y ,  and th e  
t o t a l i t y  o f  o u r  f o r e i g n  a i d  e f f o r t  . . .  
t h a t  t h e  members o f  t h e  F o r e ig n  R e l a t i o n s  
Com m ittee  m ust w eigh  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  
b r a n c h  p r o p o s a l s .  34
D om estic  p ro b le m s  w i t h i n  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  a p p a r e n t l y  a l s o  s e r v e d  to
In  g e n e r a l  C ong ress  t e n d e d  to  f a v o u r  a somewhat g r e a t e r  l e v e l  
o f  s p e n d in g  on d o m e s t ic  p ro b lem s  th a n  th e  e x e c u t i v e ;  t h e  
e x e c u t i v e  p a id  more heed  to  t h e  p ro b le m  o f  b a l a n c i n g  th e  b u d g e t ,  
and to  p r i o r i t i e s  i n  t h e  a r e a s  o f  d e f e n c e  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
a f f a i r s .
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confirm and extend the opposition of some Congressmen to existing aid 
programmes. In 1967, Fulbright had moved over to oppose the exist­
ing bilateral aid programme, citing its role in extending U.S. involve­
ment abroad, and the demeaning nature of bilateral aid for the recip­
ient. At that time, he indicated his support for multilateral aid 
at levels well above those spent on the existing aid programme. A 
year later, in the context of urban disturbances within the United 
States, Fulbright’s line of argument had shifted significantly. There 
was "... something wrong with a system of priorities that proposes to 
continue foreign aid as usual under the circumstances facing our 
nation today". Despite "an obligation on the part of the richest, 
most powerful nation to help narrow the growing gap between the rich 
and the poor of this world", that obligation did not have precedence 
over "the needs of our own citizens". It was more important "to build 
hope out of despair for the ghetto dwellers in Detroit, Newark and
33Harlem than ... to try to remake the societies of Asia and Africa".
It might be argued that foreign aid accounted for only a small 
percentage of the total federal budget and that it is accordingly 
implausible to suggest that concern to make room for spending in other 
areas, or to contain the deficit, was a significant factor in its 
decline. However, while foreign aid was a small percentage of total 
spending, it was a much larger fraction of those items capable of being 
trimmed. A very large percentage of the budget in any given year can 
be regarded as essentially fixed, being for unavoidable, or continuing 
programmes. Given difficulties in reducing other programmes, it is 
not surprising that foreign aid - always unpopular in Congress, and 
lacking any powerful domestic constituency - should have been seen as 
a convenient area in which to impose cuts.
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Again, Congressmen were confronted under both the Johnson and
Nixon Administrations with instances where relatively small programmes
favoured by Congress were opposed by the executive or vetoed on
grounds of economy; in some instances funds voted by Congress were
36impounded as a result of presidential decision. In these circum­
stances, it was not surprising that Congressmen questioned spending 
on the aid programme. The problem was raised by Senator Sparkman and 
Senator Aiken, both consistent supporters of foreign aid, in the course 
of Congressional hearings on Asian Development Bank funds in 1971.
Senator Sparkman:
... I am talking about the impounding 
of funds that have been appropriated by 
Congress. ... I believe the House 
Committee has come out in the neighbourhood 
of about $12 million in funds appropriated 
for our uses here at home that have been 
impounded. I will pick out one thing, for 
instance, in which I am involved. That is 
the matter of housing and urban affairs.
The total appropriation last year was 
$3,400,000. There has been impounded 
$1,300,000. It seems to me an unduly heavy 
amount for that one activity, particularly 
when it is probably the best job-producer 
in the country. ... When you are trying 
to get rid of unemployment, why impound 
funds that would produce jobs and at the 
same time plan a deficit of some $20 billion 
over two fiscal years? ...
Dr. Walker:
... You are worried about the deficit on the 
one side but willing to release these funds.
But obviously releasing the funds would swell 
the deficit unless you cut back somewhere else.
Senator Aiken:
I would like to say that the shortage of 
homes, the shortage of places for people to 
live, is perhaps the greatest need of the 
country at this time and the construction 
would create more employment and more business.
But before you can build a home you have to 
have a water supply and a sewer system.
Senator Sparkman:
Those funds are impounded too.
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Senator Aiken:
That is what I was leading up to.
And you have to get people out of the 
cities if you are going to continue the 
rural development program. Out of a 
hundred million dollars which was appro­
priated by both Houses of Congress, I 
think without any dissenting vote, only 
$34 million have been permitted to be 
expended ...
Senator Sparkman:
... I remember when President Johnson 
impounded $2 billion I think on public 
works, road building, housing, Farmers 
Home Administration, a good many things.
... He said he was ready to release a 
part of those funds. ... He did make that 
release and I just hope you will consider 
releasing some of these badly needed things, 
such as community facilities, that will 
produce jobs. »
Senator Aiken:
It is more far reaching than that, because 
it is the impoundment of the funds for 
these relatively inexpensive programs which 
are wholly approved by the Congress and the 
public ...
Senator Sparkman:
That is what I said.
Senator Aiken (continuing):
Which has created so much opposition to 
the foreign aid programs. 37
Deteriorating relations with some aid recipients was a fourth 
factor contributing to the decline in concessional economic aid from 
the United States. Attacks by governments of less developed countries 
on U.S. policies, and expressions of 'anti-American* sentiments with­
in less developed countries were not new, but they appear to have
become somewhat more frequent and hostile over the period under dis-
38cussion here. These attacks appear to have had some influence on 
Congressional decisions on foreign aid. For example, the defeat of 
the 1971 foreign aid authorization bill on the Senate floor in 1971 
can be partly attributed to the overwhelming vote in the United Nations 
a few days earlier to expel Taiwan and admit the Chinese People's
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Republic. Not only did U.N. delegates vote against the American
position, there was also evident jubilation at the result. The U.N.
decision was mentioned frequently in floor debate in the Senate and
there was some discussion of the possibility of cutting allocations
39to U.N. organisations. It seems likely that this and other expres­
sions of opposition to U.S. policy contributed to a weakening of sup­
port for economic aid, especially among more conservative members of
„ 40Congress.
Apart from general expressions of opposition and criticism of 
the type mentioned above, there was also a marked deterioration in 
U.S. relations with some countries which had been particularly import­
ant aid recipients in the early 1960s. This contributed to smaller 
allocations of bilateral aid for the countries in question. It prob­
ably also contributed to a reduction in the total amount of U.S. aid 
to less developed countries, for in formulating programme requests 
for aid within the executive, the amounts to be provided to particular 
countries were taken into account; and it was normal for Congress­
ional committees to consider executive proposals for particular 
countries when deciding on recommendations for aid levels.
Egypt can be taken as one example where poor relations prevent­
ed the transfer of much aid. As Table 6 indicates, Egypt received 
an average of $135 million/year over the 1962/65 interval. As early
as 1965, Rusk indicated during the course of Congressional Hearings
41that relations with the U.A.R. were a matter of great concern, and 
commitments in 1966 and 1967 were well below the average levels of 
the 1962-65 interval. With the 1967 war, however, relations deterior­
ated further and additional cuts were made; indeed, Egypt received 
no new commitments at all between fiscal 1968 and 1971; and only
42insignificant amounts in 1972 and 1973.
Strained relations also contributed to the reduction in aid
provided in India. This was probably a factor as early as 1967, for
it was evident by this date that India had moved into a position
involving a much closer relationship with the Soviet Union than that
43in the early sixties. The decline in U.S. bilateral aid to India
was significantly greater than that of the total aid programme; thus
assistance from the Agency of International Development to India over
1968-71 was 37% below that for 1962-65, while the decline in the total
44A.I.D. budget was of the order of 20%. It is evident that a number
of policy makers, especially in Congress were annoyed by India's
45criticisms of, and divergence from, U.S. policy, and it is plausible
to attribute the decline in aid partly to this factor. India's 1971
war with Pakistan (leading to the dismemberment of that country and
the creation of Bangladesh) further strained relations with the United
46States as U.S. officials openly conceded. As a consequence, India
received negligible commitments of aid through the Agency of Inter­
national Development between fiscal years 1972 and 1974; commitments
47for PL480 were also much reduced.
A fifth change relevant to the decline of concessional American 
economic aid was the increase in capital flows and transfers to less 
developed countries from other sources, as well as their improved 
export earnings. There was a considerable expansion in the total
knominal value of capital and transfers to less developed countries - 
despite the decline of concessional economic aid from the United 
States. This much is indicated in Table 12, which provides two sets
k An increase in flows is said to be in 'nominal terms' 
if it has not been adjusted for price changes and altered 
exchange rates.
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of data on these flows. The first, based on I.M.F. statistics, 
measures net capital flows to the public and private sector of less 
developed countries (excluding OPEC countries) as well as transfers 
(excluding military aid) received by the governments of those countries. 
The second, based on statistics presented in reports of the Develop-
•kment Assistance Committee of O.E.C.D. estimates flows from member 
nations of DAC to 'developing countries' (including under this defini­
tion countries in Southern Europe such as Cyprus, Spain and Greece) 
and multilateral agencies. These sources indicate that total net capi­
tal flows to less developed countries more than doubled in nominal 
terms between 1967 and 1973. In real terms (that is, with due allow­
ance for changes in prices and exchange rates), the increase was much 
smaller, but was still appreciable. This is indicated in item 4 of 
the table, which employs deflators prepared by DAC to estimate the 
total net flow of resources in constant 1970 dollars.
One source of this expansion was an increase in bilateral 
development assistance from donors other than the United States.
Table 13 indicates that bilateral development assistance from DAC 
members other than the United States more than doubled in nominal 
terms between 1966 and 1973, rising from $2267 million to $4799 million. 
Countries in which bilateral development aid more than doubled (in 
nominal terms) over this interval included Australia, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden 
and Switzerland.
Members of the Development Assistance Committee covered 
by the table include Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the 
United States. Data for one other DAC member, New Zealand, 
is not readily available for the entire period.
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Table 12
Capital Flows and Transfers to Developing 
Countries (millions of U.S. dollars)
l.Net Capital Flows 
and Government 
Unrequited Trans­
fers to less
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
developed 7141 7866 6895 10332 11792 14644 17819
countries of 
Asia, Africa, and 
the Middle East 
(excluding OPEC 
countries).
2. Net Flow of 
Financial re­
sources (official 
and private) from 
DAC members to
developing 11435 13509 13778 15791 18158 19876 24391
countries and multi­
lateral agencies.
’Developing 
countries’ in­
clude countries 
in Southern Europe.
3. Deflator for the 
total net flow of
resources in (2) 
above.
(1970 = 100)
90.9 92.7 94.9 100.0 106.5 115.9 142.2
Flow identified 
in (2) above 
adjusted for 12580 14573 14518 15791 17050 17149 17153
changes in prices 
and exchange rates. 
(Constant 1970 
dollars).
Sources: 1. International Monetary Fund, International
Financial Statistics: Vol. XXIX, No.8, August,
1976, p .88.
2. O.E.C.D., Flow of Resources to Developing 
Countries: O.E.C.D., 1973, pp. 431.
Development Cooperation: 1974 Review_, O.E.C.D., 
1974, pp. 209, 212-215. Data on flows from 
New Zealand are not included.
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Table 13.
Bilateral Development Assistance from 
DAC members (in millions U.S. dollars)
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Total 5648 5800 5626 5570 5707 6421 6750 7136
U.S. 3381 3165 2994 2762 2657 2893 2724 2337
DAC members 
other than 
the United 2267 2635 2632 2808 3050 3528 4026 4799
States
Source: O.E.C.D., Flow of Resources to Developing Countries:
O.E.C.D., 1973, pp. 431, 447; Development 
Cooperation: 1974 Review: O.E.C.D., 1974, pp. 212-215.
Data for New Zealand is available for 1972 and 1973 
only; accordingly, it has been excluded.
Multilateral agencies were another source of increased capital 
and transfers for less developed countries. As the table below indi­
cates, net disbursements from this source almost doubled in nominal 
terms between 1966 and 1973. This resulted, in part, from increased 
concessional contributions and subscriptions to multilateral agencies 
by a number of governments (including the United States); and in part 
from increased capital of other kinds - for example, greater borrowing 
by the World Bank from private capital markets and from governments at 
market rates. Table 15 provides evidence on these points.
A further channel for increased resource flows to less develop­
ed countries consisted of bilateral transfers and credits from govern­
ments other than those included under the heading of ’development 
assistance'. Government export credits at commercial or near commerc­
ial rates, various forms of debt rescheduling, government equities in 
foreign investment in less developed countries, and other ’hard loans’
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Table 14
Net Flows of Resources from Multilateral 
Institutions to Developing Countries of 
Africa, Asia and Latin America. (Net 
disbursements, millions of dollars)_____
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Soft Loans & 
Grants: Total 606 745 558 779 936 1138 960 1179
of which I.D.A. 254 351 189 234 151 279 277 607
U.N.
Agencies 244 259 314 350 414 515 545 576
Hard Loans: Total 111 256 232 292 477 669 574 560
of which I.B.R.D. 211 197 171 215 347 499 619 4 36
Total Disburse- 883 1002 789 1071 1413 1807 1534 1739
(may differs slightly 
from the sum of the 
above figures.)
Source: UNCTAD, Financial Flows to and from Developing
Countries: United Nations, 1975, p. 55.
Disbursements are net of repayments, capital subscriptions 
and participations by less developed countries.
Table 15
Multilateral Agencies: Sources of Finance 
(Data in millions of U.S. dollars)
1.Contributions by DAC 
member govs, to multi­
lateral agencies at 
concessional rates 
(includes capital sub­
scriptions to the 
I.B,R.D., etc.)
2 . Contributions by DAC'*' 
govs, at market rates.
3. Private multilateral 
portfolio investment 
(from DAC member 
nations). ^
4. World Bank:^
Total borrowings:
Net borrowings:
(data is for the relevant
fiscal year)
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
336 736 683 1050 1124
-32 307 248 330 393
53 20 -10 -15 273
175 469 767 419 474
288 729 735 1224 735
64 503 222 698 299
1971 1972 1973
1339 1901 2245)Total 
)
431 625 631) U.S.
267 372 398
770 667 258
1368 1744 1723
819 1136 955
Contd.
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Table 15 (contined)
Source: O.E.C.D., Flow of Resources to Developing
Countries: O.E.C.D., 1973, pp. 431, 447; 
Development Cooperation: 1974 Review_,
O.E.C.D., 1974, pp. 212-215.
World Bank : Annual Report 1975: I.B.R.D., 
1975, p.3.
1. New Zealand is not included.
2. World Bank borrowings include some of the amounts 
noted in rows 2 and 3 of this table.
from public sources are included within this category. Table 16, which
provides data on net flows of this kind from member governments of
the Development Assistance Committee, indicates that there was a signi-
48ficant growth in this item over the period under review. Govern­
ment export credits made an important contribution to expanding flows 
within this category.
Table 16
'Other Official Flows' (Bilateral) from 
member governments of the Development 
Assistance Committee to 'Developing Countries'.
(in millions of U.S. dollars)
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Total 394 499 748 586 880 1004 1205 2185
of which 
export credits 259 392 646 502 578 573 724 1122
Source: O.E.C.D., Flow of Resources to Developing
Countries: p. 431; Development Cooperation:
1974 Review: pp. 212-215.
New Zealand is excluded from the data presented above.
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Finally, less developed countries received increased transfers 
and capital flows from private sources. Table 17 provides data on 
flows of this kind (including loans and investment at market rates, 
and grants by voluntary agencies) between member nations of the Develop­
ment Assistance Committee and ’developing countries'. While some 
private flows are only partly reflected in the totals given, and while 
private flows are frequently difficult to estimate, the table does 
indicate the considerable expansion in transactions of this type which 
occurred over the period under review; from a little over 4 billion 
dollars in 1966 to more than 12 billion in 1973 (in current dollars).
Table 17
Private Flows from member nations of the 
Development Assistance Committee to 
’Developing Countries'. (Net disbursements 
in millions of dollars) .___________________
A. Ret Private
flows at market
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
rates (excluding 
disbursements to 
multilateral 
institutions).
3784 3912 5695 6167 6474 7445 7951 10811
... of which:
direct investment 2179 2105 3152 2919 3563 3874 4445 6654
private export
credits (wholly or 
partly guaranteed)
1119 995 1586 2013 2156 2724 1409 1150
bilateral portfolio
investment 485 812 959 1234 755 846 2096 3007
B. Grants by voluntary
agencies. (296) n. a. (446) (620) 858 913 1031 1357
Sources: O.E.C.D., Flow of Resources to Developing Countries: 
O.E.C.D., 1973, pp. 431; and Development Cooperation: 
1974 Review: pp. 212-215.
New Zealand is not included in the above.
Data in parenthesis is estimated.
374.
As the table Indicates, grants from voluntary agencies account­
ed for part of the increase in private flows; these grants rose from 
approximately $300 million in 1966 to more than four times that 
amount (in nominal terms) by 1973. Private direct investment expand­
ed from slightly over two billion dollars to more than six billion
49in 1973, with increased disbursements in each year except 1969.
In the case of private export credits, the pattern is more uneven.
The data given indicates a pattern of growth until 1971, when net dis­
bursements were more than double the 1966 value in nominal terms. 
However, there was an appreciable decline in 1972 and 1973, partly 
because increased borrowing on the Eurocurrency market"^ substituted 
for credits of this kind.
The table shows a substantial expansion in bilateral portfolio 
investment in developing countries, especially in 1972 and 1973. 
According to the figures given, net flows of this type amounted to 
$3007 million in 1973, compared with $846 million in 1971 and $485 
million in 1966. Statistics from the Development Assistance Committee 
are, however, thought to understate the amounts involved. Thus bonds 
issued by developing countries in foreign and international capital 
markets'^ accounted for an important part of the growth in portfolio 
investment, but the corresponding flows are believed to be only partly 
reflected in the figures cited previously. Table 18 provides inform­
ation on the gross amounts involved in such issues, based on data 
collected by the World Bank.
52Again, Eurocurrency lending by private banks was a signifi­
cant source of increased portfolio investment in less developed 
countries, but information on lending of this type is limited, and the 
amounts transferred are generally thought to be greater than those
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Table 18
Foreign and International Bond Issues by 
Developing Countries, 1966-73.____ ____
(including bonds issued in North America, 
and Europe, and Eurobonds.)
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
North America 204 2 74 225 235 201 283 339 713
Europe 74 173 307 51 15 17 - 38
Eurobond 103 129 71 492 438
Total 278 446 532 389 345 371 830 1189
Source: UNCTAD, Financial Flows to and from
Develoipina Countries: United Nations,
1975, p .39.
Both public and private placements are included. 
Eurobond issues over 1965-68 are included under 
Europe, and the 1973 figure for North America includes 
some issues on European markets. Because of rounding, 
data given may not add exactly to the total.
Eurobonds are not the same as bonds issued in a single 
national market in a European country; they are bonds 
issued in more than one market simultaneously, and are 
denominated in third-country currencies.
recorded in DAC statistics. Table 19 provides information on the
volume of publicly announced credits, but the fraction of total lending
53revealed in this way is unclear.
Less developed countries also obtained increased foreign ex­
change by expanding their export earnings. Table 20 below provides 
data on merchandise exports for less developed areas, and indicates 
that their value more than doubled in nominal terms between 1966 and 
1973. The table also indicates that export earnings rose more rapidly 
than import prices; accordingly expanded earnings were not simply 
absorbed bv higher prices abroad, but made it possible to purchase
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Table 19
Publicized Eurocurrency Credits to 
Developing Countries: 19 71-73.____
1971 1972 1973
Total (includes credits to countries
in Southern Europe such as 1475 3888 9348
Spain and Greece)
... of which, e.g.,
Algeria 120 257 1353
Argentine 50 244 87
Brazil 212 577 718
Columbia 90 170
India 10
Indonesia 98 478
Mexico 140 490 1573
Nicaragua 10 15 92
Peru 147 734
Philippines 61 179
Venezuela 78 259 63
Zaire 55 90 287
Source : O.E.C.D., Development Cooperation: 1974 Review:
O.E.C.D., 1974, pp. 288. The countries listed 
are examples only; for the full list see the 
source mentioned.
Table 20
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Exports (fob) of less 
developed areas (in
millions of U.S. 38100 39900 43600 48700 54500 62000 74000 10000
dollars)
m^p° ^ _ priCeS lndex 94 94 94 96 100 104 111 128for LDCs.
Source : I.M.F., International Financial Statistics_,
Vol. XXVII, No. 8, August 1974, pp. 33, 36.
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a larger volume of imports.
Had there been no increase, or a significantly smaller incre­
ment, in the export earnings of less developed countries, and in 
transfers and flows of capital to them through other channels?it is 
likely that the U.S. Government would have increased concessional eco­
nomic aid as a means of overcoming foreign exchange shortages and 
other constraints (for example, savings constraints) on the develop­
ment programmes of the countries concerned. As it was, developing 
market economies were able to expand their imports of goods and services 
over 1965-73 at a rate which was above the growth in G.D.P. The 
growth of imports over 1965-73 was also more than double that for 
1960-65 in real terms. Not only did less developed countries expand 
their imports rapidly over 1965-73, there was also a build up in for­
eign exchange reserves, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of 
imports (Tables 21 and 22).
Table 21.
Developing Market Economies: Average
Annual Rates of Growth (at constant 
prices) of:______ ___________________
Gross Domestic 
Product
Gross Fixed
Capital
Formation
Imports of Goods 
and Services
1960-65 4.9% 5.0% 3.3.%
1965-70 5.9% 8.4% 7.8%
1970-73 6.0% 8.0% 6.7%
Source : Department of Economics and Social Affairs, U.N.,
Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 107/13
Vol.III, United Nations, 1975, p.98.
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Table 22.
Reserves of Less Developed Areas 
(data in millions of U.S. dollars)
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Reserves for:
Latin America 3435 3915 4470 5640 6585 10550 16305
Middle East 3310 3320 3035 3245 5255 7630 11595
Other Asia 4085 4295 4880 5235 5920 7830 10135
Other Africa 2125 2495 3095 4180 5500 5925 6535
Total Reserves 
for less 
developed 
areas (end of 
year)
13015 14185 15625 184 30 23390 32125 44720
Imports, c.i.f. 41900 45300 49800 56000 63500 70900 92600
Reserves as a 
% of imports 31% 31% 31% 33% 37% 45% 48%
Source : from data in International Monetary Fund,
International Financial Statistics, Vol. XXVII,
No. 8, August 1974, pp. 19,37. The data on 
imports does not include all imports (for example, 
some services are excluded), but this does not 
affect the conclusion that reserves increased as 
a percentage of imports. The figure for total 
reserves for less developed areas is not obtained 
by adding the regional data provided.
The preceding analysis is based on data for all less developed 
countries, and accordingly conceals marked differences among countries 
within this category. For some countries, increased transfers and 
capital flows from other sources, and improved export earnings promot­
ed conditions in which U.S. officials could make substantial reductions 
in the level of concessional economic aid. Taiwan was a very large 
recipient of concessional economic aid during the 1950s and early 
1960s, receiving on average 96 million dollars in commitments each 
year over 1953-65.“*^  For much of this period U.S. aid was of consid­
erable importance, typically financing at least two-thirds of the
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sizable deficit on current account. However, from the early sixties,
exports expanded rapidly, especially in manufactures, while private
capital flows also increased (Table 23). Taiwan was accordingly able
to expand its imports extremely rapidly, while at the same time build-
57 58ing up its reserves. These trends, among others, made it possible
for the Johnson Administration to announce the termination of conces-
59sional aid through the A.I.D. in 1965. Taiwan subsequently received
only small amounts of concessional aid through such programmes as 
PL480.
Table 23.
Taiwan’s Balance of Payments : 1960-70 
(millions of U.S. dollars)
1960-62 1963-65 1966-68 1969-70
Imports of goods 
and services -1071 -1512 -2737 -3111
Exports of goods 
and services 719 1452 2565 3087
Current balance -352 -60 -172 -24
Net official transfer 207 56 5 -7
Net official capital 76 85 61 7
Net private long term 
capital 37 50 238 277
Net short term capital
and errors and 
omissions -2 23 -46 41
Overall balance -34 154 86 294
Source : Ching-yuan Lin, Industrialisation in Taiwan,
1946-72: Trade & Import - Substitution Solides 
for Developing Countries: Praeger, 1973, p.124.
Again, in the case of Brazil, a rapid expansion of exports and 
large capital flows from other sources helped to make possible sub­
stantial reductions in the level of concessional economic aid.
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Table 24 which provides data on Brazil’s balance of payments, indi­
cates the changes in question. Thus exports, which grew only slowly 
in the five years after 1963, began to expand rapidly after 1968, 
increasing more than threefold in nominal terms between 1968 and 1973. 
Net capital inflows also grew rapidly from the same date to reach more 
than 3 billion dollars in 1973. This was not due to increased disburse­
ments of concessional aid from the U.S. and other donors; indeed, 
such aid declined (Table 25). It resulted principally from a growth 
in hard loans from multilateral agencies and from other official sources 
(for example, export credits), increased flows of direct private in­
vestment, and portfolio investment (Table 19 indicates that Brazil 
borrowed heavily in the Eurocurrency market).*^ As a consequence 
of these developments, Brazil was able to increase its imports at an 
extremely rapid rate, with the growth in imports averaging between 18% 
and 20%/annum in real terms over 1965-73. At the same time, it made 
massive additions to its reserves, especially in 1972 and 1973 (see 
Tables 26 and 27). U.S. officials were accordingly able to make sub- 
stantial reductions in the level of concessional American economic aid. 
Whereas commitments of U.S. development assistance to Brazil had aver­
aged $258 million per annum over 1962-68, they amounted to only $75 
million/annum for 1969-73.^^
In India, by contrast, foreign exchange difficulties imposed 
severe constraints on imports over the period under review. Exports 
did increase, but the expansion was modest in comparison with that of 
Brazil, and total net capital flows declined significantly (Table 18). 
Foreign exchange shortages accordingly imposed a constraint on India's 
capacity to import. Partly for this reason, the decision was made to 
abandon the draft version of the fourth five year plan (which had been
381.
Table 24.
Brazil : Balance of payments : 1963-73 
(data in millions of U.S. dollars)
1963 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Exports, fob. 1406 1741 1654 1881 2311 2739 2891 3941 6084
Imports, fob. -1294 -1303 -1441 -1855 -1993 -2507 -3256 -4193 -6146
Trade Balance 
fob. 112 438 213 26 318 232 -365 -252 -63
Balance on goods 
and services -214 -110 -353 -548 -367 -582 -1330 -1495 -1785
Unrequit ted 
transfers 43 79 77 22 31 21 13 5 27
Capital, 
n.i.e.: 
private - 62 136 40 343 664 668 1199 1835 2346
Central govt. 76 220 98 48 184 215 404 532 986
Deposit money 
banks 16 -27 39 228 183 232 286 1112 431
Allocation of
SDRs - - - - - 59 47 51 -
Monetary 
authorities 
(increase in
93 -273 134 -92 -675 -651 -610 -2478 -2376
reserves negative)
Net errors and 
omissions -76 -25 -35 -1 -20 38 -9 438 371
Source : I.M.F., International Financial Statistics_,
Vol. XXIX, Number 8, August 1976, p.59.
Table 25.
Brazil : Receipts of 'Official Development 
Assistance' from DAC Countries and Resources at 
Concessional Terms from Multilatera! Agencies: 1969-73.
1969 - 138
1970 - 136
1971 - 120
19 72 - 93
1973 - 63
Source Development Cooperation: 1973 Review:
pp. 206-207; Development Cooperation
O.E.C.D., 1974, pp. 266-267.
O.E.C.D., 1973
1974 Review:
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Table 2b
Average Annual Rates of Growth of Gross 
Domestic Product, Exports and Imports at 
Constant Prices
Brazil GDP Exports Imports
1960-65 4.2 % 3.5% -5.2%
1965-70 7.5% 9.5% 18.2%
19 71 11.3% 8.8% 20.5%
19 72 10.4% 8.8% 19.9%
1973 11.4% 15.1% 18.3%
Sources: Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1972:
Vol. International Tables: United Nations, 
1974, p.90; and Economic Commission for Latin 
America, Economic Survey of Latin America3 1973,
Economic Commission for Latin America, United 
Nations, 1975, p. 142.
Table 27
Brazil : Reserves, 1967-73
(in millions of U.S. Dollars)
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Total Reserves 199 257 656 1187 1746 4183 6417
Imports, cif. 1667 2132 2265 2849 3701 4783 6855
Reserves 
Imports,
as % 
cif 12% 12% 29% 42% 47% 87% 94%
Source : I.M.F., International Financial Statistics3
Vol. XXVII, No. 8, August 1974, pp. 19, 37.
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i s s u e d  i n  1966) and t o  p ro c e e d  on an i n t e r i m  b a s i s  f o r  some y e a r s .
The new F o u r th  P l a n ,  p r e p a r e d  i n  1969 , p r o j e c t e d  im p o r t s  a t  a  l e v e l
6 3w e l l  be low  th o s e  p la n n e d  in  t h e  1966 v e r s i o n .  As l a t e  a s  1972, I n d i a ’ s
im p o r t s  r em a in e d  be low  t h e  1963 l e v e l s ,  even  i n  n o m ina l  t e r m s .  G ross
f i x e d  c a p i t a l  f o rm a t io n  a l s o  f a i l e d  to  i n c r e a s e  a s  a p e r c e n ta g e  o f  GDP,
a s  T a b le  29 i n d i c a t e s .  The d e c l i n e  i n  A m erican  econom ic  a i d  to  I n d i a
c a n n o t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  be  e x p la i n e d  by r e f e r e n c e  t o  th e  r a p i d  grow th  o f
64o t h e r  s o u r c e s  o f  f o r e i g n  exchange  and o f  d o m e s t ic  s a v i n g s .
A s i x t h  f a c t o r  c o n t r i b u t i n g  to  t h e  d e c l i n e  o f  econom ic a i d  was 
a  s h i f t  i n  a t t i t u d e s  c o n c e r n in g  i t s  e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  R e f e re n c e  h a s  a l ­
r e a d y  b een  made to  changed  a s s e s s m e n t s  a b o u t  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  c o n se q u e n c e s  
o f  a i d ,  b u t  t h e r e  w as, i n  a d d i t i o n ,  g r e a t e r  s c e p t i c i s m  a s  to  i t s  r o l e  
i n  p ro m o t in g  econom ic and s o c i a l  d e v e lo p m e n t .  W hile  a  few saw t h i s  a s  
an  i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  even  g r e a t e r  e f f o r t s  w ere  r e q u i r e d ,  many p o l i c y  
m akers  c o n s id e r e d  i t  an  a rgum en t f o r  a c c o r d in g  l e s s  p r i o r i t y  to  econom ic  
a i d .
One i n d i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  change i n  a t t i t u d e s  u n d e r  d i s c u s s i o n  i s  
t o  be found  i n  t h e  s t a t e m e n t s  o f  some C ongressm en . S e n a to r  Church 
p r o v i d e s  an example o f  d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t  from  t h e  l i b e r a l  end o f  th e  s p e c ­
t ru m . I n  a  sp e ec h  to  t h e  U .S . S e n a te  i n  1 971 , he a rg u e d  t h a t  U .S . e c o ­
nomic a i d  had  b e e n  commonly u se d  t o  p rom ote  i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n  programmes 
w hich  g e n e r a t e d  a h ig h  l e v e l  o f  c o n su m p tio n  f o r  th e  p r i v i l e g e d  w i th  
l i t t l e ,  i f  any , ' t r i c k l e  down' f o r  th e  d i s p o s s e s s e d .  W hile  t h e  Kennedy 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  had a t t e m p te d  to  e n c o u ra g e  p r o g r e s s i v e  p o l i c i e s  i n  L a t in  
A m erica ,  t h i s  had f a i l e d  b e c a u s e  t h e  a b i l i t y  to  im pose re fo rm s  from 
th e  o u t s i d e  was l i m i t e d ,  and b e c a u s e  th e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  w an ted  ' s t a b i l ­
i t y '  and a f a v o u r a b le  c l i m a t e  f o r  p r i v a t e  in v e s tm e n t  even  more t h a n  i t  
w an ted  r e f o r m .  A c c o r d in g ly :
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Table 29
India : Imports and Gross Fixed Capital
Formation as a Percentage of Gross Domestic 
Product.
Imports as a Gross Fixed Capital
% GDP Formation as a % GDP
1963 7% 16%
1964 7% 16%
1965 6% 17%
1966 8% 17%
1967 7% 16%
1968 6% 17%
1969 5% 16%
1970 5% 16%
1971 5% 16%
Source: Department of Economic and Social
Affairs, U.N. Yearbook of National 
Accounts Statistics 19743 Vol.Z, 
International Tables: U.N., 1975, 
p.A3.
... the per capita income of Latin 
American countries has risen during 
the years of the Alliance for Progress, 
but it has risen in so imbalanced and 
inequitable a way that the gains have 
gone almost entirely to the twenty per 
cent ... who live within the modern 
economy. The benefits accruing to the 
lower eighty per cent have not even kept 
up with population growth...
In countries long under the domination of corrupt oligarchies, Church 
argued, nothing less than a radical redistribution of political
65power might be the essential precondition for economic development.
A further indication of the change in attitudes which had
occurred can be found by examining statements from the executive.
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It has been seen in an earlier chapter that speeches concerning aid
during the Kennedy Administration were often extremely optimistic in
their assessment of the possibilities for rapid development, and the
contribution which aid could make to this process. Thus one statement
cited suggested that the difficulties involved in promoting economic
development in Latin America were broadly comparable to those which the
United States had faced in the reconstruction of Europe, and that a
decade of the Alliance for Progress would suffice to eliminate hunger,
bring basic education to all, and remove the need for massive assist­
iveance from outside. Whether those making such statements believed
them or not, the fact that they could be included in speeches is an
indication of the climate of optimism which existed at the time. By
the end of the 1960s, it was usual for remarks about the impact of
6 6aid to be couched in more sober terms. Moreover, senior officials
(or former officials) themselves made the point that the contribution 
which aid could make had been exaggerated in the past. ^
Seventh, the way in which other increasingly unpopular issues 
became linked to economic aid contributed to its decline. Over 1966- 
73, military assistance was regarded with increasing disquiet by a
68number of liberal Congressmen and by liberal groups outside Congress.
Since military aid was normally included with economic aid in one
piece of legislation, the diminishing popularity of the former tended
69to weaken support for the latter. As one liberal. Senator Kennedy
saw it, the military assistance programme "was the worst aspect of
Actual achievement fell far short of these targets.
In the case of education, it has been seen that only 58% 
of the 5-14 age group were enrolled as primary students 
in Latin America in 1971 - a rise of 12% from the 1960 
figure of 46%.
the (foreign aid) bill now before us, contaminating what remains 
by its very presence".^ Again, partly because a large share of 
military and economic aid was transferred to Indochina, economic 
assistance became linked with the issue of American involvement in 
that region, and its popularity suffered with those groups which 
favoured withdrawal. As noted previously, this issue contributed to 
a weakening of support for the bill on the part of church groups.
More broadly, the aid programme served as one means whereby 
Congressmen could indicate their dissatisfaction with the Administra­
tion policy on a whole range of foreign policy and national security 
issues. The remarks of Representative Fraser, normally a strong sup­
porter of economic aid, illustrate the way in which some Congressmen 
saw their support for aid as linked with the Administration's stance 
on more general issues. In the course of Congressional hearings on 
aid in 1969, Fraser noted that:
The current Administration, like the 
last Administration, is pursuing marginal 
or fictional security concerns. The 
result is that we don't have very much 
money for domestic programs. ... I am 
having a real problem developing any real 
enthusiasm for working hard for foreign 
aid this year. And I am deeply disturbed 
by the Administration's continued insistence 
on the testing of the MIRV program, and by 
what I regard as the unbelievable assertions 
by the Secretary of Defense with respect 
to the security threats facing the United 
States. ... This Administration, it seems 
to me, has got to do better if it expects 
some of us to help in the program which, 
for the most part, has be^y opposed by the 
members of his own party.
It seems likely that disillusionment with general foreign and defence 
policies of the kind expressed by Fraser contributed to some weaken­
ing of support for aid in this manner.
Two further factors must be considered as possible causes of
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the fall in concessional economic aid. There is first the possibil­
ity that it resulted from a decline in the capacity of the United 
States to bear the economic and financial burden of providing aid. 
Congressmen frequently made reference to this factor as a reason for 
restricting the programme; indeed, one statement making reference 
to grounds of this kind has been cited already in this chapter.
In one sense the capacity of the United States to provide aid 
did decline. Over the period under review, the United States faced 
a continuing problem with its balance of payments. Concern with this 
problem was not new; it had given rise to measures to increasingly 
tie aid as early as 1958. But by the mid-sixties, the problem was more 
serious. After a series of deficits, U.S. official reserve assets 
(mainly gold, but also including other convertible currencies and its 
reserve position with the International Monetary Fund) had declined 
from the 1958 level of more than 22 billion to a 1966 value of less 
than 15 billion (Table 30). Thereafter, reserves fluctuated, falling 
to a low of a little over 12 billion at the end of 1971. Over the 
whole period, short term dollar claims held by foreigners tended to 
increase, giving rise to increasing doubts as to the ability of the
72U.S. Government to maintain the value of the dollar in terms of gold.
Ultimately, the American Government was forced to temporarily suspend
official gold convertibility for the U.S. dollar (August 1971), to
seek an upward realignment of other currencies, and to twice devalue
73the dollar in terms of gold (1972 and 1973). But increased concern
with the balance of payments problem had led to new measures well 
before this; thus in 1965, a voluntary programme for corporations was 
introduced under which the business community accepted the need for 
limits on investment in developed countries, for export expansion,
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
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Table 30.
U.S. Official Reserve Assets and Changes 
in Liquid Liabilities to Foreigners: 
__________1958-73.______________________
(in millions of U.S. dollars)
U.S. Official 
Reserve Assets 
(end of period)
Total
Total Gold (a + b)
22540 20582
21504 19507
19359 17804 +1531
18753 16947 +1646
17220 16057 +1331
16843 15596 +2336
16672 15471 +2525
15450 13806 +1255
14882 13235 +1583
14830 12065 +4631
15710 10892 +2491
16964 11859 +7268
14487 11072 +1644
12167 10206 +19617
13151 10487 +13797
14378 11652 +7442
Changes in liabilities to 
foreigners
a. To Foreign b. Liquid 
official Liabilities
agencies* to private
foreigners
1258 273
742 904
1117 214
155 7 779
1363 1162
67 1188
-787 2370
3366 1265
-761 3252
-1552 8820
7362 -5988
27405 -7788
10322 3475
5099 2343
Source: Economic Report of the President
Transmitted to the Congress3 January 19763 
together with the Annual Report of the 
Council of Economic Advisers:
U.S. Government Printing Office 1976, 
pp. 275, 279.
Includes liabilities to foreign official agencies 
reported by U.S. Government and U.S. banks and U.S 
liabilities to the I.M.F. arising from reversible 
gold sales to, and gold deposits with, the United 
States.
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and f o r  i n c r e a s e d  r e p a t r i a t i o n  o f  f o r e ig n  e a r n i n g s .  T h is  was r e p l a c e d
by s t r i c t e r  m andato ry  c o n t r o l s  e n t e r i n g  i n t o  f o r c e  a t  t h e  b e g in n in g  
74o f  1968.
T here  a r e  s e v e r a l  r e a s o n s  f o r  s u g g e s t i n g  t h a t  c o n c e rn  w i th
th e  A m erican  b a la n c e  o f  paym ents  p rob lem  c o n t r i b u t e d  to  a  w eaken ing
o f  s u p p o r t  f o r  econom ic  a i d .  A lth o u g h  a i d  had b een  l a r g e l y  t i e d  to
p ro c u re m e n t  w i t h i n  th e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  by t h e  m i d - s i x t i e s ,  t h e r e  rem a in ed
a s m a l l  l e a k a g e  a r i s i n g  b o th  from  th e  s m a l l  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  a i d  w hich
re m a in e d  u n t i e d  and from  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  s h ip m e n ts  f i n a n c e d  by
a i d  m ig h t  d i s p l a c e  com m erc ia l  e x p o r t s  from  th e  U n i te d  S t a t e s ,  T here
i s  e v id e n c e  o f  a c o n s i d e r a b l e  m easu re  o f  c o n c e rn  w i t h i n  s e c t i o n s  o f
t h e  e x e c u t i v e  (m ost n o t a b l y  t h e  T r e a s u r y )  o v e r  th e  im p a c t  o f  a i d  i n
t h i s  a r e a :  c o n c e rn  w hich  i n  some i n s t a n c e s  gave r i s e  t o  d e c i s i o n s
to  r e d u c e  th e  r e a l  v a lu e  o f  a id  t o  r e c i p i e n t s  o r  even  to  im pose c u t s
on t h e  program me. Thus f o r  a  s h o r t  p e r i o d  a f t e r  1967 , an a t t e m p t  was
made to  e n s u r e  t h e  a i d  f i n a n c e d  com m odit ies  and s e r v i c e s  ’a d d i t i o n a l '
to  t h o s e  w hich would have  b e e n  p ro v id e d  th ro u g h  com m erc ia l  c h a n n e l s ? “*
At one s t a g e ,  e a c h  l o a n  p r o p o s a l  made by A . I .D .  was s c r u t i n i s e d  by
T r e a s u r y  f o r  p o s s i b l e  f o r e i g n  exchange  c o s t s .  A c c o rd in g  to  A . I .D .
A d m i n i s t r a t o r  Gaud:
I  w a s n ' t  to o  w o r r i e d  a b o u t  t h i s  ( t h e  
im p a c t  o f  a id  on th e  b a la n c e  o f  p a y m e n t s ) .
But Joe  F o w le r ,  th e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  th e  
T r e a s u r y  w as. . . .  The c o n c e rn  was so 
p ron o u n ced  t h a t  each  o f  o u r  lo a n s  went 
th ro u g h  T r e a s u r y  to  be exam ined . The 
S e c r e t a r y  o f  th e  T re a s u r y  t h e n  r e p o r t e d   ^
to  t h e  W hite  House on e v e ry  lo a n  we made.
A f u r t h e r  i n d i c a t i o n  o f  c o n c e rn  was t h e  1971 announcem en t,  n o te d  
p r e v i o u s l y ,  t h a t  a id  would be c u t  by 10% a s  p a r t  o f  a pack ag e  o f  mea­
s u r e s  t o  im prove th e  U.S. b a l a n c e  o f  paym ents  p o s i t i o n .
W ith in  C ongress  c o n c e rn  o v e r  t h e  im p a c t  o f  a i d  on th e  b a la n c e
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of payments was expressed frequently. In some instances, it was
suggested that this factor was of considerable importance to the
Congressmen concerned. Thus, Senator Symington pointed out that he
had opposed soft loans for the Asian Development Bank in 1965 because
78the U.S. balance of payments was becoming such a problem.
The notion of a decline in the capacity of the United States
to provide aid is less plausible in other senses. The per capita
GNP of the United States grew at an average rate of 2% per annum in
79real terms over the 1965-72 interval. Budget receipts increased
(in nominal terms) from 117 billion in fiscal 1965 to 232 billion in 
801973. It is accordingly somewhat unreasonable to suggest that the
U.S. Government was less able to bear the budgetary cost of providing 
aid. In Congress, it was at times suggested that large budget deficits 
(especially in the context of rapid inflation) and an expanding 
national debt were reasons for curtailing foreign aid programmes. 
However, both deficits and increased debt arose from increased spend­
ing in other areas rather than from a decline in government revenue; 
they are accordingly better treated as symptoms of greater emphasis 
on other areas in public expenditure rather than as indications of a 
decline in the capacity to provide aid. The manner in which increased 
priority in other fields contributed to a weakening of support for aid 
has already been examined under a different heading in this chapter.
The remaining possibility is that the decline in concessional 
economic aid resulted from greater resort to alternative instruments 
by American policy makers. Military assistance, trade preferences 
and concessions, hard loans and measures to encourage private capital 
flows may act as partial substitutes for concessional economic aid in
some circumstances.
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The available evidence suggests that a shift towards alter­
native instruments was of relatively little importance in explaining 
the decline in concessional economic aid. In the case of military 
aid, there was a significant growth in the total amount provided to 
less developed countries between 1966 and 1973, but as Table 31 shows, 
the increase was largely channeled to Israel, South Vietnam, Laos, 
Cambodia and South Korea. In the case of two of these countries - 
Cambodia and Israel - there was a significant expansion of economic
aid over the 1966-73 interval; military aid was thus not increased
81to offset declining levels of economic aid. The possibility that
the executive branch used increased military aid in preference to
seeking additional economic assistance cannot be ruled out in the
remaining instances, but there is no direct evidence to support this
view, and it is more likely that the increase arose from greater
82military requirements.
There is no evidence to suggest that the decline in concession­
al economic aid from the United States resulted from greater use of 
trade concessions. A number of other countries moved to implement 
general tariff preferences for products from less developed countries 
over the period 1966-73, but the United States was not among the group
While President Johnson agreed to consider a generalised preference
8 3scheme as early as 1967, It was not until January 1, 1976, that one
84was actually brought into effect. Other trade negotiations do not 
appear to have been employed to offset declining economic aid to any 
appreciable extent.^
As far as private foreign investment is concerned, there was 
a significant increase in the amount made available to developing 
countries from sources within the United States with the total rising
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Table 31.
U.S. Military Aid : 1966-73 
(data represents commitments 
in millions of U.S. dollars)
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 19 71 1972 1973
Near East and 
South Asia 558 546 349 436 192 835 611 592
Israel 90 7 25 85 30 545 300 308
Latin America 126 88 76 45 23 75 91 83
East Asia 1123 1228 1808 2129 2249 3084 3852 4417
S.Vietnam 659 652 1064 1353 1512 1920 25 71 3299
Laos 63 82 82 95 140 198 287 374
Cambodia - - - - 8 184 187 160
S.Korea 210 272 389 480 330 556 532 363
Africa 30 48 20 31 18 48 37 29
Total Military 
Aid for the 
Regions listed
1837 1910 2253 2641 2482 404 3 4591 5121
Total excluding 
Israel, 815 897 693 628 462 640 714 617
S. Vietnam, Laos, 
Cambodia, Korea.
Source: Data obtained directly or calculated from
information given in U.S. Overseas Loans and 
Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations,
July 1, 1945 - June 30, 1974.
from $1859 million in 1965 to $3996 million in 1973.^ Most of this 
represented an increase in direct investment, though there was also 
a significant expansion in the case of portfolio investment and pri­
vate export credits. However, it would seem that much of the expansion 
which occurred resulted from factors other than changes in government 
policy. Encouragement of foreign private investment in less developed 
countries had long been an objective of U.S. policy and a variety of
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methods had been employed for some time to promote this end. These 
included attempts to persuade less developed countries to improve 
the climate for foreign investment, measures to guarantee approved 
foreign investment against losses arising from revolution, expropri­
ation and other contingencies, advice to foreign investors, loans in
domestic currencies accumulated through the sale of agricultural
8 7commodities, and various tax advantages. The administration of
the various insurance and guarantee programmes was simplified by the
establishment of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation in 1969,
but provisions designed to encourage private investment abroad were
88not notably more liberal than those which had existed previously.
Indeed, in some respects, U.S. government policy became increasingly
restrictive. Although the 1965 voluntary restraints on private foreign
investment exempted developing countries, the 1968 controls limited
new investment in less developed countries by individuals and companies
89to 110% of their 1965-66 average. Thus, though increased private
foreign investment from the United States may have contributed to the 
decline of aid in the manner discussed in a previous section of this 
chapter, policy makers did not, by and large, bring about this growth 
so that they could reduce concessional aid.
A further possibility is that the American Government opted 
increasingly for what in O.E.C.D. statistics are termed ’other offi­
cial flows' - flows such as government export credits which fall out­
side the category of concessional economic aid. Net flows of this 
type from the United States fluctuated markedly over the period under
review without any apparent tendency towards expansion; thus the
901972 total was below the amount reached in 1967, It is accordingly 
difficult to suggest that the decline of aid resulted from increased
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u s e  o f  t h i s  i n s t r u m e n t .
I l l
To c o n c lu d e ,  t h e r e  was a s i g n i f i c a n t  d e c l i n e  i n  th e  l e v e l  o f  
c o n c e s s i o n a l  A m erican  econom ic a id  t o  l e s s  d e v e lo p e d  c o u n t r i e s  o v e r  
t h e  p e r i o d  1966 -1973 . T h i s  d e c l i n e  r e s u l t e d  from an  e r o s i o n  o f  
s u p p o r t  among b o t h  l i b e r a l s  and c o n s e r v a t i v e s .  D ise n ch a n tm e n t  was 
p e r h a p s  m ost v i s i b l e  i n  C o n g re s s ,  b u t  t h e r e  was a l s o  a w eaken ing  o f  
s u p p o r t  w i t h i n  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  and among o t h e r  g ro u p s .
A number o f  c h a n g es  e x p l a i n  t h i s  l o s s  o f  s u p p o r t .  ’ Cold W ar’ 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  p r e v i o u s l y  i m p o r ta n t  i n  j u s t i f y i n g  th e  t r a n s f e r  o f  
a i d  l o s t  some o f  t h e i r  f o r c e  i n  t h e  l a t e  1960s and e a r l y  1 9 7 0 s ,  w h i l e  
i n c r e a s i n g  c o n c e rn  w i th  d o m e s t ic  p ro b le m s  (su c h  a s  u rb a n  s q u a l o r ,  
p o v e r t y  and i n f l a t i o n )  gave r i s e  to  p r e s s u r e  to  c u t  s p e n d in g  on i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  program m es. D e c l in i n g  a g r i c u l t u r a l  s u r p l u s e s ,  a d e t e r i o r a t i o n  
i n  r e l a t i o n s  b e tw e en  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  and some a i d  r e c i p i e n t s ,  g r e a t ­
e r  s c e p t i c i s m  c o n c e r n in g  th e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  a id  i n  p ro m o t in g  e cono ­
m ic and s o c i a l  d e v e lo p m e n t ,  and  th e  i n c r e a s i n g  s e v e r i t y  o f  th e  
A m erican  b a l a n c e  o f  paym ents  p ro b lem  w ere  o t h e r  c o n t r i b u t i n g  f a c t o r s .
A number o f  l e s s  d e v e lo p e d  c o u n t r i e s  w ere  a b le  to  im prove  t h e i r  e x p o r t  
e a r n i n g s  m a rk e d ly ,  and o b t a i n  s u b s t a n t i a l  i n c r e a s e s  i n  c a p i t a l  f lo w s  
from  o t h e r  s o u r c e s ;  c u t s  c o u ld  t h e r e f o r e  be  made i n  t h e i r  a i d  w i t h o u t  
p l a c i n g  t h e i r  d e v e lo p m en t  programmes i n  j e o p a r d y .  F i n a l l y ,  econom ic 
a i d  w a s ,  o r  becam e, l i n k e d  w i th  o t h e r  i n c r e a s i n g l y  u n p o p u la r  i s s u e s  
such  a s  t h e  A m erican  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  In d o c h in a  and i t s  in v o lv e m e n t  i n  
s u p p ly i n g  arm s to  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  u n d e r  m i l i t a r y  a s s i s t a n c e  p rogram m es.
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CONCLUSION
It was noted at the outset that this dissertation would be 
concerned with three principal questions. The first problem was to 
explain the emergence of significant programmes of economic aid for 
less developed countries over the period 1933-47. The second was to 
account for the expansion of concessional economic aid to LDCs 
between 1948 and 1966, while the third was to explain the decline of 
this type of assistance over 1966-73.
The first three parts of this concluding chapter will state 
the findings of the dissertation on these points. In the fourth 
section, an attempt will be made to make some generalisations about 
the factors which have affected the level of aid to less developed 
countries ?-
I
A number of factors help to account for the emergence of signi­
ficant programmes of economic aid for less developed countries over 
1933-47. First, there were strong foreign policy and defence motives 
for providing aid, arising principally from conflict with the Axis 
powers and the broad nature of American post-war objectives. From 
1938 through the war period, aid was used to increase influence over 
other governments or deny it to hostile powers, to create good will 
for the United States and its cause, to strengthen the capacity of 
recipients to resist the Axis powers, to contribute to political stabi­
lity where this was considered important to the effort against the 
opposing powers, and to add to the production of resources needed for
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the war effort. A variety of programmes, including Eximbank and 
technical assistance operations, were expanded with these consider­
ations in mind. Aid was provided for comparable purposes after the 
Second World War. In addition, the general objective of a more stable 
and peaceful post-war world encouraged policy makers to establish the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
For at least part of the period, there were strong reasons for 
providing aid as a means of developing markets and outlets for American 
products. This was, to a large extent, a consequence of the Depression 
and of fears of a new depression following the Second World War. It 
was the problem of falling agricultural prices, brought about by the 
Depression, which prompted the Roosevelt Administration to take its 
first major initiative in the field of foreign aid - a credit enabling 
China to purchase American wheat and cotton. Early loans by the 
Export-Import Bank were also largely concerned with promoting the sale 
of American products. Private sources of finance for exports had de­
clined abruptly because of the Depression, leaving American exporters 
at a disadvantage with respect to competitors in Great Britain, Italy, 
France and Japan who could draw on government export agencies estab­
lished in the period since the end of the First World War. Concern 
with the problem of maintaining full employment and prosperity follow­
ing the Second World War was an important factor in the decision to 
create such institutions as the World Bank and the International Mone­
tary Fund.
A third factor encouraging the emergence of significant pro­
grammes of economic aid was a change in attitudes concerning the effect­
iveness of aid as a foreign policy instrument. Aid to governments 
was initially thought more likely to damage relations than improve
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them . T h is  a t t i t u d e  was i m p o r ta n t  in  t h e  r e j e c t i o n  o f  a  number o f  
p r o p o s a l s  f o r  a i d ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  L a t i n  A m erica .  For a v a r i e t y  o f  
r e a s o n s ,  t h i s  v iew  had  changed  a p p r e c i a b l y  by t h e  l a t e  1 9 3 0 s ,  and 
t h e  A m erican  Government began  to  u se  a id  a s  a means o f  p ro m o t in g  more 
f r i e n d l y  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s .  S u b se q u e n t  e x p e r i e n c e  s a t i s ­
f i e d  many o f f i c i a l s  and Congressm en t h a t  a i d  was an  e f f e c t i v e  i n s t r u ­
m ent f o r  t h i s  p u r p o s e .
S u b s t a n t i a l  r e q u i r e m e n t s  on t h e  p a r t  o f  r e c i p i e n t s  c o n t r i b u t e d  
to  t h e  g row th  o f  a i d .  R e q u ire m en ts  f o r  a id  w ere  l a r g e  b e c a u s e  o f  th e  
d i s r u p t i o n  o f  many econom ies  d u r in g  t h e  Second World War, th e  d e c l i n e  
i n  p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l  f lo w s  from  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  and o t h e r  c r e d i t o r  
c o u n t r i e s  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  D e p r e s s io n ,  and g r e a t e r  i n t e r e s t  i n  i n d u s t r i a l ­
i s a t i o n  and  econom ic  d ev e lo p m en t i n  many l e s s  d e v e lo p e d  c o u n t r i e s .
T h e re  w ere  some s e n s e s  i n  w h ich  th e  c a p a c i t y  o f  t h e  U n i te d  
S t a t e s  t o  p r o v id e  a i d  i n c r e a s e d .  S u b s t a n t i a l  i n c r e a s e s  ( i n  r e a l  te rm s)  
i n  g r o s s  n a t i o n a l  p r o d u c t  and governm ent r e v e n u e  w ere  r e g i s t e r e d ,  d e s ­
p i t e  a  te m p o ra ry  d e c l i n e  d u r in g  th e  D e p r e s s io n .  F u r t h e r ,  t h e  U n i te d  
S t a t e s  was i n c r e a s i n g l y  a b l e  to  p r o v id e  l a r g e  am ounts o f  a id  w i t h o u t  
r u n n in g  i n t o  b a l a n c e  o f  paym en ts  p ro b le m s .  Even s o ,  t h e r e  w ere  con ­
s t r a i n t s  on a i d  d u r i n g  th e  Second World War b e c a u s e  o f  s c a r c i t i e s  o f  
many c o m m od it ie s  u r g e n t l y  n ee d ed  f o r  t h e  war e f f o r t .
I n  some i n s t a n c e s ,  im proved  r e l a t i o n s  be tw een  t h e  U n i ted  S t a t e s  
and  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  e n c o u ra g e d  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  o f  a i d .  T h is  was so  i n  
Mexico w here  s e t t l e m e n t  o f  i s s u e s  a r i s i n g  from  n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  o f  
A m erican  p r o p e r t y  c l e a r e d  t h e  way f o r  t h e  t r a n s f e r  o f  s i g n i f i c a n t  
am ounts  o f  a i d .  R e s o r t  t o  econom ic  a id  was a l s o  e n c o u ra g e d  by a  s h i f t  
away from  a l t e r n a t i v e  t e c h n i q u e s  f o r  i n f l u e n c i n g  e v e n t s  i n  l e s s  d e v e lo p ­
ed c o u n t r i e s .  A l t e r n a t i v e s  no lo n g e r  f a v o u re d  i n c l u d e d  m i l i t a r y
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i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  th e  use  o f  custom s r e c e i v e r s h i p s ,  gu n b o a t  d ip lo m ac y ,  
and m e a s u re s  to  deny o r  f a c i l i t a t e  l o a n s  from p r i v a t e  s o u r c e s .
C h a p te r  One d e m o n s t r a te d  t h a t  t h e s e  t e c h n i q u e s  w ere  u se d  e x t e n s i v e l y  
by t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  i n  C e n t r a l  Am erica  i n  t h e  f i r s t  p a r t  o f  t h e  
p r e s e n t  c e n t u r y .
F u r t h e r ,  t h e r e  was a r e l a t i v e l y  f a v o u r a b le  d o m e s t ic  p o l i t i c a l  
c l i m a t e  f o r  t h e  t r a n s f e r  o f  a i d ,  a r i s i n g  i n  p a r t  from  i n c r e a s e d  a c c e p t ­
an ce  o f  governm ent i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  th e  economy. Not o n ly  d i d  t h i s
i n d i r e c t l y  h e lp  to  make p o s s i b l e  such  m ea su res  to  " p r o v id e  a New Deal
2
i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e c o n o m ics"  a s  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  e s t a b l i s h e d  a t  B r e t t o n  
Woods: t h e r e  w ere  a l s o  a number o f  i n s t a n c e s  w here b ro a d  powers
g r a n t e d  to  e n a b le  th e  governm ent to  d e a l  w i th  war o r  d e p r e s s i o n  w ere  
u s e d  to  e s t a b l i s h  o r  f i n a n c e  programmes o f  econom ic a i d .  A g a in ,  a i d  
to  l e s s  d e v e lo p e d  c o u n t r i e s  was o f t e n  l i n k e d  w i th  i s s u e s  h a v in g  b r o a d ­
e r  s u p p o r t  -  f o r  e x a m p le ,  t h e  g e n e r a l  war e f f o r t ,  o r  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  
a i d  t o  E u ro p e .
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  w id e s p re a d  d e s t r u c t i o n  b r o u g h t  a b o u t  by t h e  Second 
World War a p p e a r s  t o  have  g iv e n  r i s e  t o  some s u p p o r t  f o r  r e l i e f  mea­
s u r e s  on h u m a n i t a r i a n  g r o u n d s .  There  were a l r e a d y  p o w e r fu l  r e a s o n s  
f o r  p r o v i d i n g  r e l i e f  on o t h e r  g r o u n d s ,  f o r  i t  was th o u g h t  to  c o n t r i ­
b u t e  to  p o l i t i c a l  s t a b i l i t y ,  t o  prom ote  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  an expand­
in g  l i b e r a l  w o r ld  economy, and a s s i s t  in  p r o s e c u t i o n  o f  t h e  war e f f o r t .  
But h u m a n i t a r i a n  m o t iv e s  added  to  t h e  w e ig h t  o f  t h e s e .
I I
The seco n d  t a s k  o f  t h e  d i s s e r t a t i o n  was to  a c c o u n t  f o r  t h e  i n ­
c r e a s e  i n  th e  amount o f  c o n c e s s i o n a l  econom ic a id  p r o v id e d  to  l e s s  
d e v e lo p e d  c o u n t r i e s  b e tw e e n  1948 and 1966. C h a p te r s  T h ree  and F o u r ,
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which deal with this question, suggest a number of factors which 
help to explain this change. First, there was increased concern with 
the danger of 'communist' influence in less developed countries.
This concern had not been absent in the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
but policy makers were then preoccupied with, first, the problem of 
economic collapse and left wing influence in Europe, and second, the 
possibility of direct military expansion by communist powers. From 
the mid-1950s onward, U.S. officials and Congressmen became increasing­
ly concerned with the danger that internal political change, together 
with the expanded use of trade, economic aid and other instruments 
by communist powers, would lead to growing communist influence in 
less developed areas. Economic aid for LDCs was accordingly given 
greater emphasis. There were other factors which tended to encourage 
the transfer of additional amounts of economic aid on foreign policy 
grounds. Thus some decisions to increase aid appear to have been 
influenced by the intense efforts of less developed countries to ob­
tain a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development.
Large stockpiles of agricultural surpluses began to accumulate 
in the United States in the early 1950s, with inventories of the Com­
modity Credit Corporation exceeding six billion dollars by 1954.
This was an important factor (thought not the only one) behind the 
introduction of programmes providing agricultural commodity assistance. 
Initially, commodities were supplied to Europe and Japan as well as 
less developed countries: it was not until 1958 that half of the
agricultural commodity assistance was provided to LDCs. However, 
the American Government increasingly took the view that Europe and 
Japan should obtain commodities through commercial channels. Less 
developed areas therefore became the main outlet for American
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surpluses, receiving almost 90% of commodities provided by 1965.
The growth of aid was facilitated by the emergence and growing 
currency of doctrines which were optimistic in their assessment of 
the way in which aid could promote economic development abroad. One 
source of this optimism was the burgeoning literature on economic 
development. The work of Millikan, Rostow and others from the Center 
for International Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Techno­
logy was of particular importance. These writers suggested that the 
United States could, through the application of large scale capital 
aid for a limited period, move many of the less developed countries 
into self sustained growth. The experience of the Marshall Plan was 
a further source of optimism concerning the impact of aid.
Requirements for aid increased in many less developed countries. 
Sometimes, this was because development objectives became more ambi­
tious. In other cases, it resulted from such changes as declining 
terms of trade, increased indebtedness, and the dissipation of pre­
viously accumulated foreign exchange reserves. Policy makers tended 
to take account of these factors when determining aid levels. Some­
times, as in India following the introduction of the Second Five Year 
Plan, they provided further aid when unanticipated foreign exchange 
problems arose. In the case of surplus agricultural commodity pro­
grammes, increased requirements in LDCs for imported grains helped 
to make it possible for the United States to dispose of large volumes 
of surpluses. Officials had to leave room for commercial exports 
from American and other producers: accordingly, it would have been
difficult to dispose of surpluses without this change. As it was, 
it was not always possible to dispose of surpluses at the rate
desired.
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T h e re  w ere  some s e n s e s  i n  w hich t h e  c a p a c i t y  o f  t h e  U n i ted  
S t a t e s  t o  p r o v id e  a i d  i n c r e a s e d .  A g g re g a te  p r o d u c t i o n  and A m erican 
governm en t  r e v e n u e  c o n t in u e d  to  i n c r e a s e  i n  r e a l  t e r m s .  W ith o u t  
t h e s e  t r e n d s ,  i t  i s  l i k e l y  t h a t  th e  g row th  o f  a i d  would have  b e e n  
s lo w e r .  As i t  w as ,  b u d g e ta r y  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  o f t e n  l e d  E isen h o w er  
to  im pose  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on econom ic  a i d .  F u r t h e r ,  a s  econom ic  r e c o v ­
e r y  p r o c e e d e d ,  t h e r e  was a s h a rp  d e c l i n e  in  t h e  amount o f  a i d  p r o v i d ­
ed  to  Europe  -  w i th  comm itm ents f a l l i n g  from  more th a n  $3 b i l l i o n /  
y e a r  o v e r  1949-52  to  l e s s  th a n  $20 m i l l i o n / y e a r  o v e r  1 9 6 2 -6 5 .  T h is  
h e lp e d  t o  make p o s s i b l e  i n c r e a s e d  a id  e l s e w h e r e .  Of c o u r s e ,  t h e  
c a p a c i t y  o f  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  to  p r o v id e  a id  d id  n o t  i n c r e a s e  i n  a l l  
r e s p e c t s .  T here  was i n c r e a s i n g  d i f f i c u l t y  w i th  t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  p a y ­
m en ts  from  1958 , and  t h i s  l e d  p o l i c y  m akers  to  r e d u c e  t h e  r e a l  v a lu e  
o f  each  u n i t  o f  a i d  p r o v id e d  by  p r o g r e s s i v e l y  t y i n g  a i d  to  co m m o d it ie s  
and  s e r v i c e s  p ro d u c e d  i n  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s .
R e l a t i o n s  b e tw e e n  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  and some l e s s  d e v e lo p e d  
c o u n t r i e s  im p ro v e d ,  m aking t h e  t r a n s f e r  o f  i n c r e a s e d  am ounts o f  a i d  
t o  them more a c c e p t a b l e .  T h i s  was s i g n i f i c a n t  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  I n d i a ,  
w here  i n c r e a s e d  t o l e r a n c e  o f  n o n - a l ig n m e n t  and somewhat l e s s  e m p h a s is  
on d i f f e r e n c e s  o v e r  ’ s o c i a l i s m '  t e n d e d  t o  e n c o u ra g e  t h e  g row th  o f  
a i d .  I t  was a l s o  a f a c t o r  i n  E g y p t .  I n c r e a s e d  a c c e p ta n c e  o f  n o n -  
a l i g n m e n t  and t h e  p o l i c y  ch an g es  i n t r o d u c e d  by N a s s e r  from  1959 ( d i s ­
c u s s e d  i n  C h a p te r  T h re e )  h e lp e d  to  c r e a t e  a c l i m a t e  in  w hich  t h a t  
c o u n t r y  c o u ld  emerge a s  a m a jo r  r e c i p i e n t .  Im proved r e l a t i o n s  b e ­
tw een  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  and o t h e r  p r o d u c e r  c o u n t r i e s  ( n o t  a l l  LDCs) 
was a m ino r  f a c t o r  f a c i l i t a t i n g  th e  e x p a n s io n  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  com­
m o d ity  a i d  from 1959 . P r e v i o u s l y ,  t h e r e  had b e e n  s t r o n g  c r i t i c i s m  
o f  some a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  PL480 programme from  a number o f  p r o d u c e r s .
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Finally, policy makers became less optimistic in their assess­
ment of some of the alternatives to economic aid. They had tended 
to argue, in the early part of the period under review, that measures 
to encourage private capital flows, trade liberalisation and the 
provision of loans at near commercial rates would be adequate to meet 
most of the requirements of less developed countries. This view was 
no longer as widely held by the early 1960s.
Ill
There was a significant decline (in real terms) in the level 
of U.S. concessional economic aid to less developed countries over 
1966-73. The final task of the dissertation was to provide an explan­
ation for this change. The immediate cause of the decline was an
erosion of support among a variety of groups in the United States,
3including both liberals and conservatives. Disenchantment was per­
haps most visible in Congress, but there was also a weakening of sup­
port within the executive and among other groups.
This loss of support, and hence the decline of concessional 
aid, can be seen as the result of a number of changes. First, 'cold 
war' considerations previously important in justifying the transfer 
of aid lost some of their force for many in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. This was a consequence of improved relations with the Soviet 
Union following the Cuban missile crisis; schism within 'the com­
munist bloc'; the fact that many LDCs seemed less vulnerable to radi­
cal movements and to the blandishments of other communist powers; 
and awareness of the cost of attempting to impose America's preferred 
political order on less developed countries. At the same time, there 
was increased concern with domestic problems in the United States,
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such  a s  u rb a n  s q u a l o r ,  p o v e r ty  and i n f l a t i o n .  A c c o r d in g ly ,  t h e r e  
was a s h i f t  i n  em p h as is  away from  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  o b j e c t i v e s ,  l e a d i n g  
to  p r e s s u r e  to  c u t  econom ic  a i d  and o t h e r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p rogram m es.
S econd , t h e  l e v e l  o f  U .S . a g r i c u l t u r a l  s u r p l u s e s  d e c l i n e d  
m a rk e d ly .  The v a lu e  o f  com m od it ies  a c t u a l l y  owned by t h e  Commodity 
C r e d i t  C o r p o r a t io n  d ropped  from o v e r  $5 b i l l i o n  i n  1963 t o  l e s s  t h a n  
$400 m i l l i o n  i n  1973 . In  t h a t  y e a r ,  s h ip m e n ts  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  commod­
i t y  a s s i s t a n c e  f e l l  to  t h e i r  lo w e s t  l e v e l  s i n c e  t h e  i n c e p t i o n  o f  
PL480 i n  1954 , a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  
A g r i c u l t u r e  t h a t  co m m o d it ie s  w ere  i n  s h o r t  s u p p ly .
A g a in ,  t h e r e  was a s h i f t  i n  a t t i t u d e s  r e g a r d i n g  th e  e f f e c t i v e ­
n e s s  o f  a i d .  The i n e q u i t a b l e  p a t t e r n  o f  grow th  i n  many LDCs, and 
t h e  f a i l u r e  o f  a i d  t o  a c h i e v e  t a r g e t s  p r e v i o u s l y  c o n s id e r e d  a t t a i n ­
a b l e  l e d  to  g r e a t e r  s c e p t i c i s m  a s  to  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  a i d  i n  p r o ­
m o tin g  econom ic and  s o c i a l  d e v e lo p m e n t .  In  t h e  c l i m a t e  o f  o p t im ism  
o f  t h e  e a r l y  1 9 6 0 s ,  th e  e x e c u t i v e  had  been  a b l e  t o  r e l e a s e  s t a t e m e n t s  
s u g g e s t i n g  t h a t  a  d e c ad e  o f  t h e  A l l i a n c e  f o r  P r o g r e s s  w ould s u f f i c e  
to  e l i m i n a t e  h u n g e r ,  b r i n g  b a s i c  e d u c a t io n  to  a l l ,  and  remove t h e  n eed  
f o r  m a s s iv e  a s s i s t a n c e  from  o u t s i d e .  By t h e  end o f  t h e  1 9 6 0 s ,  i t  
was u s u a l  f o r  re m a rk s  a b o u t  t h e  im p a c t  o f  a id  to  be  couched  i n  much 
more s o b e r  t e r m s .  T h e re  w as, t o o ,  a b e l i e f  on the. p a r t  o f  some p o l i c y  
m a k e rs ,  t h a t  a id  was l e s s  e f f e c t i v e  th a n  had been  p r e v i o u s l y  th o u g h t  
i n  p ro m o t in g  s t a b i l i t y  and  w in n in g  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  on 
f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  i s s u e s .  Some, l i k e  F u l b r i g h t ,  a rg u e d  t h a t  b i l a t e r a l  
econom ic  a i d  had  become a v e h i c l e  f o r  t h e  e x t e n s i o n  o f  Am erican 
i n t e r e s t s  a b r o a d ,  l e a d i n g  u l t i m a t e l y  to  t h e  ty p e  o f  m i l i t a r y  i n t e r ­
v e n t i o n  w hich had  o c c u r r e d  i n  V ie tnam .
A number o f  l e s s  d e v e lo p e d  c o u n t r i e s  w ere  a b l e  to  o b t a i n
413.
substantial increases in the amount of capital provided from other 
sources, including private sources, other governments and multi­
lateral agencies. Many countries also improved their export earnings 
markedly. Such countries - Taiwan and Brazil are examples - could 
finance their growing requirements for imports from these sources. 
Accordingly, cuts could be made in concessional aid from the United 
States without placing their development programmes in jeopardy.
The American balance of payments problem became increasingly 
severe over the period reviewed. This weakened support for aid, for 
in spite of measures to tie aid to procurement of American products, 
there was still a small leakage of dollars abroad, and there was a 
possibility that aid could displace commercial exports. There is evi­
dence of a considerable measure of concern with aid programmes on 
this account, both within the executive (most notably the Treasury) 
and in Congress.
Relations between the United States and some recipients deter­
iorated. Attacks by governments of less developed countries in U.S. 
policies, and expressions of ’anti-American’ sentiments within less 
developed countries appear to have become somewhat more frequent and 
hostile over the period under discussion. These apparently had some 
impact on Congressional decisions on foreign aid. Further, there was 
a marked deterioration in U.S. relations with some countries which 
had been important aid recipients in the early 1960s, and this contri 
buted to smaller aid allocations to the countries in question. Egypt 
and India are examples.
Finally, concessional economic aid was or became linked with 
other issues which were increasingly unpopular. Thus military assist 
ance was regarded with increasing disquiet by a number of liberal
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Congressmen and by liberal groups outside Congress. Economic 
assistance was also linked with the issue of American involvement 
in Indochina, and its popularity in Congress suffered accordingly.
IV
The final section of this concluding chapter will attempt to 
make some general statements concerning the factors which have affect­
ed the amount of economic aid provided to less developed countries 
by the United States. First, the level of aid has been influenced 
by the importance and scope"* of such foreign policy and defence object­
ives as promoting political stability abroad, influencing the policies 
of other governments, promoting a favourable image of the United 
States abroad, and strengthening the capacity of recipients to deal 
with military threats. When these considerations became of paramount 
importance prior to and during the Second World War, the level of 
economic aid rose sharply. Increased concern with the danger of radi­
cal movements in less developed countries, and with the influence 
that communist powers might gain through their aid programmes was also 
an important factor in the growth of concessional economic aid between 
1948 and 1966. Again, decreased emphasis on ’cold war’ objectives 
between 1966 and 1973 was a significant factor in the decline of aid.
The level of aid has also been affected by the degree of Ameri­
can interest in disposing of surplus products abroad, or in developing 
markets. Interest in adding to the markets for American products 
was, of course, an important factor in the expansion of Eximbank oper­
ations in less developed countries. Concern with the possibility of 
inadequate demand in the post war period contributed to the intro­
duction of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, for
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these institutions were expected to increase the demand from abroad 
for American products. Again, the emergence of large stockpiles of 
surplus agricultural commodities gave rise to a programme of aid to 
dispose of them, while the decline in these stockpiles was an import­
ant cause of reduced shipments under these programmes.
Thirdly, the amount of aid provided has been influenced by 
policy makers’ assessments as to its effectiveness. Attitudes regard­
ing the effectiveness of aid as a means of influencing the policies 
of other governments and winning support from other countries have 
changed markedly over the period discussed in this dissertation.
During the early 1930s, it was generally assumed that aid would damage 
relations, giving rise to problems over the question of repayment, 
suspicion of American motives, and expressions of dissatisfaction 
from governments not favoured. By the late 1930s, that attitude of 
many policy makers had changed (though there remained a number of 
sceptics), and aid was increasingly used as a means of promoting a 
favourable image of the United States abroad, and influencing events 
elsewhere. This contributed to the growth of aid. There were signs 
of increased disenchantment with aid on this score between 1966 and 
1973, and this appears to have been a factor in the decline of con­
cessional economic aid.
Attitudes concerning the effectiveness of aid as an instrument 
of economic development have also changed markedly, contributing to 
changes in the level of aid. At the height of optimism in the early 
1960s, it was possible for U.S. officials to argue that a decade of 
aid would suffice to eliminate poverty and achieve self sustained 
growth in large parts of the underdeveloped world. In the more scepti­
cal climate of the late 1960s, senior officials openly conceded that
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t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  w hich  a i d  c o u ld  make had  b e e n  o v e r - e s t i m a t e d ,  and 
some o f  t h o s e  who had  f o rm e r ly  s u p p o r t e d  t h e  programme i n  C ongress  
c o n c lu d e d  t h a t  i t  had  f a i l e d  to  b e n e f i t  th e  b u lk  o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  
i n  m ost  r e c i p i e n t  c o u n t r i e s .
F o u r th ,  t h e  amount o f  econom ic a i d  p r o v id e d  by t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  
t o  l e s s  d e v e lo p e d  c o u n t r i e s  h a s  b e e n  i n f l u e n c e d  by t h e i r  r e q u i r e m e n t s  
f o r  a i d .  B a lan ce  o f  paym ents  p ro b lem s  a r i s i n g  from more a m b i t io u s  
t a r g e t s  f o r  econom ic  g row th  and i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n ,  i n c r e a s e d  i n d e b t e d ­
n e s s ,  d e c l i n i n g  e x p o r t  r e v e n u e s ,  and re d u c e d  f lo w s  o f  p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l  
have  te n d e d  to  g e n e r a t e  p r e s s u r e  f o r  i n c r e a s e s  i n  A m erican  econom ic 
a i d .  T h i s  h a s  a l s o  o c c u r r e d  w i th  m a jo r  food  s h o r t a g e s  o r  w id e s p re a d  
d e s t r u c t i o n  i n  t h e  r e c i p i e n t .  These  f a c t o r s  w ere  im p o r t a n t  i n  the. 
em ergence  and g row th  o f  econom ic a i d .  R apid  g row th  i n  e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s  
an d  s h a r p  i n c r e a s e s  i n  p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l  f lo w s  a l s o  made p o s s i b l e  r e ­
d u c t i o n s  i n  t h e  amount o f  c o n c e s s i o n a l  A m erican econom ic  a i d  p ro v id e d  
t o  su ch  c o u n t r i e s  a s  Taiwan and B r a z i l .
F i f t h ,  t h e  l e v e l  o f  a i d  h a s  b e e n  i n f l u e n c e d  by t h e  c a p a c i t y  o f  
t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  t o  p r o v id e  i t .  C o n t in u ed  econom ic  g ro w th ,  e x p a n d in g  
gove rnm en t  r e v e n u e s ,  and r e d u c t i o n s  i n  a i d  t o  r e c i p i e n t s  o u t s i d e  th e  
T h i r d  W orld h av e  f a c i l i t a t e d  t h e  g row th  o f  a i d  to  l e s s  d e v e lo p e d  
c o u n t r i e s .  Even w i t h  t h e s e  t r e n d s ,  a i d  l e v e l s  h a v e  been  r e s t r i c t e d  
by  b u d g e ta r y  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  o r  even ( d u r in g  th e  Second World War) 
s h o r t a g e s  o f  t h e  c o m m o d it ie s  r e q u i r e d .  B a la n ce  o f  paym ents  d i f f i c u l ­
t i e s  h a v e  a l s o  had  an im p a c t  on t h e  l e v e l  o f  a i d .  P ro b lem s w i th  th e  
A m erican  b a l a n c e  o f  paym en ts  d u r in g  th e  l a t e  1950s and e a r l y  1960s 
d i d  n o t  p r e v e n t  i n c r e a s e s  i n  t h e  amount o f  a i d  p r o v i d e d ,  b u t  
l e d  p o l i c y  m akers t o  p r o g r e s s i v e l y  t i e  a i d  to  A m erican p r o d u c t s ,  
t h e r e b y  r e d u c i n g  t h e  r e a l  v a lu e  o f  e a ch  u n i t  o f  a id  t r a n s f e r r e d .
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Increasingly severe difficulties with the balance of payments was a 
factor in the decline of concessional aid between 1966 and 1973.
Sixth, the level of aid has been affected by the nature of re­
lations between the United States and recipient countries. Where 
there have been strong differences over foreign policy questions or 
over issues such as American property rights in the recipient, the 
amount of aid provided has tended to be relatively small. India and 
Egypt provide examples of countries where there have been significant 
changes in the level of aid because of improved or deteriorating re­
lations. In the case of Egypt, improved relations in the late 1950s 
helped to create a climate in which that country could emerge as a 
significant aid. recipient. Egypt received an average of $135 million/ 
year in concessional economic aid over 1962-65« However, relations 
again deteriorated, and the U.A.R. broke off relations with the United 
States in 1967. Egypt received no new aid commitments between fiscal 
1968 and 1971, and only insignificant amounts in 1972 and 1973.
Changes affecting the use of alternatives to economic aid have 
sometimes had an impact on the level of assistance. In the first 
part of the century, the American Government used a variety of techni­
ques (ranging from gunboat diplomacy to the institution of customs 
receiverships) in its efforts to impose political and economic stabi­
lity in Central America, or to Influence the policies of governments 
in that region. Use of these instruments helps to account for limited 
recourse to aid in this period. Again, a more sober assessment of 
the possibilities of trade liberalisation, 'hard1 loans and measures 
to encourage private capital contributed to the expansion of conces­
sional economic aid between 1948 and 1966.
Other factors have affected the domestic political climate for
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a i d ,  and a c c o r d i n g l y  have  i n f l u e n c e d  t h e  amount p r o v id e d .  I n c r e a s e d  
a c c e p ta n c e  o f  governm ent i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  and the  manner in  which a id  
was l i n k e d  w i th  o t h e r  i s s u e s  w i t h  b r o a d e r  s u p p o r t  f a c i l i t a t e d  t h e  
em erg en ce  o f  econom ic a i d  b e tw een  1933 and 1947. A g a in ,  one f a c t o r  
c o n t r i b u t i n g  to  t h e  d e c l i n e  o f  a id  o v e r  1966-73  was t h e  i n c r e a s i n g  
u n p o p u l a r i t y  o f  i s s u e s  w i th  w hich  i t  was l i n k e d  -  t h e  w ar i n  I n d o c h in a  
and A m erican  in v o lv e m e n t  i n  s u p p ly in g  arms to  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  u n d e r  
t h e  m i l i t a r y  a s s i s t a n c e  programme.
F i n a l l y ,  t h e r e  a p p e a r  to  have  b e e n  ch an g es  i n  t h e  m ea su re  o f  
s u p p o r t  among p o l i c y  m akers  and o t h e r s  i n  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t e s  f o r  t r a n s ­
f e r r i n g  a i d  s im p ly  on h u m a n i t a r i a n  g ro u n d s  -  a s  a means o f  r e l i e v i n g  
p o v e r t y  and d i s t r e s s  a b ro a d  a s  an end i n  i t s e l f .  W idesp read  d e v a s t ­
a t i o n  i n  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  a p p e a r s  t o  have  som etim es g iv e n  r i s e  to  a 
s i g n i f i c a n t  amount o f  s u p p o r t  f o r  a i d  on t h i s  g ro u n d .  T h is  seems to  
h av e  b een  a f a c t o r  i n  t h e  e x t e n s i o n  o f  r e l i e f  a id  d u r in g  and a f t e r  
t h e  Second W orld War, th o u g h  a number o f  o t h e r  m o t iv e s  w ere  a l s o  p r e s ­
e n t .  S to n e  h a s  a rg u e d  t h a t  i n c r e a s e d  a c c e p t a n c e  by  governm en ts  o f  
t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  m a i n t a i n  minimum l i v i n g  s t a n d a r d s  f o r  a l l  t h e i r  
c i t i z e n s ,  and t h e  p a r t i a l  d i f f u s i o n  o f  t h i s  d o m e s t ic  ’p r i n c i p l e  o f  
j u s t i c e ’ to  t h e  p o o r e r  r e g i o n s  o f  t h e  w o r ld ,  h a s  b e e n  t h e  dom inan t 
f a c t o r  b e h in d  t h e  g row th  o f  a i d  from  r i c h  c o u n t r i e s .  But i t  h a s  b een  
a rg u e d  i n  t h i s  d i s s e r t a t i o n  t h a t  t h i s  was a t  b e s t  a weak f a c t o r  i n  
t h e  e x p a n s io n  o f  A m erican  econom ic a id  to  l e s s  d e v e lo p e d  c o u n t r i e s .
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FOOTNOTES
1 .  I n  t h i s  e h a p t e r ,  d a t a  an d  e v i d e n c e  a r e  n o t  d o c u m e n te d  
a s  a  r u l e .  F u l l  d e t a i l s  c a n  b e  fo u n d  i n  t h e  r e l e v a n t  
c h a p t e r  o f  t h e  d i s s e r t a t i o n .
2 .  A c c o r d in g  t o  G a r d n e r ,  R o o s e v e l t  d e s c r i b e d  e a r l y  p l a n s  
f o r  t h e  W orld  Bank an d  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  M o n e ta ry  Fund a s  
" a  New D e a l  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e c o n o m i c s " .  L .  G a r d n e r ,  
o p . c i t . ,  p .  285 .
3 .  Use o f  t h e  w ord  ’ d i s e n c h a n t m e n t ’ i s  n o t  i n t e n d e d  t o  co n v ey
t h e  i m p r e s s i o n  t h a t  t h e r e  h a d  e v e r  b e e n  w i l d  e n t h u s i a s m  
f o r  a i d  i n  C o n g r e s s :  m e r e l y  t h a t  t h e r e  was a  l o s s  o f
s u p p o r t .
4 .  T he l i n k  b e tw e e n  ec o n o m ic  a n d  m i l i t a r y  a i d  s t i l l  h e l p e d  
t o  a t t r a c t  some s u p p o r t  f ro m  c o n s e r v a t i v e s .
5 .  An o b j e c t i v e  i n c r e a s e s  i n  s c o p e  i f  i t  a p p l i e s  t o  a  l a r g e r  
nu m b er  o f  c o u n t r i e s .
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